The Experts below are selected from a list of 327 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Arthur Schram - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Gordon Tullock and experimental Public Choice
Constitutional Political Economy, 2016Co-Authors: Arthur SchramAbstract:In this paper, I discuss Gordon Tullock’s views on Experimentation in Economics, his own research experiment, and his influence on the field of experimental Public Choice. I argue that Tullock can credibly claim to have been an early supporter of the method and that his work is cited more often than that of other Public Choice scholars active in the same period. His work on rent seeking forms the basis of an extensive experimental literature and studies on trust, demand revelation and voter turnout have been strongly influenced by Tullock’s work.
Dennis C Mueller - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Public Choice
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice Volume 1, 2019Co-Authors: Dennis C MuellerAbstract:This chapter reviews the early contributions to Public Choice beginning with what might be called its antecedents. These include the works of the Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794), Jean-Charles de Borda (1733–1799), Charles L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) (1823–1898), Harold Hotelling (1895–1973), Knut Wicksell (1851–1926), and Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883–1950). The chapter dates the modern literature from 1948, starting with the work of Duncan Black (1908–1991). It defines the early modern literature as spanning the twenty-five years after Black’s first contributions (1948–1973). The chapter proceeds by chronicling the contributions of the leading figures in Public Choice over that period in addition to Black—James M. Buchanan (1919–2013), Kenneth J. Arrow (1921–2017), Kenneth O. May (1915–1977), Anthony Downs (1930–), Gordon Tullock (1922–2014), William Vickrey (1914–1996), William H. Riker (1920–1993), Mancur Olson (1932–1998), James S. Coleman (1926–1995), Amartya K. Sen (1933–), and William A. Niskanen (1933–2011). It offers some final thoughts on the early literature in the closing section.
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Public Choice, social Choice, and political economy
Public Choice, 2015Co-Authors: Dennis C MuellerAbstract:Since World War II a large literature has arisen that uses the methodology of economics to examine the behavior of governments and the actors in them. Some scholars refer to their research as Public Choice, some as social Choice, and still others as political economy. This article discusses the distinctions among these three terms. It concludes that all of the research falling under these three headings has much in common, and that people who refer to their work as Public Choice or political economy are essentially employing identical methodologies. Contributions to Public Choice, narrowly defined, are more often positive and empirical analyses of government behavior than those in social Choice, narrowly defined.
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Gordon Tullock and Public Choice
Public Choice, 2012Co-Authors: Dennis C MuellerAbstract:Gordon Tullock is one of the founders of the field of Public Choice, of the Public Choice Society, and of the Public Choice Center. He is a coauthor with James M. Buchanan of one of the true classics in the Public Choice field—The Calculus of Consent. He has been one of the field’s most prolific scholars, with his research spanning virtually all dimensions of the Public Choice field. This article surveys his major contributions.
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perspectives on Public Choice
1997Co-Authors: Dennis C MuellerAbstract:Public Choice or rational politics differs from other approaches to the study of political behavior in that it builds on models in which rational individuals seek to advance their own interests. This five-part volume surveys the main ideas and contributions of the field. It contains twenty-five essays written by thirty scholars, both economists and political scientists, from North America and Europe. Part I discusses the nature and justification for the existence of government and various forms it can take, including mixed, private, and Public institutions, international organizations, federalisms, and constitutional governments. Part II examines the properties of different voting rules and preference aggregation procedures. Part III explores multiparty systems, interest groups, logrolling and political business cycles. The individual decisionmaker is the focus of Part IV, with surveys of the experimental literature on individual behavior, and why people vote as they do. The final section applies Public-Choice reasoning to bureaucracy, taxation, and the size of government.
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perspectives on Public Choice a handbook
1996Co-Authors: Dennis C MuellerAbstract:1. Public Choice in perspective Dennis C. Mueller Part I. The Need for and Forms of Cooperation: 2. Economic theories of the state Russell Hardin 3. Neither markets nor states: linking transformation processes in collective-action arenas Elinor Ostrom and James Walker 4. The political economy of Federalism Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld 5. The Public Choice of international organizations Bruno S. Frey 6. Constitutional Public Choice Dennis C. Mueller Part II. Voting Rules and Preference Aggregation: 7. Cycling and majority rule James M. Enelow 8. Majority rule Douglas W. Rae and Eric Schickler 9. Group Choice and individual judgments H. Peyton Young 10. Some paradoxes of preference aggregation Prasanta K. Pattanaik 11. Voting and the revelation of preferences for Public activities T. Nicolaus Tideman Part III. Electoral Politics: 12. The spatial analysis of elections and committees: four decades of research Peter C. Ordeshook 13. Multiparty electoral politics Norman Schofield 14. Interest groups: money, information and influence David Austen Smith 15. Logrolling Thomas Stratmann 16. Political business cycles Martin Paldam Part IV. Individual Behavior and Collective Action: 17. When is it rational to vote? John H. Aldrich 18. Voting behavior Morris P. Fiorina 19. Public Choice Experiments Elizabeth Hoffman Part V. Public Choice in Action: 20. Modern bureaucratic theory Ronald Wintrobe 21. The positive theory of Public bureaucracy Terry Moe 22. The political economy of taxation Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer 23. Rent seeking Robert D. Tollison 24. Endogenous protection: a survey Stephen P. Magee 25. Why does government's share of national income grow? An assessment of the recent literature on the US experience Cheryl M. Holsey and Thomas Borchering.
