The Experts below are selected from a list of 57 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Paul W Macavoy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the active board of directors and its effect on the performance of the large Publicly Traded Corporation
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1999Co-Authors: Paul W Macavoy, Ira M MillsteinAbstract:In recent years, boards of directors have become more active and independent of management in pursuing shareholder interests. But, up to this point, there has been little empirical evidence that active boards help companies produce higher rates of return for their shareholders. In this article, after describing the new board activism, the authors argue that past failures to document an association between independent boards and superior corporate performance can be explained by two features of the research: its concentration on periods prior to the 1990s (when most boards were largely irrelevant) and its use of unreliable proxies (such as a minimum percentage of outside directors) for a well-functioning board. 1999 Morgan Stanley.
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the active board of directors and improved performance of the large Publicly Traded Corporation
Columbia Law Review, 1998Co-Authors: Ira M Millstein, Paul W MacavoyAbstract:Our working hypothesis is that a professional board which is independent of management should tip the scales in favor of higher returns to investors. Although this hypothesis is amply supported by observation and reasonable assumptions, no detailed analysis of corporate relative performance has been undertaken. Here we define returns to investors as the achievement of "economic profit," ie., operating earnings in excess of the costs of capital, and we posit the presence/absence of a professional board for each Corporation in a reasonably comprehensive sample of large Corporations. An empirical study based on such reasonable studies and 1991- 1995 data demonstrates that the added returns to investors associated with the presence of a professional board are positive and significant. Corporations with active and independent boards appear to have performed much better in the 1990s than those with passive boards.
Ira M Millstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the active board of directors and its effect on the performance of the large Publicly Traded Corporation
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1999Co-Authors: Paul W Macavoy, Ira M MillsteinAbstract:In recent years, boards of directors have become more active and independent of management in pursuing shareholder interests. But, up to this point, there has been little empirical evidence that active boards help companies produce higher rates of return for their shareholders. In this article, after describing the new board activism, the authors argue that past failures to document an association between independent boards and superior corporate performance can be explained by two features of the research: its concentration on periods prior to the 1990s (when most boards were largely irrelevant) and its use of unreliable proxies (such as a minimum percentage of outside directors) for a well-functioning board. 1999 Morgan Stanley.
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the active board of directors and improved performance of the large Publicly Traded Corporation
Columbia Law Review, 1998Co-Authors: Ira M Millstein, Paul W MacavoyAbstract:Our working hypothesis is that a professional board which is independent of management should tip the scales in favor of higher returns to investors. Although this hypothesis is amply supported by observation and reasonable assumptions, no detailed analysis of corporate relative performance has been undertaken. Here we define returns to investors as the achievement of "economic profit," ie., operating earnings in excess of the costs of capital, and we posit the presence/absence of a professional board for each Corporation in a reasonably comprehensive sample of large Corporations. An empirical study based on such reasonable studies and 1991- 1995 data demonstrates that the added returns to investors associated with the presence of a professional board are positive and significant. Corporations with active and independent boards appear to have performed much better in the 1990s than those with passive boards.
Paul F. Williams - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Really Rethinking Financial Reporting: A Discussion of Rethinking Financial Reporting: Standards, Norms and Institutions by Shyam Sunder
Accounting Economics and Law: A Convivium, 2018Co-Authors: Paul F. WilliamsAbstract:Professor Sunder’s book raises significant issues about the state of financial reporting, particularly his concern at the proliferation of complex rules for which there are only questionable justifications. In this review essay issue is taken not that there isn’t a problem with current financial reporting, but with the unexamined premise about the nature of that problem and the role that accounting and auditing play in the regulation of the modern, powerful Corporation. It is argued that rules are the logical consequence of a competitive order and that resorting to norms as an alternative to rules or standards promises no better alternative unless there is a critical examination of who is to be the community to which norms apply. Thus, it is crucial to question the premise of decision usefulness as the underlying purpose of accounting vis-a-vis the Publicly Traded Corporation. I argue that re-considering the historical norms of accounting that are based on the premise that holding Corporations accountable, is crucial to really rethinking financial reporting.
Stephen N Bretsen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the faithful business as a Publicly Traded Corporation testing the outer limits of corporate law
The Journal of Biblical Integration in Business, 2006Co-Authors: Stephen N BretsenAbstract:A faithful business operates its business as a mission by holistically integrating Christian theological and social principles. A business strategy leading to profitable growth can allow a faithful business to raise capital from the public markets. The question becomes whether corporate law permits a Publicly Traded Corporation to primarily glorify God and advance God’s Kingdom rather than to primarily maximize shareholder wealth. In affirming that a faithful business can function within the mandates of corporate law as a Publicly Traded Corporation, this article reveals the expanding outer limits of corporate law.
Susan E. Woodward - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Takeover Premiums, Appraisal Rights, and the Price Elasticity of a Firm's Publicly Traded Stock
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002Co-Authors: J. Gregory Sidak, Susan E. WoodwardAbstract:Financial economists generally believe that the demand for a specific Publicly Traded stock is virtually perfectly price-elastic. This proposition has significant implications for many rules of corporate law that concern the correct value of the Corporation. In a Yale Law Journal article, Professor Lynn Stout argues that the demand curve for the common stock of a Publicly Traded Corporation is downward-sloping. She claims that a critical assumption underlying the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is that investors have homogeneous expectations about a stock's value, and that this assumption implies that the CAPM will predict each stock to have infinitely (perfectly) price-elastic demand. In Part I of this Article, we show that Stout's claim of less-than-infinite price elasticity does not advance her thesis that the market price of a security is an unreliable and unfair measure of value. Infinite price elasticity of a firm's stock is not implied by either the CAPM or the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH). The new-information hypothesis of stock price changes offers a more plausible explanation for events that Stout claims are more readily explained by price pressure resulting from less than infinitely elastic demand. In Part II, we explain why the appraisal remedy, and the stock market exception to it, are wealth-maximizing features of corporate law that enhance the liquidity of ownership and control of the Publicly Traded Corporation. We further explain that Stout's appraisal rule, which would ignore market value even for Publicly Traded Corporations, is flawed in theory and unworkable in practice. If adopted, Stout's rule would diminish the liquidity (and hence the value) of corporate ownership and control, make management's performance of its fiduciary duty in unsolicited corporate control transactions nonfalsifiable and, thus, diminish shareholder wealth.
