The Experts below are selected from a list of 114 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Frank Yeong-sung Lin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Maximization of multi-round Network survivability under considerations of the Defender's defensive messaging strategies
Proceedings - 2013 International Conference on MOBILe Wireless MiddleWARE Operating Systems and Applications Mobilware 2013, 2013Co-Authors: Pei Yu Chen, I. Ju Shih, Frank Yeong-sung LinAbstract:Nowadays, enterprises face many challenges of cyber security. How to efficiently allocate defensive resources to reduce damages which are caused by cyber attackers and evaluate system survivability to keeping services operating became important issues. Hence, we develop a scenario of that both cyber attacker and Network Defender are with incompletely understanding the information about each other is considered. We conduct a mathematical model for analyze this problem for the decision makers to resolve these dilemmas. The Average DOD is then applied to evaluate damage degree of Network to estimate all possible strategies which both cyber attacker and Network Defender would take. Moreover, Network Defender could release message which might be doing nothing at all, truth, secrecy or deception to confuse cyber attacker to achieve better defense efficiency. In the process of problem solving, the "gradient method" and "game theory" would be used to obtain the optimal resource allocation strategies for both cyber attacker and Network Defender.
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MOBILWARE - Maximization of Multi-Round Network Survivability under Considerations of the Defender's Defensive Messaging Strategies
2013 International Conference on MOBILe Wireless MiddleWARE Operating Systems and Applications, 2013Co-Authors: Pei Yu Chen, I. Ju Shih, Frank Yeong-sung LinAbstract:Nowadays, enterprises face many challenges of cyber security. How to efficiently allocate defensive resources to reduce damages which are caused by cyber attackers and evaluate system survivability to keeping services operating became important issues. Hence, we develop a scenario of that both cyber attacker and Network Defender are with incompletely understanding the information about each other is considered. We conduct a mathematical model for analyze this problem for the decision makers to resolve these dilemmas. The Average DOD is then applied to evaluate damage degree of Network to estimate all possible strategies which both cyber attacker and Network Defender would take. Moreover, Network Defender could release message which might be doing nothing at all, truth, secrecy or deception to confuse cyber attacker to achieve better defense efficiency. In the process of problem solving, the "gradient method" and "game theory" would be used to obtain the optimal resource allocation strategies for both cyber attacker and Network Defender.
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Recovery and Resource Allocation Strategies to Maximize Mobile Network Survivability by Using Game Theories and Optimization Techniques
Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2013Co-Authors: Pei Yu Chen, Frank Yeong-sung LinAbstract:With more and more mobile device users, an increasingly important and critical issue is how to efficiently evaluate mobile Network survivability. In this paper, a novel metric called Average Degree of Disconnectivity (Average DOD) is proposed, in which the concept of probability is calculated by the contest success function. The DOD metric is used to evaluate the damage degree of the Network, where the larger the value of the Average DOD, the more the damage degree of the Network. A multiround Network attack-defense scenario as a mathematical model is used to support Network operators to predict all the strategies both cyber attacker and Network Defender would likely take. In addition, the Average DOD would be used to evaluate the damage degree of the Network. In each round, the attacker could use the attack resources to launch attacks on the nodes of the target Network. Meanwhile, the Network Defender could reallocate its existing resources to recover compromised nodes and allocate defense resources to protect the survival nodes of the Network. In the approach to solving this problem, the “gradient method” and “game theory” are adopted to find the optimal resource allocation strategies for both the cyber attacker and mobile Network Defender.
