The Experts below are selected from a list of 20064 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Yanqi Tong - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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transitions from state socialism economic and Political change in hungary and china
The Journal of Asian Studies, 1999Co-Authors: Timothy Cheek, Yanqi TongAbstract:Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 Hungary and China Under State Socialism Chapter 3 Preliminary Ideological and Political Liberalization Chapter 4 The Political Consequences of Economic Reform Chapter 5 Societal Challenges to the Political Establishment Chapter 6 The Adaptability of the Political Establishment Chapter 7 Coalition and Confrontation Chapter 8 Developments in Hungary and China After 1989 Chapter 9 Conclusion
Mary E Gallagher - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Introduction to Contagious Capitalism: Globalization and the Politics of Labor in China
Introductory Chapters, 2007Co-Authors: Mary E GallagherAbstract:One of the core assumptions of recent American foreign policy is that China's post-1978 policy of "reform and openness" will lead to Political Liberalization. This book challenges that assumption and the general relationship between economic Liberalization and democratization. Moreover, it analyzes the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) Liberalization on Chinese labor politics. Market reforms and increased integration with the global economy have brought about unprecedented economic growth and social change in China during the last quarter of a century. Contagious Capitalism contends that FDI Liberalization played several roles in the process of China's reforms. First, it placed competitive pressure on the state sector to produce more efficiently, thus necessitating new labor practices. Second, it allowed difficult and Politically sensitive labor reforms to be extended to other parts of the economy. Third, it caused a reformulation of one of the key ideological debates of reforming socialism: the relative importance of public industry. China's growing integration with the global economy through FDI led to a new focus of debate--away from the public vs. private industry dichotomy and toward a nationalist concern for the fate of Chinese industry. In comparing China with other Eastern European and Asian economies, two important considerations come into play, the book argues: China's pattern of ownership diversification and China's mode of integration into the global economy. This book relates these two factors to the success of economic change without Political Liberalization and addresses the way FDI Liberalization has affected relations between workers and the ruling Communist Party. Its conclusion: reform and openness in this context resulted in a strengthened Chinese state, a weakened civil society (especially labor), and a delay in Political Liberalization.
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reform and openness why china s economic reforms have delayed democracy
World Politics, 2002Co-Authors: Mary E GallagherAbstract:Most theories that seek to explain democratization look to changes in the economy as the precursor to significant Political Liberalization, locating the main causal factor in either severe economic crisis or rapid economic growth. In the Chinese context, by contrast, the Communist Party has extricated itself from the socialist social contract with the urban working class without losing its grip on Political power. Moreover, China has maintained a rapid pace of economic growth for over twenty-five years without significant Political Liberalization. Comparative analysis of China's post-1978 reform policies yields insights both across types of socialist transition, comparing China with Eastern Europe and Russia, and across time, comparing China with other high-growth East Asian economies. A key factor in China's ability to reform the economy without sacrificing Political control is the timing and sequencing of its foreign direct investment (FDI) Liberalization. There are two key variables that are important to this comparative analysis: China's pattern of ownership diversification and China's mode of integration into the global economy. The article relates these two variables to the success of economic change without Political Liberalization, in particular, how FDI Liberalization has affected relations between workers and the ruling Communist Party. "Reform and openness" in this context resulted in a strengthened Chinese state, a weakened civil society (especially labor), and a delay in Political Liberalization.
Timothy Cheek - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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transitions from state socialism economic and Political change in hungary and china
The Journal of Asian Studies, 1999Co-Authors: Timothy Cheek, Yanqi TongAbstract:Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 Hungary and China Under State Socialism Chapter 3 Preliminary Ideological and Political Liberalization Chapter 4 The Political Consequences of Economic Reform Chapter 5 Societal Challenges to the Political Establishment Chapter 6 The Adaptability of the Political Establishment Chapter 7 Coalition and Confrontation Chapter 8 Developments in Hungary and China After 1989 Chapter 9 Conclusion
Cyrus Samii - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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International Institutions and Political Liberalization: Evidence from the World Bank Loans Program
British Journal of Political Science, 2017Co-Authors: Allison Carnegie, Cyrus SamiiAbstract:How do international institutions affect Political Liberalization in member states? Motivated by an examination of the World Bank loans program, this article shows that institutions can incentivize Liberalization by offering opportunities for countries to become associated with advanced, wealthy members. In the World Bank, when a loan recipient reaches a specified level of economic development, it becomes eligible to graduate from borrower status to lender status. Using a regression discontinuity design, the study demonstrates that this incentive motivates states to improve their domestic behavior with respect to human rights and democracy. Combining qualitative and quantitative evidence, the results suggest that the desire to become a member of this elite group is responsible for motivating member states to reform due to the belief that such membership brings diffuse international and domestic benefits.
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International Institutions and Political Liberalization: Evidence from the World Bank Loans Program
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014Co-Authors: Allison Carnegie, Cyrus SamiiAbstract:How do international institutions affect Political Liberalization in member states? Motivated by an examination of the World Bank loans program, we argue that institutions can confer prestige in exchange for Political reforms. When offered an opportunity to improve their institutionally-conferred status, thereby boosting their international and domestic reputations, states are willing to make policy concessions in exchange. To test our theory, we exploit a unique feature of the World Bank loans program: when a loan recipient reaches a specified level of economic development, it becomes eligible to graduate from borrower status. Although graduation entails losing access to loans, governments typically seek to graduate. We show that governments view graduation as an indicator of the transition from a developing state to a developed state. Using a unique regression discontinuity design, we demonstrate that when states become eligible for graduation, their governments democratize to achieve this enhanced status. Thus, a government's interest in improving its status in the international system can motivate domestic reform.
Jennifer A Widner - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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economic change and Political Liberalization in sub saharan africa
Foreign Affairs, 1995Co-Authors: Jennifer A WidnerAbstract:In 1989, following the beginning of democratization in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe, a wave of Political Liberalization swept countries south of the Sahara. In "Economic and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa", Jennifer Widner brings together a distinguished group of scholars to examine the reasons for these tentative steps toward democracy in a context of poverty, highlighting the effects of economic crisis on demands for Political reform. Combining broadly comparative, theoretical chapters with important case studies that offer new hypotheses for consideration, the book seeks to establish the nature of the relationship between the economic challenges of the 1980s and the steps toward greater Political openness taken by governments at the end of that decade. Cases include Benin, the first African country to engage in Political liberation in this period, as well as Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana and Cameroon.
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Two Leadership Styles and Patterns of Political Liberalization
African Studies Review, 1994Co-Authors: Jennifer A WidnerAbstract:In his novels and essays and most recently in the pages of The New York Times , Nigerian author Chinua Achebe has repeatedly claimed that the “trouble with Nigeria” lies with its leaders (1982, 1993)—and few of those who followed the pronouncements of General Babangida would say that the actions of the Nigerian head of state were without import for the Political future of the country. Achebe finds an intellectual ally in social scientist Giuseppe de Palma (1992), who argues that the actions of decision makers at critical junctures in the process of Political opening shape the range of choices and the kinds of risks they and their successors face subsequently. Although the conditions that make democratic consolidation more or less difficult may be a function of levels of socioeconomic development, the presence or absence of a civic culture, or the existence of a middle class, the decisions of leaders matter. Democracies are crafted, not born whole. This essay tries to identify the sources of difference in leadership style during a period of Political reform. It proceeds from two observations. First, tactical and strategic choices of leaders are partly a function of the incentive structures Political and economic institutions offer. Electoral rules, the amount of central control over important electoral resources such as the media, participation in regional monetary agreements—all of these institutions shape the options available for building coalitions.
