The Experts below are selected from a list of 42231 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Abbie J Smith - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • financial accounting information Organizational Complexity and corporate governance systems
    Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Rob Bushman, Ellen Engel, Qi Chen, Abbie J Smith
    Abstract:

    The purpose of this paper is to investigate how governance systems of large public U.S. corporations vary with information properties of numbers produced by their financial accounting systems. We argue that in firms whose current accounting numbers do a relatively poor job of capturing the effects of the firm's current activities and outcomes on shareholder value, the accounting numbers are less effective in the governance setting. We predict that such firms will substitute costly governance mechanisms to compensate for their less useful accounting numbers. We explore whether governance systems vary with the timeliness of earnings by examining the cross-sectional relation between proxies for earnings timeliness and subsequent corporate governance systems of 784 firms in the Fortune 1000. The governance systems we consider include board composition, stockholdings of inside and outside directors, ownership concentration and the structure of executive compensation. Our results support a significant negative relation between our timeliness metrics and subsequent costly corporate governance mechanisms after controlling for other firm characteristics.

  • financial accounting information Organizational Complexity and corporate governance systems
    Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Robert M Bushman, Ellen Engel, Qi Chen, Abbie J Smith
    Abstract:

    Abstract We posit that limited transparency of firms’ operations to outside investors increases demands on governance systems to alleviate moral hazard problems. We investigate how ownership concentration, directors’ and executive's incentives, and board structure vary with: (1) earnings timeliness, and (2) Organizational Complexity measured as geographic and/or product line diversification. We find that ownership concentration, directors’ and executives’ equity-based incentives, and outside directors’ reputations vary inversely with earnings timeliness, and that ownership concentration, and directors’ equity-based incentives increase with firm Complexity. However, board size and the percentage of inside directors do not vary significantly with earnings timeliness or firm Complexity.

Ellen Engel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • financial accounting information Organizational Complexity and corporate governance systems
    Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Rob Bushman, Ellen Engel, Qi Chen, Abbie J Smith
    Abstract:

    The purpose of this paper is to investigate how governance systems of large public U.S. corporations vary with information properties of numbers produced by their financial accounting systems. We argue that in firms whose current accounting numbers do a relatively poor job of capturing the effects of the firm's current activities and outcomes on shareholder value, the accounting numbers are less effective in the governance setting. We predict that such firms will substitute costly governance mechanisms to compensate for their less useful accounting numbers. We explore whether governance systems vary with the timeliness of earnings by examining the cross-sectional relation between proxies for earnings timeliness and subsequent corporate governance systems of 784 firms in the Fortune 1000. The governance systems we consider include board composition, stockholdings of inside and outside directors, ownership concentration and the structure of executive compensation. Our results support a significant negative relation between our timeliness metrics and subsequent costly corporate governance mechanisms after controlling for other firm characteristics.

  • financial accounting information Organizational Complexity and corporate governance systems
    Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Robert M Bushman, Ellen Engel, Qi Chen, Abbie J Smith
    Abstract:

    Abstract We posit that limited transparency of firms’ operations to outside investors increases demands on governance systems to alleviate moral hazard problems. We investigate how ownership concentration, directors’ and executive's incentives, and board structure vary with: (1) earnings timeliness, and (2) Organizational Complexity measured as geographic and/or product line diversification. We find that ownership concentration, directors’ and executives’ equity-based incentives, and outside directors’ reputations vary inversely with earnings timeliness, and that ownership concentration, and directors’ equity-based incentives increase with firm Complexity. However, board size and the percentage of inside directors do not vary significantly with earnings timeliness or firm Complexity.

Qi Chen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • financial accounting information Organizational Complexity and corporate governance systems
    Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Rob Bushman, Ellen Engel, Qi Chen, Abbie J Smith
    Abstract:

    The purpose of this paper is to investigate how governance systems of large public U.S. corporations vary with information properties of numbers produced by their financial accounting systems. We argue that in firms whose current accounting numbers do a relatively poor job of capturing the effects of the firm's current activities and outcomes on shareholder value, the accounting numbers are less effective in the governance setting. We predict that such firms will substitute costly governance mechanisms to compensate for their less useful accounting numbers. We explore whether governance systems vary with the timeliness of earnings by examining the cross-sectional relation between proxies for earnings timeliness and subsequent corporate governance systems of 784 firms in the Fortune 1000. The governance systems we consider include board composition, stockholdings of inside and outside directors, ownership concentration and the structure of executive compensation. Our results support a significant negative relation between our timeliness metrics and subsequent costly corporate governance mechanisms after controlling for other firm characteristics.

