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Lorenzo Sacconi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ethics economic organisation and the Social Contract
Research Papers in Economics, 2012Co-Authors: Lorenzo SacconiAbstract:This chapter introduces a notion of Social/ethical norm that integrates its description as a self- sustaining regularity of behavior with the normative meanings of the statements by which a norm is formulated in the moral language. This definition is applied to organizational ethics where the main problem Ð abuse of authority - is identified with the help of a critical reading of the new-institutional economic theory of the firm. Given a game theoretical definition of an institution, it is then shown that only by integrating it with the Social Contract as shared mode of reasoning the process of convergence to the beliefs system that backs an equilibrium institution may be started. Thus the chapter illustrates the egalitarian Social Contract as both an impartial justification for organizational constitutions and as an equilibrium selection device. It is shown that equilibrium selection through the Social Contract solves the problem of legitimization of authority in the organizational relation between a non-controlling stakeholder and the entrepreneur or the management of a firm, holding hierarchical authority over the stakeholder. The result is a fiduciary relation between a stakeholder (the trustor) and the owner, director or manager (the trustees) based on fair distribution of the firm surplus. This is the basis for the explanation of corporate Social responsibility, understood as an extended model of organizational governance. It generalizes to all the possible ownership forms of the economic organization, giving credit to the idea that Social responsibility is an overarching Social norm in the field of organization governance.
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a Social Contract account for csr as an extended model of corporate governance ii compliance reputation and reciprocity
Journal of Business Ethics, 2007Co-Authors: Lorenzo SacconiAbstract:This essay seeks to give a Contractarian foundation to the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), meant as an extended model of corporate governance of the firm. Whereas, justificatory issues have been discussed in a related paper (Sacconi, L.: 2006b, this journal), in this essay I focus on the implementation of and compliance with this normative model. The theory of reputation games, with reference to the basic game of trust, is introduced in order to make sense of self-regulation as a way to implement the Social Contract on the multi-fiduciary model of corporate governance. This affords understanding of why self-regulation, meant as mere recourse to a long-run strategy in a repeated trust game, fails. Two basic problems for the functioning of the reputation mechanism are examined: the cognitive fragility problem, and the motivational problem. As regards the cognitive fragilities of reputation (which result from the impact of unforeseen contingencies and from bounded rationality), the paper develops the logic and the structure that self-regulatory norms must satisfy if they are to serve as gap-filling tools with which to remedy cognitive limitations in the reputation mechanism. The motivation problem then arises from the possibility of sophisticated abuse by the firm. Developed in this case is an entirely new application of the theory of conformism-and-reciprocity-based preferences, the result of which is that the stakeholders refuse to acquiesce to sophisticated abuse on the part of the firm.
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corporate Social responsibility csr as a model of extended corporate governance an explanation based on the economic theories of Social Contract reputation and reciprocal conformism
LIUC Papers in Ethics Law and Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Lorenzo SacconiAbstract:This paper first sets a definition of corporate Social responsibility (CSR) as an extended model of corporate governance and then accounts for a voluntary approach to CSR, meant as voluntary compliance with CSR strategic management standards, in terms of an economic theory of self-regulation based on the concepts of Social Contract, reputation and reciprocal conformism. The paper argues that extended fiduciary duties toward all the firm's stakeholders are needed because of the same neo-institutional analysis of the firm that justifies it as a unified system of governance of economic transactions based on authority relations and residual rights of control. The key concept here is that of abuse of firm's authority vis-a-vis the stakeholders who hold incomplete Contracts with the firm. Extended fiduciary duties are singled out from the model of a Social Contract amongst the firm's stakeholders. This provide for a clear cut and calculable criterion of strategic management no less able to set a bottom-line to the firm management than the profit maximisation principle, while being able of answering legitimate claims of fair treatment from all the firm's stakeholders. Such a task is accomplished by an application of the theory of bargaining games to the Social Contract of the firm, which employs the Nash-Harsanyi bargaining solution as a normative criterion for strategic management and corporate governance, providing an answer to the deficit of uniqueness problem raised by Michael Jensen (2001) against the notion of stakeholders value. Then, the paper distinguishes two models of self regulation (the discretionary one, and the explicit-norms-cum-self-enforcement one) and argues that while incomplete Contracts and imperfect knowledge debar form resorting to reputation effects in order to support discretional self-regulation, on the contrary an explicit standard for CSR strategic management, based on general and abstract business ethics principles and precautionary protocols and rules of behaviour - both publicly shared by stakeholders and firms through Social dialog - make possible to put again at work the reputation mechanism inducing endogenous incentives of compliance with a voluntary standard. The paper here suggests how (by both fuzzy logic and default reasoning ) a CSR Strategic Management Standard may work as a cognitive gap filling tool with respect to the firm's commitments and the stakeholders' expectations in presence of incomplete information. Moreover recent developments in the theory of conformist non-purely-self-interested preferences add motivational force to the basic result about self-enforcement of a CSR management standard. Hence, conformist preferences solve the problem of optimal mixed strategies that otherwise could enable the firm inducing the stakeholders to “trust” it without really conforming to a CSR standard. This result is given a formal proof in sec.11. The paper concludes with a collusion-proof design of intermediate Social bodies (civil society institutions) that may answer the demand for assurance and external verifiability of CSR standards compliance by independent third-parties.
