The Experts below are selected from a list of 66 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Javier Martintorres - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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pressure optimized Powered Respirator proper a miniaturized wearable cleanroom and biosafety system for aerially transmitted viral infections such as covid 19
HardwareX, 2020Co-Authors: Miracle Israel Nazarious, Thasshwin Mathanlal, M P Zorzano, Javier MartintorresAbstract:The supply of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in hospitals to keep the Health Care Professionals (HCP) safe taking care of patients may be limited, especially during the outbreak of a new disease. In particular, the face and body protective equipment is critical to prevent the wearer from exposure to pathogenic biological airborne particulates. This situation has been now observed worldwide during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. As concern over shortages of PPE at hospitals grows, we share with the public and makers' community the Pressure Optimized Powered Respirator (PROPER) equipment, made out of COTS components. It is functionally equivalent to a Powered Air Purifying Respirator (PAPR). PROPER, a hood-based system which uses open source and easily accessible components is low-cost, relatively passive in terms of energy consumption and mechanisms, and easy and fast to 3D print, build and assemble. We have adapted our experience on building clean room environments and qualifying the bioburden of space instruments to this solution, which is in essence a miniaturized, personal, wearable cleanroom. PROPER would be able to offer better protection than an N95 Respirator mask, mainly because it is insensitive to seal fit and it shields the eyes as well. The PROPER SMS fabric is designed for single-use and not intended for reuse, as they may start to tear and fail but the rest of the parts can be disinfected and reused. We provide a set of guidelines to build a low-cost 3D printed solution for an effective PAPR system and describe the procedures to validate it to comply with the biosafety level 3 requirements. We have validated the prototype of PROPER unit for air flow, ISO class cleanliness level, oxygen and carbon-dioxide gas concentrations during exhalation, and present here these results for illustration. We demonstrate that the area inside the hood is more than 200 times cleaner than the external ambient without the operator and more than 175 times with the operator and in an aerosol exposed environment. We also include the procedure to clean and disinfect the equipment for reuse. PROPER may be a useful addition to provide protection to HCPs against the SARS-CoV-2 virus or other potential future viral diseases that are transmitted aerially.
M P Zorzano - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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pressure optimized Powered Respirator proper a miniaturized wearable cleanroom and biosafety system for aerially transmitted viral infections such as covid 19
HardwareX, 2020Co-Authors: Miracle Israel Nazarious, Thasshwin Mathanlal, M P Zorzano, Javier MartintorresAbstract:The supply of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in hospitals to keep the Health Care Professionals (HCP) safe taking care of patients may be limited, especially during the outbreak of a new disease. In particular, the face and body protective equipment is critical to prevent the wearer from exposure to pathogenic biological airborne particulates. This situation has been now observed worldwide during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. As concern over shortages of PPE at hospitals grows, we share with the public and makers' community the Pressure Optimized Powered Respirator (PROPER) equipment, made out of COTS components. It is functionally equivalent to a Powered Air Purifying Respirator (PAPR). PROPER, a hood-based system which uses open source and easily accessible components is low-cost, relatively passive in terms of energy consumption and mechanisms, and easy and fast to 3D print, build and assemble. We have adapted our experience on building clean room environments and qualifying the bioburden of space instruments to this solution, which is in essence a miniaturized, personal, wearable cleanroom. PROPER would be able to offer better protection than an N95 Respirator mask, mainly because it is insensitive to seal fit and it shields the eyes as well. The PROPER SMS fabric is designed for single-use and not intended for reuse, as they may start to tear and fail but the rest of the parts can be disinfected and reused. We provide a set of guidelines to build a low-cost 3D printed solution for an effective PAPR system and describe the procedures to validate it to comply with the biosafety level 3 requirements. We have validated the prototype of PROPER unit for air flow, ISO class cleanliness level, oxygen and carbon-dioxide gas concentrations during exhalation, and present here these results for illustration. We demonstrate that the area inside the hood is more than 200 times cleaner than the external ambient without the operator and more than 175 times with the operator and in an aerosol exposed environment. We also include the procedure to clean and disinfect the equipment for reuse. PROPER may be a useful addition to provide protection to HCPs against the SARS-CoV-2 virus or other potential future viral diseases that are transmitted aerially.
John P. Kerchberger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Personal protective equipment for care of pandemic influenza patients: a training workshop for the Powered air purifying Respirator.
