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Nicolas Michel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the Polluter Pays Principle in eu law bold case law and poor harmonisation
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: De Sadeleer, Nicolas MichelAbstract:More than thirty-five years have passed since Recommendation 75/436/Euratom, ECSC, EEC of 3 March 1975 regarding cost allocation and action by public authorities on environmental matters was adopted by the Commission, a soft law instrument that has been clarifying the ways in which the Polluter-Pays Principle should be applied in the EU. Unfortunately, in spite of all efforts, environmental externalities are not yet fully integrated into prices of goods and services.
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state aids and environmental measures time for promoting the Polluter Pays Principle
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: De Sadeleer, Nicolas MichelAbstract:The prohibition of State aids under Article 107 TFEU did not prevent the Commission to develop its own vision of a well-tailored State aid policy regarding the protection of the environment. However, granting of State aids to undertakings is likely to impinge both positively and negatively on environmental policies. Moreover, State aids are not only distorting competition, but they may also run counter the Polluter Pays Principle enshrined in Article 192(2) TFEU. It is the aim of this article to explore some of the key issues arising in the implementation of Treaty provisions and secondary law. Particular attention is drawn to the allocation of emission allowances free of charge and to tax exemption regimes.
Alexander Zahar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the Polluter Pays Principle and its ascendancy in climate change law
Social Science Research Network, 2019Co-Authors: Alexander ZaharAbstract:Under the international agreements on climate change, states have a responsibility to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions. We may refer to this as an “obligation to regulate”. This article argues that the general, treaty-derived obligation to regulate is supplemented by a separate legal Principle on how to regulate: the Principle that the Polluter must pay. The obligation to arrest greenhouse gas emissions through regulation necessarily comes at a cost to states and individuals, as any regulation does. But the general obligation to regulate does not contain any guidance on who should bear the costs of regulation and under what circumstances. This is where the Polluter Pays Principle comes in. In its legal instantiation, it is a Principle of justice. It requires Polluters, both states and individuals, to pay, because it is not fair that they assume unlimited access to the atmospheric commons. Yet, as a Principle of justice, the Polluter Pays Principle must itself be implemented fairly. Not every Polluter should be made to pay, or pay the same amount, indiscriminately, or without support, if that would cause another, even greater, unfairness. Thus the Polluter Pays Principle serves as a guide to how the general obligation of states to regulate is to be implemented.
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the Polluter Pays Principle in international climate change law are states under an obligation to price carbon emissions
Social Science Research Network, 2018Co-Authors: Alexander ZaharAbstract:In a 2010 paper Feng and Buhi suggested that the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 had demoted the Principle of common but differentiated responsibility and “silently” elevated the Polluter-Pays Principle to a dominant position in international climate law. As evidence they cited the fact that some non-Annex I parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, including China, had taken positions previously associated only with Annex I parties, in particular on the provision of climate finance to (other) developing countries. Now, eight years later, with the Paris Agreement erected on the conceptual foundation of the Copenhagen Accord, I ask whether the Feng-Buhi hypothesis has gained plausibility. Certainly, the Paris Agreement obliges states to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions more than they would have otherwise. It thereby obliges them to incur a cost, or pay a price, for those emissions mitigated because of the Agreement. In this sense, states are under an obligation to price at least some of their emissions. (The general rule holds even if we exclude the United States and those less wealthy countries whose domestic mitigation effort may not be affected by the Agreement in the short term.) Other elements of the Agreement, detailed in this paper, also signify a treaty-led elevation of the Polluter-Pays Principle in the climate change regime. Has it now therefore gained a legal foothold in the regime, if only implicitly? An alternative narrative is that the parties to the Agreement have agreed to reduce their emissions in response to, not any legal imperative, but what we might call the physical necessity of avoiding global warming of 2°C or above. A stronger counter-narrative points to certain political sensitivities that conspire to keep the Polluter-Pays Principle’s ascendancy quiet, if not entirely “silent”. In practice, however, as I argue, the Principle is increasingly being recognized as delivering a positive obligation for states to act. The logical endpoint of this progressive development of the law is that every “Polluter-state” is to accept that the emission of greenhouse gases in its territory must come at a cost to the state, as a matter of law. An emerging legal compulsion to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by pricing them is not to be made light of in a field that is almost devoid of substantive law. Open acceptance of the Principle may help to speed up and deepen the global response to climate change.
