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Joseph Raz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Normativity and the other
Social Science Research Network, 2021Co-Authors: Joseph RazAbstract:The paper examines some arguments for and against the view that practical reasons are subject to a participatory condition of some kind. The distinctive constitutive element of participatory conditions is that conduct or attitudes, actual or hypothetical, of people other than those who have a reason, expressing approval or the absence of disapproval of the reason in question, are a condition for the existence of practical reasons, or of large classes of them.
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Normativity the place of reasoning
Philosophical Issues, 2015Co-Authors: Joseph RazAbstract:It is more or less common ground that an important aspect of the explanation of Normativity relates it to the way Reason (our rational powers), reasons (for beliefs, emotions, actions, etc.) and reasoning, with all its varieties and domains, are inter-connected. The relation of reasoning to reasons is the topic of this this paper. It does not start from a tabula rasa. It presupposes that Normativity has to do with the ability to respond rationally to reasons, and with responding to reasons with the use of our rational powers. The question is where does reasoning fit in? I will compare two sketchy accounts of reasoning, judging their success in elucidating the concept and its role in the explanation of Normativity. First I outline the view that reasoning is an activity of searching for a justified answer or for a justification of the answer to a question. Some critical reflection on that view leads to what I call the simple account, which takes reasoning to consist (broadly speaking) in responsiveness to perceived reasons. I will illustrate ways in which the simple account is at odds with the concept of reasoning. Its merits depend on the thought that intentions, attempts or actions can be conclusions of reasoning. Those who affirm that possibility often regard reasoning that has such conclusions as practical reasoning. Hence much of the paper will be about practical reasoning. That would lead to a tentative endorsement of reasoning as a search for a justified answer, suggesting a different view of the place of reasoning in explaining Normativity.
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from Normativity to responsibility
2012Co-Authors: Joseph RazAbstract:1. The Hope PART ONE: REGARDING Normativity 2. Practical Reasons: Explanatory and Normative 3. Reasons: Practical and Adaptive 4. The Guise of the Good 5. Reason, Rationality & Normativity PART TWO: REGARDING PRACTICAL REASONING 6. Epistemic Modulations 7. Practical Reasoning 8. The Myth of Instrumental Rationality 9. Reasons in Conflict 10. Numbers: With and Without Contractualism 11. Promoting Value? PART THREE: ON RESPONSIBILITY 12. Being in the World 13. Responsibility and the Negligence Standard
Torben Spaak - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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legal positivism conventionalism and the Normativity of law
Jurisprudence, 2017Co-Authors: Torben SpaakAbstract:ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to see whether we can account for the Normativity of law within the framework of legal positivism and whether the idea of a social convention could be of help in ...
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legal positivism conventionalism and the Normativity of law
Jurisprudence, 2017Co-Authors: Torben SpaakAbstract:The aim of this article is to see whether we can account for the Normativity of law within the framework of legal positivism and whether the idea of a social convention could be of help in this end...
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legal positivism conventionalism and the Normativity of law
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Torben SpaakAbstract:The aim of this article is to investigate and see whether we can account for the Normativity of law within the framework of legal positivism and whether the idea of a social convention could be of help in this endeavor. As I shall explain, I do not believe that it is possible to offer such an account; and to illustrate the difficulties involved in trying to do so, I am going to consider the accounts of the Normativity of law proposed by three prominent jurisprudents, who all work in the tradition of legal positivism, namely, Hans Kelsen, Gerald Postema, and Andrei Marmor. I argue (A) that we need to distinguish carefully between (a) the problem of accounting for the Normativity of law, conceived as a necessary property of law, and (b) the problem of accounting for the use of normative legal language on the part of judges, attorneys, legal scholars, and others; (B) that the contemporary debate about the Normativity of law, which mainly concerns (a), is in substance, if not in form, more or less identical to the old debate between legal positivists and non-positivists; (C) that one simply cannot account for the Normativity of law, conceived along the lines of (a), within the framework of legal positivism, whether or not one invokes the idea of a social convention, and that the problem of the Normativity of law thus conceived and considered within the framework of legal positivism, is not an open, and therefore not a very interesting, legal-philosophical question; (D) that the important question for a legal positivist is whether a given legal order (or legal system) is in fact normative, in roughly the sense of justified (or authoritative) Normativity (a notion to be explained below), and that to determine whether this is so, one needs to consider the content and the administration of this legal order; and (E) that the idea of