The Experts below are selected from a list of 2349 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Gerhard P. Hancke - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
A Session Hijacking Attack Against a Device-Assisted Physical-Layer Key Agreement
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 2020Co-Authors: Qiao Hu, Bianxia Du, Konstantinos Markantonakis, Gerhard P. HanckeAbstract:Physical-layer key agreement is used to generate a shared key between devices on demand. Such schemes utilize the characteristics of the wireless channel to generate the shared key from the device-to-device channel. As all characteristics are time-dependent and location-dependent, it is hard for eavesdroppers to get the key. However, most research works in this area use Passive Attack models whereas active Attacks that aim at manipulating the channel and key are also possible. Physical-layer key agreement with User Introduced Randomness (PHYUIR) is a solution similar to the Diffie-Hellman protocol against such a kind of active Attack. The users (devices) introduce their own randomness to help to prevent active Attacks. In this paper, we analyze the possibility of launching a session hijacking Attack on PHY-UIR to allow an Attacker to control the shared key established. The session hijacking Attack manipulates the key agreement through a man-in-the-middle interaction and forces legitimate devices to run the PHY-UIR protocol with the Attacker. Our simulation and experiment results validate our Attack and show the high performance of our Attack on manipulating the generated key. We also propose PHY-UIR± where devices simultaneously exchange information about the established shared keys, which allows them to detect whether they have agreed to different keys with a third party.
Qiao Hu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
A Session Hijacking Attack Against a Device-Assisted Physical-Layer Key Agreement
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 2020Co-Authors: Qiao Hu, Bianxia Du, Konstantinos Markantonakis, Gerhard P. HanckeAbstract:Physical-layer key agreement is used to generate a shared key between devices on demand. Such schemes utilize the characteristics of the wireless channel to generate the shared key from the device-to-device channel. As all characteristics are time-dependent and location-dependent, it is hard for eavesdroppers to get the key. However, most research works in this area use Passive Attack models whereas active Attacks that aim at manipulating the channel and key are also possible. Physical-layer key agreement with User Introduced Randomness (PHYUIR) is a solution similar to the Diffie-Hellman protocol against such a kind of active Attack. The users (devices) introduce their own randomness to help to prevent active Attacks. In this paper, we analyze the possibility of launching a session hijacking Attack on PHY-UIR to allow an Attacker to control the shared key established. The session hijacking Attack manipulates the key agreement through a man-in-the-middle interaction and forces legitimate devices to run the PHY-UIR protocol with the Attacker. Our simulation and experiment results validate our Attack and show the high performance of our Attack on manipulating the generated key. We also propose PHY-UIR± where devices simultaneously exchange information about the established shared keys, which allows them to detect whether they have agreed to different keys with a third party.
Chi-sung Laih - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Conference key agreement protocol with non-interactive fault-tolerance over broadcast network
International Journal of Information Security, 2009Co-Authors: Jiin-chiou Cheng, Chi-sung LaihAbstract:Most conventional conference key agreement protocols have not been concerned with a practical situation. There may exist some malicious conferees who attempt to block conference initiation for some purposes, e.g. commercial, political or military benefit. Instances where conference must be launched immediately due to emergency, efficient detection of malicious behavior would be needed. Recently, Tzeng (IEEE Trans. Comput. 51(4):373–379, 2002) proposed a fault-tolerant conference key agreement protocol to address the issue where a conference key can be established among conferees even though malicious conferees exist. However, his protocol might be complex and inefficient during fault-detection. In the case where a malicious conferee exists and a fault-tolerant mechanism is launched, complicated interactions between conferees will be required. In this paper, we introduce a novel strategy, where any malicious conferee may be identified and removed from the conferee list without any interaction. With such a non-interactive fault-tolerance, conferences could be established and started efficiently. A complete example of our protocol will be given to describe the fascinating fault-tolerance. We analyse the security of our protocol regarding four aspects, i.e. correctness, fault-tolerance, active Attack and Passive Attack. The comparisons of performance between our protocol and that of Tzeng are also shown. As a whole, the advantage of our protocol is superior to that of Tzeng under the situation where malicious conferees exist.
Peter Sewell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Passive-Attack analysis for connection-based anonymity systems
International Journal of Information Security, 2005Co-Authors: Andrei Serjantov, Peter SewellAbstract:In this paper we consider low-latency connection-based anonymity systems which can be used for applications like web browsing or SSH. Although several such systems have been designed and built, their anonymity has so far not been adequately evaluated. We analyse the anonymity of connection-based systems against global Passive adversaries. We give a precise description of a packet-counting Attack which requires a very low degree of precision from the adversary, evaluate its effectiveness against connection-based systems depending on their size, architecture and configuration, and calculate the amount of traffic necessary to provide a minimum degree of protection. We then present a second Attack based on tracking connection starts which gives us another lower bound on traffic volumes required to provide at least some anonymity.
-
Passive Attack analysis for connection based anonymity systems
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, 2003Co-Authors: Andrei Serjantov, Peter SewellAbstract:In this paper we consider low latency connection-based anonymity systems which can be used for applications like web browsing or SSH. Although several such systems have been designed and built, their anonymity has so far not been adequately evaluated.
-
ESORICS - Passive Attack Analysis for Connection-Based Anonymity Systems
Computer Security – ESORICS 2003, 2003Co-Authors: Andrei Serjantov, Peter SewellAbstract:In this paper we consider low latency connection-based anonymity systems which can be used for applications like web browsing or SSH. Although several such systems have been designed and built, their anonymity has so far not been adequately evaluated.
-
Passive Attack analysis for connection based anonymity systems
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2003Co-Authors: Andrei Serjantov, Peter SewellAbstract:In this paper we consider low latency connection-based anonymity systems which can be used for applications like web browsing or SSH. Although several such systems have been designed and built, their anonymity has so far not been adequately evaluated. We analyse the anonymity of connection-based systems against Passive adversaries. We give a precise description of two Attacks, evaluate their effectiveness, and calculate the amount of traffic necessary to provide a minimum degree of protection against them.
Karsten Engelmann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
active Passive Attack operations battle management command control communications computers and intelligence pillar integration apab pi
1996Co-Authors: Karsten EngelmannAbstract:Abstract : In 1995, the US Army Space and Strategic Defense Command and the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency rapid response low-resolution theater-level theater missile defense model. This report discusses how the Active, Passive Attack Operations Battle Management/Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence - Pillar Integration (APAB-PI) model was developed to meet these objectives. The purpose of the APAB-PI study was to develop a methodology and a supporting model which simulated all of the missile battles that together comprise the missile defense campaign for an entire theater. A process which allows the examination of the entire campaign enables analysts to answer decision makers' questions regarding the effect of different aspects of the tactical ballistic missile/theater missile defense on that campaign.
-
Active, Passive, Attack Operations, Battle Management/Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence - Pillar Integration (APAB-PI).
1996Co-Authors: Karsten EngelmannAbstract:Abstract : In 1995, the US Army Space and Strategic Defense Command and the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency rapid response low-resolution theater-level theater missile defense model. This report discusses how the Active, Passive Attack Operations Battle Management/Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence - Pillar Integration (APAB-PI) model was developed to meet these objectives. The purpose of the APAB-PI study was to develop a methodology and a supporting model which simulated all of the missile battles that together comprise the missile defense campaign for an entire theater. A process which allows the examination of the entire campaign enables analysts to answer decision makers' questions regarding the effect of different aspects of the tactical ballistic missile/theater missile defense on that campaign.