The Experts below are selected from a list of 324 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Gregory K. Leonard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Predatory Pricing in China – In Line with International Practice?
2010Co-Authors: Adrian Emch, Gregory K. LeonardAbstract:China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) prohibits a dominant company from selling products at prices below cost without legitimate reasons. Chinese antitrust agencies and courts have provided some signals as to how they will enforce the Predatory Pricing provision in the AML and similar provisions in other laws. For example, in 2009, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) circulated for comments a draft regulation implementing aspects of the AML, including its Predatory Pricing provision. However, all in all, the law on Predatory Pricing is still relatively undeveloped in China at this stage. As US and EU courts have long dealt with the fundamental questions raised by Predatory Pricing claims, we assess the existing and draft rules in China against the backdrop of US and EU jurisprudence. We focus in particular on four factors: existence of dominance/monopoly power; definition of the benchmark used in a cost test; injury to competition; and absence of pro-competitive justifications.
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Predatory Pricing - Economics and Law in the United States and the European Union (in English)
2009Co-Authors: Adrian Emch, Gregory K. LeonardAbstract:Predatory Pricing occurs where a firm deliberately sets prices below cost to eliminate, discipline or deter entry by a competitor, with the goal to subsequently recoup its losses by charging supra-competitive prices. China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, Anti-Unfair Competition Law and Price Law contain prohibitions of Predatory Pricing, but their provisions do not go into much detail. Given the relative scarcity of guidance on Predatory Pricing in China, this paper examines the solutions proposed by economists, antitrust agencies and courts in the United States and the European Union. The paper analyzes many traditional and more modern economic theories, including the findings of the Chicago School and and the theories and models before and after the Chicago School. Moreover, the authors decribe the U.S. case law on Predatory Pricing, including Matsushita and Brooke Group, and the EU case law, ranging from AKZO to Wanadoo. Note: The downloadable document is the English translation of the Chinese original, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1520308.
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Predatory Pricing after linkLine and Wanadoo
2009Co-Authors: Gregory K. Leonard, Adrian EmchAbstract:In the United States, beginning with the Matsushita decision in 1986, the Supreme Court has required plaintiffs in Predatory Pricing cases to meet stringent conditions to prevail on their claims. As a result, Predatory Pricing cases have become 'rarely tried and even more rarely successful', to paraphrase Matsushita. The Supreme Court’s point of view appears to have been motivated by a concern with the chilling effects on price competition that 'false positives' in Predatory Pricing cases would have, combined with a strong skepticism, from both a theoretical and practical point of view, about whether Predatory Pricing is a rational business strategy. European Union (EU) antitrust law has generally followed a different path with regard to Predatory Pricing. The traditional EU case law, based on the AKZO judgment, has set a substantially lower bar to prevail on a Predatory Pricing claim than has the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, under the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), a price could be found to be Predatory, even if it were above average variable cost, where the defendant had a 'plan to eliminate a competitor'. This raises the question: When it comes to Predatory Pricing, is the 'EU from Venus, and the United States from Mars'? This short article attempts to answer the question by analyzing the recent developments in the area of Predatory Pricing across the Atlantic, in particular the Supreme Court’s linkLine decision and the ECJ’s Wanadoo judgment.
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The Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009Co-Authors: Gregory K. Leonard, Adrian EmchAbstract:In addition to other types of behaviour, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) targets certain anti-competitive single-firm conduct. In particular, the AML prohibits companies in a dominant market position from engaging in conduct viewed as abusive. One type of prohibited conduct is Predatory Pricing. What the AML prohibits more specifically is that dominant companies sell products at prices below costs, absent valid justifications. Moreover, rules in existence prior to the AML – such as the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, the Price Law and the latter’s implementing measures – contain prohibitions of Predatory Pricing. Nonetheless, the stipulations on Predatory Pricing in both the AML and the older rules do not go into much detail. Given this relative scarcity of guidance on Predatory Pricing in China, this paper attempts to examine the solutions proposed by economists, antitrust agencies and courts in the United States and the European Union (EU). The paper includes descriptions of the economic theories and the legal reasoning of the competition law enforcement agencies and courts in the US and the EU. In addition, the authors set out their views on the basic elements that a sound economic and legal analysis of Predatory Pricing should contain, and explain how their proposals could be used in China.
