The Experts below are selected from a list of 306 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Walter Trockel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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on non cooperative foundation and implementation of the nash solution in subgame Perfect Equilibrium via rubinstein s game
Research Papers in Economics, 2016Co-Authors: Papatya Duman, Walter TrockelAbstract:The alternating offers game due to Rubinstein (1982) had been used by Binmore (1980) and by Binmore et.al. (1986) to provide via its unique subgame Perfect Equilibrium an approximate non-cooperative support for the Nash bargaining solution of associated cooperative two-person bargaining games. These results had strengthened the prominent role of the Nash bargaining solution in cooperative axiomatic bargaining theory and its application, for instance in labor markets, and have often even be interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non-cooperative foundations first, in our Proposition, via weakly subgame Perfect equilibria of a game that is a modification of Rubinstein´s game, then in our Theorem, via sub-game Perfect equilibria of a game that is a further modification of our first game. Moreover, they provide a general rule how to transform approximate support results into exact ones. Finally, we discuss the relation of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly) subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the Nash solution. There we come to the conclusion that a sound interpretation as an implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players´ preferences.
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on non cooperative foundation and implementation of the nash solution in subgame Perfect Equilibrium via rubinstein s game
Social Science Research Network, 2016Co-Authors: Papatya Duman, Walter TrockelAbstract:In their seminal article in the Rand Journal of Economics Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) analyze “the relation between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining”. They consider two related but different strategic models of alternating offers based on Rubinstein´s famous article in Econometrica (1982) that differ in the employed utility functions representing time preferences in one model and risk of breakdown of bargaining in the other one. In each model “when the motivation to reach agreement is made [almost] negligible, the unique [subgame] Perfect Equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution with utilities that reflect the incentive to settle and with the proper disagreement point chosen”. Their results are intended to “provide a guide for the application of the Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling”.While these models provide approximate non-cooperative supports for the Nash solution there does not exist a limit model with an exact non-cooperative support.In our paper we first provide a modification of the Rubinstein game that allows such an exact non-cooperative support in weak sub- game Perfect Equilibrium. That concept as well as the method underlying our modification had been introduced by Trockel (2011) in JME for a direct non-cooperative foundation of the Discrete Raiffa solution.After establishing in our Proposition 1 the direct non-cooperative support of the Nash solution in weak sub-game Perfect Equilibrium we state in our Proposition 2 and prove a direct non-cooperative support in sub-game Perfect Equilibrium. In both games there is an infinite number of (weak) sub-game Perfect equilibria. But all have the same payoffs namely those of the Nash bargaining solution in the utility space generated from the respective underlying utility functions of the two models. And these payoffs are reaches after the first stage where the proposer suggests the Nash bargaining payoffs while the follower accepts exactly those payoffs granting himself at least his coordinate of the Nash solution.Finally we discuss the relation of our non-cooperative support results (in the sense of the Nash Program) to mechanism theoretic implementation in (weak) sub-game Perfect equilibria. It turns out that a sensible implementation can be provided only in that model where players do not discount time but rather where expected utilities of payoffs more remote in time decrease due to probabilities of breakdown of negotiation that are not part of players´ characteristics but rather instruments of design in the hands of the planner.
Ulrich Kamecke - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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can subgame Perfect Equilibrium threats foster cooperation an experimental test of finite horizon folk theorems
Economic Inquiry, 2013Co-Authors: Vera Angelova, Lisa Bruttel, Werner Guth, Ulrich KameckeAbstract:This paper considers extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second pure strategy Equilibrium in the stage game allows for mutual cooperation in all but the last round of the finitely repeated game as an Equilibrium outcome. We distinguish a strict and a weak extension of the prisoners' dilemma game in a long and a short horizon treatment. A comparison with the corresponding finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games shows that the strict additional Equilibrium increases cooperation rates while the weak does not. This result is robust to the variation of the time horizon. (JEL C73, C91)
Magnus Hatlebakk - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a new and robust subgame Perfect Equilibrium in a model of triadic power relations
Journal of Development Economics, 2002Co-Authors: Magnus HatlebakkAbstract:Abstract This note presents a new subgame Perfect Equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game, which has Basu's triadic model as the stage game (Oxford Econ. Pap., 38 (1986) 259). The payoff for the laborer is the same as in Basu's model. The Equilibrium is more robust than the Naqvi and Wemhoner's solution (J. Dev. Econ. 47 (1995) 191), in the sense that the Equilibrium does not require the same high degree of rationality; simple well-known strategies are applied, and both the landlord and the merchant are better off than in the stage game. In the Equilibrium outcome, the merchant receives a share of the extra profit from the extortionary labor contract.
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a new and robust subgame Perfect Equilibrium in a model of triadic power relations
Research Papers in Economics, 2000Co-Authors: Magnus HatlebakkAbstract:We present a new subgame Perfect Equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game, which has Basu's triadic model as the stage game. The payoff for the laborer is the same as in Basu's model. The Equilibrium is more robust than the solution in Naqvi and Wemhoner in the sense that the Equilibrium does not require the same high degree of rationality; simple well-known strategies are applied, and both the lanklord and the merchant are better of than in the stage game.
Troels Bjerre Sorensen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the complexity of approximating a trembling hand Perfect Equilibrium of a multi player game in strategic form
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory, 2014Co-Authors: Kousha Etessami, Peter Bro Miltersen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Troels Bjerre SorensenAbstract:We consider the task of computing an approximation of a trembling hand Perfect Equilibrium for an n-player game in strategic form, n >= 3. We show that this task is complete for the complexity class FIXP_a. In particular, the task is polynomial time equivalent to the task of computing an approximation of a Nash Equilibrium in strategic form games with three (or more) players.
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computing a quasi Perfect Equilibrium of a two player game
Economic Theory, 2010Co-Authors: Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre SorensenAbstract:Refining an algorithm due to Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel, we show how to apply Lemke’s algorithm for solving linear complementarity programs to compute a quasi-Perfect Equilibrium in behavior strategies of a given two-player extensive-form game of Perfect recall. A quasi-Perfect Equilibrium is known to be sequential, and our algorithm thus resolves a conjecture of McKelvey and McLennan in the positive. A quasi-Perfect Equilibrium is also known to be normal-form Perfect and our algorithm thus provides an alternative to an algorithm by von Stengel, van den Elzen and Talman. For the case of a zero-sum game, we devise variants of the algorithm that rely on linear programming rather than linear complementarity programming and use the simplex algorithm or other algorithms for linear programming rather than Lemke’s algorithm. We argue that these latter algorithms are relevant for recent applications of Equilibrium computation to artificial intelligence.
Kai A Konrad - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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strategic transfers and private provision of public goods
Journal of Public Economics, 1995Co-Authors: Wolfgang Buchholz, Kai A KonradAbstract:Abstract This paper considers strategic monetary transfers between two agents when these contribute to a mutual public good. If the agents differ in their contribution productivity, then the less productive agent has an incentive to make large unconditional transfers to the more productive agent. Although agents move simultaneously in each stage of the game, the less productive agent becomes a Stackelberg leader. Furthermore, the generic subgame Perfect Equilibrium is characterized by full specialization.
