The Experts below are selected from a list of 291 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Xue Min Shen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Investigating Public-Key Certificate Revocation in Smart Grid
    IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2015
    Co-Authors: Mohamed Mahmoud, Jelena Misic, Kemal Akkaya, Xue Min Shen
    Abstract:

    The Public Key cryptography (PKC) is essential for securing many applications in smart grid. For the secure use of the PKC, Certificate revocation schemes tailored to smart grid applications should be adopted. However, little work has been done to study Certificate revocation in smart grid. In this paper, we first explain different motivations that necessitate revoking Certificates in smart grid. We also identify the applications that can be secured by PKC and thus need Certificate revocation. Then, we explain existing Certificate revocation schemes and define several metrics to assess them. Based on this assessment, we identify the applications that are proper for each scheme and discuss how the schemes can be modified to fully satisfy the requirements of its potential applications. Finally, we study Certificate revocation in pseudonymous Public Key infrastructure (PPKI), where a large number of certified Public/private Keys are assigned for each node to preserve privacy. We target vehicles-to-grid communications as a potential application. Certificate revocation in this application is a challenge because of the large number of Certificates. We discuss an efficient Certificate revocation scheme for PPKI, named compressed Certificate revocation lists (CRLs). Our analytical results demonstrate that one revocation scheme cannot satisfy the overhead/security requirements of all smart grid applications. Rather, different schemes should be employed for different applications. Moreover, we used simulations to measure the overhead of the schemes.

  • efficient Public Key Certificate revocation schemes for smart grid
    Global Communications Conference, 2013
    Co-Authors: Mohamed Mahmoud, Jelena Misic, Xue Min Shen
    Abstract:

    The Public Key cryptography will play an essential role in securing the smart grid communications. For the secure use of the Public Key cryptography, an efficient and secure Certificate revocation scheme specially tailored to smart grid architecture should be adopted. In this paper, we study Certificate revocation in smart grid and design efficient and scalable Certificate revocation schemes. The schemes have different security strengths and require different overhead levels. We also propose an efficient Certificate revocation scheme for pseudonymous Public Key infrastructure using compressed Certificate revocation lists. Analytical results demonstrate that using revocation schemes is essential for securing smart grid, and the proposed schemes are secure. Moreover, simulation results demonstrate that the proposed schemes require low overhead.

  • GLOBECOM - Efficient Public-Key Certificate revocation schemes for smart grid
    2013 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2013
    Co-Authors: Mohamed Mahmoud, Jelena Misic, Xue Min Shen
    Abstract:

    The Public Key cryptography will play an essential role in securing the smart grid communications. For the secure use of the Public Key cryptography, an efficient and secure Certificate revocation scheme specially tailored to smart grid architecture should be adopted. In this paper, we study Certificate revocation in smart grid and design efficient and scalable Certificate revocation schemes. The schemes have different security strengths and require different overhead levels. We also propose an efficient Certificate revocation scheme for pseudonymous Public Key infrastructure using compressed Certificate revocation lists. Analytical results demonstrate that using revocation schemes is essential for securing smart grid, and the proposed schemes are secure. Moreover, simulation results demonstrate that the proposed schemes require low overhead.

  • ASIC: Aggregate signatures and Certificates verification scheme for vehicular networks
    GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2009
    Co-Authors: Albert Wasef, Xue Min Shen
    Abstract:

    To achieve high safety levels in vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs), the Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) implies each vehicle to periodically broadcast a safety beacon message. Many safety-related applications in VANET are based on the safety beacon messages. To ensure secure communications, the message authentication and integrity must be verified by respectively verifying the Public Key Certificate and the digital signature of the sender. Since each vehicle could receive a large number of messages from the neighboring vehicles, one of the inevitable VANET challenges is the ability for each vehicle to verify a large number of messages in a timely manner. In this paper, we propose an aggregate signatures and Certificates (ASIC) verification scheme enabling each vehicle to simultaneously verify not only the signatures but also the Certificates of the senders. ASIC significantly increases the vehicle capability to verify a large number of signatures and Certificates in a timely manner. Performance evaluation demonstrates that ASIC is reliable, efficient, and scalable.