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corporate Social responsibility csr as a model of extended corporate governance an explanation based on the economic theories of Social Contract reputation and reciprocal conformism
Social Science Research Network, 2004Co-Authors: Lorenzo SacconiAbstract:This paper first sets a definition of corporate Social responsibility (CSR) as an extended model of corporate governance and then accounts for a voluntary approach to CSR, meant as voluntary compliance with CSR strategic management standards, in terms of an economic theory of self-regulation based on the concepts of Social Contract, reputation and reciprocal conformism. The paper argues that extended fiduciary duties toward all the firm's stakeholders are needed because of the same neo-institutional analysis of the firm that justifies it as a unified system of governance of economic transactions based on authority relations and residual rights of control. The key concept here is that of abuse of firm's authority vis-a-vis the stakeholders who hold incomplete Contracts with the firm. Extended fiduciary duties are singled out from the model of a Social Contract amongst the firm's stakeholders. This provide for a clear cut and calculable criterion of strategic management no less able to set a bottom-line to the firm management than the profit maximisation principle, while being able of answering legitimate claims of fair treatment from all the firm's stakeholders. Such a task is accomplished by an application of the theory of bargaining games to the Social Contract of the firm, which employs the Nash-Harsanyi bargaining solution as a normative criterion for strategic management and corporate governance, providing an answer to the deficit of uniqueness problem raised by Michael Jensen (2001) against the notion of stakeholders value. Then, the paper distinguishes two models of self regulation (the discretionary one, and the explicit-norms-cum-self-enforcement one) and argues that while incomplete Contracts and imperfect knowledge debar form resorting to reputation effects in order to support discretional self-regulation, on the contrary an explicit standard for CSR strategic management, based on general and abstract business ethics principles and precautionary protocols and rules of behaviour - both publicly shared by stakeholders and firms through Social dialog - make possible to put again at work the reputation mechanism inducing endogenous incentives of compliance with a voluntary standard. The paper here suggests how (by both fuzzy logic and default reasoning) a CSR Strategic Management Standard may work as a cognitive gap filling tool with respect to the firm's commitments and the stakeholders' expectations in presence of incomplete information. Moreover recent developments in the theory of conformist non-purely-self-interested preferences add motivational force to the basic result about self-enforcement of a CSR management standard. Hence, conformist preferences solve the problem of optimal mixed strategies that otherwise could enable the firm inducing the stakeholders to "trust" it without really conforming to a CSR standard. This result is given a formal proof in sec.11. The paper concludes with a collusion-proof design of intermediate Social bodies (civil society institutions) that may answer the demand for assurance and external verifiability of CSR standards compliance by independent third.
Peter Temin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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corporate health care purchasing and the revised Social Contract with workers
Business & Society, 2000Co-Authors: J G Maxwell, Forrest Briscoe, Peter TeminAbstract:The implicit Social Contract between large companies and their employees has been recently revised to emphasize workforce flexibility and the financial responsibility of individual employees for their own employment and benefits-related decisions. The most recent aspect of this Social Contract to be significantly changed is health care benefits. On the basis of in-depth case studies of health benefits purchasing at 15 large United States employers, the authors found that the reported use of a purchasing technique called managed competitionhas enabled firms to bring health benefits purchasing in line with other elements of the revised Social Contract. An important minority of companies in our study appear to have retained a different, “employer responsibility” approach toward employee health benefits, leading them to move more gradually to managed competition purchasing and refrain from instituting heavy premium cost sharing or cutting coverage for their employees. These findings are preliminary and deserv...
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corporate health care purchasing and the revised Social Contract with workers
Business & Society, 2000Co-Authors: James Maxwell, Forrest Briscoe, Peter TeminAbstract:The implicit Social Contract between large companies and their employees has been recently revised to emphasize workforce flexibility and the financial responsibility of individual employees for their own employment and benefits-related decisions. The most recent aspect of this Social Contract to be significantly changed is health care benefits. On the basis of in-depth case studies of health benefits purchasing at 15 large United States employers, the authors found that the reported use of a purchasing technique called managed competition has enabled firms to bring health benefits purchasing in line with other elements of the revised Social Contract. An important minority of companies in our study appear to have retained a different, employer responsibility approach toward employee health benefits, leading them to move more gradually to managed competition purchasing and refrain from instituting heavy premium cost sharing or cutting coverage for their employees. These findings are preliminary and deserve further study as to their generalizability and persistence
Jill Gabrielle Klein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Ethical decision making and research deception in the behavioral sciences: An application of Social Contract theory
Ethics and Behavior, 2011Co-Authors: Allan J. Kimmel, N. Craig Smith, Jill Gabrielle KleinAbstract:Despite significant ethical advances in recent years, including professional developments in ethical review and codification, research deception continues to be a pervasive practice and contentious focus of debate in the behavioral sciences. Given the disciplines’ generally-stated ethical standards regarding the use of deceptive procedures, researchers have little practical guidance as to their ethical acceptability in specific research contexts. We use Social Contract theory to identify the conditions under which deception may or may not be morally permissible, and formulate practical recommendations to guide researchers on the ethical employment of deception in behavioral science research.