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Predatory Pricing after linkLine and Wanadoo
Antitrust Chronicle, 2009Co-Authors: Adrian Emch, Gregory K. LeonardAbstract:This raises the question: When it comes to Predatory Pricing, is the EU from Venus, and the United States from Mars? The answer is not as simple as it may seem.
Sukarmiati Sukarmiati - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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JURIDICAL OVERVIEW OF ALLEGATION OF Predatory Pricing PRACTICE IN ONLINE APPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IN INDONESIA
2019Co-Authors: Ika Dewi Sartika Saimima, Sukarmiati SukarmiatiAbstract:: Developing technologies have now changed the way of thinking, working and also mobility of our society. Technology sector is becoming a revolution of industry which have developed in society. However, technology development is not supported by public policy and government regulation to anticipate such change. In law sector, the existing policy and government regulation is not functionate in harmony There is an inequality when technology's presence cannot go along due to the different point of view with the existing laws and regulations. Upon such technology development, the technology transportation services have now come up. The presence of online transportation has caused legal problems to arise. One of them that will be discussed in this paper is Predatory Pricing practice allegedly conducted by applicator businessmen in the field of online public transportation company. The implementation of Predatory Pricing allegedly conducted by applicator online transportation company has caused businessmen in the relevant market closed down and has caused barrier to entry to the online transportation which causes unfair competition. In practice, Rule of Reason approach in this Predatory Pricing is difficult to prove due to the investigation process and deep economic analysis. The role of regulation in business competition is unable to protect small and medium enterprises in transportation field to keep exist and compete in facing this Predatory Pricing practice as the purpose of this regulation. The presence of online transportation has to be controlled as it might caused a very low price to be applied by applicator of online transportation which fulfilled the element of prohobited activites based on Law No.5 of 1999 Article 20 concerning Predatory Pricing. In its impelementation, such activity cannot be proceed by KPPU, while unfair business competition continues to occured in practice. This has shown that such regulation is not effective to protect business competition, eventually online transportation technology is becoming a threat to the sustainability of conventional transportation. Therefore, the Predatory Pricing regulation in the Law of Unfair Business Competion in Indonesia needs to be reassessed and its implementing regulation which put forward mitigation needs to be renewed to become a legal basis to KPPU to act so that it can create fair business competition, legal certainty and justice by creating the same level playing field in the public transportation in Indonesia. Keywords : Predatory Pricing, Transportation Online
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JURIDICAL OVERVIEW OF ALLEGATION OF Predatory Pricing PRACTICE IN ONLINE APPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IN INDONESIA
2019Co-Authors: Saimima, Ika Dewi Sartika, Sukarmiati SukarmiatiAbstract:: Developing technologies have now changed the way of thinking, working and also mobility of our society. Technology sector is becoming a revolution of industry which have developed in society. However, technology development is not supported by public policy and government regulation to anticipate such change. In law sector, the existing policy and government regulation is not functionate in harmony There is an inequality when technology's presence cannot go along due to the different point of view with the existing laws and regulations. Upon such technology development, the technology transportation services have now come up. The presence of online transportation has caused legal problems to arise. One of them that will be discussed in this paper is Predatory Pricing practice allegedly conducted by applicator businessmen in the field of online public transportation company. The implementation of Predatory Pricing allegedly conducted by applicator online transportation company has caused businessmen in the relevant market closed down and has caused barrier to entry to the online transportation which causes unfair competition. In practice, Rule of Reason approach in this Predatory Pricing is difficult to prove due to the investigation process and deep economic analysis. The role of regulation in business competition is unable to protect small and medium enterprises in transportation field to keep exist and compete in facing this Predatory Pricing practice as the purpose of this regulation. The presence of online transportation has to be controlled as it might caused a very low price to be applied by applicator of online transportation which fulfilled the element of prohobited activites based on Law No.5 of 1999 Article 20 concerning Predatory Pricing. In its impelementation, such activity cannot be proceed by KPPU, while unfair business competition continues to occured in practice. This has shown that such regulation is not effective to protect business competition, eventually online transportation technology is becoming a threat to the sustainability of conventional transportation. Therefore, the Predatory Pricing regulation in the Law of Unfair Business Competion in Indonesia needs to be reassessed and its implementing regulation which put forward mitigation needs to be renewed to become a legal basis to KPPU to act so that it can create fair business competition, legal certainty and justice by creating the same level playing field in the public transportation in Indonesia. Keywords : Predatory Pricing, Transportation Onlin
Adrian Emch - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Predatory Pricing in China – In Line with International Practice?
