The Experts below are selected from a list of 327 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Henrik Uggla - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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artist as brand Portfolio Manager a strategic brand management framing of the artist
IUP Journal of Brand Management, 2016Co-Authors: Henrik UgglaAbstract:IntroductionThe alignment of brand Portfolio strategy with art and the artist has several practical implications for artists, curators, Managers and other actors involved in the process of creating and leveraging art in markets and society. First, it can enable a much more expansive go-to-market framework for the artist. Second, it may be helpful to curators, gallery owners and other actors in the creative value chain, by viewing the issue of art and art management in a more expansive way.Research by Schroeder (2005) indicated that visual artists could contribute to the understanding and development of brands and brand-related theories. Schroeder argued that some pop-artists like Andy Warhol both leveraged and built their brand in their effort to comment upon popular culture:Warhol provides a stunning example of artist as brand-he was extremely articulate about his ambition to become famous-and his work reflectively comments on brands and consumer culture. Warhol's contributions to branding are many, and he remains a hot brand almost 20 years after his untimely death.According to Kapferer (2001), luxury brands should stay close to being considered as art, i.e., esoteric art. The brand Portfolio strategy is very transparent for some global luxury brands such as illy, GUCCI, Bugatti, Lamborghini and others. The alignment between art and brands can increase brand relevance, create synergies and contribute to further overall development (Aaker, 2011). A typical example of this type of collaboration is the illy art collection together with the young artist Dasha Zaichanka. In this case, the relatively young and promising artist is built through the illy brand:The illy Art Collection, the famous collection of art objects for daily use, is enhanced by a new artist-designed can. The signature is that of a young artist, Daria 'Dasha' Zaichanka: the winner of the special project developed by illy in conjunction with the University of Applied Arts in Vienna, a contest that saw the participation of over a hundred students. The ten works by the competition finalists were exhibited at Vienna Contemporary Art, the important contemporary art show which this year took place from 24 to 27 September and hosted ninety-nine galleries from twenty-five countries. (illy, 2015).This paper outlines the opportunity for dynamic brand Portfolio strategies together with and in collaboration with artists, aimed at expanding and nurturing the predominant business strategy. It is suggested that a brand building perspective should be gradually replaced by a leverage-focused brand Portfolio framework. The artist's contribution to brand Portfolio strategy is discussed and nurtured throughout the text. The paper explores different ways and possibilities for the artist to involve in the brand Portfolio strategy, as master brand, as extended brand and as other strategic possibilities. Both brand building and leveraging perspectives are considered herein.Brand Portfolio PatternsDifferent artists use very different brand Portfolio patterns to deliver their brand promise. However, three broad perspectives on the issue emerge from the cases studied- cobranding, leverage, and synergy-based brand Portfolio strategy.Jeff Koons used at least four established co-branding strategies in his eclectic poststructural art effort, such as reach-awareness co-branding, values-endorsement cobranding, ingredient co-branding and complementary competence co-branding.Consider Jeff Koons' celebrated sculpture-Michael Jackson and Bubbles (1988) (Refer Figure 1)-a porcelain and gilt confection depicting the late pop-legend with his chimpanzee. In this art work, Koons uses a sub-culture category association with kitsch (i.e., porcelain figurines) as a metaphor for embedding the superficial brand identity of the King of Pop and Bubbles. Secondly, Koons creates reach and capitalizes heavily on the brand awareness of Michael Jackson and his iconic qualities within the pop-industry at the time. …
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artist as brand Portfolio Manager a strategic brand management framing of the artist
Social Science Research Network, 2016Co-Authors: Henrik UgglaAbstract:The purpose of this paper is to expand the perspective on the artist from brand Manager to brand Portfolio Manager, focusing on applying the brand Portfolio metaphor and framework from strategic brand management to the artist and art. This paper has two aims, first to embed the creative artist’s work within the strategic brand management literature and the brand Portfolio management literature in particular. Secondly, the author moves beyond the traditional description of the artist as a brand by framing the artist as an inclusive brand Portfolio Manager, leveraging entities, artifacts and impressions in and outside his or her brand territory. It is suggested that the artist can potentially manage a complex brand Portfolio of product-brands, brand extensions and co-brands and align distinct brand Portfolio objectives with his or her business strategy.