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DCAI - Resource Allocation Strategies to Maximize Network Survivability Considering of Average DOD
Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, 2012Co-Authors: Frank Yeong-sung Lin, Pei Yu Chen, Quen Ting ChenAbstract:In this paper, an innovative metric called Average Degree of Disconnectivity (Average DOD) is proposed. The Average DOD combining the concept of the probability calculated by contest success function with the DOD metric would be used to evaluate the damage degree of Network. The larger value of the Average DOD, the more damage degree of the Network would be. An attack-defense scenario as a mathematical model would be used to support Network operators to predict that all the likelihood strategies both cyber attacker and Network Defender would take. The attacker could use the attack resources to launch attack on the nodes of Network. On the other hand, the Network Defender allocates existed resources of Defender to protect survival nodes of Network. In the process of problem solving, the “gradient method” and “game theory” would be adopted to find the optimal resource allocation strategies for both cyber attacker and Network Defender.
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IEA/AIE - Near-Optimal evaluation of Network survivability under multi-stage attacks
Advanced Research in Applied Artificial Intelligence, 2012Co-Authors: Frank Yeong-sung Lin, Pei Yu Chen, Quen Ting ChenAbstract:In this paper, a multi-stage attack-defense model is proposed. We consider cyber attackers and Network Defenders with complete understanding of the information about each other. In general, in the strategic interaction between cyber attackers and Network Defenders, both parties repeatedly interact with each other. These interactions should thus not be one-stage but multi-stage. From the Network Defenders' view, this model is used to support Network operators and to predict all the likely strategies used by both cyber attacker and Network Defender. As a result, the Average Degree of Disconnectivity (Average DOD) is provided as a survivability metric for evaluating the residual Network after malicious attacks. To solve the problem, a gradient method and game theory is adopted to find the optimal resource allocation strategies for both cyber attackers and Network Defenders.
Quanyan Zhu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Dynamic Game Approach to Strategic Design of Secure and Resilient Infrastructure Network
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2020Co-Authors: Juntao Chen, Corinne Touati, Quanyan ZhuAbstract:Infrastructure Networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient Networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure Network designer is to keep the Network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the Network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the Network Defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. We further investigate the resilience planning of the Defender and the strategic timing of attack of the adversary. Finally, we use case studies of UAV-enabled communication Networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
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A Dynamic Game Analysis and Design of Infrastructure Network Protection and Recovery
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 2017Co-Authors: Juntao Chen, Corinne Touati, Quanyan ZhuAbstract:Infrastructure Networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient Networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure Network designer is to keep the Network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the Network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the Network Defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication Networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
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a dynamic game analysis and design of infrastructure Network protection and recovery 125
Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems, 2017Co-Authors: Juntao Chen, Corinne Touati, Quanyan ZhuAbstract:Infrastructure Networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient Networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure Network designer is to keep the Network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the Network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the Network Defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication Networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
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Interdependent strategic cyber defense and robust switching control design for wind energy systems
2017 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting, 2017Co-Authors: Juntao Chen, Quanyan ZhuAbstract:In this paper, we design a secure, robust and resilient cyber-physical wind energy system (WES) from a cross-layer perspective. We establish a system-of-systems framework for the large-scale wind farm which includes the cyber and physical components. For the cyber layer, we use a game-theoretic model to capture the strategic behaviors of the Network Defender and the cyber attacker, and compute its mixed strategy Nash equilibria. For the physical layer, we design a robust and resilient switching controller using a Markov jump linear system model. Due to the interdependence between the cyber and physical systems, their performances are coupled and need to be designed in a holistic manner. To address this challenge, we propose an iterative algorithm to study the system-of-systems performance under the equilibrium design which jointly takes the cyber and physical layers into account. Case studies are provided to illustrate the interdependent design principles of cyber-physical WES.
