The Experts below are selected from a list of 44910 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Pauline Jones Luong - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • is there an islamist Political Advantage
    Annual Review of Political Science, 2014
    Co-Authors: Melani Cammett, Pauline Jones Luong
    Abstract:

    There is a widespread presumption that Islamists have an Advantage over their opponents when it comes to generating mass appeal and winning elections. The question remains, however, as to whether these Advantages—or, what we refer to collectively as an Islamist Political Advantage—actually exist. We argue that—to the extent that Islamists have a Political Advantage—the primary source of this Advantage is reputation rather than the provision of social services, organizational capacity, or ideological hegemony. Our purpose is not to dismiss the main sources of the Islamist Political Advantage identified in scholarly literature and media accounts, but to suggest a different causal path whereby each of these factors individually and sometimes jointly promotes a reputation for Islamists as competent, trustworthy, and pure. It is this reputation for good governance that enables Islamists to distinguish themselves in the streets and at the ballot box.

Raj M Desai - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the Political Advantage of soft budget constraints
    European Journal of Political Economy, 2006
    Co-Authors: Raj M Desai, Anders Olofsgard
    Abstract:

    Abstract Why do soft budget constraints persist in many post-socialist economies? We submit that the explanation may be to serve the Political purpose of hiding the incumbent government's inability to promote job creation. We present a voting model with adverse selection in which politicians who are unable to implement productivity-enhancing reforms resort to firm subsides to decrease the rate of job destruction. We characterize the equilibrium size of subsidies and its composition into explicit and implicit subsidies. The equilibrium size and composition of subsides depend, among other things, on government rents, Political transparency, Political expectations, and firms' labour unit costs.

  • the Political Advantage of soft budget constraints
    Social Science Research Network, 2003
    Co-Authors: Raj M Desai, Anders Olofsgard
    Abstract:

    One of the enduring puzzles in transition economies is why incumbent politicians postpone reforms aimed at hardening budget constraints towards unproductive firms. We submit that voters prefer politicians capable of implementing reforms that promote job creation rather than policies that simply maintain high levels of employment by avoiding job destruction, but they cannot always tell the difference. To show this, we develop a voting model with incomplete information in which politicians who are unable to identify or implement productivity-enhancing reforms can hide their inability through firm subsidies that decreases the rate of job destruction. The model characterizes the equilibrium size and composition of subsidies - both through explicit budgetary support and through economically more detrimental implicit subsidies such as the accumulation of arrears to tax authorities, suppliers, creditors, or workers. The model generates a rich set of predictions, of which we highlight in particular two. An increase in government rents will increase the level of subsidies and shift them in favour of implicit subsidies, incurring a double cost to the economy. An increase in monitoring capacity of the voters will decrease the level of subsidies but also shift them towards implicit subsidies. It follows that democratization and increased freedom of the press may have the negative implication that it causes politicians to choose less efficient instruments for their subsidies.

Melani Cammett - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • is there an islamist Political Advantage
    Annual Review of Political Science, 2014
    Co-Authors: Melani Cammett, Pauline Jones Luong
    Abstract:

    There is a widespread presumption that Islamists have an Advantage over their opponents when it comes to generating mass appeal and winning elections. The question remains, however, as to whether these Advantages—or, what we refer to collectively as an Islamist Political Advantage—actually exist. We argue that—to the extent that Islamists have a Political Advantage—the primary source of this Advantage is reputation rather than the provision of social services, organizational capacity, or ideological hegemony. Our purpose is not to dismiss the main sources of the Islamist Political Advantage identified in scholarly literature and media accounts, but to suggest a different causal path whereby each of these factors individually and sometimes jointly promotes a reputation for Islamists as competent, trustworthy, and pure. It is this reputation for good governance that enables Islamists to distinguish themselves in the streets and at the ballot box.

Anders Olofsgard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the Political Advantage of soft budget constraints
    European Journal of Political Economy, 2006
    Co-Authors: Raj M Desai, Anders Olofsgard
    Abstract:

    Abstract Why do soft budget constraints persist in many post-socialist economies? We submit that the explanation may be to serve the Political purpose of hiding the incumbent government's inability to promote job creation. We present a voting model with adverse selection in which politicians who are unable to implement productivity-enhancing reforms resort to firm subsides to decrease the rate of job destruction. We characterize the equilibrium size of subsidies and its composition into explicit and implicit subsidies. The equilibrium size and composition of subsides depend, among other things, on government rents, Political transparency, Political expectations, and firms' labour unit costs.

  • the Political Advantage of soft budget constraints
    Social Science Research Network, 2003
    Co-Authors: Raj M Desai, Anders Olofsgard
    Abstract:

    One of the enduring puzzles in transition economies is why incumbent politicians postpone reforms aimed at hardening budget constraints towards unproductive firms. We submit that voters prefer politicians capable of implementing reforms that promote job creation rather than policies that simply maintain high levels of employment by avoiding job destruction, but they cannot always tell the difference. To show this, we develop a voting model with incomplete information in which politicians who are unable to identify or implement productivity-enhancing reforms can hide their inability through firm subsidies that decreases the rate of job destruction. The model characterizes the equilibrium size and composition of subsidies - both through explicit budgetary support and through economically more detrimental implicit subsidies such as the accumulation of arrears to tax authorities, suppliers, creditors, or workers. The model generates a rich set of predictions, of which we highlight in particular two. An increase in government rents will increase the level of subsidies and shift them in favour of implicit subsidies, incurring a double cost to the economy. An increase in monitoring capacity of the voters will decrease the level of subsidies but also shift them towards implicit subsidies. It follows that democratization and increased freedom of the press may have the negative implication that it causes politicians to choose less efficient instruments for their subsidies.

Allison M N Archer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.