Yuehua Tang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Portfolio Manager compensation in the u s mutual fund industry
Journal of Finance, 2019Co-Authors: Yuehua Tang, Juanpedro GomezAbstract:This paper empirically studies Portfolio Manager compensation structures in the U.S. mutual fund industry. Using a unique hand-collected dataset on over 4,000 mutual funds, we find that about threequarters of Portfolio Managers receive explicit performance-based incentives from the investment advisors. Our cross-sectional investigation suggests that Portfolio Manager compensation structures are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. In particular, explicit performancebased incentives are more prevalent in scenarios where this incentive mechanism is more valuable or alternative incentive mechanisms, such as labor market discipline, are less effective. Specifically, our results show that explicit performance-based incentives are more common when (i) the investment advisors are larger or have more complex business models, (ii) the fund returns are less volatile, (iii) the Portfolio Managers are not the stakeholders of the advisors, (iv) the funds are managed by a team rather than an individual, and (v) the funds are not outsourced to an external sub-advisory firm. Overall, our study provides novel empirical evidence on optimal contracting in the delegated asset management industry.
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Portfolio Manager ownership and mutual fund risk taking
Management Science, 2019Co-Authors: Yuehua TangAbstract:This paper studies the effect of Portfolio Manager ownership (i.e., “skin in the game”) on mutual fund risk taking. Using holdings-based risk change measures that capture Managers’ ex ante risk cho...
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Portfolio Manager ownership and mutual fund risk taking
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Yuehua TangAbstract:This paper studies the effect of Portfolio Manager ownership (i.e., skin in the game) on mutual fund risk-shifting behavior. Previous literature suggests that risk shifting can hurt fund performance and impose costs on fund investors. We find that Portfolio Manager ownership can mitigate Managers’ incentive to engage in such risk-shifting behavior. In particular, using holdings-based risk-shifting measures, we find that Portfolio Manager ownership reduces both intra-year and across-year risk-shifting activities. Fund investors reward funds with greater Managerial ownership with more capital inflows. Overall, our evidence suggests that Portfolio Manager ownership serves as an incentive alignment mechanism and has important implications to fund investors.
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Portfolio Manager compensation and mutual fund performance
Social Science Research Network, 2016Co-Authors: Yuehua Tang, Juanpedro GomezAbstract:We use a novel dataset to study the relation between individual Portfolio Manager compensation and mutual fund performance. Managers with explicit performance-based pay exhibit superior subsequent fund performance, especially when investment advisors link pay to performance over a longer time period. In contrast, alternative compensation arrangements, such as fixed salary, assets-based pay, or advisor-profits-based pay are not associated with superior performance. Our tests further show that the positive relation between performance-based contracts and fund performance is not driven by the selection of talented Managers proxied by education background. Lastly, Managers with performance-based pay engage less in risk-shifting activities.
Anders Ekholm - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Portfolio returns and Manager activity how to decompose tracking error into security selection and market timing
Journal of Empirical Finance, 2012Co-Authors: Anders EkholmAbstract:Abstract We develop a new method for detecting Portfolio Manager activity. Our method relies exclusively on Portfolio returns and, consequently, avoids the pitfalls associated with disclosed Portfolio holdings. We investigate the link between activity and performance of actively managed U.S. equity funds from 2000 to 2007 and document robust evidence that future performance is positively related to past stock picking and negatively associated with past market timing. Finally, we find that Portfolio Manager activity is highly persistent over time, which supports the conclusion that stock picking increases performance while market timing decreases performance.
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Portfolio returns and Manager activity how to decompose tracking error into security selection and market timing
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Anders EkholmAbstract:We develop a new method for detecting Portfolio Manager activity. Our method relies exclusively on Portfolio returns and, consequently, avoids the pitfalls associated with disclosed Portfolio holdings. We investigate the interrelation between activity and performance of actively managed U.S. equity funds from 2000 to 2007 and document robust evidence that future performance is positively related to past stock picking and negatively associated with past market timing. Finally, we find that Portfolio Manager activity is highly persistent over time, which supports the conclusion that stock picking increases performance while market timing decreases performance.
