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Oriol Carbonell-nicolau - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Essential equilibrium in Normal-Form Games with perturbed actions and payoffs
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018Co-Authors: Oriol Carbonell-nicolau, Nathan WohlAbstract:Abstract A Nash equilibrium of a Normal-Form Game G is essential if it is robust to perturbations of G . A Game is essential if all of its Nash equilibria are essential. This paper provides conditions on the primitives of a (possibly) discontinuous Game that guarantee the generic existence of essential Games. Unlike the extant literature, the present analysis allows for perturbations of the players’ action spaces, in addition to the standard payoff perturbations.
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Further results on essential Nash equilibria in Normal-Form Games
Economic Theory, 2015Co-Authors: Oriol Carbonell-nicolauAbstract:A Nash equilibrium $$x$$ x of a Normal-Form Game $$G$$ G is essential if any perturbation of $$G$$ G has an equilibrium close to $$x$$ x . Using payoff perturbations, we identify a new collection of Games containing a dense, residual subset of Games whose Nash equilibria are all essential. This collection covers economic examples that cannot be handled by extant results and subsumes the sets of Games considered in the literature.
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On Essential Nash Equilibria in Normal-Form Games
Research Papers in Economics, 2012Co-Authors: Oriol Carbonell-nicolauAbstract:A Nash equilibrium x of a Normal-Form Game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we identify a new collection of Games containing a dense, residual subset of Games whose Nash equilibria are all essential. This collection subsumes the sets of Games considered in the literature. An economic Game illustrates our results.
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Essential equilibria in Normal-Form Games
Journal of Economic Theory, 2010Co-Authors: Oriol Carbonell-nicolauAbstract:A Nash equilibrium x of a Normal-Form Game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we show that for Games that are generic in the set of compact, quasiconcave, and generalized payoff secure Games with upper semicontinuous sum of payoffs, all equilibria are essential. Some variants of this result are also established.
Michal Ramsza - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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imagine self perspective taking and rational self interested behavior in a simple experimental normal form Game
Frontiers in Psychology, 2017Co-Authors: Adam Karbowski, Michal RamszaAbstract:The purpose of this study is to explore the link between imagine-self perspective-taking and rational self-interested behavior in experimental Normal-Form Games. Drawing on the concept of sympathy developed by Adam Smith and further literature on perspective taking in Games, we hypothesize that introduction of imagine-self perspective-taking by decision-makers promotes rational self-interested behavior in a simple experimental Normal-Form Game. In our study, we examined behavior of 404 undergraduate students in the two-person Game, in which the participant can suffer a monetary loss only if she plays her Nash equilibrium strategy and the opponent plays her dominated strategy. Results suggest that the threat of suffering monetary losses effectively discourages the participants from choosing Nash equilibrium strategy. In general, players may take into account that opponents choose dominated strategies due to specific not self-interested motivations or errors. However, adopting imagine-self perspective by the participants leads to more Nash equilibrium choices, perhaps by alleviating participants’ attributions of susceptibility to errors or non-self-interested motivation to the opponents.
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imagine self perspective taking and rational self interested behavior in a simple experimental normal form Game
EconStor Open Access Articles, 2017Co-Authors: Adam Karbowski, Michal RamszaAbstract:The purpose of this study is to explore the link between imagine-self perspective-taking and rational self-interested behavior in experimental Normal-Form Games. Drawing on the concept of sympathy developed by Adam Smith and further literature on perspective taking in Games, we hypothesize that introduction of imagine-self perspective-taking by decision-makers promotes rational self-interested behavior in a simple experimental Normal-Form Game. In our study, we examined behavior of 404 undergraduate students in the two-person Game, in which the participant can suffer a monetary loss only if she plays her Nash equilibrium strategy and the opponent plays her dominated strategy. Results suggest that the threat of suffering monetary losses effectively discourages the participants from choosing Nash equilibrium strategy. In Game theory terms, the participants may rationally take the possibility of playing dominated strategy by their opponents into account, because the dominated strategy can be played due to not full rationality of the opponents or their specific not self-interested motivation. However, adopting imagine-self perspective by the participants promotes their rational self-interested behavior (indicated by Nash equilibrium choices), perhaps by alleviating their attributions of a susceptibility to errors or a non-self-interested motivation to the opponents. The imagine-self-self-interest link is next postulated and succinctly discussed in the context of relevant psychological and economic literature.
