The Experts below are selected from a list of 312 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Tomomi Tanaka - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Price Controls, Non-Price Quality Competition, and the Nonexistence of Competitive Equilibrium
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2016
    Co-Authors: John William Hatfield, Charles R. Plott, Tomomi Tanaka
    Abstract:

    We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time, double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities. When price controls exist, the existence of competitive equilibria is no longer guaranteed; hence, we investigate the nature of Non-Price Competition and how markets might evolve in its presence. We develop a quality Competition model based on matching theory. Equilibria of the quality Competition model always exist in such price-constrained markets; moreover, they naturally correspond to competitive equilibria when competitive equilibria exist. Additionally, we characterize the set of equilibria of the quality Competition model in the presence of price restrictions. In a series of experiments, we find that market outcomes closely conform to the predictions of the model. In particular, price controls induce Non-Price Competition between agents both in theory and in the experimental environment; market behaviors result in allocations close to the predictions of the model.

  • Price Controls, Non-Price Quality Competition, and the Nonexistence of Competitive Equilibrium
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
    Co-Authors: John William Hatfield, Charles R. Plott, Tomomi Tanaka
    Abstract:

    We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time, double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities. When price controls exist, the existence of competitive equilibria (the solution concept of classical market theory) is no longer guaranteed; hence, we investigate the nature of Non-Price Competition and how markets might evolve in its presence. We develop a quality Competition model based on matching theory. Equilibria of the quality Competition model always exist in such price-constrained markets; moreover, they naturally correspond to competitive equilibria when competitive equilibria exist. Additionally, we characterize the set of equilibria of the quality Competition model in the presence of price restrictions. In a series of experiments, we find that market outcomes closely conform to the predictions of the model. In particular, price controls induce Non-Price Competition between agents both in theory and in the experimental environment; market behaviors result in allocations close to the predictions of the model.

  • understanding price controls and nonprice Competition with matching theory
    The American Economic Review, 2012
    Co-Authors: John William Hatfield, Charles R. Plott, Tomomi Tanaka
    Abstract:

    We develop a quality Competition model to understand how price controls affect market outcomes in buyer-seller markets with discrete goods of varying quality. While competitive equilibria do not necessarily exist in such markets when price controls are imposed, we show that stable outcomes do exist and characterize the set of stable outcomes in the presence of price restrictions. In particular, we show that price controls induce Non-Price Competition: price floors induce the trade of inefficiently high quality goods, while price ceilings induce the trade of inefficiently low quality goods.

  • Understanding Price Controls and Non-Price Competition with Matching Theory
    2012
    Co-Authors: John William Hatfield, Charles R. Plott, Tomomi Tanaka
    Abstract:

    We develop a quality Competition model to understand how price controls affect market outcomes in buyer-seller markets with discrete goods of varying quality. While competitive equilibria do not necessarily exist in such markets when price controls are imposed, we show that stable outcomes do exist and characterize the set of stable outcomes in the presence of price restrictions. In particular, we show that price controls induce Non-Price Competition: price floors induce the trade of inefficiently high quality goods, while price ceilings induce the trade of inefficiently low quality goods.

Hamed Markazi Moghadam - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Price and Non-Price Competition in an oligopoly: an analysis of relative payoff maximizers
    Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2019
    Co-Authors: Hamed Markazi Moghadam
    Abstract:

    Do firms that engage in relative payoff maximizing (RPM) behavior always choose a strategy profile that results in tougher Competition compared to firms that engage in absolute payoff maximizing (APM) behavior? We address this question by way of a simple model of symmetric oligopoly where firms simultaneously select a two-dimensional strategy set consisting of a price variable and a Non-Price (i.e., quality) variable. Our results show that equilibrium solutions of RPM and APM are distinct. It is further shown that the standard result of Nash equilibrium in oligopoly, namely, that the Non-Price variable is used to soften price Competition, survives also when firms are concerned with relative payoff considerations.

  • Price and Non-Price Competition in an oligopoly: an analysis of relative payoff maximizers
    Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2019
    Co-Authors: Hamed Markazi Moghadam
    Abstract:

    Wahlen Firmen, die ihre relativen Profite maximieren (RPM), immer ein Strategieprofil, das zu harterem Wettbewerb fuhrt, im Vergleich zu Firmen, die ihre absoluten Profite maximieren (APM)? In diesem Aufsatz werden wir diese Frage durch ein einfaches, symmetrisches Oligopol-Modell beleuchten, wo Firmen gleichzeitig eine zwei-dimensionale Strategie wahlen, bestehend aus einer Preis- und einer nicht-Preis-Variable, die wir als Qualitat bezeichnen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Gleichgewichtslosungen fur RPM und APM unterschiedlich sind. Desweiteren charakterisieren wir den Unterschied zwischen diesen beiden Gleichgewichten. Insbesondere fuhrt RPM nicht immer zu harterem Wettbewerb im Vergleich zum Nash-Gleichgewicht (APM). In der Tat wird der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Gleichgewichtskonzepten durch die Parameter der Nachfragekurve und der Kostenfunktion beeinflusst. Die in diesem Aufsatz abgeleiteten Voraussetzungen legen fest, unter welchen Umstanden RPM mehr oder weniger Wettbewerb in Bezug auf die Preis- oder nicht-Preis-Dimension induziert.

