The Experts below are selected from a list of 19383 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
T. K. Das - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Determinants of Partner Opportunism in Strategic Alliances: A Conceptual Framework
Journal of Business and Psychology, 2010Co-Authors: T. K. Das, Noushi RahmanAbstract:Purpose We present a comprehensive framework of the key determinants of partner Opportunism in strategic alliances. Design/methodology/approach We propose an extended definition of partner Opportunism and three categories of the determinants of partner Opportunism based on a review of the literature. These categories comprise economic factors (equity involvement, asymmetric alliance-specific investments, mutual hostages, and payoff inequity), relational factors (cultural diversity and goal incompatibilities), and temporal factors (alliance horizon and pressures for quick results). Findings The framework of determinants makes clear how the various determinants of partner Opportunism may be differentially salient in the three major alliance types, namely, equity joint ventures, minority equity alliances, and nonequity alliances. Implications Based on the framework, a number of propositions are developed to facilitate empirical research on partner Opportunism. Managerial implications flowing from the proposed framework are also discussed. Originality/value Although scholars in various disciplines have studied the general topic of opportunistic behavior, our understanding of partner Opportunism in strategic alliances appears to be fragmented and inadequate. As partner Opportunism is acknowledged as a significant threat to alliance survival and success, a comprehensive framework of the key determinants of such Opportunism should improve our understanding of this phenomenon and to also provide an impetus for future research. The article also responds to the need of alliance managers for a framework of key factors that are responsible for partner Opportunism so that they may be able to deploy appropriate deterrence mechanisms to minimize opportunistic behaviors.
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Strategic Alliance Temporalities and Partner Opportunism
British Journal of Management, 2006Co-Authors: T. K. DasAbstract:The troubling potential for opportunistic behaviour in strategic alliances is acknowledged in both research and practice, and yet the antecedents of such Opportunism remain largely unexplored in the literature. In this article we suggest that the inherent temporalities of alliances play significant roles in partner Opportunism. We propose a model of potential partner Opportunism that assigns antecedent and contingent roles to the temporal horizons of alliances and the temporal orientations of the member firms. We introduce the notion of alliance horizons and suggest that they are constituted by the temporal orientations of the member firms and a number of common alliance formation factors. We also discuss how these alliance horizons in conjunction with the temporal orientations of member firms result in different levels of potential Opportunism. Lastly, we develop a number of propositions to facilitate empirical research on the temporal contingencies of partner Opportunism and indicate directions for further studies.
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Time‐span and risk of partner Opportunism in strategic alliances
Journal of Managerial Psychology, 2004Co-Authors: T. K. DasAbstract:The temporalities of Opportunism – a term that generally means “self‐interest seeking with guile” – have not been adequately examined in the literature. This article suggests that Opportunism is a variegated phenomenon that can be better appreciated by exploring the role of its temporal dimension. Adopting this temporal approach, the article proposes a framework of partner Opportunism in strategic alliances that incorporates the two fundamental dimensions of time and risk. It then discusses four types of partner Opportunism in this comprehensive time‐risk framework. Finally, the article indicates directions for further research.
Christopher W. Craighead - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The interplay of drivers and deterrents of Opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 2013Co-Authors: Qiong Wang, Julie Juan Li, William T. Ross, Christopher W. CraigheadAbstract:Fostering and maintaining buyer–supplier relationships is a fundamental premise of many channel initiatives. Indeed, these relationships may culminate in significant performance enhancements and competitive advantage. Yet these relationships may also result in competitively harmful events such as partner Opportunism. Despite this potential competitive erosion, there is a lack of studies examining the interplay between the drivers and deterrents of Opportunism. By building on transaction cost economics and social capital theory, we examine, via a sample of 400 manufacturing firms in China, how the interplay between drivers (relationship-specific investments and behavioral uncertainty) and deterrents (inter-firm social capital) of Opportunism affect partner Opportunism in buyer–supplier exchanges. The significance of this interplay between the drivers and deterrents sheds new light on how a firm can leverage social capital to curb the harmful effects of Opportunism.
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The Interplay of Drivers and Deterrents of Opportunism in Buyer-Supplier Relationships
2012Co-Authors: Qiong Wang, William T. Ross, Christopher W. CraigheadAbstract:Fostering and maintaining buyer–supplier relationships is a fundamental premise of many channel initiatives. Indeed, these relationships may culminate in significant performance enhancements and competitive advantage. Yet these relationships may also result in competitively harmful events such as partner Opportunism. Despite this potential competitive erosion, there is a lack of studies examining the interplay between the drivers and deterrents of Opportunism. By building on transaction cost economics and social capital theory, we examine, via a sample of 400 manufacturing firms in China, how the interplay between drivers (relationship-specific investments and behavioral uncertainty) and deterrents (inter-firm social capital) of Opportunism affect partner Opportunism in buyer-supplier exchanges. The significance of this interplay between the drivers and deterrents sheds new light on how a firm can leverage social capital to curb the harmful effects of Opportunism.