  • Provably Secure Self-Certified Partially Blind Signature Scheme from Bilinear Pairings
    2008 IEEE International Conference on Communications, 2008
    Co-Authors: Xiaodong Lin, Pin-han Ho, Rongxing Lu, Haojin Zhu, Xue Min Shen
    Abstract:

    To enable the practical electronic cash systems, significant attention has been paid to the partially blind signature because of its unlinkability and unforgeability. To the best of our knowledge, most of partially blind signature schemes are constructed under either the traditional Public Key Certificate based system or the ID-based system, which may incur significant efforts in certification management and/or revocation. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for partially blind signature with self-certified Public Keys. This is the first research effort for significantly reducing the Certificate management and revocation in partially blind signature, and is characterized by the adoption of bilinear pairings and the analytic techniques of provable security.

Hun Myoung Park - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • HICSS - The Web Accessibility Crisis of the Korea's Electronic Government: Fatal Consequences of the Digital Signature Law and Public Key Certificate
    2012 45th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2012
    Co-Authors: Hun Myoung Park
    Abstract:

    Korea's e-government ranked top in e-government benchmarking for the past five years but showed relatively lower scores in Web accessibility. As a result of the Digital Signature Act, Public Key Certificate was introduced and digital Certificate software was developed using de facto technology standards, Microsoft ActiveX. Government, Certificate authorities, and Certificate consumers all overlooked the implications of using Microsoft standards and ignored criticisms of those who do not use Microsoft products. Government failed to implement digital signature policy successfully. Its consequences include unbelievable Microsoft monopoly with almost 99 percent market shares of Microsoft products, chronic addiction to Microsoft standards, bad computing practices, and fatal Web accessibility problems. ActiveX should be removed immediately to support diverse operating systems and Web browsers. Eventually current client-side Certificate should be switched to server-side system. This paper calls for careful evaluation of Korea's e-government.

  • The Web Accessibility Crisis of the Korea's Electronic Government: Fatal Consequences of the Digital Signature Law and Public Key Certificate
    2012 45th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2012
    Co-Authors: Hun Myoung Park
    Abstract:

    Korea's e-government ranked top in e-government benchmarking for the past five years but showed relatively lower scores in Web accessibility. As a result of the Digital Signature Act, Public Key Certificate was introduced and digital Certificate software was developed using de facto technology standards, Microsoft ActiveX. Government, Certificate authorities, and Certificate consumers all overlooked the implications of using Microsoft standards and ignored criticisms of those who do not use Microsoft products. Government failed to implement digital signature policy successfully. Its consequences include unbelievable Microsoft monopoly with almost 99 percent market shares of Microsoft products, chronic addiction to Microsoft standards, bad computing practices, and fatal Web accessibility problems. ActiveX should be removed immediately to support diverse operating systems and Web browsers. Eventually current client-side Certificate should be switched to server-side system. This paper calls for careful evaluation of Korea's e-government.

Madjid Merabti - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Revocation of privacy-enhanced Public-Key Certificates
    Journal of Systems and Software, 2005
    Co-Authors: N. Zhang, Madjid Merabti
    Abstract:

    This paper presents a novel protocol for the revocation of privacy-enhanced/anonymous Public-Key Certificates in relation to a protocol for anonymous Public-Key Certificate issuing published previously. Not only can this Certificate revocation protocol revoke an anonymous Public-Key Certificate upon a request from its holder, but also automatically revoke any Certificate issued directly or indirectly based on the Certificate revoked, in an anonymous and accountable manner. In case the private Key associated with an anonymous Public-Key Certificate is suspected of having been compromised, the Certificate holder can operate the protocol to easily revoke the compromised Certificate together with its related ones so as to stop them being abused. The protocol is also assessed with regard to requirements such as accountability and anonymity.