conditional Normativity, or Normativity from a point of view, although of considerable interest when discussing (b), is of little or no interest to those who are concerned with (a). As regards claim (C), I argue, more specifically, (C1) that Kelsen’s theory of the basic norm offers no solution to (a), because it offers nothing more than Normativity from a point of view, and that it is better understood as aiming to solve (b), (C2) that Gerald Postema’s coordination convention account, although in many ways a very fine account, cannot (as Postema is well aware of) generate obligations for the citizens, as distinguished from the legal officials, and (C3) that Andrei Marmor’s constitutive convention account, which capitalizes on the idea of conditional Normativity, does not and cannot take things further than Kelsen’s basic-norm account does. On route to establishing claims (A)-(E), I also argue (i) that when discussing (α), we should focus on the level of legal orders (legal systems), not on the level of individual legal norms, (ii) that the claim that law is necessarily normative is to be understood as the conceptual claim that necessarily, if x is a legal norm, x is normative, not as the essentialist claim that if x is a legal norm, x is necessarily normative, and (iii) that we should think of the concept of a legal ‘ought’ as having the function of connecting grounds (or conditions) and consequences in legal norms and of the import of the concept of ought (or, roughly, the meaning of the word ‘ought’) as being the same in different fields. Furthermore, I argue (iv) that we should distinguish between different grades (or degrees) of Normativity; (v) that the most interesting grade of Normativity when discussing (α) is what Joseph Raz has called justified Normativity; and (vi) that we may think of moral philosopher David Copp’s notion of authoritative Normativity as an illuminating specification of the somewhat loose idea of justified Normativity.
Daniel Whiting - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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what is the Normativity of meaning
Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 2016Co-Authors: Daniel WhitingAbstract:AbstractThere has been much debate over whether to accept the claim that meaning is normative. One obstacle to making progress in that debate is that it is not always clear what the claim amounts to. In this paper, I try to resolve a dispute between those who advance the claim concerning how it should be understood. More specifically, I critically examine two competing conceptions of the Normativity of meaning, rejecting one and defending the other. Though the paper aims to settle a dispute among proponents of the claim that meaning is normative, it should be of interest to those who challenge it. After all, before one takes aim, one’s target needs to be in clear view.
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the Normativity of belief
Analysis, 2014Co-Authors: Conor Mchugh, Daniel WhitingAbstract:This is a survey of recent debates concerning the Normativity of belief. We explain what the thesis that belief is normative involves, consider arguments for and against that thesis, and explore its bearing on debates in metaethics.
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the Normativity of meaning defended
Analysis, 2007Co-Authors: Daniel WhitingAbstract:Meaning, according to a significant number of philosophers, is an intrinsically normative notion.1 For this reason, it is suggested, meaning is not conducive to a naturalistic explanation. In this paper, I shall not address whether this is indeed so. Nor shall I present arguments in support of the Normativity thesis (see Glock 2005; Kripke 1982). Instead, I shall examine and respond to two forceful objections recently (and independently) raised against it by Boghossian (2005), Hattiangadi (2006) and Miller (2006). Although I shall argue that the objections are unsuccessful, they are worth attending to, not only because the Normativity thesis is so widely accepted and is thought to have such ramifications but, most importantly, because doing so offers the opportunity to help clarify how it is to be understood.
John Broome - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Normativity in reasoning
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2014Co-Authors: John BroomeAbstract:Reasoning is a process through which premise-attitudes give rise to a conclusion-attitude. When you reason actively you operate on the propositions that are the contents of your premise-attitudes, following a rule, to derive a new proposition that is the content of your conclusion-attitude. It may seem that, when you follow a rule, you must, at least implicitly, have the normative belief that you ought to comply with the rule, which guides you to comply. But I argue that to follow a rule is to manifest a particular sort of disposition, which can be interpreted as an intention. An intention is itself a guiding disposition. It can guide you to comply with a rule, and no normative belief is required.
Matthew S Bedke - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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might all Normativity be queer
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2010Co-Authors: Matthew S BedkeAbstract:Here I discuss the conceptual structure and core semantic commitments of reason-involving thought and discourse needed to underwrite the claim that ethical Normativity is not uniquely queer. This deflates a primary source of ethical scepticism and it vindicates so-called partner in crime arguments. When it comes to queerness objections, all reason-implicating normative claims—including those concerning Humean reasons to pursue one's ends, and epistemic reasons to form true beliefs—stand or fall together.