Edward Peter Stringham - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Public Choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey
Public Choice, 2009Co-Authors: Benjamin Powell, Edward Peter StringhamAbstract:Public Choice economists began studying the economics of anarchy in the 1970s. Since then, the amount of research on anarchy has burgeoned. This article surveys the important Public Choice contributions to the economics of anarchy. Following the lead of the early Public Choice economists, many current economists are researching and analyzing how individuals interact without government. From their non-ublic-interested explanations of the creation of government law enforcement to their historical studies of attempts to internalize externalities under anarchy, Public Choice scholars are arriving at a more realistic perspective on government and how people interact when government law enforcement is lacking. Although the economics of politics often receives more attention, the economics of anarchy is an important area of research in Public Choice.
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Public Choice and the economic analysis of anarchy a survey
MPRA Paper, 2009Co-Authors: Benjamin Powell, Edward Peter StringhamAbstract:Public Choice economists began studying the economics of anarchy in the 1970s. Since then, the amount of research on anarchy has burgeoned. This article surveys the important Public Choice contributions to the economics of anarchy. Following the lead of the early Public Choice economists, many current economists are researching and analyzing how individuals interact without government. From their non-ublic-interested explanations of the creation of government law enforcement to their historical studies of attempts to internalize externalities under anarchy, Public Choice scholars are arriving at a more realistic perspective on government and how people interact when government law enforcement is lacking. Although the economics of politics often receives more attention, the economics of anarchy is an important area of research in Public Choice.
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mises bastiat Public opinion and Public Choice
Review of Political Economy, 2005Co-Authors: Bryan Caplan, Edward Peter StringhamAbstract:The political economy of Ludwig von Mises and Frederic Bastiat has been largely ignored even by their admirers. We argue that Mises' and Bastiat's views in this area were both original and insightful. While traditional Public Choice generally maintains that democracy fails because voters' views are rational but ignored, the Mises-Bastiat view is that democracy fails because voters' views are irrational but heeded. Mises and Bastiat anticipate many of the most effective criticisms of tra4itional Public Choice to emerge during the last decade and point to many avenues for future research.
Randall G. Holcombe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Advanced Introduction to Public Choice
2016Co-Authors: Randall G. HolcombeAbstract:Using Public Choice economic methods, this Advanced Introduction presents a focused narrative about political decision-making based on the work that has defined the discipline. Each chapter ends with a Notes section to discuss the research on which the chapter is based, with an emphasis on the pioneering work that has shaped the development of Public Choice. Randall G. Holcombe emphasizes the theoretical foundations of Public Choice, with the idea that it offers a context within which empirical research can be understood. This book successfully explores the political decision-making process for readers and ensures that they understand how preferences of citizens are aggregated to produce Public policies.
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Public Choice and Austrian Economics
The Oxford Handbook of Austrian Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Randall G. HolcombeAbstract:Austrian economics is a school of thought, while Public Choice is an area of inquiry, so one way to analyze the two together is to look at how the Austrian school approaches the subject matter of Public Choice. There are substantial and long-standing areas of commonality between Austrian ideas and the literature in Public Choice, but most Austrian school contributions to Public Choice are in the form of critiques of the ideas of Public-Choice theories rather than the development of an independent Austrian Public-Choice theory. Public Choice analyzes collective decision-making processes, but Austrian economists often assume away collective decision-making issues to focus on knowledge problems that hinder government allocation of resources. For this and other reasons, an Austrian school analysis of collective decision-making processes remains underdeveloped. Austrian economics offers many insights that could be used to develop a more Austrian Public-Choice theory.
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Public Choice in a local government setting
Public Choice, 2011Co-Authors: Randall G. HolcombeAbstract:From its beginnings, Public Choice has always had a substantial component devoted to federalism and local government decision-making. The DeVoe Moore Center at Florida State University has made the study of local government within a Public Choice framework a core component of its mission. The Center held a conference February 17–19, 2011, on Public Choice in a local government setting. This special issue of Public Choice contains the papers presented at that conference.
Zane A. Spindler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Public Choice of “superior” sanctions
Public Choice, 1995Co-Authors: Zane A. SpindlerAbstract:This paper analyzes the Public Choice of specific forms of sanctions. Current sanctions are essentially quantity constraints (“Q-sanctions”) which are like quotas in that they might bestow benefits on certain special interest groups in the target country. Revenue sanctions (“Rsanctions”) may be able to recapture such benefits in the form of sender government revenue which could either compensate for the costs of sanctions to the sending country or finance other sanction enhancing activities aimed at the target country. Hence, R-sanctions may be “superior” to Q-Sanctions in general or on the basis of “target efficiency”. However, Public Choice analysis suggests that Q-sanctions will generally be chosen over R-sanctions by democratic countries.