Pei Yu Chen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Maximization of multi-round Network survivability under considerations of the Defender's defensive messaging strategies
Proceedings - 2013 International Conference on MOBILe Wireless MiddleWARE Operating Systems and Applications Mobilware 2013, 2013Co-Authors: Pei Yu Chen, I. Ju Shih, Frank Yeong-sung LinAbstract:Nowadays, enterprises face many challenges of cyber security. How to efficiently allocate defensive resources to reduce damages which are caused by cyber attackers and evaluate system survivability to keeping services operating became important issues. Hence, we develop a scenario of that both cyber attacker and Network Defender are with incompletely understanding the information about each other is considered. We conduct a mathematical model for analyze this problem for the decision makers to resolve these dilemmas. The Average DOD is then applied to evaluate damage degree of Network to estimate all possible strategies which both cyber attacker and Network Defender would take. Moreover, Network Defender could release message which might be doing nothing at all, truth, secrecy or deception to confuse cyber attacker to achieve better defense efficiency. In the process of problem solving, the "gradient method" and "game theory" would be used to obtain the optimal resource allocation strategies for both cyber attacker and Network Defender.
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MOBILWARE - Maximization of Multi-Round Network Survivability under Considerations of the Defender's Defensive Messaging Strategies
2013 International Conference on MOBILe Wireless MiddleWARE Operating Systems and Applications, 2013Co-Authors: Pei Yu Chen, I. Ju Shih, Frank Yeong-sung LinAbstract:Nowadays, enterprises face many challenges of cyber security. How to efficiently allocate defensive resources to reduce damages which are caused by cyber attackers and evaluate system survivability to keeping services operating became important issues. Hence, we develop a scenario of that both cyber attacker and Network Defender are with incompletely understanding the information about each other is considered. We conduct a mathematical model for analyze this problem for the decision makers to resolve these dilemmas. The Average DOD is then applied to evaluate damage degree of Network to estimate all possible strategies which both cyber attacker and Network Defender would take. Moreover, Network Defender could release message which might be doing nothing at all, truth, secrecy or deception to confuse cyber attacker to achieve better defense efficiency. In the process of problem solving, the "gradient method" and "game theory" would be used to obtain the optimal resource allocation strategies for both cyber attacker and Network Defender.
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Recovery and Resource Allocation Strategies to Maximize Mobile Network Survivability by Using Game Theories and Optimization Techniques
Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2013Co-Authors: Pei Yu Chen, Frank Yeong-sung LinAbstract:With more and more mobile device users, an increasingly important and critical issue is how to efficiently evaluate mobile Network survivability. In this paper, a novel metric called Average Degree of Disconnectivity (Average DOD) is proposed, in which the concept of probability is calculated by the contest success function. The DOD metric is used to evaluate the damage degree of the Network, where the larger the value of the Average DOD, the more the damage degree of the Network. A multiround Network attack-defense scenario as a mathematical model is used to support Network operators to predict all the strategies both cyber attacker and Network Defender would likely take. In addition, the Average DOD would be used to evaluate the damage degree of the Network. In each round, the attacker could use the attack resources to launch attacks on the nodes of the target Network. Meanwhile, the Network Defender could reallocate its existing resources to recover compromised nodes and allocate defense resources to protect the survival nodes of the Network. In the approach to solving this problem, the “gradient method” and “game theory” are adopted to find the optimal resource allocation strategies for both the cyber attacker and mobile Network Defender.
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DCAI - Resource Allocation Strategies to Maximize Network Survivability Considering of Average DOD
Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, 2012Co-Authors: Frank Yeong-sung Lin, Pei Yu Chen, Quen Ting ChenAbstract:In this paper, an innovative metric called Average Degree of Disconnectivity (Average DOD) is proposed. The Average DOD combining the concept of the probability calculated by contest success function with the DOD metric would be used to evaluate the damage degree of Network. The larger value of the Average DOD, the more damage degree of the Network would be. An attack-defense scenario as a mathematical model would be used to support Network operators to predict that all the likelihood strategies both cyber attacker and Network Defender would take. The attacker could use the attack resources to launch attack on the nodes of Network. On the other hand, the Network Defender allocates existed resources of Defender to protect survival nodes of Network. In the process of problem solving, the “gradient method” and “game theory” would be adopted to find the optimal resource allocation strategies for both cyber attacker and Network Defender.