  • Price and Non-Price Competition in oligopoly: An analysis of relative payoff maximizers
    Research Papers in Economics, 2015
    Co-Authors: Hamed Markazi Moghadam
    Abstract:

    Do firms under relative payoffs maximizing (RPM) behavior always choose a strategy profile that results in tougher Competition compared to firms under absolute payoffs maximizing (APM) behavior? In this paper we will address this issue through a simple model of symmetric oligopoly where firms select a two dimensional strategy set of price and a Non-Price variable known as quality simultaneously. In conclusion, our results show that equilibrium solutions of RPM and APM are distinct. We further characterize the comparison between these two equilibrium concepts. In particular, RPM does not always lead to stricter Competition compared to the Nash equilbrium (APM). In fact, the comparison between two equilibrium concepts is influenced by the parameters of demand curve and cost function. The conditions, derived in this paper, determine under which circumstances RPM induces more Competition or less Competition w.r.t the price or Non-Price dimension.

  • Price and Non-Price Competition in Oligopoly – An Analysis of Relative Payoff Maximizers
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
    Co-Authors: Hamed Markazi Moghadam
    Abstract:

    Do firms under relative payoff s maximizing (RPM) behavior always choose a strategy profile that results in tougher Competition compared to firms under absolute payoffs maximizing (APM) behavior? In this paper we will address this issue through a simple model of symmetric oligopoly where firms select a two dimensional strategy set of price and a Non-Price variable known as quality simultaneously. In conclusion, our results show that equilibrium solutions of RPM and APM are distinct. We further characterize the comparison between these two equilibrium concepts. In particular, RPM does not always lead to stricter Competition compared to the Nash equilbrium (APM). In fact, the comparison between two equilibrium concepts is influenced by the parameters of demand curve and cost function. The conditions, derived in this paper, determine under which circumstances RPM induces more Competition or less Competition w.r.t the price or Non-Price dimension.

John William Hatfield - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Price Controls, Non-Price Quality Competition, and the Nonexistence of Competitive Equilibrium
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2016
    Co-Authors: John William Hatfield, Charles R. Plott, Tomomi Tanaka
    Abstract:

    We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time, double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities. When price controls exist, the existence of competitive equilibria is no longer guaranteed; hence, we investigate the nature of Non-Price Competition and how markets might evolve in its presence. We develop a quality Competition model based on matching theory. Equilibria of the quality Competition model always exist in such price-constrained markets; moreover, they naturally correspond to competitive equilibria when competitive equilibria exist. Additionally, we characterize the set of equilibria of the quality Competition model in the presence of price restrictions. In a series of experiments, we find that market outcomes closely conform to the predictions of the model. In particular, price controls induce Non-Price Competition between agents both in theory and in the experimental environment; market behaviors result in allocations close to the predictions of the model.

  • Price Controls, Non-Price Quality Competition, and the Nonexistence of Competitive Equilibrium
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
    Co-Authors: John William Hatfield, Charles R. Plott, Tomomi Tanaka
    Abstract:

    We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time, double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities. When price controls exist, the existence of competitive equilibria (the solution concept of classical market theory) is no longer guaranteed; hence, we investigate the nature of Non-Price Competition and how markets might evolve in its presence. We develop a quality Competition model based on matching theory. Equilibria of the quality Competition model always exist in such price-constrained markets; moreover, they naturally correspond to competitive equilibria when competitive equilibria exist. Additionally, we characterize the set of equilibria of the quality Competition model in the presence of price restrictions. In a series of experiments, we find that market outcomes closely conform to the predictions of the model. In particular, price controls induce Non-Price Competition between agents both in theory and in the experimental environment; market behaviors result in allocations close to the predictions of the model.

  • understanding price controls and nonprice Competition with matching theory
    The American Economic Review, 2012
    Co-Authors: John William Hatfield, Charles R. Plott, Tomomi Tanaka
    Abstract:

    We develop a quality Competition model to understand how price controls affect market outcomes in buyer-seller markets with discrete goods of varying quality. While competitive equilibria do not necessarily exist in such markets when price controls are imposed, we show that stable outcomes do exist and characterize the set of stable outcomes in the presence of price restrictions. In particular, we show that price controls induce Non-Price Competition: price floors induce the trade of inefficiently high quality goods, while price ceilings induce the trade of inefficiently low quality goods.

