The Experts below are selected from a list of 168 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Andrew Pickles - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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strategic voting and constituency context modelling party preference and vote in multiparty elections
Political Geography, 2007Co-Authors: Edward Fieldhouse, Nick Shryane, Andrew PicklesAbstract:Abstract We examine the role of strategic motivations in mediating the relationship between underlying political preferences and vote choice, in a multiparty, single member, simple Plurality System, and examine the role of constituency context in determining the scope for strategic voting. Political preference data from the British Election Panel Survey, 1997–2001, were modelled with mixed multinomial logit models. Latent variables were used to model the stable party political traits underlying observed preferences, allowing correlation between choices and so avoiding the restrictive assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives. Ranked approval ratings were used to characterize the underlying political preferences in the presence of insincere voting. From these models we estimate that approximately 9% of votes cast may have been affected by strategic factors. In keeping with ‘Duvergers law’, the smallest of the three main parties, the Liberal Democrats, were found to be most affected by strategic voting.
Margherita Corina - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Political elections and corporate investment: International evidence
Journal of International Business Studies, 2021Co-Authors: Mario Daniele Amore, Margherita CorinaAbstract:AbstractRecent literature shows that the spike in uncertainty during political elections harms firms’ investment. Bridging insights from international business and political science, we argue that the effect of political elections on firms’ investment activities is contingent on the country’s electoral System. In particular, we expect the negative effect of elections on corporate investment to be smaller for firms operating in Plurality Systems. We test our theory using a panel dataset of listed firms around the world, and a panel of US multinationals. Our results confirm that during an election period, firms in countries with a Plurality System reduce investment less than firms in other countries. Additionally, we show that multinationals’ foreign investment is affected by elections abroad: their investment in a host country declines during an election in that country, though to a lesser extent if the election is held with a Plurality System. Collectively, our findings provide new evidence on the role of political institutions for firms’ investment decisions.
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Political elections and corporate investment: International evidence
Journal of International Business Studies, 2021Co-Authors: Mario Daniele Amore, Margherita CorinaAbstract:Una literatura reciente muestra que el aumento brusco de la incertidumbre durante las elecciones políticas perjudica la inversión de las empresas. Tejiendo puentes de los aportes provenientes de negocios internacionales y ciencia política, sostenemos que el efecto de las elecciones políticas en las actividades de inversión de las empresas depende el sistema electoral del país. En particular, esperamos el efecto negativo de las elecciones sobre la inversión corporativa sea menor para las empresas que operan en sistemas pluralistas. Probamos nuestra teoría usando un panel de daros de empresas que cotizan en bolsa alrededor del mundo, y un panel de multinacionales estadounidenses. Nuestros resultados confirman que durante un periodo de elecciones las empresas de los países con un sistema pluralista reducen menos la inversión que las empresas en otros países. Adicionalmente, mostramos que la inversión extranjera de las multinacionales es afectada por las elecciones en el extranjero: su inversión en un país anfitrión disminuye durante las elecciones en ese país, sin embargo, en menor medida si la elección es llevada a cabo con un sistema pluralista. Colectivamente nuestros hallazgos proporcionan nueva evidencia sobre el papel de las instituciones políticas para las decisiones de inversión de las empresas. Recent literature shows that the spike in uncertainty during political elections harms firms’ investment. Bridging insights from international business and political science, we argue that the effect of political elections on firms’ investment activities is contingent on the country’s electoral System. In particular, we expect the negative effect of elections on corporate investment to be smaller for firms operating in Plurality Systems. We test our theory using a panel dataset of listed firms around the world, and a panel of US multinationals. Our results confirm that during an election period, firms in countries with a Plurality System reduce investment less than firms in other countries. Additionally, we show that multinationals’ foreign investment is affected by elections abroad: their investment in a host country declines during an election in that country, though to a lesser extent if the election is held with a Plurality System. Collectively, our findings provide new evidence on the role of political institutions for firms’ investment decisions. Uma literatura recente mostra que o aumento da incerteza durante as eleições políticas prejudica o investimento de empresas. Conectando insights de negócios internacionais e ciência política, argumentamos que o efeito de eleições políticas em atividades de investimento de empresas depende do sistema eleitoral do país. Em particular, esperamos que o efeito negativo de eleições sobre o investimento corporativo seja menor para empresas que operam em sistemas pluralistas. Testamos nossa teoria usando um conjunto de dados em painel de empresas listadas em todo o mundo e um painel de multinacionais dos EUA. Nossos resultados confirmam que, durante um período eleitoral, empresas em países com sistema pluralista reduzem investimento menos do que empresas em outros países. Além disso, mostramos que o investimento estrangeiro de multinacionais é afetado por eleições no exterior: seu investimento em um país anfitrião diminui durante uma eleição naquele país, embora em menor grau se a eleição é realizada com um sistema de pluralista. Coletivamente, nossas descobertas fornecem nova evidência sobre o papel de instituições políticas nas decisões de investimento de empresas. 