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IEA/AIE - Near-Optimal evaluation of Network survivability under multi-stage attacks
Advanced Research in Applied Artificial Intelligence, 2012Co-Authors: Frank Yeong-sung Lin, Pei Yu Chen, Quen Ting ChenAbstract:In this paper, a multi-stage attack-defense model is proposed. We consider cyber attackers and Network Defenders with complete understanding of the information about each other. In general, in the strategic interaction between cyber attackers and Network Defenders, both parties repeatedly interact with each other. These interactions should thus not be one-stage but multi-stage. From the Network Defenders' view, this model is used to support Network operators and to predict all the likely strategies used by both cyber attacker and Network Defender. As a result, the Average Degree of Disconnectivity (Average DOD) is provided as a survivability metric for evaluating the residual Network after malicious attacks. To solve the problem, a gradient method and game theory is adopted to find the optimal resource allocation strategies for both cyber attackers and Network Defenders.
Juntao Chen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Dynamic Game Approach to Strategic Design of Secure and Resilient Infrastructure Network
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2020Co-Authors: Juntao Chen, Corinne Touati, Quanyan ZhuAbstract:Infrastructure Networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient Networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure Network designer is to keep the Network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the Network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the Network Defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. We further investigate the resilience planning of the Defender and the strategic timing of attack of the adversary. Finally, we use case studies of UAV-enabled communication Networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
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A Dynamic Game Analysis and Design of Infrastructure Network Protection and Recovery
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 2017Co-Authors: Juntao Chen, Corinne Touati, Quanyan ZhuAbstract:Infrastructure Networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient Networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure Network designer is to keep the Network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the Network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the Network Defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication Networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
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a dynamic game analysis and design of infrastructure Network protection and recovery 125
Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems, 2017Co-Authors: Juntao Chen, Corinne Touati, Quanyan ZhuAbstract:Infrastructure Networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient Networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure Network designer is to keep the Network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the Network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the Network Defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication Networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
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Interdependent strategic cyber defense and robust switching control design for wind energy systems
2017 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting, 2017Co-Authors: Juntao Chen, Quanyan ZhuAbstract:In this paper, we design a secure, robust and resilient cyber-physical wind energy system (WES) from a cross-layer perspective. We establish a system-of-systems framework for the large-scale wind farm which includes the cyber and physical components. For the cyber layer, we use a game-theoretic model to capture the strategic behaviors of the Network Defender and the cyber attacker, and compute its mixed strategy Nash equilibria. For the physical layer, we design a robust and resilient switching controller using a Markov jump linear system model. Due to the interdependence between the cyber and physical systems, their performances are coupled and need to be designed in a holistic manner. To address this challenge, we propose an iterative algorithm to study the system-of-systems performance under the equilibrium design which jointly takes the cyber and physical layers into account. Case studies are provided to illustrate the interdependent design principles of cyber-physical WES.
Corinne Touati - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Dynamic Game Approach to Strategic Design of Secure and Resilient Infrastructure Network
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2020Co-Authors: Juntao Chen, Corinne Touati, Quanyan ZhuAbstract:Infrastructure Networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient Networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure Network designer is to keep the Network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the Network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the Network Defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. We further investigate the resilience planning of the Defender and the strategic timing of attack of the adversary. Finally, we use case studies of UAV-enabled communication Networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
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A Dynamic Game Analysis and Design of Infrastructure Network Protection and Recovery
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 2017Co-Authors: Juntao Chen, Corinne Touati, Quanyan ZhuAbstract:Infrastructure Networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient Networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure Network designer is to keep the Network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the Network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the Network Defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication Networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
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a dynamic game analysis and design of infrastructure Network protection and recovery 125
Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems, 2017Co-Authors: Juntao Chen, Corinne Touati, Quanyan ZhuAbstract:Infrastructure Networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient Networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure Network designer is to keep the Network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the Network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the Network Defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication Networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.