  • Understanding Price Controls and Non-Price Competition with Matching Theory
    2012
    Co-Authors: John William Hatfield, Charles R. Plott, Tomomi Tanaka
    Abstract:

    We develop a quality Competition model to understand how price controls affect market outcomes in buyer-seller markets with discrete goods of varying quality. While competitive equilibria do not necessarily exist in such markets when price controls are imposed, we show that stable outcomes do exist and characterize the set of stable outcomes in the presence of price restrictions. In particular, we show that price controls induce Non-Price Competition: price floors induce the trade of inefficiently high quality goods, while price ceilings induce the trade of inefficiently low quality goods.

Danny Fernandes - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • retail strategies on the web price and non price Competition in the online book industry
    Journal of Industrial Economics, 2003
    Co-Authors: Karen Clay, Ramayya Krishnan, Eric Wolff, Danny Fernandes
    Abstract:

    Two conflicting predictions have emerged regarding the effect of low-cost information on price. The first states that all Internet retailers will charge the same low price for mass produced goods. The second states that Internet retailers will differentiate to avoid intense price Competition. Using data collected in April 1999 on the prices of 107 books in thirteen online and two physical bookstores, we find similar average prices online and in physical stores and substantial price dispersion online. Analysis of product differentiation yields no clear results. The substantial premium charged by Amazon provides indirect evidence of product differentiation. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

  • retail strategies on the web price and non price Competition in the online book industry
    2003
    Co-Authors: Karen Clay, Ramayya Krishnan, Eric Wolff, Danny Fernandes
    Abstract:

    Two conflicting predictions have emerged regarding the effect of low-cost information on price. The first states that all Internet retailers will charge the same low price for mass produced goods. The second states that Internet retailers will differentiate to avoid intense price Competition. Using data collected in April 1999 on the prices of 107 books in thirteen online and two physical bookstores, we find similar average prices online and in physical stores and substantial price dispersion online. Analysis of product differentiation yields no clear results. The substantial premium charged by Amazon provides indirect evidence of product differentiation.

  • Retail Strategies on the Web: Price and Non–price Competition in the Online Book Industry
    The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2003
    Co-Authors: Karen Clay, Ramayya Krishnan, Eric Wolff, Danny Fernandes
    Abstract:

    Two conflicting predictions have emerged regarding the effect of low–cost information on price. The first states that all Internet retailers will charge the same low price for mass produced goods. The second states that Internet retailers will differentiate to avoid intense price Competition. Using data collected in April 1999 on the prices of 107 books in thirteen online and two physical bookstores, we find similar average prices online and in physical stores and substantial price dispersion online. Analysis of product differentiation yields no clear results. The substantial premium charged by Amazon provides indirect evidence of product differentiation.

Karen Clay - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • retail strategies on the web price and non price Competition in the online book industry
    Journal of Industrial Economics, 2003
    Co-Authors: Karen Clay, Ramayya Krishnan, Eric Wolff, Danny Fernandes
    Abstract:

    Two conflicting predictions have emerged regarding the effect of low-cost information on price. The first states that all Internet retailers will charge the same low price for mass produced goods. The second states that Internet retailers will differentiate to avoid intense price Competition. Using data collected in April 1999 on the prices of 107 books in thirteen online and two physical bookstores, we find similar average prices online and in physical stores and substantial price dispersion online. Analysis of product differentiation yields no clear results. The substantial premium charged by Amazon provides indirect evidence of product differentiation. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

  • retail strategies on the web price and non price Competition in the online book industry
    2003
    Co-Authors: Karen Clay, Ramayya Krishnan, Eric Wolff, Danny Fernandes
    Abstract:

    Two conflicting predictions have emerged regarding the effect of low-cost information on price. The first states that all Internet retailers will charge the same low price for mass produced goods. The second states that Internet retailers will differentiate to avoid intense price Competition. Using data collected in April 1999 on the prices of 107 books in thirteen online and two physical bookstores, we find similar average prices online and in physical stores and substantial price dispersion online. Analysis of product differentiation yields no clear results. The substantial premium charged by Amazon provides indirect evidence of product differentiation.

  • Retail Strategies on the Web: Price and Non–price Competition in the Online Book Industry
    The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2003
    Co-Authors: Karen Clay, Ramayya Krishnan, Eric Wolff, Danny Fernandes
    Abstract:

    Two conflicting predictions have emerged regarding the effect of low–cost information on price. The first states that all Internet retailers will charge the same low price for mass produced goods. The second states that Internet retailers will differentiate to avoid intense price Competition. Using data collected in April 1999 on the prices of 107 books in thirteen online and two physical bookstores, we find similar average prices online and in physical stores and substantial price dispersion online. Analysis of product differentiation yields no clear results. The substantial premium charged by Amazon provides indirect evidence of product differentiation.