The Experts below are selected from a list of 12831 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Tim Güneysu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Applications of machine learning techniques in side-channel attacks: a survey
Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 2019Co-Authors: Benjamin Hettwer, Stefan Gehrer, Tim GüneysuAbstract:With increasing expansion of the Internet of Things, embedded devices equipped with cryptographic modules become an important factor to Protect Sensitive Data. Even though the employed algorithms in such devices are mathematically secure in theory, adversaries may still be able to compromise them by means of side-channel attacks. In power-based side-channel attacks, the instantaneous power consumption of the target is analyzed with statistical tools to draw conclusions about the secret keys that are used. There is a recent line of work that additionally makes use of techniques from the machine learning domain to attack cryptographic implementations. Since a complete review of this emerging field has not been done so far, this research aims to survey the current state of the art. We use a target-based classification to differentiate published work and drive general conclusions according to a common machine learning workflow. Furthermore, we outline the relationship between traditional power analysis techniques and machine learning-based attacks. This enables researchers to gain a better understanding of the topic in order to design new attack methods as well as potential countermeasures.
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Applications of machine learning techniques in side-channel attacks: a survey
Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 2019Co-Authors: Benjamin Hettwer, Stefan Gehrer, Tim GüneysuAbstract:With increasing expansion of the Internet of Things, embedded devices equipped with cryptographic modules become an important factor to Protect Sensitive Data. Even though the employed algorithms in such devices are mathematically secure in theory, adversaries may still be able to compromise them by means of side-channel attacks. In power-based side-channel attacks, the instantaneous power consumption of the target is analyzed with statistical tools to draw conclusions about the secret keys that are used. There is a recent line of work that additionally makes use of techniques from the machine learning domain to attack cryptographic implementations. Since a complete review of this emerging field has not been done so far, this research aims to survey the current state of the art. We use a target-based classification to differentiate published work and drive general conclusions according to a common machine learning workflow. Furthermore, we outline the relationship between traditional power analysis techniques and machine learning-based attacks. This enables researchers to gain a better understanding of the topic in order to design new attack methods as well as potential countermeasures.
Jop Briët - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ISIT - Revisiting the Sanders-Bogolyubov-Ruzsa theorem in F p n and its application to non-malleable codes
2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 2016Co-Authors: Divesh Aggarwal, Jop BriëtAbstract:Non-malleable codes (NMCs) Protect Sensitive Data against degrees of corruption that prohibit error detection, ensuring instead that a corrupted codeword decodes correctly or to something that bears little relation to the original message. The split-state model, in which codewords consist of two blocks, considers adversaries who tamper with either block arbitrarily but independently of the other. The simplest construction in this model, due to Aggarwal, Dodis, and Lovett (STOC'14), was shown to give NMCs sending k-bit messages to O(k7)-bit codewords. It is conjectured, however, that the construction allows linear-length codewords. Towards resolving this conjecture, we show that the construction allows for code-length O(k5). This is achieved by analysing a special case of Sanders's Bogolyubov-Ruzsa theorem for general Abelian groups. Closely following the excellent exposition of this result for the group F 2 n by Lovett, we expose its dependence on p for the group F p n, where p is a prime.
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Revisiting the Sanders-Freiman-Ruzsa Theorem in $\mathbb{F}_p^n$ and its Application to Non-malleable Codes
arXiv: Discrete Mathematics, 2016Co-Authors: Divesh Aggarwal, Jop BriëtAbstract:textabstractNon-malleable codes (NMCs) Protect Sensitive Data against degrees of corruption that prohibit error detection, ensuring instead that a corrupted codeword decodes correctly or to something that bears little relation to the original message. The split-state model, in which codewords consist of two blocks, considers adversaries who tamper with either block arbitrarily but independently of the other. The simplest construction in this model, due to Aggarwal, Dodis, and Lovett (STOC'14), was shown to give NMCs sending k-bit messages to $O(k^7)$-bit codewords. It is conjectured, however, that the construction allows linear-length codewords. Towards resolving this conjecture, we show that the construction allows for code-length $O(k^5)$. This is achieved by analysing a special case of Sanders's Bogolyubov-Ruzsa theorem for general Abelian groups. Closely following the excellent exposition of this result for the group $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ by Lovett, we expose its dependence on $p$ for the group $\mathbb{F}_p^n$, where $p$ is a prime.
Benjamin Hettwer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Applications of machine learning techniques in side-channel attacks: a survey
Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 2019Co-Authors: Benjamin Hettwer, Stefan Gehrer, Tim GüneysuAbstract:With increasing expansion of the Internet of Things, embedded devices equipped with cryptographic modules become an important factor to Protect Sensitive Data. Even though the employed algorithms in such devices are mathematically secure in theory, adversaries may still be able to compromise them by means of side-channel attacks. In power-based side-channel attacks, the instantaneous power consumption of the target is analyzed with statistical tools to draw conclusions about the secret keys that are used. There is a recent line of work that additionally makes use of techniques from the machine learning domain to attack cryptographic implementations. Since a complete review of this emerging field has not been done so far, this research aims to survey the current state of the art. We use a target-based classification to differentiate published work and drive general conclusions according to a common machine learning workflow. Furthermore, we outline the relationship between traditional power analysis techniques and machine learning-based attacks. This enables researchers to gain a better understanding of the topic in order to design new attack methods as well as potential countermeasures.