Ana I. Saracho - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The supercore for Normal-Form Games
Journal of Economic Theory, 2007Co-Authors: Elena Inarra, Ma Concepción Larrea, Ana I. SarachoAbstract:Abstract This paper analyzes the supercore of a system derived from a Normal-Form Game. For the case of a finite Game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of Games and show that the supercore coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the last Game in that sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n -person prisoner's dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a Normal-Form Game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for Games with a finite number of Nash equilibria.
Shi-jim Yen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Revisiting Monte-Carlo Tree Search on a Normal Form Game: NoGo
2011Co-Authors: C.-w. Chou, Olivier Teytaud, Shi-jim YenAbstract:We revisit Monte-Carlo Tree Search on a recent Game, termed NoGo. Our goal is to check if known results in Computer-Go and various other Games are general enough for being applied directly on a new Game. We also test if the known limitations of Monte-Carlo Tree Search also hold in this case and which improvements of Monte-Carlo Tree Search are necessary for good performance and which have a minor effect. We also tested a generic Monte-Carlo simulator, designed for "no more moves" Games.
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EvoApplications (1) - Revisiting Monte-Carlo tree search on a normal form Game: NoGo
Applications of Evolutionary Computation, 2011Co-Authors: C.-w. Chou, Olivier Teytaud, Shi-jim YenAbstract:We revisitMonte-Carlo Tree Search on a recent Game, termed NoGo. Our goal is to check if known results in Computer-Go and various other Games are general enough for being applied directly on a new Game. We also test if the known limitations of Monte-Carlo Tree Search also hold in this case and which improvements of Monte-Carlo Tree Search are necessary for good performance and which have a minor effect. We also tested a generic Monte-Carlo simulator, designed for "no more moves" Games.
Andrew Mclennan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Imitation Games and Computation
Games and Economic Behavior, 2010Co-Authors: Andrew Mclennan, Rabee TourkyAbstract:An imitation Game is a finite two person normal form Game in which the two players have the same set of pure strategies and the goal of the second player is to choose the same pure strategy as the first player. Gale et al. (1950) gave a way of passing from a given two person Game to a symmetric Game whose symmetric Nash
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The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game
Econometrica, 2005Co-Authors: Andrew MclennanAbstract:Fix finite pure strategy sets S1,..., S,,, and let S = S, x... x S-n. In our model of a random Game the agents' payoffs are statistically independent, with each agent's payoff uniformly distributed on the unit sphere in R-A. For given nonempty T-1 subset of S-1,..., T-n subset of S-n we give a computationally implementable formula for the mean number of Nash equilibria in which each agent i's mixed strategy has support T-i. The formula is the product of two expressions. The first is the expected number of totally mixed equilibria for the truncated Game obtained by eliminating pure strategies outside the sets Ti. The second may be construed as the "probability" that such an equilibrium remains an equilibrium when the strategies in the sets S-i\T-i become available.
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From Imitation Games to Kakutani
2005Co-Authors: Andrew Mclennan, Rabee TourkyAbstract:We give a full proof of the Kakutani (1941) fixed point theorem that is brief, elementary, and based on Game theoretic concepts. This proof points to a new family of algorithms for computing approximate fixed points that have advantages over simplicial subdivision methods. An imitation Game is a finite two person normal form Game in which the strategy spaces for the two agents are the same and the goal of the second player is to choose the same strategy as the first player. These appear in our proof, but are also interesting from other points of view.
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The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game
1999Co-Authors: Andrew MclennanAbstract:We propose a model of a random normal Game for given (finite nonempty) sets of players and pure strategies; this model is shown to be canonical in a certain sense.
