The Experts below are selected from a list of 29103 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Taehee Whang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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designing foreign policy voters Special Interest Groups and economic sanctions
Journal of Peace Research, 2014Co-Authors: Elena V Mclean, Taehee WhangAbstract:The literature on economic sanctions has long studied sender countries’ policymaking as a simple choice between imposing sanctions to extract concessions from the targeted country and doing nothing. We depart from this simplifying assumption and analyze sanctions as a multifaceted foreign policy instrument. We argue that senders design sanction policies in response to policy preferences of two domestic constituencies. Voters expect a response to an international dispute in the form of some policy, such as economic sanctions; hence, the sender’s policymakers seek to demonstrate their competence in foreign affairs by imposing sanctions. Once the policymakers announce the use of sanctions, Special Interest Groups that stand to experience economic losses when this foreign policy is implemented pressure the policymakers to choose sanction measures limiting such losses. As a result, the policymakers design sanction policies to include measures that will be less detrimental to Special Interest Groups. We test our theoretical argument using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions data and show that, while pressures from public opinion increase the likelihood of sanctions, Special Interest Groups that benefit from the relationship with the target country are associated with a lower probability of the use of sanction measures that would impose substantial costs on domestic Interest Groups.
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designing foreign policy voters Special Interest Groups and economic sanctions
Journal of Peace Research, 2014Co-Authors: Elena V Mclean, Taehee WhangAbstract:The literature on economic sanctions has long studied sender countries’ policymaking as a simple choice between imposing sanctions to extract concessions from the targeted country and doing nothing...
Elhanan Helpman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Special Interest Groups and economic policy
NBER Reporter Online, 2000Co-Authors: Gene M Grossman, Elhanan HelpmanAbstract:Elhanan Helpman [*] In the idealized democratic society; economic policy is determined by "one man, one vote." But in all real societies, Special Interest Groups play an important role in the process that determines economic policy. Pressure Groups represent relatively narrow Interests, for example of peanut farmers, auto workers, or shareholders of firms that produce semiconductors, They also represent broader Interests, such as those of retired workers, capital owners, and those with Special concerns for the environment. Hardly a day passes without the media reporting on the activities and influence of Special Interests. Discussions of campaign finance reform in the United States have focused attention on one important way in which Interest Groups seek to influence policies: Interest Groups are contributing ever-larger sums to political campaigns and political parties, apparently to encourage politicians to take positions favorable to their causes and to aid those who do so in their bids for election. Contributions by Political Action Committees to congressional candidates, which in 1975-6 totaled less than $23 million, exceeded $430 million in the 1995-6 electoral cycle. [1] Interest Groups also engage in public display, such as the highly visible protests that surrounded the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings in Seattle and the recent International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings in Washington, DC. These displays are meant to demonstrate to politicians the strength of the Groups' convictions and to educate the p ublic about the policy issues. Less visible but still important are the everyday activities of the legion of lobbyists in Washington, Brussels, and other capitol cities. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the number of registered lobbyists in Washington grew from 14,946 in 1997 to 20,512 in 1999. [2] These lobbyists spend a good portion of their days meeting with elected officials in order to share their alleged expertise and to persuade the policymakers about the worthiness of their causes. In the early 1990s, we began to study the effects that Special Interests have on trade policy deliberations and outcomes. Trade is an area where Interest Groups have been eSpecially visible. Groups representing workers and firms figured prominently in the protection afforded the U.S. steel, auto, textile, and footwear industries in the 1970s and 1980s. Agricultural Interests were active and effective in pushing the Common Agriculture Policy of the European Community (now the European Union). Groups representing labor and environmentalists were vociferous in their opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement, while many business Groups lobbied in favor of that agreement. These same Groups are joined by still others in the current debate about the future of the WTO. Although an extensive literature on the political economy of trade policy existed by the time we became Interested in the subject -- with important contributions from William Brock and Stephen Magee, Robert E. Baldwin, Jagdish Bhagwati, Anne 0. Krueger, and Wolfgang Mayer, among others -- the prevailing approaches took shortcuts that seemed to obscure important relationships and to limit the purview of the theory and empirics. For example, the framework used often was ill suited to making predictions about the variation in rates of protection, despite the fact that much of the empirical work focused on exactly this sort of evidence. Our early work on Special Interest politics focused on campaign contributions (of time and money) as the tool by which Interest Groups might influence the policy process. In our first paper, we develop an analytical approach that emphasizes the strategic interaction between Interest Groups and policymakers on the one hand and the strategic interaction among the Interest Groups on the other. [3] We suggest that trade policies can be viewed as objects "for sale," with the policymaker as seller and Special Interest Groups as buyers. …
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electoral competition and Special Interest politics
The Review of Economic Studies, 1996Co-Authors: Gene M Grossman, Elhanan HelpmanAbstract:We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a legislature. The parties have fixed positions on some issues, but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions. In this context, we examine whether Special Interest Groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving, and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms. We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of Special Interest Groups. The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the Special Interests.