Kuoting Hung - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the interaction effect of relational norms and agent cooperativeness on Opportunism in buyer supplier relationships
Journal of Operations Management, 2010Co-Authors: Chanchai Tangpong, Kuoting HungAbstract:Abstract In this study, we examined the effect of relational norms and agent cooperativeness on Opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships. Drawing from the theoretical grounding of transaction cost economics, personality trait theory, and contingency theory, we proposed three distinct perspectives on Opportunism mitigation in buyer–supplier relationships: (1) organizationalist, (2) individualist, and (3) interactionist, where relational norms, agent cooperativeness, and the interaction between them, respectively, serve as the key predictors in these three perspectives. The results of replicated experiments indicated that relational norms and agent cooperativeness interact with each other in mitigating Opportunism and that the interactionist perspective yielded the highest explained variance in Opportunism. This suggests that the interactionist perspective, a multi-level theoretical lens encompassing the dynamic interplay between organization-level and individual-level factors, was a more complete model in explaining Opportunism than either the organizationalist or individualist perspectives. The consensus which emerged from post-experimental interviews of purchasing professionals is that agent personalities play an important role in buyer–supplier relationships. Some purchasing professionals had observed that uncooperative agents or personnel turnover in the boundary-spanning functions can substantially undermine even established relational exchanges. These qualitative findings are in line with our theoretical arguments and experimental outcomes.
Yadong Luo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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improving performance and reducing cost in buyer supplier relationships the role of justice in curtailing Opportunism
Journal of Business Research, 2015Co-Authors: Yadong Luo, Yi Liu, Qian Yang, Vladislav Maksimov, Jigang HouAbstract:Abstract Building on social exchange theory, we study the role of justice perceptions in curtailing Opportunism and, in turn, improving performance and reducing governance cost in buyer–supplier relationships. Our analysis of 225 dyads in the Chinese home appliance industry indicates that distributive justice is negatively linked to strong form Opportunism, whereas procedural justice and interactional justice perceptions are negatively related to weak form Opportunism. Additionally, while relationship performance is equally reduced by both forms of Opportunism, governance cost increases significantly more with strong form Opportunism. We conclude that preserving the formal structure of the exchange through distributive justice and the informal mechanisms of interaction through procedural justice and interactional justice is important in enhancing performance and reducing cost. We caution that we view the role of organizational justice as complementary to economic forces such as contractual and managerial governance.
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Opportunism in Inter-firm Exchanges in Emerging Markets
Management and Organization Review, 2006Co-Authors: Yadong LuoAbstract:This article develops a theoretical model of Opportunism in inter-organizational exchanges in emerging markets. I decompose Opportunism into ‘strong form’ (contractual norm violation) and ‘weak form’ (relational norm violation), and suggest that strong form tends to be more observable, measurable and remediable than weak form and its adverse effect on cooperation tends to be stronger but less enduring than weak form. I address how external uncertainty, a multidimensional concept that includes market volatility, legal unprotectability, information unverifiability and regulatory variability, along with internal uncertainty that reflects dyadic tensions such as goal disparity, resource misfit, cultural dissimilarity and bargaining asymmetry, together affect exchange members' Opportunism. This is followed by further discussions on conditions under which firms will opt for strong form or weak form Opportunism in the face of such external and internal uncertainties. I suggest that suppressing forces against Opportunism necessitates not only economic ordering, such as contractual mechanisms and structural mechanisms, but also social ordering, such as relational mechanisms and justice mechanisms. I expect that economic ordering is more effective in resisting strong form Opportunism while social ordering is more forceful in curtailing weak form Opportunism.
Erin Anderson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Safeguarding Interorganizational Performance and Continuity Under Ex Post Opportunism
Management Science, 2003Co-Authors: Sandy D. Jap, Erin AndersonAbstract:Opportunism is a central construct in exchange theory. Economists contend that despite the firm's best efforts to erect governance structures that reduce Opportunism and preserve outcomes, there is always some Opportunism that remains once the transaction is in place. Despite this, there are few studies that systematically investigate thesafeguarding efficacy of relationship attributes in the presence of such ex post Opportunism. In this research, we develop a theoretical framework and provide a longitudinal test of the ability of various relationship safeguards to preserve performance outcomes and future expectations given varying levels of ex post Opportunism in the relationship. Our survey results from over 300 buyers and suppliers indicates that given lower levels of Opportunism, bilateral idiosyncratic investments and interpersonal trust enhance performance outcomes and future expectations, while goal congruence has no discernable effect. However, at higher levels of Opportunism, goal congruence becomes a more powerful safeguard, while interpersonal trust becomes less effective. Bilateral idiosyncratic investments continue to preserve performance outcomes and future expectations even at higher levels of Opportunism. Implications for the long-term management of interorganizational alliances are discussed.
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Safeguarding Interorganizational Performance and Continuity Under Ex Post Opportunism
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2003Co-Authors: Sandy D. Jap, Erin AndersonAbstract:Opportunism is a central construct in exchange theory. Economists contend that despite the firm's best efforts to erect governance structures that reduce Opportunism and preserve outcomes, some Opportunism always remains once the transaction is in place. Despite this fact, few studies systematically investigate the safeguarding efficacy of relationship attributes in the presence of such ex post Opportunism. In this research, we develop a theoretical framework and provide a longitudinal test of the ability of various relationship safeguards to preserve performance outcomes and future expectations given varying levels of ex post Opportunism in the relationship. Our survey results from over 300 buyers and suppliers indicate that in relationships with extremely low levels of ex post Opportunism, bilateral idiosyncratic investments and interpersonal trust enhance performance outcomes and future expectations, while goal congruence produces no discernable effect. However, at higher levels of ex post Opportunism, goal congruence gains efficacy, becoming a more powerful safeguard, while interpersonal trust loses efficacy, becoming a less effective safeguard. Bilateral idiosyncratic investments continue to preserve performance outcomes and future expectations, and with the same efficacy, at higher and lower levels of Opportunism. Implications for the long-term management of interorganizational alliances are discussed.