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Social Contract theory and the ethics of deception in consumer research
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 2009Co-Authors: Craig N Smith, Allan J. Kimmel, Jill Gabrielle KleinAbstract:Abstract Deception of research participants is a pervasive ethical issue in experimental consumer research. Content analyses find as many as three-fourths of published human participant studies in our field involved some form of deception, almost all of which employed experimental methodologies. However, researchers have little guidance on the acceptability of the use of deception, notwithstanding the codes of root disciplines. We turn to theories of moral philosophy and use Social Contract theory specifically to identify conditions under which deception may be justified as morally permissible. Seven guiding principles for research practice are formulated and their implications for consumer researchers are identified, together with practical recommendations for decision making on studies involving deception.
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Social Contract Theory and the Ethics of Deception in Consumer Research
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 2009Co-Authors: N. Craig Smith, Allan J. Kimmel, Jill Gabrielle KleinAbstract:Deception of research participants is a pervasive ethical issue in experimental consumer research. Content analyses find as many as three-quarters of published human participant studies in our field involved some form of deception and almost all of these deceptive studies employed experimental methodologies. However, researchers have little guidance on the acceptability of this use of deception, notwithstanding the codes of root disciplines. We turn to the theories of moral philosophy and use Social Contract theory to identify conditions under which deception may be justified as morally permissible. Seven principles to guide research practice are formulated and their implications for consumer researchers and others are identified, together with practical recommendations for decision making on deception studies.
Forrest Briscoe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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corporate health care purchasing and the revised Social Contract with workers
Business & Society, 2000Co-Authors: J G Maxwell, Forrest Briscoe, Peter TeminAbstract:The implicit Social Contract between large companies and their employees has been recently revised to emphasize workforce flexibility and the financial responsibility of individual employees for their own employment and benefits-related decisions. The most recent aspect of this Social Contract to be significantly changed is health care benefits. On the basis of in-depth case studies of health benefits purchasing at 15 large United States employers, the authors found that the reported use of a purchasing technique called managed competitionhas enabled firms to bring health benefits purchasing in line with other elements of the revised Social Contract. An important minority of companies in our study appear to have retained a different, “employer responsibility” approach toward employee health benefits, leading them to move more gradually to managed competition purchasing and refrain from instituting heavy premium cost sharing or cutting coverage for their employees. These findings are preliminary and deserv...
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corporate health care purchasing and the revised Social Contract with workers
Business & Society, 2000Co-Authors: James Maxwell, Forrest Briscoe, Peter TeminAbstract:The implicit Social Contract between large companies and their employees has been recently revised to emphasize workforce flexibility and the financial responsibility of individual employees for their own employment and benefits-related decisions. The most recent aspect of this Social Contract to be significantly changed is health care benefits. On the basis of in-depth case studies of health benefits purchasing at 15 large United States employers, the authors found that the reported use of a purchasing technique called managed competition has enabled firms to bring health benefits purchasing in line with other elements of the revised Social Contract. An important minority of companies in our study appear to have retained a different, employer responsibility approach toward employee health benefits, leading them to move more gradually to managed competition purchasing and refrain from instituting heavy premium cost sharing or cutting coverage for their employees. These findings are preliminary and deserve further study as to their generalizability and persistence
Leslie P Francis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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justice through trust disability and the outlier problem in Social Contract theory
Social Science Research Network, 2005Co-Authors: Anita Silvers, Leslie P FrancisAbstract:Viewed as a bargain among equals for reciprocal advantage, Social Contract theory has been criticized as ignoring outliers such as persons with disabilities. Critics such as Martha Nussbaum have contended that the idea of a Social Contract must be abandoned in favor of other ways of modeling justice. This article contends that the problem lies in modeling Social Contract justifications as bargaining for mutual advantage. The insight of Social Contract theory rests on the importance of respect for individuals with differing conceptions of their good. Reconceptualizing Contract theory in terms of building trust relationships fosters inclusiveness and respect.
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justice through trust disability and the outlier problem in Social Contract theory
Ethics, 2005Co-Authors: Anita Silvers, Leslie P FrancisAbstract:During the past quarter century, commentators concerned about justice for women and racial minorities have argued that Social Contract theory is inherently flawed. Far from offering a firm foundation on which to build comprehensive concurrence about justice, these critics contend, the Contract model enables mutual agreement only within the boundaries of an “in-group/out-group” frame. Pateman, for example, has argued that the Contract model reaches only a restrictive mutuality that privileges men and denies recognition to women. Mills has similarly claimed that Contract theory positions African Americans at a disadvan-