2010Co-Authors: Adrian Emch, Gregory K. LeonardAbstract:China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) prohibits a dominant company from selling products at prices below cost without legitimate reasons. Chinese antitrust agencies and courts have provided some signals as to how they will enforce the Predatory Pricing provision in the AML and similar provisions in other laws. For example, in 2009, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) circulated for comments a draft regulation implementing aspects of the AML, including its Predatory Pricing provision. However, all in all, the law on Predatory Pricing is still relatively undeveloped in China at this stage. As US and EU courts have long dealt with the fundamental questions raised by Predatory Pricing claims, we assess the existing and draft rules in China against the backdrop of US and EU jurisprudence. We focus in particular on four factors: existence of dominance/monopoly power; definition of the benchmark used in a cost test; injury to competition; and absence of pro-competitive justifications.
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Predatory Pricing - Economics and Law in the United States and the European Union (in English)
2009Co-Authors: Adrian Emch, Gregory K. LeonardAbstract:Predatory Pricing occurs where a firm deliberately sets prices below cost to eliminate, discipline or deter entry by a competitor, with the goal to subsequently recoup its losses by charging supra-competitive prices. China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, Anti-Unfair Competition Law and Price Law contain prohibitions of Predatory Pricing, but their provisions do not go into much detail. Given the relative scarcity of guidance on Predatory Pricing in China, this paper examines the solutions proposed by economists, antitrust agencies and courts in the United States and the European Union. The paper analyzes many traditional and more modern economic theories, including the findings of the Chicago School and and the theories and models before and after the Chicago School. Moreover, the authors decribe the U.S. case law on Predatory Pricing, including Matsushita and Brooke Group, and the EU case law, ranging from AKZO to Wanadoo. Note: The downloadable document is the English translation of the Chinese original, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1520308.
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Predatory Pricing after linkLine and Wanadoo
2009Co-Authors: Gregory K. Leonard, Adrian EmchAbstract:In the United States, beginning with the Matsushita decision in 1986, the Supreme Court has required plaintiffs in Predatory Pricing cases to meet stringent conditions to prevail on their claims. As a result, Predatory Pricing cases have become 'rarely tried and even more rarely successful', to paraphrase Matsushita. The Supreme Court’s point of view appears to have been motivated by a concern with the chilling effects on price competition that 'false positives' in Predatory Pricing cases would have, combined with a strong skepticism, from both a theoretical and practical point of view, about whether Predatory Pricing is a rational business strategy. European Union (EU) antitrust law has generally followed a different path with regard to Predatory Pricing. The traditional EU case law, based on the AKZO judgment, has set a substantially lower bar to prevail on a Predatory Pricing claim than has the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, under the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), a price could be found to be Predatory, even if it were above average variable cost, where the defendant had a 'plan to eliminate a competitor'. This raises the question: When it comes to Predatory Pricing, is the 'EU from Venus, and the United States from Mars'? This short article attempts to answer the question by analyzing the recent developments in the area of Predatory Pricing across the Atlantic, in particular the Supreme Court’s linkLine decision and the ECJ’s Wanadoo judgment.
-
The Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009Co-Authors: Gregory K. Leonard, Adrian EmchAbstract:In addition to other types of behaviour, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) targets certain anti-competitive single-firm conduct. In particular, the AML prohibits companies in a dominant market position from engaging in conduct viewed as abusive. One type of prohibited conduct is Predatory Pricing. What the AML prohibits more specifically is that dominant companies sell products at prices below costs, absent valid justifications. Moreover, rules in existence prior to the AML – such as the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, the Price Law and the latter’s implementing measures – contain prohibitions of Predatory Pricing. Nonetheless, the stipulations on Predatory Pricing in both the AML and the older rules do not go into much detail. Given this relative scarcity of guidance on Predatory Pricing in China, this paper attempts to examine the solutions proposed by economists, antitrust agencies and courts in the United States and the European Union (EU). The paper includes descriptions of the economic theories and the legal reasoning of the competition law enforcement agencies and courts in the US and the EU. In addition, the authors set out their views on the basic elements that a sound economic and legal analysis of Predatory Pricing should contain, and explain how their proposals could be used in China.
