The Experts below are selected from a list of 201 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Pablo Querubin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers' Union
    American Journal of Political Science, 2017
    Co-Authors: Horacio Larreguy, Cesar E. Montiel Olea, Pablo Querubin
    Abstract:

    Political brokers mobilize voters all over the world, yet little is known about what motivates them to do so. This article theorizes about two drivers of brokers' efforts: (1) incentives—monetary rewards or sanctions—and monitoring and (2) partisan attachment. We examine our theory using data on the Mexican National Educational Workers Union (SNTE), Latin America's largest union and a well-known Political Machine. Consistent with the role of teachers as brokers, we find that the vote share of parties supported by the SNTE Machine is higher in polling stations located in schools. This effect is absent when teachers are asked to mobilize voters in support of a party for which they have no partisan attachment, and it is uncorrelated with the union's monitoring capacity. This suggests that partisan attachment, rather than incentives and monitoring, explains the SNTE's effectiveness as a Political Machine.

  • The Role of Labor Unions as Political Machines: Evidence from the Case of the Mexican Teachers' Union
    2014
    Co-Authors: Horacio Larreguy, Cesar E. Montiel Olea, Pablo Querubin
    Abstract:

    In this paper we analyze the electoral role of the Mexican teacher’s union as a Political Machine. To study its eect on electoral outcomes, we exploit variation across time in its Political alliances, whether polling stations are located in schools {which facilitates the Machine’s operation{ and its strength across Mexican states. Our ndings suggest that the candidates supported by the Machine of the teacher’s union experience a signicant increase in their vote share when a polling station is located in a school. However, such an eect is only present in the areas where the leadership of the teacher’s union exerts inuence over its aliates. We also show evidence that is consistent with the fact that SNTE uses electoral results at a low level of aggregation to monitor school directors and teachers.

Horacio Larreguy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers' Union
    American Journal of Political Science, 2017
    Co-Authors: Horacio Larreguy, Cesar E. Montiel Olea, Pablo Querubin
    Abstract:

    Political brokers mobilize voters all over the world, yet little is known about what motivates them to do so. This article theorizes about two drivers of brokers' efforts: (1) incentives—monetary rewards or sanctions—and monitoring and (2) partisan attachment. We examine our theory using data on the Mexican National Educational Workers Union (SNTE), Latin America's largest union and a well-known Political Machine. Consistent with the role of teachers as brokers, we find that the vote share of parties supported by the SNTE Machine is higher in polling stations located in schools. This effect is absent when teachers are asked to mobilize voters in support of a party for which they have no partisan attachment, and it is uncorrelated with the union's monitoring capacity. This suggests that partisan attachment, rather than incentives and monitoring, explains the SNTE's effectiveness as a Political Machine.

  • The Role of Labor Unions as Political Machines: Evidence from the Case of the Mexican Teachers' Union
    2014
    Co-Authors: Horacio Larreguy, Cesar E. Montiel Olea, Pablo Querubin
    Abstract:

    In this paper we analyze the electoral role of the Mexican teacher’s union as a Political Machine. To study its eect on electoral outcomes, we exploit variation across time in its Political alliances, whether polling stations are located in schools {which facilitates the Machine’s operation{ and its strength across Mexican states. Our ndings suggest that the candidates supported by the Machine of the teacher’s union experience a signicant increase in their vote share when a polling station is located in a school. However, such an eect is only present in the areas where the leadership of the teacher’s union exerts inuence over its aliates. We also show evidence that is consistent with the fact that SNTE uses electoral results at a low level of aggregation to monitor school directors and teachers.

Cesar E. Montiel Olea - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers' Union
    American Journal of Political Science, 2017
    Co-Authors: Horacio Larreguy, Cesar E. Montiel Olea, Pablo Querubin
    Abstract:

    Political brokers mobilize voters all over the world, yet little is known about what motivates them to do so. This article theorizes about two drivers of brokers' efforts: (1) incentives—monetary rewards or sanctions—and monitoring and (2) partisan attachment. We examine our theory using data on the Mexican National Educational Workers Union (SNTE), Latin America's largest union and a well-known Political Machine. Consistent with the role of teachers as brokers, we find that the vote share of parties supported by the SNTE Machine is higher in polling stations located in schools. This effect is absent when teachers are asked to mobilize voters in support of a party for which they have no partisan attachment, and it is uncorrelated with the union's monitoring capacity. This suggests that partisan attachment, rather than incentives and monitoring, explains the SNTE's effectiveness as a Political Machine.

  • The Role of Labor Unions as Political Machines: Evidence from the Case of the Mexican Teachers' Union
    2014
    Co-Authors: Horacio Larreguy, Cesar E. Montiel Olea, Pablo Querubin
    Abstract:

    In this paper we analyze the electoral role of the Mexican teacher’s union as a Political Machine. To study its eect on electoral outcomes, we exploit variation across time in its Political alliances, whether polling stations are located in schools {which facilitates the Machine’s operation{ and its strength across Mexican states. Our ndings suggest that the candidates supported by the Machine of the teacher’s union experience a signicant increase in their vote share when a polling station is located in a school. However, such an eect is only present in the areas where the leadership of the teacher’s union exerts inuence over its aliates. We also show evidence that is consistent with the fact that SNTE uses electoral results at a low level of aggregation to monitor school directors and teachers.

