The Experts below are selected from a list of 327 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Weihuan Zhou - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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appellate body report on eu biodiesel the future of china s State capitalism under the wto anti dumping agreement
World Trade Review, 2018Co-Authors: Weihuan ZhouAbstract:China's unique economic system poses increasing challenges to the world trading system and attracts growing academic and policy debate. WTO members have frequently resorted to antidumping measures in dealing with price distortions caused by the Chinese government's influence on the economy. The Appellate Body's decision in the recent EU–Biodiesel dispute starts to remove the flexibility of condemning State Intervention and price distortions under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement through antidumping measures. This decision, read with the relevant WTO jurisprudence on the ‘ordinary course of trade’ test and subsidies, suggests that price distortions resulting from State Intervention should be addressed under other WTO rules. Therefore, it is necessary for WTO members to shift their focus to, and explore the capacity of, the other rules to overcome the challenges arising from China's State capitalism.
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appellate body report on eu biodiesel the future of china s State capitalism under the wto anti dumping agreement
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Weihuan ZhouAbstract:China’s unique economic system poses increasing challenges to the world trading system and attracts growing academic and policy debates. WTO members have frequently resorted to antidumping measures in dealing with price distortions caused by Chinese government influence in the economy. The Appellate Body’s decision in the recent EU – Biodiesel dispute starts to remove the flexibility of condemning State Intervention and price distortions under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement through antidumping measures. This decision, read with the relevant WTO jurisprudence on the “ordinary course of trade” test and subsidies, suggests that price distortions resulting from State Intervention should be addressed under other WTO rules. Therefore, it is necessary for WTO members to shift their focus to, and explore the capacity of, the other rules to overcome the challenges arising from China’s State capitalism.
Mark C Weidemaier - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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contracting for State Intervention the origins of sovereign debt arbitration
2011Co-Authors: Mark C WeidemaierAbstract:Most models of contracting behavior assume that contract terms are meant to be enforced, whether through legal or relational means. That assumption extends to dispute resolution terms like arbitration clauses. According to theory, contracting parties adopt arbitration clauses because they want to arbitrate disputes and because they believe that a counter-party who has agreed to arbitrate will keep that promise rather than incur the resulting legal or extra-legal sanction.In this article, I describe how this standard account cannot explain the origins of arbitration clauses in sovereign bond contracts. Drawing on original archival research and secondary sources, the article traces the routine use of arbitration clauses to U.S. dollar diplomacy in the first decades of the 20th century and shows that these early clauses were not designed to facilitate an arbitration between lender and borrower. Instead, the clauses were designed to justify Intervention by capital-exporting States on behalf of disappointed citizen-investors and to convince prospective investors that the prospect of such Intervention would deter default. These early arbitration clauses, then, were little more than efforts to signify and project power by capital-exporting States. The article traces the evolution of arbitration clauses over the first half of the century and concludes that lenders often hoped (typically in vain) that these clauses would enable them to harness the enforcement capacity of State actors.
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contracting for State Intervention the origins of sovereign debt arbitration
Law and contemporary problems, 2010Co-Authors: Mark C WeidemaierAbstract:I INTRODUCTION Most models of contracting behavior assume that contracts are drafted with the expectation that their terms will be enforced, whether through legal or relational means. That assumption extends to contract terms governing the method of enforcement, such as arbitration clauses. According to theory, contracting parties keep promises to arbitrate either because they know courts will compel them to do so (or will enforce an arbitral award rendered in their absence) or because compliance is necessary to avoid some reputational or other extra-legal sanction. In other words, parties include arbitration clauses in their contracts because they want to arbitrate disputes and because they believe that a counter-party who has agreed to arbitrate will be unable or unwilling to renege on this promise. In this article, written for a symposium on innovations on the sovereign debt markets, I describe how this account cannot explain the origins of arbitration clauses in contracts related to sovereign lending) Sovereign debt arbitration has been much in the news of late, primarily due to bondholders' efforts to arbitrate claims arising out of Argentina's 2001 default before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). (2) The reality, however, is that modern sovereign debt contracts generally choose litigation in national courts over arbitration. (3) But this was not always the case. In the first several decades of the twentieth century, arbitration clauses appeared with some frequency in sovereign debt contracts. That these contracts would have addressed dispute resolution at all is somewhat surprising. As part I of this article explains, one might expect such terms to have originated sometime in the mid-twentieth century, when changes to the law of sovereign immunity made it feasible for creditors to obtain a judgment based on a sovereign government's ex ante consent to litigation or arbitration. During the previous era of absolute immunity, by contrast, States typically were immune from suit unless they consented at the time of the lawsuit itself. Since any dispute-resolution process would require the sovereign's ex post consent, there would seem little point to bargaining over such a process ex ante. More puzzling still, there is little evidence that sovereign borrowers voluntarily complied with their promises to arbitrate future disputes. Thus, a ready solution to the puzzle--that borrowers kept their arbitration-related promises to maintain their reputations as reliable transaction partners--appears inapt. So what explains the use of arbitration clauses in these early-twentieth century contracts? Part