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Predatory Pricing after linkLine and Wanadoo
Antitrust Chronicle, 2009Co-Authors: Adrian Emch, Gregory K. LeonardAbstract:This raises the question: When it comes to Predatory Pricing, is the EU from Venus, and the United States from Mars? The answer is not as simple as it may seem.
Steven Van Uytsel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Could Predatory Pricing Rules Substitute for Antidumping Laws in the Proposed China–Japan–Korea Free Trade Agreement?
Social Science Japan Journal, 2015Co-Authors: Steven Van UytselAbstract:The proliferation of trade agreements heightens the interest in Predatory Pricing rules because of their possibility to replace antidumping laws. Successful practices have already been achieved in several regional trade agreements. The current paper focuses on the proposed China–Japan–Korea Free Trade Agreement (CJK FTA) and argues that substitution may be complicated by the presence of two different forms of Predatory Pricing: dominance-orientated Predatory Pricing and unfair Predatory Pricing. Reviewing the rules of the former fortifies the evidence that specific rules of competition law can substitute antidumping law. However, by exploring the rules of the latter, this conclusion is troubled. Unfair Predatory Pricing rules, as they exist in China, Japan, and Korea, are prone to protectionist abuse. Hence, efforts to harmonize Predatory Pricing rules so as to abolish antidumping laws would confront more difficulties in the proposed CJK FTA.
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could Predatory Pricing rules substitute for antidumping laws in the proposed china japan korea free trade agreement
Social Science Japan Journal, 2015Co-Authors: Steven Van UytselAbstract:The proliferation of trade agreements heightens the interest in Predatory Pricing rules because of their possibility to replace antidumping laws. Successful practices have already been achieved in several regional trade agreements. The current paper focuses on the proposed China–Japan–Korea Free Trade Agreement (CJK FTA) and argues that substitution may be complicated by the presence of two different forms of Predatory Pricing: dominance-orientated Predatory Pricing and unfair Predatory Pricing. Reviewing the rules of the former fortifies the evidence that specific rules of competition law can substitute antidumping law. However, by exploring the rules of the latter, this conclusion is troubled. Unfair Predatory Pricing rules, as they exist in China, Japan, and Korea, are prone to protectionist abuse. Hence, efforts to harmonize Predatory Pricing rules so as to abolish antidumping laws would confront more difficulties in the proposed CJK FTA.
Louis Kaplow - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Recoupment and Predatory Pricing Analysis
Journal of Legal Analysis, 2018Co-Authors: Louis KaplowAbstract:Abstract Recoupment inquiries play an increasingly important role in antitrust analysis, yet they raise a number of conundrums: How can a failure of recoupment due to the plausible long-run profit recovery being dwarfed by short-run losses be reconciled with a defense of no predation that presupposes no short- run sacrifice to begin with? How can recoupment inquiries be diagnostic with respect to competing explanations for defendants’ behavior—such as product promotion or “legal” predation—that likewise require recoupment? This article addresses these questions and others by grounding recoupment and Predatory Pricing analysis more broadly in a decision framework that focuses on classification (distinguishing illegal predation from other explanations for firms’ Pricing) and on the magnitudes of the deterrence benefits and chilling costs of imposing liability. Regarding the latter, although concerns for the chilling of procompetitive activity sensibly drive Predatory Pricing analysis, the great variation in chilling costs across competing explanations for alleged predation is unrecognized. Much of the analysis here is not particular to recoupment; the investigation aims to inform future research, policy, and practice regarding many aspects of Predatory Pricing as well as other forms of anticompetitive conduct.
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Recoupment, Market Power, and Predatory Pricing
2018Co-Authors: Louis KaplowAbstract:Recoupment inquiries play an important role in Predatory Pricing cases. Nevertheless, their place in antitrust analysis is unclear and potentially problematic in ways that are not fully appreciated. Does a recoupment requirement define, augment, or replace the preexisting monopoly power requirement that involves similar analysis? How can a recoupment test be inserted in sequential assessments of alleged Predatory Pricing when all of the steps are intertwined with the others, including those deemed to come later? Why is a plaintiff permitted to show either that recoupment was ex ante plausible or that sufficient ex post profit recovery occurred, rather than requiring one in particular, or both? This article addresses these questions by examining the underlying purposes of recoupment assessments and Predatory Pricing inquiries more broadly. As will become evident, much of the analysis is relevant not just to Predatory Pricing but to other forms of anticompetitive conduct as well.