Anesthesia & Analgesia, 2010Co-Authors: Bonnie M. Tompkins, John P. KerchbergerAbstract:Virulent Respiratory infectious diseases may present a life-threatening risk for health care professionals during aerosol-generating procedures, including endotracheal intubation. The 2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) brings this concern to the immediate forefront. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have stated that, when performing or participating in aerosol-generating procedures on patients with virulent contagious Respiratory diseases, health care professionals must wear a minimum of the N95 Respirator, and they may wish to consider using the Powered air purifying Respirator (PAPR). For influenza and other diseases transmitted by both Respiratory and contact modes, protective Respirators must be combined with contact precautions. The PAPR provides 2.5 to 100 times greater protection than the N95, when used within the context of an Occupational Safety and Health Administration-compliant Respiratory protection program. The relative protective capability of a Respirator is quantified using the assigned protection factor. The level of protection designated by the APF can only be achieved with appropriate training and correct use of the Respirator. Face seal leakage limits the protective capability of the N95 Respirator, and fit testing does not assure the ability to maintain a tight face seal. The protective capability of the PAPR will be defeated by improper handling of contaminated equipment, incorrect assembly and maintenance, and improper don (put on) and doff (take off) procedures. Stress, discomfort, and physical encumbrance may impair performance. Acclimatization through training will mitigate these effects. Training in the use of PAPRs in advance of their need is strongly advised. "Just in time" training is unlikely to provide adequate preparation for groups of practitioners requiring specialized personal protective equipment during a pandemic. Employee health departments in hospitals may not presently have a PAPR training program in place. Anesthesia and critical care providers would be well advised to take the lead in working with their hospitals' employee health departments to establish a PAPR training program where none exists. User instructions state that the PAPR should not be used during surgery because it generates positive outward airflow, and may increase the risk of wound infection. Clarification of this prohibition and acceptable solutions are currently lacking and need to be addressed. The surgical hood system is not an acceptable alternative. We provide on line a PAPR training workshop. Supporting information is presented here. Anesthesia and critical care providers may use this workshop to supplement, but not substitute for, the manufacturers' detailed use and maintenance instructions.
Craig Zimring - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Common Behaviors and Faults When Doffing Personal Protective Equipment for Patients With Serious Communicable Diseases.
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 2019Co-Authors: Joel M. Mumma, Francis T. Durso, Lisa M. Casanova, Kimberly Erukunuakpor, Colleen S. Kraft, Victoria L. Walsh, Andi L. Shane, Puja Y. Shah, Craig ZimringAbstract:BACKGROUND: The safe removal of personal protective equipment (PPE) can limit transmission of serious communicable diseases, but this process poses challenges to healthcare workers (HCWs). METHODS: We observed 41 HCWs across 4 Ebola treatment centers in Georgia doffing PPE for simulated patients with serious communicable diseases. Using human factors methodologies, we obtained the details, sequences, and durations of doffing steps; identified the ways each step can fail (failure modes [FMs]); quantified the riskiness of FMs; and characterized the workload of doffing steps. RESULTS: Eight doffing steps were common to all hospitals-removal of boot covers, gloves (outer and inner pairs), the outermost garment, the Powered air purifying Respirator (PAPR) hood, and the PAPR helmet assembly; repeated hand hygiene (eg, with hand sanitizer); and a final handwashing with soap and water. Across hospitals, we identified 256 FMs during the common doffing steps, 61 of which comprised 19 common FMs. Most of these common FMs were above average in their riskiness at each hospital. At all hospitals, hand hygiene, removal of the outermost garment, and removal of boot covers were above average in their overall riskiness. Measurements of workload revealed that doffing steps were often mentally demanding, and this facet of workload correlated most strongly with the effortfulness of a doffing step. CONCLUSIONS: We systematically identified common points of concern in protocols for doffing high-level PPE. Addressing FMs related to hand hygiene and the removal of the outermost garment, boot covers, and PAPR hood could improve HCW safety when doffing high-level PPE.We identified ways that doffing protocols for high-level personal protective equipment may fail to protect healthcare workers. Hand hygiene, removing the outermost garment, boot covers, and Respirator hood harbored the greatest risk and failed in similar ways across different hospitals.
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Human Factors Risk Analyses of a Doffing Protocol for Ebola-Level Personal Protective Equipment: Mapping Errors to Contamination.
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 2018Co-Authors: Joel M. Mumma, Francis T. Durso, Ashley N. Ferguson, Christina L. Gipson, Lisa M. Casanova, Kimberly Erukunuakpor, Colleen S. Kraft, Victoria L. Walsh, Craig Zimring, Jennifer R. DuboseAbstract:Background Doffing protocols for personal protective equipment (PPE) are critical for keeping healthcare workers (HCWs) safe during care of patients with Ebola virus disease. We assessed the relationship between errors and self-contamination during doffing. Methods Eleven HCWs experienced with doffing Ebola-level PPE participated in simulations in which HCWs donned PPE marked with surrogate viruses (ɸ6 and MS2), completed a clinical task, and were assessed for contamination after doffing. Simulations were video recorded, and a failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree analyses were performed to identify errors during doffing, quantify their risk (risk index), and predict contamination data. Results Fifty-one types of errors were identified, many having the potential to spread contamination. Hand hygiene and removing the Powered air purifying Respirator (PAPR) hood had the highest total risk indexes (111 and 70, respectively) and number of types of errors (9 and 13, respectively). ɸ6 was detected on 10% of scrubs and the fault tree predicted a 10.4% contamination rate, likely occurring when the PAPR hood inadvertently contacted scrubs during removal. MS2 was detected on 10% of hands, 20% of scrubs, and 70% of inner gloves and the predicted rates were 7.3%, 19.4%, 73.4%, respectively. Fault trees for MS2 and ɸ6 contamination suggested similar pathways. Conclusions Ebola-level PPE can both protect and put HCWs at risk for self-contamination throughout the doffing process, even among experienced HCWs doffing with a trained observer. Human factors methodologies can identify error-prone steps, delineate the relationship between errors and self-contamination, and suggest remediation strategies.