  • Revocation of privacy-enhanced Public-Key Certificates
    Journal of Systems and Software, 2005
    Co-Authors: N. Zhang, Q. Shi, Madjid Merabti
    Abstract:

    This paper presents a novel protocol for the revocation of privacy-enhanced/anonymous Public-Key Certificates in relation to a protocol for anonymous Public-Key Certificate issuing published previously. Not only can this Certificate revocation protocol revoke an anonymous Public-Key Certificate upon a request from its holder, but also automatically revoke any Certificate issued directly or indirectly based on the Certificate revoked, in an anonymous and accountable manner. In case the private Key associated with an anonymous Public-Key Certificate is suspected of having been compromised, the Certificate holder can operate the protocol to easily revoke the compromised Certificate together with its related ones so as to stop them being abused. The protocol is also assessed with regard to requirements such as accountability and anonymity. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

N. Zhang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Revocation of privacy-enhanced Public-Key Certificates
    Journal of Systems and Software, 2005
    Co-Authors: N. Zhang, Madjid Merabti
    Abstract:

    This paper presents a novel protocol for the revocation of privacy-enhanced/anonymous Public-Key Certificates in relation to a protocol for anonymous Public-Key Certificate issuing published previously. Not only can this Certificate revocation protocol revoke an anonymous Public-Key Certificate upon a request from its holder, but also automatically revoke any Certificate issued directly or indirectly based on the Certificate revoked, in an anonymous and accountable manner. In case the private Key associated with an anonymous Public-Key Certificate is suspected of having been compromised, the Certificate holder can operate the protocol to easily revoke the compromised Certificate together with its related ones so as to stop them being abused. The protocol is also assessed with regard to requirements such as accountability and anonymity.

  • Revocation of privacy-enhanced Public-Key Certificates
    Journal of Systems and Software, 2005
    Co-Authors: N. Zhang, Q. Shi, Madjid Merabti
    Abstract:

    This paper presents a novel protocol for the revocation of privacy-enhanced/anonymous Public-Key Certificates in relation to a protocol for anonymous Public-Key Certificate issuing published previously. Not only can this Certificate revocation protocol revoke an anonymous Public-Key Certificate upon a request from its holder, but also automatically revoke any Certificate issued directly or indirectly based on the Certificate revoked, in an anonymous and accountable manner. In case the private Key associated with an anonymous Public-Key Certificate is suspected of having been compromised, the Certificate holder can operate the protocol to easily revoke the compromised Certificate together with its related ones so as to stop them being abused. The protocol is also assessed with regard to requirements such as accountability and anonymity. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  • Security enhanced accountable anonymous PKI Certificates for mobile e-commerce
    Computer Networks, 2004
    Co-Authors: D. Critchlow, N. Zhang
    Abstract:

    This paper presents enhancements to an anonymous Public-Key Certificate scheme originally intended for anonymous and fair document exchange. The appropriate use of these Certificates may enable a party with access to a mobile phone and/or laptop computer to conduct multiple mobile e-commerce transactions anonymously yet accountably and thereby reduce the risk of developing a pseudonymous on-line profile. We propose modifications to the existing scheme to solve a recognised security flow. The proof of rightful ownership of the anonymous/real Public-Key Certificate presented to obtain a (further) anonymous Public-Key Certificate is presently achieved with a single piece of evidence, i.e. the private Key associated with the presented Certificate. Should an adversary compromise this Key, then the adversary may obtain anonymous Certificates in the rightful owner's name. Our proposal minimises the risk of an adversary obtaining anonymous Certificates with a compromised private Key.

Jingfeng Li - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a new Public Key Certificate revocation scheme based on one way hash chain
    Web-Age Information Management, 2005
    Co-Authors: Jingfeng Li
    Abstract:

    The Public Key Certificate (PKC) is an important way to support the secure global WEB applications. The revocation of the PKC, however, remains as one of the most costly problems in the Certificate management. In this paper, a new Public Key Certificate revocation scheme based on one-way hash chain is proposed. Specifically, no centralized authority holds responsibility to collect and publish Certificate status information. Instead, the individual user takes charge of his own Certificate status by periodically releasing an updated secure hash value. The paper concludes with an informal examination of the security, efficiency and scalability of this scheme.

  • WAIM - A new Public Key Certificate revocation scheme based on one-way hash chain
    Advances in Web-Age Information Management, 2005
    Co-Authors: Jingfeng Li
    Abstract:

    The Public Key Certificate (PKC) is an important way to support the secure global WEB applications. The revocation of the PKC, however, remains as one of the most costly problems in the Certificate management. In this paper, a new Public Key Certificate revocation scheme based on one-way hash chain is proposed. Specifically, no centralized authority holds responsibility to collect and publish Certificate status information. Instead, the individual user takes charge of his own Certificate status by periodically releasing an updated secure hash value. The paper concludes with an informal examination of the security, efficiency and scalability of this scheme.