  • financial accounting information Organizational Complexity and corporate governance systems
    Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Robert M Bushman, Ellen Engel, Qi Chen, Abbie J Smith
    Abstract:

    Abstract We posit that limited transparency of firms’ operations to outside investors increases demands on governance systems to alleviate moral hazard problems. We investigate how ownership concentration, directors’ and executive's incentives, and board structure vary with: (1) earnings timeliness, and (2) Organizational Complexity measured as geographic and/or product line diversification. We find that ownership concentration, directors’ and executives’ equity-based incentives, and outside directors’ reputations vary inversely with earnings timeliness, and that ownership concentration, and directors’ equity-based incentives increase with firm Complexity. However, board size and the percentage of inside directors do not vary significantly with earnings timeliness or firm Complexity.

Rashad A Abdelkhalik - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • self sorting incentive compensation and human capital assets
    European Accounting Review, 2003
    Co-Authors: Rashad A Abdelkhalik
    Abstract:

    Skilled labour has gained significance as a production factor in the age of information technology, but accounting does not recognize human capital as an asset that contributes to the firm's earning power. This paper suggests a method to develop a latent index to proxy the managerial-skill component of human capital. The proposed index depends on the empirical validity of self-sorting theories for managerial tasks and the choice of the type of at-risk (i.e. outcome-contingent) compensation contract. The empirical analysis uses data on compensation of executive members of the board of directors, their personal attributes (experience, risk aversion and wealth), firm-specific variables (profitability growth rates, Organizational Complexity and operating risk), and type of industry. The extent to which equity markets value the predicted labour skills shows that investors in the marketplace recognize human capital even though accounting does not. The valuation coefficient on the variable imputed for human capi...

  • self sorting incentive compensation and human capital assets
    Social Science Research Network, 2003
    Co-Authors: Rashad A Abdelkhalik
    Abstract:

    Skilled labour has gained significance as a production factor in the age of information technology, but accounting does not recognize human capital as an asset that contributes to the firm’s earning power. This paper suggests a method to develop a latent index to proxy the managerial-skill component of human capital. The proposed index depends on the empirical validity of self-sorting theories for managerial tasks and the choice of the type of at-risk (i.e. outcome-contingent) compensation contract. The empirical analysis uses data on compensation of executive members of the board of directors, their personal attributes (experience, risk aversion and wealth), firm-specific variables ( profitability growth rates, Organizational Complexity and operating risk), and type of industry. The extent to which equity markets value the predicted labour skills shows that investors in the marketplace recognize human capital even though accounting does not. The valuation coefficient on the variable imputed for human capital is significant for all years examined. This study contributes to the literature by showing that relative incentive compensation (incentive pay per dollar of fixed salary) is a viable surrogate for human capital defined as the skills embodied in people.

Rob Bushman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • financial accounting information Organizational Complexity and corporate governance systems
    Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Rob Bushman, Ellen Engel, Qi Chen, Abbie J Smith
    Abstract:

    The purpose of this paper is to investigate how governance systems of large public U.S. corporations vary with information properties of numbers produced by their financial accounting systems. We argue that in firms whose current accounting numbers do a relatively poor job of capturing the effects of the firm's current activities and outcomes on shareholder value, the accounting numbers are less effective in the governance setting. We predict that such firms will substitute costly governance mechanisms to compensate for their less useful accounting numbers. We explore whether governance systems vary with the timeliness of earnings by examining the cross-sectional relation between proxies for earnings timeliness and subsequent corporate governance systems of 784 firms in the Fortune 1000. The governance systems we consider include board composition, stockholdings of inside and outside directors, ownership concentration and the structure of executive compensation. Our results support a significant negative relation between our timeliness metrics and subsequent costly corporate governance mechanisms after controlling for other firm characteristics.