Political Influence

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Rafael Di Tella - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • plata o plomo bribe and punishment in a theory of Political Influence
    Social Science Research Network, 2002
    Co-Authors: Rafael Di Tella
    Abstract:

    We present a model where groups attempt to exert Influence on policies using both bribes (plata, Spanish for silver) and the threat of punishment (plomo, Spanish for lead). We then use it to make predictions about the quality of a country's public officials and to understand the role of institutions granting politicians with immunity from legal prosecution. The use of punishment lowers the returns from public office and reduces the incentives of high ability citizens to enter public life. Cheaper plomo and more resources subject to official discretion are associated with more frequent corruption and less able politicians. Moreover, the possibility of punishment changes the nature of the Influence game, so that even cheaper plata can lower the ability of public officials. Protecting officials from accusations of corruption (immunity) will decrease the frequency of corruption and may increase the quality of politicians if the judiciary is weak. These predictions are the opposite to those emerging from a model where only bribes are used.

  • plata o plomo bribe and punishment in a theory of Political Influence
    Research Papers in Economics, 2002
    Co-Authors: Rafael Di Tella
    Abstract:

    We present a model where groups attempt to Influence policies using both bribes (plata, Spanish for silver) and the threat of punishment (plomo, Spanish for lead). We then use it to make predictions about the quality of a country’s public officials and to understand the role of institutions granting politicians with immunity from legal prosecution. The use of punishment lowers the returns from public office and reduces the incentives of high-ability citizens to enter public life. Cheaper plomo and more resources subject to official discretion are associated with more frequent corruption and less able politicians. This predicts that violence in a country will typically go together with corruption and worse politicians. Moreover, the possibility of punishment changes the nature of the Influence game, so that even cheaper plata can lower the ability of public officials. Protecting officials from accusations of corruption (immunity) will decrease the frequency of corruption if the judiciary is weak and may increase the quality of politicians. These predictions cannot emerge from a traditional model where only bribes are used. The positive evils and dangers of the representative, as of every other form of government, may be reduced to two heads: first, general ignorance and incapacity, or, to speak more moderately, insufficient mental qualifications, in the controlling body; secondly, the danger of its being under the Influence of interests not identical with the general welfare of the community.

Martin Schiefelbusch - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Sebastiano Vigna - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Timothy A Judge - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Political Influence behavior and career success
    Journal of Management, 1994
    Co-Authors: Timothy A Judge, Robert D Bretz
    Abstract:

    The present study examined an important yet under-investigated topic, the effect of Political Influence behavior on career success. Drawing from past research on Influence behavior and relevant theory from social psychology, the effect of Political Influence behavior on career success was hypothesized to depend on the type of Influence tactic employed. Results from a sample of past graduates of two universities indicated that supervisor-focused tactics, manifesting a strategy of ingratiation, resulted in higher levels of career success while job-focused tactics, manifesting a strategy of self-promotion, resulted in lower levels of success. Implications of the results for the study of careers and career management processes are discussed.

  • Political Influence behavior and career success
    Academy of Management Proceedings, 1992
    Co-Authors: Timothy A Judge, Robert D Bretz
    Abstract:

    In a recent review, Ferris and Judge (1991) indicated that no studies had investigated the relationship between Influence behavior and overall career success. In the present study, the effect of Influence behavior on career success was hypothesized to depend on the type of tactic employed. Results indicated support for hypotheses

  • Political Influence behavior and career success
    Academy of Management Proceedings, 1992
    Co-Authors: Timothy A Judge, Robert D Bretz
    Abstract:

    In a recent review, Ferris and Judge (1991) indicated that no studies had investigated the relationship between Influence behavior and overall career success. In the present study, the effect of in...

  • personnel human resources management a Political Influence perspective
    Journal of Management, 1991
    Co-Authors: Gerald R Ferris, Timothy A Judge
    Abstract:

    It was suggested over 10 years ago that new and different perspectives should be applied to the Personnel/Human Resources Management (P/HRM)field in an effort to promote theory and research and expand our understanding of the dynamics underlying P/HRM processes. This article tries to address this suggestion in three ways. First, it proposes a Political Influence perspective as an alternative way to view P/HRM decisions and actions. Second, it reviews research investigating Political Influence in key P/HRM areas. Third, it examines the strengths and limitations of the Political Influence perspective relative to other perspectives.

Bradley E Wright - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • connecting the dots in public management Political environment organizational goal ambiguity and the public manager s role ambiguity
    Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2006
    Co-Authors: Sanjay K Pandey, Bradley E Wright
    Abstract:

    This article is a systematic effort to study a key theoretical question from the vantage point of public sector organizational behavior. Most Political science models, with a primary interest in democratic control of bureaucracy, study the Political Influence on the bureaucracy from an agency theory perspective. Organization behavior literature, on the other hand, is focused largely on the study of individual-level phenomena in private organizations and does not incorporate Political context as part of explanatory models. This article proposes a middle-range theory to "connect the dots," beginning with disparate sources in the polity influencing organizational goal ambiguity, which in turn is expected to increase managerial role ambiguity. An empirical test, using data collected from a national survey of managers working in state human service agencies, supports this theoretical model. We find that certain types of Political Influence have an impact on organizational goal ambiguity, which in turn has a direct effect in increasing role ambiguity and also an indirect effect in increasing role ambiguity through organizational structure.