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Applications of machine learning techniques in side-channel attacks: a survey
Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 2019Co-Authors: Benjamin Hettwer, Stefan Gehrer, Tim GüneysuAbstract:With increasing expansion of the Internet of Things, embedded devices equipped with cryptographic modules become an important factor to Protect Sensitive Data. Even though the employed algorithms in such devices are mathematically secure in theory, adversaries may still be able to compromise them by means of side-channel attacks. In power-based side-channel attacks, the instantaneous power consumption of the target is analyzed with statistical tools to draw conclusions about the secret keys that are used. There is a recent line of work that additionally makes use of techniques from the machine learning domain to attack cryptographic implementations. Since a complete review of this emerging field has not been done so far, this research aims to survey the current state of the art. We use a target-based classification to differentiate published work and drive general conclusions according to a common machine learning workflow. Furthermore, we outline the relationship between traditional power analysis techniques and machine learning-based attacks. This enables researchers to gain a better understanding of the topic in order to design new attack methods as well as potential countermeasures.
Slimane Ouhmad - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a swift cloud paillier scheme to Protect Sensitive Data confidentiality in cloud computing
Procedia Computer Science, 2018Co-Authors: Khalid El Makkaoui, Abdellah Ezzati, Abderrahim Benihssane, Slimane OuhmadAbstract:Abstract Concerns over the confidentiality of Sensitive Data are still the main obstacles limiting the wide-spread adoption of cloud services. Actually, scientists have suggested a new encryption form, called homomorphic encryption (HE), which can offer a third-party having the ability to perform operations on encrypted Data. The HE property can be considered as a useful method to get over these concerns. Since cloud environments are threatened by outsider/insider security attacks and since the cloud consumers oftentimes access to cloud services utilizing resource-limited devices, the HE schemes need to be promoted in terms of security level and running time to work effectively. At BDAW'16, we boosted a Paillier scheme at the security level, we refer to as Cloud-Paillier. In this paper, we propose a fast variant of Cloud-Paillier scheme to accelerate its decryption process. The variant employs the Chinese remaindering to decrypt. Simulation results show that the proposed variant provides a large decryption speedup over Cloud-Paillier scheme while preserves the same security level.
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FNC/MobiSPC - A swift Cloud-Paillier scheme to Protect Sensitive Data confidentiality in cloud computing
Procedia Computer Science, 2018Co-Authors: Khalid El Makkaoui, Abdellah Ezzati, Abderrahim Beni-hssane, Slimane OuhmadAbstract:Abstract Concerns over the confidentiality of Sensitive Data are still the main obstacles limiting the wide-spread adoption of cloud services. Actually, scientists have suggested a new encryption form, called homomorphic encryption (HE), which can offer a third-party having the ability to perform operations on encrypted Data. The HE property can be considered as a useful method to get over these concerns. Since cloud environments are threatened by outsider/insider security attacks and since the cloud consumers oftentimes access to cloud services utilizing resource-limited devices, the HE schemes need to be promoted in terms of security level and running time to work effectively. At BDAW'16, we boosted a Paillier scheme at the security level, we refer to as Cloud-Paillier. In this paper, we propose a fast variant of Cloud-Paillier scheme to accelerate its decryption process. The variant employs the Chinese remaindering to decrypt. Simulation results show that the proposed variant provides a large decryption speedup over Cloud-Paillier scheme while preserves the same security level.
Divesh Aggarwal - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ISIT - Revisiting the Sanders-Bogolyubov-Ruzsa theorem in F p n and its application to non-malleable codes
2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 2016Co-Authors: Divesh Aggarwal, Jop BriëtAbstract:Non-malleable codes (NMCs) Protect Sensitive Data against degrees of corruption that prohibit error detection, ensuring instead that a corrupted codeword decodes correctly or to something that bears little relation to the original message. The split-state model, in which codewords consist of two blocks, considers adversaries who tamper with either block arbitrarily but independently of the other. The simplest construction in this model, due to Aggarwal, Dodis, and Lovett (STOC'14), was shown to give NMCs sending k-bit messages to O(k7)-bit codewords. It is conjectured, however, that the construction allows linear-length codewords. Towards resolving this conjecture, we show that the construction allows for code-length O(k5). This is achieved by analysing a special case of Sanders's Bogolyubov-Ruzsa theorem for general Abelian groups. Closely following the excellent exposition of this result for the group F 2 n by Lovett, we expose its dependence on p for the group F p n, where p is a prime.
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Revisiting the Sanders-Freiman-Ruzsa Theorem in $\mathbb{F}_p^n$ and its Application to Non-malleable Codes
arXiv: Discrete Mathematics, 2016Co-Authors: Divesh Aggarwal, Jop BriëtAbstract:textabstractNon-malleable codes (NMCs) Protect Sensitive Data against degrees of corruption that prohibit error detection, ensuring instead that a corrupted codeword decodes correctly or to something that bears little relation to the original message. The split-state model, in which codewords consist of two blocks, considers adversaries who tamper with either block arbitrarily but independently of the other. The simplest construction in this model, due to Aggarwal, Dodis, and Lovett (STOC'14), was shown to give NMCs sending k-bit messages to $O(k^7)$-bit codewords. It is conjectured, however, that the construction allows linear-length codewords. Towards resolving this conjecture, we show that the construction allows for code-length $O(k^5)$. This is achieved by analysing a special case of Sanders's Bogolyubov-Ruzsa theorem for general Abelian groups. Closely following the excellent exposition of this result for the group $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ by Lovett, we expose its dependence on $p$ for the group $\mathbb{F}_p^n$, where $p$ is a prime.
