The Experts below are selected from a list of 171414 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Imran Rasul - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data
Econometrica, 2009Co-Authors: Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, Imran RasulAbstract:We present evidence on the effect of social connections between workers and managers on productivity in the workplace. To evaluate whether the existence of social connections is beneficial to the firm's overall performance, we explore how the effects of social connections vary with the strength of managerial incentives and worker's ability. To do so, we combine panel Data on individual worker's productivity from Personnel records with a natural field experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial incentives, from fixed wages to bonuses based on the average productivity of the workers managed. We find that when managers are paid fixed wages, they favor workers to whom they are socially connected irrespective of the worker's ability, but when they are paid performance bonuses, they target their effort toward high ability workers irrespective of whether they are socially connected to them or not. Although social connections increase the performance of connected workers, we find that favoring connected workers is detrimental for the firm's overall performance.
Oriana Bandiera - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data
Econometrica, 2009Co-Authors: Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, Imran RasulAbstract:We present evidence on the effect of social connections between workers and managers on productivity in the workplace. To evaluate whether the existence of social connections is beneficial to the firm's overall performance, we explore how the effects of social connections vary with the strength of managerial incentives and worker's ability. To do so, we combine panel Data on individual worker's productivity from Personnel records with a natural field experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial incentives, from fixed wages to bonuses based on the average productivity of the workers managed. We find that when managers are paid fixed wages, they favor workers to whom they are socially connected irrespective of the worker's ability, but when they are paid performance bonuses, they target their effort toward high ability workers irrespective of whether they are socially connected to them or not. Although social connections increase the performance of connected workers, we find that favoring connected workers is detrimental for the firm's overall performance.
Iwan Barankay - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data
Econometrica, 2009Co-Authors: Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, Imran RasulAbstract:We present evidence on the effect of social connections between workers and managers on productivity in the workplace. To evaluate whether the existence of social connections is beneficial to the firm's overall performance, we explore how the effects of social connections vary with the strength of managerial incentives and worker's ability. To do so, we combine panel Data on individual worker's productivity from Personnel records with a natural field experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial incentives, from fixed wages to bonuses based on the average productivity of the workers managed. We find that when managers are paid fixed wages, they favor workers to whom they are socially connected irrespective of the worker's ability, but when they are paid performance bonuses, they target their effort toward high ability workers irrespective of whether they are socially connected to them or not. Although social connections increase the performance of connected workers, we find that favoring connected workers is detrimental for the firm's overall performance.
Laura Giuliano - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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minimum wage effects on employment substitution and the teenage labor supply evidence from Personnel Data
Journal of Labor Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Laura GiulianoAbstract:Using Personnel Data from a large US retail firm, I examine the firm’s response to the 1996 federal minimum wage increase. Compulsory increases in average wages had negative but statistically insignificant effects on overall employment. However, increases in the relative wages of teenagers led to significant increases in the relative employment of teenagers, especially younger and more affluent teenagers. Further analysis suggests a pattern consistent with noncompetitive models. Where the legislation affected mainly the wages of teenagers and so was only moderately binding, it led both to higher teenage labor market participation and to higher absolute employment of teenagers.
Bengt Holmstrom - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994Co-Authors: George P. Baker, Michael Gibbs, Bengt HolmstromAbstract:We analyze twenty years of Personnel Data from one firm. The hierarchical structure is quite simple and stable. Career movements suggest that the employee's rate of learning and the firm's learning about ability are important. There are promotion "fast tracks." Exit rates vary little with tenure or salary. The firm has Personnel policies like those described in the internal labor markets literature, although several theoretical preconditions for ILMs, such as ports of entry and exit, are lacking. Job levels are important to compensation, but there is also substantial individual variation in pay within levels. Our companion paper (in this issue) explores the wage policy of this firm.
