The Experts below are selected from a list of 14340 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Silvia Masiero - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • decentralisation clientelism and social protection programmes a study of india s mgnrega
    Oxford Development Studies, 2018
    Co-Authors: Diego Maiorano, Silvia Masiero
    Abstract:

    Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India’s (and the world’s) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan’s decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh’s centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find that in both states local implementers have incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in Rajasthan, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP.

  • decentralisation clientelism and social protection programmes a study of india s mgnrega
    Oxford Development Studies, 2018
    Co-Authors: Diego Maiorano, Upasak Das, Silvia Masiero
    Abstract:

    Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India’s (and the world’s) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan’s decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh’s centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find that in both states local implementers have incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in Rajasthan, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP.

Shylashri Shankar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • capture of anti poverty programs an analysis of the national rural employment guarantee program in india
    Journal of Asian Economics, 2009
    Co-Authors: Raghbendra Jha, Sambit Bhattacharyya, Raghav Gaiha, Shylashri Shankar
    Abstract:

    Using pooled household level data for the Indian states of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh we find that the size of landholdings is a negative predictor of participation in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program (NREGP). In state level analysis this pattern survives in Rajasthan but reverses in Andhra Pradesh where we notice a positive relationship. This paper examines whether this sign reversal in Andhra Pradesh is indicative of program capture in Andhra Pradesh and better targeting in Rajasthan. We compare land inequality, ratio of NREG and slack season agricultural wage rates, political interference, and geographical remoteness across the two states and conclude that program capture may be an issue in Andhra Pradesh, largely because of these reasons. We also find evidence of complementarity between NREGP and the Public Distribution System (PDS), implying that the real income transfer through food subsidy needs supplementation.

  • capture of anti poverty programs an analysis of the national rural employment guarantee program in india
    2008
    Co-Authors: Raghbendra Jha, Sambit Bhattacharyya, Raghav Gaiha, Shylashri Shankar
    Abstract:

    Using pooled household level data for the Indian states of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh we find that the size of landholdings is a negative predictor of participation in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program (NREGP). In state level analysis this pattern survives in Rajasthan but reverses in Andhra Pradesh where we notice a positive relationship. This paper examines whether this sign reversal in Andhra Pradesh is indicative of program capture in Andhra Pradesh and better targeting in Rajasthan. We compare land inequality, political interference, and geographical remoteness across the two states and conclude that program capture may be an issue in Andhra Pradesh, largely because of these reasons. We also find evidence of complementarity between NREGP and the Public Distribution System (PDS).

Diego Maiorano - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • decentralisation clientelism and social protection programmes a study of india s mgnrega
    Oxford Development Studies, 2018
    Co-Authors: Diego Maiorano, Silvia Masiero
    Abstract:

    Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India’s (and the world’s) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan’s decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh’s centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find that in both states local implementers have incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in Rajasthan, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP.

  • decentralisation clientelism and social protection programmes a study of india s mgnrega
    Oxford Development Studies, 2018
    Co-Authors: Diego Maiorano, Upasak Das, Silvia Masiero
    Abstract:

    Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India’s (and the world’s) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan’s decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh’s centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find that in both states local implementers have incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in Rajasthan, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP.

Raghbendra Jha - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • capture of anti poverty programs an analysis of the national rural employment guarantee program in india
    Journal of Asian Economics, 2009
    Co-Authors: Raghbendra Jha, Sambit Bhattacharyya, Raghav Gaiha, Shylashri Shankar
    Abstract:

    Using pooled household level data for the Indian states of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh we find that the size of landholdings is a negative predictor of participation in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program (NREGP). In state level analysis this pattern survives in Rajasthan but reverses in Andhra Pradesh where we notice a positive relationship. This paper examines whether this sign reversal in Andhra Pradesh is indicative of program capture in Andhra Pradesh and better targeting in Rajasthan. We compare land inequality, ratio of NREG and slack season agricultural wage rates, political interference, and geographical remoteness across the two states and conclude that program capture may be an issue in Andhra Pradesh, largely because of these reasons. We also find evidence of complementarity between NREGP and the Public Distribution System (PDS), implying that the real income transfer through food subsidy needs supplementation.

  • capture of anti poverty programs an analysis of the national rural employment guarantee program in india
    2008
    Co-Authors: Raghbendra Jha, Sambit Bhattacharyya, Raghav Gaiha, Shylashri Shankar
    Abstract:

    Using pooled household level data for the Indian states of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh we find that the size of landholdings is a negative predictor of participation in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program (NREGP). In state level analysis this pattern survives in Rajasthan but reverses in Andhra Pradesh where we notice a positive relationship. This paper examines whether this sign reversal in Andhra Pradesh is indicative of program capture in Andhra Pradesh and better targeting in Rajasthan. We compare land inequality, political interference, and geographical remoteness across the two states and conclude that program capture may be an issue in Andhra Pradesh, largely because of these reasons. We also find evidence of complementarity between NREGP and the Public Distribution System (PDS).

Raghav Gaiha - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • capture of anti poverty programs an analysis of the national rural employment guarantee program in india
    Journal of Asian Economics, 2009
    Co-Authors: Raghbendra Jha, Sambit Bhattacharyya, Raghav Gaiha, Shylashri Shankar
    Abstract:

    Using pooled household level data for the Indian states of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh we find that the size of landholdings is a negative predictor of participation in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program (NREGP). In state level analysis this pattern survives in Rajasthan but reverses in Andhra Pradesh where we notice a positive relationship. This paper examines whether this sign reversal in Andhra Pradesh is indicative of program capture in Andhra Pradesh and better targeting in Rajasthan. We compare land inequality, ratio of NREG and slack season agricultural wage rates, political interference, and geographical remoteness across the two states and conclude that program capture may be an issue in Andhra Pradesh, largely because of these reasons. We also find evidence of complementarity between NREGP and the Public Distribution System (PDS), implying that the real income transfer through food subsidy needs supplementation.

  • capture of anti poverty programs an analysis of the national rural employment guarantee program in india
    2008
    Co-Authors: Raghbendra Jha, Sambit Bhattacharyya, Raghav Gaiha, Shylashri Shankar
    Abstract:

    Using pooled household level data for the Indian states of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh we find that the size of landholdings is a negative predictor of participation in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program (NREGP). In state level analysis this pattern survives in Rajasthan but reverses in Andhra Pradesh where we notice a positive relationship. This paper examines whether this sign reversal in Andhra Pradesh is indicative of program capture in Andhra Pradesh and better targeting in Rajasthan. We compare land inequality, political interference, and geographical remoteness across the two states and conclude that program capture may be an issue in Andhra Pradesh, largely because of these reasons. We also find evidence of complementarity between NREGP and the Public Distribution System (PDS).