最近的文献表明, 政治选举期间不确定性的激增会损害企业的投资。 从国际商业和政治学的见解中, 我们认为政治选举对企业投资活动的影响取决于该国的选举制度。 尤其是, 我们预计选举对公司投资的负面影响对在多元化制度里运作的公司而言会较小。 我们用全球上市公司的面板数据集以及美国跨国公司的面板来检验我们的理论。 我们的结果证实, 选举期间, 在有多元化制度的国家里的公司对投资的减少比在其它国家里的公司少。 此外, 我们表明, 跨国公司的外国投资会受到国外选举的影响: 它们对东道国的投资在该国举行的选举中下降, 虽然选举如果在多元化制度里进行则程度较小。 总的来说, 我们的发现为政治制度在企业投资决策中的作用提供了新依据。 La recherche récente démontre que le pic d’incertitude lors des élections politiques nuit à l’investissement des entreprises. Nous appuyant simultanément sur les travaux en affaires internationales et science politique, nous argumentons que l’impact des élections politiques sur les activités d’investissement des entreprises soit contingent au système électoral du pays. Plus particulièrement, nous estimons que l'impact négatif des élections sur les activités d'investissement serait moindre pour les entreprises opérant dans des systèmes pluralistes. Nous testons notre théorie sur deux bases de données de panel : l’une constituée des entreprises cotées dans le monde et l’autre des multinationales américaines. Nos résultats confirment qu'en période électorale, les entreprises actives dans des pays à système pluraliste réduisent moins d’investissements que les entreprises opérant dans d’autres pays. En outre, nous démontrons que l’investissement international des multinationales est influencé par les élections à l’étranger : leur investissement dans un pays d’accueil diminue lors d’une élection dans ce pays, mais dans une moindre mesure si l’élection se déroule selon un système pluraliste. Ensemble, nos résultats apportent de nouvelles preuves du rôle des institutions politiques dans les décisions d’investissement des entreprises.
Robert Moser - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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electoral Systems and the number of parties in postcommunist states
World Politics, 1999Co-Authors: Robert MoserAbstract:Scholars studying electoral Systems have consistently found that single-member Plurality elections tend to constrain the number of parties operating in a polity to a much greater extent than multimember proportional representation Systems. This article tests this hypothesis in the postcommunist context by examining the effects of proportional representation and single-member district elections on the number of parties in five postcommunist states. It is shown that some postcommunist states, most notably Poland and Hungary, have followed the standard pattern of party consolidation over time in reaction to incentives of electoral Systems, while others, most notably Russia and Ukraine, have not. The author argues that the different effects of electoral Systems can be attributed to different levels of party institutionalization found in postcommunist states. These findings have policy implications. Under conditions of extreme party underdevelopment, the electoral System that promotes the use of party labels--proportional representation--may be more effective than the Plurality System in constraining the number of parties, provided a legal threshold is used. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom that Plurality elections offer the greatest constraint on the number of parties.
Edward Fieldhouse - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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strategic voting and constituency context modelling party preference and vote in multiparty elections
Political Geography, 2007Co-Authors: Edward Fieldhouse, Nick Shryane, Andrew PicklesAbstract:Abstract We examine the role of strategic motivations in mediating the relationship between underlying political preferences and vote choice, in a multiparty, single member, simple Plurality System, and examine the role of constituency context in determining the scope for strategic voting. Political preference data from the British Election Panel Survey, 1997–2001, were modelled with mixed multinomial logit models. Latent variables were used to model the stable party political traits underlying observed preferences, allowing correlation between choices and so avoiding the restrictive assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives. Ranked approval ratings were used to characterize the underlying political preferences in the presence of insincere voting. From these models we estimate that approximately 9% of votes cast may have been affected by strategic factors. In keeping with ‘Duvergers law’, the smallest of the three main parties, the Liberal Democrats, were found to be most affected by strategic voting.
Mario Daniele Amore - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Political elections and corporate investment: International evidence
Journal of International Business Studies, 2021Co-Authors: Mario Daniele Amore, Margherita CorinaAbstract:AbstractRecent literature shows that the spike in uncertainty during political elections harms firms’ investment. Bridging insights from international business and political science, we argue that the effect of political elections on firms’ investment activities is contingent on the country’s electoral System. In particular, we expect the negative effect of elections on corporate investment to be smaller for firms operating in Plurality Systems. We test our theory using a panel dataset of listed firms around the world, and a panel of US multinationals. Our results confirm that during an election period, firms in countries with a Plurality System reduce investment less than firms in other countries. Additionally, we show that multinationals’ foreign investment is affected by elections abroad: their investment in a host country declines during an election in that country, though to a lesser extent if the election is held with a Plurality System. Collectively, our findings provide new evidence on the role of political institutions for firms’ investment decisions.