Fulbert Tchana Tchana - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the implications of value at risk and short selling restrictions for Portfolio Manager performance
Social Science Research Network, 2019Co-Authors: Georges Tsafack, Fulbert Tchana TchanaAbstract:After the recent financial crisis and the tightening of the regulation processes, Portfolio Managers regularly face strong restrictions, with complex implications for their performance. This paper provides a framework to analyze the performance of a Portfolio Manager under a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint, in a Markowitz setup. Using appropriate parameters, we calibrate the model for a Manager with private information and compare the effect of VaR and short-selling (SS) constraints on the relationship between the expected Portfolio return and the market return. We find that, in a more volatile market, the VaR restriction will have a greater effect on Manager performance than the SS restriction. The VaR constraint also strongly affects a Manager with high-quality information, while the SS restriction only moderately affects a Manager with any level of information quality. Regarding their attitude toward risk, an overly aggressive Manager will find their overall performance more affected by the VaR constraint.
Lei Wedge - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Portfolio Manager ownership and the pricing of closed end funds
2009Co-Authors: Ajay Khorana, Henri Servaes, Lei WedgeAbstract:We examine the relationship between Portfolio Manager ownership, closed-end fund premiums/discounts, and future returns. Using a sample of 592 closed-end funds in 2005, representing 95% of the entire industry, we find that fund Manager ownership has a positive and economically significant impact on fund premiums and future fund performance measured using both NAV and price returns. Furthermore, a number of board level characteristics, including the fraction of independent directors and directors on the board with financial expertise, are related to premiums and returns. These findings add to our understanding of the closed-end fund discount puzzle and suggest that Portfolio Manager ownership aligns the interests of fund Managers and investors.
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Portfolio Manager ownership and fund performance
Journal of Financial Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Ajay Khorana, Henri Servaes, Lei WedgeAbstract:Abstract This paper documents the range of Portfolio Manager ownership in the funds they manage and examines whether higher ownership is associated with improved future performance. Almost half of all Managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the absolute investment is modest. Future risk-adjusted performance is positively related to Managerial ownership, with performance improving by about 3 basis points for each basis point of Managerial ownership. These findings persist after controlling for various measures of fund board effectiveness. Fund Manager ownership is higher in funds with better past performance, lower front-end loads, smaller size, longer Managerial tenure, and funds affiliated with smaller families. It is also higher in funds with higher board member compensation and in equity funds relative to bond funds. Future performance is positively related to the component of ownership that can be predicted by other variables, as well as the unpredictable component. Our findings support the notion that Managerial ownership has desirable incentive alignment attributes for mutual fund investors and indicate that the disclosure of this information is useful in making Portfolio allocation decisions.
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Portfolio Manager ownership and fund performance
Research Papers in Economics, 2006Co-Authors: Ajay Khorana, Henri Servaes, Lei WedgeAbstract:This paper documents the range of Portfolio Manager ownership in the funds they manage and examines whether higher ownership is associated with improved future performance. Almost half of all Managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the absolute investment is modest. Future risk-adjusted performance is positively related to Managerial ownership, with performance improving by about three basis points for each basis point of Managerial ownership. These findings persist after controlling for various measures of fund board effectiveness. Fund Manager ownership is higher in funds with better past performance, lower front-end loads, smaller size, longer Managerial tenure, and funds affiliated with smaller families. It is also higher in funds with higher board member compensation and in equity funds relative to bond funds. Future performance is positively related to the component of ownership that can be predicted by other variables, as well as the unpredictable component. Our findings support the notion that Managerial ownership has desirable incentive alignment attributes for mutual fund investors, and indicate that the disclosure of this information is useful in making Portfolio allocation decisions.
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Portfolio Manager ownership and fund performance
Social Science Research Network, 2006Co-Authors: Ajay Khorana, Henri Servaes, Lei WedgeAbstract:This paper documents the level of Portfolio Manager ownership in the funds they manage and examines whether higher ownership is associated with improved future performance. Almost half of all Managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the absolute investment is modest. Future risk-adjusted performance is positively related to Managerial ownership, with performance improving by about three basis points for each basis point of Managerial ownership. These findings persist after controlling for various measures of fund board effectiveness. Fund Manager ownership is higher in funds with better past performance, lower front-end loads, smaller size, funds affiliated with smaller families, and where the Manager has been in charge for a longer period of time. It is also higher in funds with higher board member compensation and in equity funds relative to bond funds. Future performance is positively related to the component of ownership that can be predicted by other variables, as well as the unpredictable component. Our findings support the notion that Managerial ownership has desirable incentive alignment attributes for mutual fund investors, and indicate that the disclosure of this information is useful in making Portfolio allocation decisions.