II of this article draws on both original archival research and secondary-source material to offer a preliminary answer to this question. Tracing the routine use of arbitration clauses in sovereign loans to U.S. dollar diplomacy in Latin America and the Caribbean in the early 1900s, it argues that arbitration clauses often had little to do with facilitating an arbitration between lender and borrower. Instead, the clauses were designed to encourage, and at times enable, influential capital-exporting States to participate in resolving disputes arising out of sovereign loans. (4) Equally important, the clauses signaled to investors--at times, inaccurately--that important creditor States supported the loan and would view default with disfavor. In their earliest incarnations, then, these clauses had little to do with facilitating an actual lender-borrower arbitration. They were instead tools to signify and justify the projection of power by creditor States. This article then briefly explores what these findings imply about the relationship between State actors and contract design. It is widely recognized, of course, that State-supplied law constitutes a set of implied terms that govern the content and manner of private exchanges unless the contracting parties agree otherwise. …
Heather Wendt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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class forces political institutions and State Intervention subnational economic development policy in the united States 1971 1990
2006Co-Authors: Craig J Jenkins, Kevin T Leicht, Heather WendtAbstract:The United States has experienced a significantdevolution of social and economic policy responsibilities to the States sincethe early 1970s. In an attempt to improve tax bases and generate jobs, Stateand local governments have adopted proactive economic development policies thattarget favored industries, promoting State Intervention in the privatemarketplace. The development of these policies is examined here in terms of:(1) the articulation of class interests, (2) State-level politicalinstitutions, (3) prior political legacies, (4) underlying production regimes,and (5) interactions of strong political institutions and classmobilization. An annual pooled cross-sectional time series design is used to capture theadoption of entrepreneurial, industrial recruitment, and labor marketregulation development policies in the lower 48 States. Results highlight theenduring role of class and State capacities to mediate and condition theeffects of organized class actors in the United States. In addition to businesspower and strong State capacities, the political legacies of 1930s welfarepolicy innovations and mezocorporatist bargaining potential condition theeffects of business power. (LKB)
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class forces political institutions and State Intervention subnational economic development policy in the united States 1971 1990
American Journal of Sociology, 2006Co-Authors: Craig J Jenkins, Kevin T Leicht, Heather WendtAbstract:The United States has experienced a major devolution of social and economic policy responsibilities to the States. Subnational industrial policies to create jobs and qualitative economic growth are key to this devolution. The authors examine the development of these policies in terms of (1) the articulation of class interests, (2) State‐level political institutions, (3) prior political legacies, (4) underlying production regimes, and (5) interactions of strong political institutions and class mobilization. An annual pooled cross‐sectional time‐series analysis of three State‐level economic development policies (entrepreneurial, industrial recruitment, and labor market regulation) shows that in addition to business power and strong State capacities, the political legacies of 1930s welfare policy innovations and mezocorporatist bargaining potential condition the effects of business power.
Kevin Keasey - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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industrial policy as an engine of economic growth a framework of analysis and evidence from south korea 1960 96
Business History, 2012Co-Authors: Jongseok Lee, Iain Clacher, Kevin KeaseyAbstract:The recent financial crisis has raised significant questions about liberal free-markets as a mechanism for generating economic growth compared to those economies where there is greater State Intervention. This article develops a theoretical framework for economic development that can explain historical changes in both industrial policy and economic growth where the State actively intervenes to direct economic development. The article then applies this framework to the case of South Korea where there is a strong Interventionist government. The results show that economic development can be explained within a sequential framework of policy Intervention and that rather than being a static decision, successful State Intervention is a dynamic and evolutionary process.
Nick Cowen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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hayek versus trump the radical right s road to serfdom
Polity, 2020Co-Authors: Aris Trantidis, Nick CowenAbstract:Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom has been interpreted as a general warning against State Intervention in the economy.1 We review this argument in conjunction with Hayek’s later work and discern an insti...
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Hayek versus Trump: The Radical Right’s Road to Serfdom
Polity, 2020Co-Authors: Aris Trantidis, Nick CowenAbstract:Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom has been interpreted as a general warning against State Intervention in the economy.1 We review this argument in conjunction with Hayek’s later work and discern an insti...
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hayek versus trump the radical right s road to serfdom
2019Co-Authors: Aris Trantidis, Nick CowenAbstract:Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom has been interpreted as a general warning against State Intervention in the economy. We review this argument in conjunction with Hayek’s later work and discern an institutional thesis about which forms of State Intervention and economic institutions could threaten personal and political freedom. Economic institutions pose a threat if they allow for coercive Interventions as described by Hayek in The Constitution of Liberty: by giving someone the power to force others to serve one’s will by the threat of inflicting harm, in the absence of general rules of conduct. According to the logic of the argument, welfare-State provisions are not coercive insofar as they do not allow the identification and discriminatory treatment of individuals. By contrast, we claim that a structure of coercion is likely to emerge from the command-and-control nature of protectionist institutions and immigration restrictions currently advocated by the Radical Right.