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electoral competition and Special Interest politics
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994Co-Authors: Gene M Grossman, Elhanan HelpmanAbstract:We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a parliament. The parliament will set two types of policies: ideological and non-ideological. The parties have fixed positions on the ideological issues, but choose their non-ideological platforms to attract voters and campaign contributions. In this context, we ask: How do the equilibrium contributions from Special Interest Groups influence the platforms of the parties? We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of Special Interest Groups. The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the Special Interests.
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the politics of free trade agreements
Research Papers in Economics, 1993Co-Authors: Gene M Grossman, Elhanan HelpmanAbstract:Suppose that an opportunity arises for two countries to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA). Will an FTA between these countries be politically viable? If so, what form will it take? We address these questions using a political economy framework that emphasizes the interaction between industry Special Interest Groups and an incumbent government. We describe the economic conditions necessary for an FTA to be an equilibrium outcome, both for the case when the agreement must cover all bilateral trade and when a few, politically sensitive sectors can be excluded from the agreement.
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protection for sale
The American Economic Review, 1992Co-Authors: Gene M Grossman, Elhanan HelpmanAbstract:The authors develop a model in which Special-Interest Groups make political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's choice of trade policy. The Interest Groups bid for protection with their campaign support. Politicians maximize their own welfare, which depends on total contributions collected and on the welfare of voters. The authors study the structure of protection that emerges in the political equilibrium and the contributions by different lobbies that support the policy outcome. They also discuss why the lobbies may in some cases prefer to have the government use trade policy to transfer income, rather than more efficient means. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.
Elena V Mclean - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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designing foreign policy voters Special Interest Groups and economic sanctions
Journal of Peace Research, 2014Co-Authors: Elena V Mclean, Taehee WhangAbstract:The literature on economic sanctions has long studied sender countries’ policymaking as a simple choice between imposing sanctions to extract concessions from the targeted country and doing nothing. We depart from this simplifying assumption and analyze sanctions as a multifaceted foreign policy instrument. We argue that senders design sanction policies in response to policy preferences of two domestic constituencies. Voters expect a response to an international dispute in the form of some policy, such as economic sanctions; hence, the sender’s policymakers seek to demonstrate their competence in foreign affairs by imposing sanctions. Once the policymakers announce the use of sanctions, Special Interest Groups that stand to experience economic losses when this foreign policy is implemented pressure the policymakers to choose sanction measures limiting such losses. As a result, the policymakers design sanction policies to include measures that will be less detrimental to Special Interest Groups. We test our theoretical argument using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions data and show that, while pressures from public opinion increase the likelihood of sanctions, Special Interest Groups that benefit from the relationship with the target country are associated with a lower probability of the use of sanction measures that would impose substantial costs on domestic Interest Groups.
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designing foreign policy voters Special Interest Groups and economic sanctions
Journal of Peace Research, 2014Co-Authors: Elena V Mclean, Taehee WhangAbstract:The literature on economic sanctions has long studied sender countries’ policymaking as a simple choice between imposing sanctions to extract concessions from the targeted country and doing nothing...
Gene M Grossman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Special Interest Groups and economic policy
NBER Reporter Online, 2000Co-Authors: Gene M Grossman, Elhanan HelpmanAbstract:Elhanan Helpman [*] In the idealized democratic society; economic policy is determined by "one man, one vote." But in all real societies, Special Interest Groups play an important role in the process that determines economic policy. Pressure Groups represent relatively narrow Interests, for example of peanut farmers, auto workers, or shareholders of firms that produce semiconductors, They also represent broader Interests, such as those of retired workers, capital owners, and those with Special concerns for the environment. Hardly a day passes without the media reporting on the activities and influence of Special Interests. Discussions of campaign finance reform in the United States have focused attention on one important way in which Interest Groups seek to influence policies: Interest Groups are contributing ever-larger sums to political campaigns and political parties, apparently to encourage politicians to take positions favorable to their causes and to aid those who do so in their bids for election. Contributions by Political Action Committees to congressional candidates, which in 1975-6 totaled less than $23 million, exceeded $430 million in the 1995-6 electoral cycle. [1] Interest Groups also engage in public display, such as the highly visible protests that surrounded the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings in Seattle and the recent International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings in Washington, DC. These displays are meant to demonstrate to politicians the strength of the Groups' convictions and to educate the p ublic about the policy issues. Less visible but still important are the everyday activities of the legion of lobbyists in Washington, Brussels, and other capitol cities. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the number of registered lobbyists in Washington grew from 14,946 in 1997 to 20,512 in 1999. [2] These lobbyists spend a good portion of their days meeting with elected officials in order to share their alleged expertise and to persuade the policymakers about the worthiness of their causes. In the early 1990s, we began to study the effects that Special Interests have on trade policy deliberations and outcomes. Trade is an area where Interest Groups have been eSpecially visible. Groups representing workers and firms figured prominently in the protection afforded the U.S. steel, auto, textile, and footwear industries in the 1970s and 1980s. Agricultural Interests were active and effective in pushing the Common Agriculture Policy of the European Community (now the European Union). Groups representing labor and environmentalists were vociferous in their opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement, while many business Groups lobbied in favor of that agreement. These same Groups are joined by still others in the current debate about the future of the WTO. Although an extensive literature on the political economy of trade policy existed by the time we became Interested in the subject -- with important contributions from William Brock and Stephen Magee, Robert E. Baldwin, Jagdish Bhagwati, Anne 0. Krueger, and Wolfgang Mayer, among others -- the prevailing approaches took shortcuts that seemed to obscure important relationships and to limit the purview of the theory and empirics. For example, the framework used often was ill suited to making predictions about the variation in rates of protection, despite the fact that much of the empirical work focused on exactly this sort of evidence. Our early work on Special Interest politics focused on campaign contributions (of time and money) as the tool by which Interest Groups might influence the policy process. In our first paper, we develop an analytical approach that emphasizes the strategic interaction between Interest Groups and policymakers on the one hand and the strategic interaction among the Interest Groups on the other. [3] We suggest that trade policies can be viewed as objects "for sale," with the policymaker as seller and Special Interest Groups as buyers. …
-
electoral competition and Special Interest politics
The Review of Economic Studies, 1996Co-Authors: Gene M Grossman, Elhanan HelpmanAbstract:We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a legislature. The parties have fixed positions on some issues, but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions. In this context, we examine whether Special Interest Groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving, and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms. We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of Special Interest Groups. The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the Special Interests.
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electoral competition and Special Interest politics
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994Co-Authors: Gene M Grossman, Elhanan HelpmanAbstract:We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a parliament. The parliament will set two types of policies: ideological and non-ideological. The parties have fixed positions on the ideological issues, but choose their non-ideological platforms to attract voters and campaign contributions. In this context, we ask: How do the equilibrium contributions from Special Interest Groups influence the platforms of the parties? We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of Special Interest Groups. The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the Special Interests.
-
the politics of free trade agreements
Research Papers in Economics, 1993Co-Authors: Gene M Grossman, Elhanan HelpmanAbstract:Suppose that an opportunity arises for two countries to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA). Will an FTA between these countries be politically viable? If so, what form will it take? We address these questions using a political economy framework that emphasizes the interaction between industry Special Interest Groups and an incumbent government. We describe the economic conditions necessary for an FTA to be an equilibrium outcome, both for the case when the agreement must cover all bilateral trade and when a few, politically sensitive sectors can be excluded from the agreement.
-
protection for sale
The American Economic Review, 1992Co-Authors: Gene M Grossman, Elhanan HelpmanAbstract:The authors develop a model in which Special-Interest Groups make political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's choice of trade policy. The Interest Groups bid for protection with their campaign support. Politicians maximize their own welfare, which depends on total contributions collected and on the welfare of voters. The authors study the structure of protection that emerges in the political equilibrium and the contributions by different lobbies that support the policy outcome. They also discuss why the lobbies may in some cases prefer to have the government use trade policy to transfer income, rather than more efficient means. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.
Stephane Wolton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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lobbying inside and out how Special Interest Groups influence policy choices
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2021Co-Authors: Stephane WoltonAbstract:Scholars have long recognized two classes of Special Interest group (SIG) expenditures: inside lobbying, which is intended to influence the content of a bill; and outside lobbying, which is intended to influence the likelihood a bill is enacted into law. This paper juxtaposes both lobbying activities within a single model. Policy choices are a function of the decision-maker's assessment of SIGs' willingness to engage in outside lobbying. Importantly, inside lobbying expenditures do not always reflect SIGs' outside lobbying capacities and therefore cannot adequately measure SIG influence. Consequently, empirical studies of SIG influence which exclusively consider inside lobbying expenditures--as nearly all existing tests do--are likely to produce spurious results. The paper highlights that strong SIG influence is consistent with a small effect of inside lobbying expenditures on policy choice.
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lobbying inside and out how Special Interest Groups influence policy choices
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Stephane WoltonAbstract:Scholars have long recognized two classes of Special Interest group (SIG) expenditures: inside lobbying, which is intended to influence the content of a bill; and outside lobbying, which is intended to influence the likelihood a bill is enacted into law. This paper juxtaposes both lobbying activities within a single model. Policy choices are a function of the decision-maker's assessment of SIGs' willingness to engage in outside lobbying. Importantly, inside lobbying expenditures do not always reflect SIGs' outside lobbying capacities and therefore cannot adequately measure SIG influence. Empirical studies which exclusively consider inside lobbying expenditures -- as nearly all existing tests do -- are likely to underestimate both the extent and strength of SIG influence. The small impact of inside lobbying expenditures often documented in the empirical literature is thus not inconsistent with the widely held belief that SIGs bias the political process in their favor.