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the Polluter Pays Principle and its implications for environmental governance in china
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Alexander ZaharAbstract:The Polluter-Pays Principle aims to correct market failure and its resulting social injustice by shifting pollution costs from the public at large to polluting enterprises, while at the same time reducing the amount of pollution produced. This article argues that China’s undoubted commitment to the implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle as a key instrument of pollution control in its domestic jurisdiction necessitates as a matter of legal Principle a corresponding reliance on a nationally regulated system of verification of pollution data by private-sector firms operating at arm’s length from the government. Even though China has taken significant steps to implement the Polluter-Pays Principle, to date there has been no provision for independent third-party verification of the monitoring-and-reporting practices of polluting enterprises. Instead, verification of the reported data is being carried out by the government itself, through site inspections by teams of government agents. In its eagerness to enforce environmental law in a society where violations by Polluters are the norm more than the exception, China’s government is contravening the Polluter-Pays Principle’s requirement of ‘independence’ in the verification of pollution data. For the Principle to be implemented fairly, the legislature should facilitate the development of an industry of environmental verifiers in the country’s non-government sector.
De Sadeleer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the Polluter Pays Principle in eu law bold case law and poor harmonisation
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: De Sadeleer, Nicolas MichelAbstract:More than thirty-five years have passed since Recommendation 75/436/Euratom, ECSC, EEC of 3 March 1975 regarding cost allocation and action by public authorities on environmental matters was adopted by the Commission, a soft law instrument that has been clarifying the ways in which the Polluter-Pays Principle should be applied in the EU. Unfortunately, in spite of all efforts, environmental externalities are not yet fully integrated into prices of goods and services.
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state aids and environmental measures time for promoting the Polluter Pays Principle
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: De Sadeleer, Nicolas MichelAbstract:The prohibition of State aids under Article 107 TFEU did not prevent the Commission to develop its own vision of a well-tailored State aid policy regarding the protection of the environment. However, granting of State aids to undertakings is likely to impinge both positively and negatively on environmental policies. Moreover, State aids are not only distorting competition, but they may also run counter the Polluter Pays Principle enshrined in Article 192(2) TFEU. It is the aim of this article to explore some of the key issues arising in the implementation of Treaty provisions and secondary law. Particular attention is drawn to the allocation of emission allowances free of charge and to tax exemption regimes.
Suzanne Kingston - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the Polluter Pays Principle in eu climate law an effective tool before the courts
Social Science Research Network, 2020Co-Authors: Suzanne KingstonAbstract:The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) is often thought of as an aspirational or guiding Principle rather than one that is justiciable by courts. While the Principle features in many international conventions in varying formulations, it has not been recognized as a Principle of customary international law. The legal status of the PPP in EU law is different. The PPP enjoys constitutional status: Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) enshrines the Principle among the fundamental Principles of the EU’s environmental policy. This article considers the legal status and development of the PPP in EU law, in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and in EU policy, most recently in the EU’s Green New Deal. It goes on to identify three bodies of climate-related litigation where the PPP has been most influential to date: first, cases concerning the EU ETS and emissions; second, cases concerning EU energy law; and third, cases concerning EU state aid law. Some reflections are offered in conclusion about the potential role of the PPP in other areas, including climate cases based on human and environmental rights, and climate cases brought against private parties.
John E Tilton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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global climate policy and the Polluter Pays Principle a different perspective
Resources Policy, 2016Co-Authors: John E TiltonAbstract:Abstract Since developed countries have contributed most of the greenhouse gas emissions currently responsible for climate change, should they pay all or most of the costs for needed climate change policies? The original Polluter Pays Principle contends that firms and in turn countries should be charged for the full costs to society of their current pollution. This policy promotes both efficiency and common perceptions of equity. The historic Polluter Pays Principle—a modification of the original Polluter Pays Principle used to argue that developed countries should pay most of the costs for climate policies—contends that the costs of remediating past pollution should be allocated according to their past pollution. For various reasons, however, the historic Polluter Pays Principle does not promote efficiency nor even equity. So those who advocate that the developed countries shoulder the lion's share of climate policy costs need to use other arguments. Moreover, regardless of how the costs are allocated, the original producer Pays Principle should be implemented so that current producers pay the full costs to society of their greenhouse gas emissions wherever they are located. These findings are of interest to the mineral and energy sectors since global climate policies will substantially affect these sectors. Moreover, one can extend the findings to remediation policies for all past pollution, including for example the cleaning up of old historic mining sites.