The Experts below are selected from a list of 1542 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Moshé Machover - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The product Paradox of Voting power
Public Choice, 1998Co-Authors: Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé MachoverAbstract:We consider a system made up of two committees, with overlapping membership but with different rules for passing decisions; the passage of a joint resolution requires separate approval by each committee. We show that it is possible for one voter a to be stronger (have greater Voting power) than another voter b in both of the two committees, while in the two-committee system (considered as a single composite entity) b is stronger than a. We argue that this apparently Paradoxical phenomenon is inherent in the structure of the decision-making system in question, rather than being an artefact of any particular index used to measure Voting power.
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The product Paradox of Voting power
Public Choice, 1998Co-Authors: Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé MachoverAbstract:The authors consider a system made up of two committees, with overlapping membership but with different rules for passing decisions; the passage of a joint resolution requires separate approval by each committee. They show that it is possible for one voter a to be stronger (have greater Voting power) than another voter b in both of the two committees, while in the two-committee system (considered as a single composite entity) b is stronger than a.-U3 The authors argue that this apparently Paradoxical phenomenon is inherent in the structure of the decision-making system in question, rather than being an artefact of any particular index used to measure Voting power. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Золотарева Zolotareva) О.А. - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Conception of Monetary Policy Institutional Structure Reforming in the Republic of Belarus
УО "Полесский государственный университет", 2017Co-Authors: Золотарева Zolotareva) О.А.Abstract:It is shown in the paper that under current institutional conditions in the Republic of Belarus necessary for the real economy stimulating economic policy turns to be impossible. The main reason for such situation is the underdevelopment of the financial market adsorbing excess liquidity. It is also shown that in the countries with special dominance of the banking segment in the structure of financial system it is almost impossible to create a solid basis for long–term investing. At the same time, legal conditions for capital market and business development exist in the Republic of Belarus. The main obstacle in the development of the privatization processes considered by the author is the crisis of vertical and horizontal trust, which manifests itself in the well–known in the economic theory Paradox of Voting while making investment decisions. The creation of a new macro–economic structure – the Investment Bank of the first tier with the original scheme of attraction and placement of funds, which will allow to overcome the Paradox of Voting while making investment decisions and, therefore, will initiate the development of large–scale circulation of capital assets in the Republic of Belarus was suggested in the paper. Key words: financial market, monetary policy, financial depth, Voting Paradox, privatization, investment, Investment Bank of the first tier, innovative clusters
Momi Dahan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Social identity and Voting behavior
Public Choice, 2012Co-Authors: Avi Ben-bassat, Momi DahanAbstract:This paper uses the unique social structure of Arab communities to examine the effect of social identity on voter turnout. We first show that voters are more likely to vote for a candidate who shares their social group (signified by last name) as compared to other candidates. Using last name as a measure of group affiliation, an inverted U-shaped relationship between group size and voter turnout has been found (borderline significant) which is consistent with theoretical models that reconcile the Paradox of Voting by incorporating group behavior.
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Social identity and Voting behavior
Public Choice, 2010Co-Authors: Avi Ben-bassat, Momi DahanAbstract:Voter turnout, Paradox of Voting, Social identity, Local elections,
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Social Identity and Voter Turnout
2008Co-Authors: Avi Ben-bassat, Momi DahanAbstract:This paper uses the unique social structure of Arab communities to examine the effect of social identity on voter turnout. We first show that voters are more likely to vote for a candidate who shares their social group (signified by last name) as compared to other candidates. Using last name as a measure of group affiliation, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between group size and voter turnout which is consistent with theoretical models that reconcile the Paradox of Voting by incorporating groups behavior.
Dan S. Felsenthal - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The product Paradox of Voting power
Public Choice, 1998Co-Authors: Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé MachoverAbstract:We consider a system made up of two committees, with overlapping membership but with different rules for passing decisions; the passage of a joint resolution requires separate approval by each committee. We show that it is possible for one voter a to be stronger (have greater Voting power) than another voter b in both of the two committees, while in the two-committee system (considered as a single composite entity) b is stronger than a. We argue that this apparently Paradoxical phenomenon is inherent in the structure of the decision-making system in question, rather than being an artefact of any particular index used to measure Voting power.
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The product Paradox of Voting power
Public Choice, 1998Co-Authors: Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé MachoverAbstract:The authors consider a system made up of two committees, with overlapping membership but with different rules for passing decisions; the passage of a joint resolution requires separate approval by each committee. They show that it is possible for one voter a to be stronger (have greater Voting power) than another voter b in both of the two committees, while in the two-committee system (considered as a single composite entity) b is stronger than a.-U3 The authors argue that this apparently Paradoxical phenomenon is inherent in the structure of the decision-making system in question, rather than being an artefact of any particular index used to measure Voting power. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Dan Usher - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Assessing the citizen – candidate model
Public Choice, 2005Co-Authors: Dan UsherAbstract:Citizen–candidate models postulate a politics without political parties. Any citizen may become a candidate for office. A winner is chosen from among the candidates by Voting with ties broken by the flip of a coin. All voters have preferences over a set of policies. The winning candidate adopts his preferred policy. It is proved on certain assumptions that there exists an equilibrium in these models and that the equilibrium is efficient. The significance of the proof is tested here with reference to the Paradox of Voting, the exploitation problem, the transposition of the Nash equilibrium from markets to politics, and constitutional constraints. The quest for a political equilibrium leads in the end to the recognition of a minimal rock-bottom requirement for cooperation and negotiation in democratic government.
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Assessing the citizen – candidate model
Public Choice, 2005Co-Authors: Dan UsherAbstract:Citizen–candidate models postulate a politics without political parties. Any citizen may become a candidate for office. A winner is chosen from among the candidates by Voting with ties broken by the flip of a coin. All voters have preferences over a set of policies. The winning candidate adopts his preferred policy. It is proved on certain assumptions that there exists an equilibrium in these models and that the equilibrium is efficient. The significance of the proof is tested here with reference to the Paradox of Voting, the exploitation problem, the transposition of the Nash equilibrium from markets to politics, and constitutional constraints. The quest for a political equilibrium leads in the end to the recognition of a minimal rock-bottom requirement for cooperation and negotiation in democratic government. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Testing the Citizen-Candidate Model
2003Co-Authors: Dan UsherAbstract:Citizen-candidate models of representative government postulate that any citizen may become a candidate for office, that a winner is chosen from among the candidates by Voting with ties broken by the flip of a coin, that all voters have preferences among a set of policies and that the office-holder adopts his preferred policy. It has been proved on certain assumptions that there exists an equilibrium in these models and that the equilibrium is efficient. The significance of the proof is tested here with reference to the Paradox of Voting , the exploitation problem and the transposition of the Nash equilibrium from markets to politics. The quest for a political equilibrium leads in the end to the recognition of minimal rock-bottom requirement for cooperation and negotiation in democratic government.