Joel M. Mumma - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Common Behaviors and Faults When Doffing Personal Protective Equipment for Patients With Serious Communicable Diseases.
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 2019Co-Authors: Joel M. Mumma, Francis T. Durso, Lisa M. Casanova, Kimberly Erukunuakpor, Colleen S. Kraft, Victoria L. Walsh, Andi L. Shane, Puja Y. Shah, Craig ZimringAbstract:BACKGROUND: The safe removal of personal protective equipment (PPE) can limit transmission of serious communicable diseases, but this process poses challenges to healthcare workers (HCWs). METHODS: We observed 41 HCWs across 4 Ebola treatment centers in Georgia doffing PPE for simulated patients with serious communicable diseases. Using human factors methodologies, we obtained the details, sequences, and durations of doffing steps; identified the ways each step can fail (failure modes [FMs]); quantified the riskiness of FMs; and characterized the workload of doffing steps. RESULTS: Eight doffing steps were common to all hospitals-removal of boot covers, gloves (outer and inner pairs), the outermost garment, the Powered air purifying Respirator (PAPR) hood, and the PAPR helmet assembly; repeated hand hygiene (eg, with hand sanitizer); and a final handwashing with soap and water. Across hospitals, we identified 256 FMs during the common doffing steps, 61 of which comprised 19 common FMs. Most of these common FMs were above average in their riskiness at each hospital. At all hospitals, hand hygiene, removal of the outermost garment, and removal of boot covers were above average in their overall riskiness. Measurements of workload revealed that doffing steps were often mentally demanding, and this facet of workload correlated most strongly with the effortfulness of a doffing step. CONCLUSIONS: We systematically identified common points of concern in protocols for doffing high-level PPE. Addressing FMs related to hand hygiene and the removal of the outermost garment, boot covers, and PAPR hood could improve HCW safety when doffing high-level PPE.We identified ways that doffing protocols for high-level personal protective equipment may fail to protect healthcare workers. Hand hygiene, removing the outermost garment, boot covers, and Respirator hood harbored the greatest risk and failed in similar ways across different hospitals.
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Human Factors Risk Analyses of a Doffing Protocol for Ebola-Level Personal Protective Equipment: Mapping Errors to Contamination.
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 2018Co-Authors: Joel M. Mumma, Francis T. Durso, Ashley N. Ferguson, Christina L. Gipson, Lisa M. Casanova, Kimberly Erukunuakpor, Colleen S. Kraft, Victoria L. Walsh, Craig Zimring, Jennifer R. DuboseAbstract:Background Doffing protocols for personal protective equipment (PPE) are critical for keeping healthcare workers (HCWs) safe during care of patients with Ebola virus disease. We assessed the relationship between errors and self-contamination during doffing. Methods Eleven HCWs experienced with doffing Ebola-level PPE participated in simulations in which HCWs donned PPE marked with surrogate viruses (ɸ6 and MS2), completed a clinical task, and were assessed for contamination after doffing. Simulations were video recorded, and a failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree analyses were performed to identify errors during doffing, quantify their risk (risk index), and predict contamination data. Results Fifty-one types of errors were identified, many having the potential to spread contamination. Hand hygiene and removing the Powered air purifying Respirator (PAPR) hood had the highest total risk indexes (111 and 70, respectively) and number of types of errors (9 and 13, respectively). ɸ6 was detected on 10% of scrubs and the fault tree predicted a 10.4% contamination rate, likely occurring when the PAPR hood inadvertently contacted scrubs during removal. MS2 was detected on 10% of hands, 20% of scrubs, and 70% of inner gloves and the predicted rates were 7.3%, 19.4%, 73.4%, respectively. Fault trees for MS2 and ɸ6 contamination suggested similar pathways. Conclusions Ebola-level PPE can both protect and put HCWs at risk for self-contamination throughout the doffing process, even among experienced HCWs doffing with a trained observer. Human factors methodologies can identify error-prone steps, delineate the relationship between errors and self-contamination, and suggest remediation strategies.