The Experts below are selected from a list of 297 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Alexandre Debs - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation
International Security, 2014Co-Authors: Nuno P. Monteiro, Alexandre DebsAbstract:When do states acquire Nuclear weapons? To address this question, a strategic theory of Nuclear Proliferation must take into account the security goals of all of the key actors: the potential proli...
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The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013Co-Authors: Nuno P. Monteiro, Alexandre DebsAbstract:When do states acquire Nuclear weapons? This article introduces a strategic theory of Nuclear Proliferation that takes into account the security goals of all key actors: the potential proliferator, its adversaries, and, when present, its allies. In order to acquire Nuclear weapons, we argue, a state must possess both the willingness and the opportunity to proliferate. Willingness requires the presence of a grave security threat that is not covered by a reliable ally. Opportunity requires high relative power vis-a-vis the state’s adversaries or the protection of an ally. While relatively weak states without a powerful ally lack the opportunity to go Nuclear, those with a reliable ally that covers all their security goals lack the willingness to do so. Therefore, only powerful states or those protected by an ally that does not reliably cover some of their security goals will acquire the bomb. We evaluate our theory against all historical instances of Nuclear development and trace its logic in the Soviet, Iraqi, Pakistani, South Korean, and West German cases. We conclude with implications for the study of Proliferation and for U.S. non-Proliferation policy.
Nuno P. Monteiro - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation
International Security, 2014Co-Authors: Nuno P. Monteiro, Alexandre DebsAbstract:When do states acquire Nuclear weapons? To address this question, a strategic theory of Nuclear Proliferation must take into account the security goals of all of the key actors: the potential proli...
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The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013Co-Authors: Nuno P. Monteiro, Alexandre DebsAbstract:When do states acquire Nuclear weapons? This article introduces a strategic theory of Nuclear Proliferation that takes into account the security goals of all key actors: the potential proliferator, its adversaries, and, when present, its allies. In order to acquire Nuclear weapons, we argue, a state must possess both the willingness and the opportunity to proliferate. Willingness requires the presence of a grave security threat that is not covered by a reliable ally. Opportunity requires high relative power vis-a-vis the state’s adversaries or the protection of an ally. While relatively weak states without a powerful ally lack the opportunity to go Nuclear, those with a reliable ally that covers all their security goals lack the willingness to do so. Therefore, only powerful states or those protected by an ally that does not reliably cover some of their security goals will acquire the bomb. We evaluate our theory against all historical instances of Nuclear development and trace its logic in the Soviet, Iraqi, Pakistani, South Korean, and West German cases. We conclude with implications for the study of Proliferation and for U.S. non-Proliferation policy.
Michael Horowitz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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When Leaders Matter: Rebel Experience and Nuclear Proliferation
The Journal of Politics, 2015Co-Authors: Matthew Fuhrmann, Michael HorowitzAbstract:This article contributes to a growing literature on leaders in international politics by explaining why and how the background experiences of leaders influence Nuclear Proliferation. Given Nuclear weapons’ crucial role in world politics, examining the importance of leaders for Nuclear Proliferation represents a key development in research on leaders. We argue that leaders with a particular experience—participation in a rebellion against the state—are more likely than their nonrebel counterparts to pursue Nuclear weapons. Former rebels are aware of the contingency of their rule and more likely to value weapons that could bolster national independence. Drawing on a new dataset on leader participation in rebel activities, we analyze 1,342 leaders in office from 1945 to 2000. The results strongly support our theory, even when accounting for leader selection. Our findings underscore the value in using leaders—not just states—as a unit of analysis in international relations research.
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When Leaders Matter: Rebel Experience and Nuclear Proliferation
2012Co-Authors: Matthew Fuhrmann, Michael HorowitzAbstract:This paper contributes to a growing literature on leaders in international politics by explaining why and how the background experiences of leaders influence Nuclear Proliferation. Given Nuclear weapons' crucial role in world politics, examining the importance of leaders for Nuclear Proliferation represents a key development in research on leaders. We argue that leaders with a particular experience -- participation in an armed rebellion against the state -- are more likely than their non-rebel counterparts to pursue Nuclear weapons. Former rebels are aware of the contingency of their rule and more likely to value weapons that could bolster national independence. Drawing on a new dataset on leader participation in rebel activities, we analyze 1,322 leaders in office from 1945 to 2000. The results strongly support our theory, even when accounting for leader selection. Our findings underscore the value in using leaders -- not just states -- as a unit of analysis in international relations research.
K. P. O'reilly - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Leaders' Perceptions and Nuclear Proliferation: A Political Psychology Approach to Proliferation
Political Psychology, 2012Co-Authors: K. P. O'reillyAbstract:Contributing to an emerging scholarship emphasizing ideational approaches for understanding Nuclear Proliferation, this work offers a new analytical framework focusing on leaders' perceptions about the international system and how their “perceived strategic context” may influence the decision of “going Nuclear.” Rather than being an inevitable occurrence driven by abstract systemic factors, like the security dilemma, this actor-specific, ideational approach offers a narrative depicting the fundamental role played by policy makers' perceptions about the international environment in which their Proliferation decisions are made. Utilizing operational code analysis, leaders' unique perceived strategic contexts are identified and expectant strategies for self and other analyzed by using the theory of moves sequential game construct. Initial testing of the framework is performed by examining the debated Nuclear Proliferation cases of South Africa and India. The results highlight the important role of individuals' views concerning the strategic environment they inhabit when weighing Proliferation decisions.
Matthew Fuhrmann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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When Leaders Matter: Rebel Experience and Nuclear Proliferation
The Journal of Politics, 2015Co-Authors: Matthew Fuhrmann, Michael HorowitzAbstract:This article contributes to a growing literature on leaders in international politics by explaining why and how the background experiences of leaders influence Nuclear Proliferation. Given Nuclear weapons’ crucial role in world politics, examining the importance of leaders for Nuclear Proliferation represents a key development in research on leaders. We argue that leaders with a particular experience—participation in a rebellion against the state—are more likely than their nonrebel counterparts to pursue Nuclear weapons. Former rebels are aware of the contingency of their rule and more likely to value weapons that could bolster national independence. Drawing on a new dataset on leader participation in rebel activities, we analyze 1,342 leaders in office from 1945 to 2000. The results strongly support our theory, even when accounting for leader selection. Our findings underscore the value in using leaders—not just states—as a unit of analysis in international relations research.
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When Leaders Matter: Rebel Experience and Nuclear Proliferation
2012Co-Authors: Matthew Fuhrmann, Michael HorowitzAbstract:This paper contributes to a growing literature on leaders in international politics by explaining why and how the background experiences of leaders influence Nuclear Proliferation. Given Nuclear weapons' crucial role in world politics, examining the importance of leaders for Nuclear Proliferation represents a key development in research on leaders. We argue that leaders with a particular experience -- participation in an armed rebellion against the state -- are more likely than their non-rebel counterparts to pursue Nuclear weapons. Former rebels are aware of the contingency of their rule and more likely to value weapons that could bolster national independence. Drawing on a new dataset on leader participation in rebel activities, we analyze 1,322 leaders in office from 1945 to 2000. The results strongly support our theory, even when accounting for leader selection. Our findings underscore the value in using leaders -- not just states -- as a unit of analysis in international relations research.