Patrick D. Joyce - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Mason W. Moseley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Life in the Political Machine - Tilling the Soil of an Uneven Landscape: Dirty Politics in Dominant-Party Enclaves
    Life in the Political Machine, 2020
    Co-Authors: Jonathan T. Hiskey, Mason W. Moseley
    Abstract:

    This chapter offers an evaluation of a central proposition of the study—that citizens living in dominant-party enclaves will be more exposed to and familiar with such Political Machine tactics as clientelism and corruption than those citizens living in multiparty systems. The empirical analysis offers robust support for the idea that while no Political system is immune to dirty politics, individuals living in dominant-party enclaves are far more likely to have direct experience with corrupt public officials and efforts to buy their votes than their counterparts in multiparty provinces. The chapter concludes with an analysis of citizens’ perceptions of corruption and government efforts to combat it. We find that those victims of corruption in dominant-party enclaves are less inclined to view corruption as a problem than their multiparty neighbors. For the former group of citizens, the dirty politics of Political Machines appears to be viewed as business as usual.

  • Life in the Political Machine
    2020
    Co-Authors: Jonathan T. Hiskey, Mason W. Moseley
    Abstract:

    Against the backdrop of a world characterized by highly uneven democracies, in which subnational dominant-party enclaves persist within nationally democratic regimes, this book explores the ways in which these enclaves shape the Political attitudes and behaviors of citizens who reside in them. Through analysis of a decade’s worth of survey data across the 55 provinces and states of Argentina and Mexico, this study finds a distinct subnational Political culture among individuals nested in dominant-party enclaves. This culture is characterized by heightened exposure to corruption and vote buying, low levels of support for democratic principles, and patterns of Political behavior that reflect the governing characteristics of the Political Machines that citizens must confront on a daily basis. In contrast, among those individuals living in subnational Political systems that have successfully shut down the Machine, the work finds a Political culture more akin to that found in established democracies. As such, this book provides extensive support for the need to more fully incorporate subnational Political dynamics into accounts of the drivers behind citizens’ Political attitudes and behaviors, in an era in which democracies across the world appear increasingly at risk.

  • Life in the Political Machine - Dominant-Party Citizens
    Life in the Political Machine, 2020
    Co-Authors: Jonathan T. Hiskey, Mason W. Moseley
    Abstract:

    This chapter presents a theory of dominant-party citizens that posits a connection between one’s subnational Political system and her Political attitudes and behaviors. It then introduces the three governing characteristics of dominant-party enclaves that are most influential in shaping the ways citizens think about and engage with politics. These include: (1) the politicization of the rule of law, (2) the partisan use of state resources, and (3) the tilting of the electoral playing field. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how such subnational Political dynamics can not only shape the ways individuals engage with politics at the local and provincial level but also influence their interactions with their national system. This work offers a new direction for Political behavior research in seeking to understand the effect of local Political context on citizen attitudes and participation, and it represents an effort to redirect the conversation toward the broader consequences of this local-level dynamic.

  • Life in the Political Machine - Welcome to the Machine
    Life in the Political Machine, 2020
    Co-Authors: Jonathan T. Hiskey, Mason W. Moseley
    Abstract:

    Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the dominant-party Machines of San Luis, Argentina, and the state of Mexico (Edomex), Mexico. Through this look at the Political systems of two subnational units in two distinct countries separated by thousands of miles, this chapter also introduces the reader to the principal motivation guiding the subsequent analyses: How do such dominant-party enclaves affect the Political attitudes and behaviors of citizens living within them? In Argentina and Mexico, like in much of the world, there are democracies that are being dragged down by subnational dominant-party enclaves. This reality has consequences for their citizens and for broader efforts to deepen democratic rule.

  • Life in the Political Machine - Conceptualizing and Measuring Dominant-Party Enclaves
    Life in the Political Machine, 2020
    Co-Authors: Jonathan T. Hiskey, Mason W. Moseley
    Abstract:

    Chapter 3 begins with a brief review of previous efforts to measure regimes at the national level and then introduces the study’s central concept, dominant-party enclaves, and the measurement strategy the authors employ to capture that concept. The latter focuses on the first transfer of power from incumbent to opposition as the marker for a system’s move from single-party dominance toward a multiparty electoral environment. This approach is then applied to the provinces and states of Argentina and Mexico, in which 16 cases of dominant-party enclaves are identified. These cases, home to more than 30 percent of citizens of the two countries, serve as the focus for the remainder of the study. The chapter then concludes with further exploration of the two cases that serve as prototypes for this study of dominant-party enclaves: the province of San Luis in Argentina and the state of Mexico (Edomex) in Mexico.