The Experts below are selected from a list of 324 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Nicolas Drouhin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Tacit Collusion in a One-Shot Game of Price Competition with Soft Capacity Constraints
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2014Co-Authors: Marie-laure Cabon-dhersin, Nicolas DrouhinAbstract:This paper analyzes Price Competition in the case of two firms operating under constant returns to scale with more than one production factor. Factors are chosen sequentially in a two-stage game generating a soft capacity constraint and implying a convex short-term cost function in the second stage of the game. We show that tacit collusion is the only predictable result of the whole game, that is, the unique payoff-dominant pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Technically, this paper bridges the capacity constraint literature on Price Competition and that of the convex cost function.
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Tacit collusion in a one-shot game of Price Competition with soft capacity constraints
2012Co-Authors: Marie-laure Cabon-dhersin, Nicolas DrouhinAbstract:This paper analyses Price Competition in the case of two firms operating under constant returns to scale with more than one production factor. Factors are chosen sequentially in a two-stage game generating a soft capacity constraint and implying a convex short term cost function in the second stage of the game. We show that tacit collusion is the only predictable result of the whole game i.e. the unique payoff-dominant pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Technically, this paper bridges the capacity constraint literature on Price Competition and that of the convex cost function.
Colin Fyfe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Simulation of Cooperation for Price Competition in Oligopolies
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2006Co-Authors: Tzai-der Wang, Colin FyfeAbstract:In this research, an agent-based simulation model for Price Competition in oligopolies is built and Genetic Algorithm is used to evolve the oligopolies' decisions of Price while facing the competitors in markets. The experimental results show two factors influencing the Price Competition situations and 'given' factor that competitor can not control leads strong influence on their decision of Price. Total cooperation (Collusion to high Prices) seems not to be achieved under the different parameter settings while many competitors involving in the market and a limitation of cooperation forms in which no effect forces the achievement of total cooperation.
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SEAL - Simulation of cooperation for Price Competition in oligopolies
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2006Co-Authors: Tzai-der Wang, Colin FyfeAbstract:In this research, an agent-based simulation model for Price Competition in oligopolies is built and Genetic Algorithm is used to evolve the oligopolies' decisions of Price while facing the competitors in markets. The experimental results show two factors influencing the Price Competition situations and ‘given' factor that competitor can not control leads strong influence on their decision of Price. Total cooperation (Collusion to high Prices) seems not to be achieved under the different parameter settings while many competitors involving in the market and a limitation of cooperation forms in which no effect forces the achievement of total cooperation.
Miao-ling Chen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The effects of advertising on retail Price Competition under vertical restraint
Journal of Business Research, 2004Co-Authors: Miao-ling ChenAbstract:Abstract This paper investigates the impact of vertical restraint on advertising effects. A model is postulated in which a manufacturer can influence retail Price Competition through advertising by increasing brand penetration, thus reducing retail Price Competition, and at the same time by increasing the promotional pricing of retailers, thus intensifying retail Price Competition. Moreover, vertical restraint will influence the effects of advertising on retail Price Competition by strengthening the relationship between brand penetration and retail Price Competition, and by weakening the relationship between advertising and promotional pricing of retailers. Consequently, retail Price Competition will be reduced. Empirical evidence from cross-sectional data from Japan supports our hypotheses that retail Price Competition is a function of not only the effects of advertising on brand penetration and promotional pricing, but also the influence of vertical restraint on advertising effects.
Tao Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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QoE-ensured Price Competition model for emerging mobile networks
IEEE Wireless Communications, 2015Co-Authors: Mianxiong Dong, Xiao Liu, Zhuzhong Qian, Anfeng Liu, Tao WangAbstract:The ubiquitous availability of devices such as smartphones, tablets, and other portable devices enables the collection of massive amounts of distributed data from the daily lives of citizens. These types of emerging mobile networks can provide new forms of valuable information that are currently not available on this scale via any traditional data collection methods. In such networks, Price Competition is the most important factor among the participants (mobile devices, services organizers [SOs], and users), highly affecting their quality of experience. In this article, we first explain how a game theory model can depict social behavior, Price Competition, and the evolutionary relationship among devices, SOs, and users, and then provide insights to understand the Price Competition process of the participants in mobile networks. Finally, we outline several important open research directions.
Marie-laure Cabon-dhersin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Tacit Collusion in a One-Shot Game of Price Competition with Soft Capacity Constraints
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2014Co-Authors: Marie-laure Cabon-dhersin, Nicolas DrouhinAbstract:This paper analyzes Price Competition in the case of two firms operating under constant returns to scale with more than one production factor. Factors are chosen sequentially in a two-stage game generating a soft capacity constraint and implying a convex short-term cost function in the second stage of the game. We show that tacit collusion is the only predictable result of the whole game, that is, the unique payoff-dominant pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Technically, this paper bridges the capacity constraint literature on Price Competition and that of the convex cost function.
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Tacit collusion in a one-shot game of Price Competition with soft capacity constraints
2012Co-Authors: Marie-laure Cabon-dhersin, Nicolas DrouhinAbstract:This paper analyses Price Competition in the case of two firms operating under constant returns to scale with more than one production factor. Factors are chosen sequentially in a two-stage game generating a soft capacity constraint and implying a convex short term cost function in the second stage of the game. We show that tacit collusion is the only predictable result of the whole game i.e. the unique payoff-dominant pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Technically, this paper bridges the capacity constraint literature on Price Competition and that of the convex cost function.