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Political elections and corporate investment: International evidence
Journal of International Business Studies, 2021Co-Authors: Mario Daniele Amore, Margherita CorinaAbstract:Una literatura reciente muestra que el aumento brusco de la incertidumbre durante las elecciones políticas perjudica la inversión de las empresas. Tejiendo puentes de los aportes provenientes de negocios internacionales y ciencia política, sostenemos que el efecto de las elecciones políticas en las actividades de inversión de las empresas depende el sistema electoral del país. En particular, esperamos el efecto negativo de las elecciones sobre la inversión corporativa sea menor para las empresas que operan en sistemas pluralistas. Probamos nuestra teoría usando un panel de daros de empresas que cotizan en bolsa alrededor del mundo, y un panel de multinacionales estadounidenses. Nuestros resultados confirman que durante un periodo de elecciones las empresas de los países con un sistema pluralista reducen menos la inversión que las empresas en otros países. Adicionalmente, mostramos que la inversión extranjera de las multinacionales es afectada por las elecciones en el extranjero: su inversión en un país anfitrión disminuye durante las elecciones en ese país, sin embargo, en menor medida si la elección es llevada a cabo con un sistema pluralista. Colectivamente nuestros hallazgos proporcionan nueva evidencia sobre el papel de las instituciones políticas para las decisiones de inversión de las empresas. Recent literature shows that the spike in uncertainty during political elections harms firms’ investment. Bridging insights from international business and political science, we argue that the effect of political elections on firms’ investment activities is contingent on the country’s electoral System. In particular, we expect the negative effect of elections on corporate investment to be smaller for firms operating in Plurality Systems. We test our theory using a panel dataset of listed firms around the world, and a panel of US multinationals. Our results confirm that during an election period, firms in countries with a Plurality System reduce investment less than firms in other countries. Additionally, we show that multinationals’ foreign investment is affected by elections abroad: their investment in a host country declines during an election in that country, though to a lesser extent if the election is held with a Plurality System. Collectively, our findings provide new evidence on the role of political institutions for firms’ investment decisions. Uma literatura recente mostra que o aumento da incerteza durante as eleições políticas prejudica o investimento de empresas. Conectando insights de negócios internacionais e ciência política, argumentamos que o efeito de eleições políticas em atividades de investimento de empresas depende do sistema eleitoral do país. Em particular, esperamos que o efeito negativo de eleições sobre o investimento corporativo seja menor para empresas que operam em sistemas pluralistas. Testamos nossa teoria usando um conjunto de dados em painel de empresas listadas em todo o mundo e um painel de multinacionais dos EUA. Nossos resultados confirmam que, durante um período eleitoral, empresas em países com sistema pluralista reduzem investimento menos do que empresas em outros países. Além disso, mostramos que o investimento estrangeiro de multinacionais é afetado por eleições no exterior: seu investimento em um país anfitrião diminui durante uma eleição naquele país, embora em menor grau se a eleição é realizada com um sistema de pluralista. Coletivamente, nossas descobertas fornecem nova evidência sobre o papel de instituições políticas nas decisões de investimento de empresas. 最近的文献表明, 政治选举期间不确定性的激增会损害企业的投资。 从国际商业和政治学的见解中, 我们认为政治选举对企业投资活动的影响取决于该国的选举制度。 尤其是, 我们预计选举对公司投资的负面影响对在多元化制度里运作的公司而言会较小。 我们用全球上市公司的面板数据集以及美国跨国公司的面板来检验我们的理论。 我们的结果证实, 选举期间, 在有多元化制度的国家里的公司对投资的减少比在其它国家里的公司少。 此外, 我们表明, 跨国公司的外国投资会受到国外选举的影响: 它们对东道国的投资在该国举行的选举中下降, 虽然选举如果在多元化制度里进行则程度较小。 总的来说, 我们的发现为政治制度在企业投资决策中的作用提供了新依据。 La recherche récente démontre que le pic d’incertitude lors des élections politiques nuit à l’investissement des entreprises. Nous appuyant simultanément sur les travaux en affaires internationales et science politique, nous argumentons que l’impact des élections politiques sur les activités d’investissement des entreprises soit contingent au système électoral du pays. Plus particulièrement, nous estimons que l'impact négatif des élections sur les activités d'investissement serait moindre pour les entreprises opérant dans des systèmes pluralistes. Nous testons notre théorie sur deux bases de données de panel : l’une constituée des entreprises cotées dans le monde et l’autre des multinationales américaines. Nos résultats confirment qu'en période électorale, les entreprises actives dans des pays à système pluraliste réduisent moins d’investissements que les entreprises opérant dans d’autres pays. En outre, nous démontrons que l’investissement international des multinationales est influencé par les élections à l’étranger : leur investissement dans un pays d’accueil diminue lors d’une élection dans ce pays, mais dans une moindre mesure si l’élection se déroule selon un système pluraliste. Ensemble, nos résultats apportent de nouvelles preuves du rôle des institutions politiques dans les décisions d’investissement des entreprises.