The Experts below are selected from a list of 12 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Enrico Moretti - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the political economy of intergenerational income mobility
    Economic Inquiry, 2011
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Loukas Karabarbounis, Enrico Moretti
    Abstract:

    The intergenerational elasticity of income is considered one of the best measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity to its members. While much research has been devoted to measuring this Reduced-Form Parameter, less is known about its underlying structural determinants. Using a model with exogenous talent endowments, endogenous parental investment in children, and endogenous redistributive institutions, we identify the structural Parameters that govern the intergenerational elasticity of income. The model clarifies how the interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of social mobility. Two societies with similar economic and biological fundamentals may have vastly different degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on their political institutions. We offer empirical evidence in line with the predictions of the model. We conclude that international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are not particularly inFormative about fairness without taking into account differences in politico-economic institutions. (JEL E24, J62, J68, P16)

  • the political economy of intergenerational income mobility
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Loukas Karabarbounis, Enrico Moretti
    Abstract:

    The intergenerational elasticity of income is considered one of the best measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity to its members. While much research has been devoted to measuring this Reduced-Form Parameter, less is known about its underlying structural determinants. Using a model with exogenous talent endowments, endogenous parental investment in children and endogenous redistributive institutions, we identify the structural Parameters that govern the intergenerational elasticity of income. The model clarifies how the interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of social mobility. Two societies with similar economic and biological fundamentals may have vastly different degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on their political institutions. We offer empirical evidence in line with the predictions of the model. We conclude that international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are not particularly inFormative about fairness without taking into account differences in politico-economic institutions.

Andrea Ichino - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the political economy of intergenerational income mobility
    Economic Inquiry, 2011
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Loukas Karabarbounis, Enrico Moretti
    Abstract:

    The intergenerational elasticity of income is considered one of the best measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity to its members. While much research has been devoted to measuring this Reduced-Form Parameter, less is known about its underlying structural determinants. Using a model with exogenous talent endowments, endogenous parental investment in children, and endogenous redistributive institutions, we identify the structural Parameters that govern the intergenerational elasticity of income. The model clarifies how the interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of social mobility. Two societies with similar economic and biological fundamentals may have vastly different degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on their political institutions. We offer empirical evidence in line with the predictions of the model. We conclude that international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are not particularly inFormative about fairness without taking into account differences in politico-economic institutions. (JEL E24, J62, J68, P16)

  • the political economy of intergenerational income mobility
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Loukas Karabarbounis, Enrico Moretti
    Abstract:

    The intergenerational elasticity of income is considered one of the best measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity to its members. While much research has been devoted to measuring this Reduced-Form Parameter, less is known about its underlying structural determinants. Using a model with exogenous talent endowments, endogenous parental investment in children and endogenous redistributive institutions, we identify the structural Parameters that govern the intergenerational elasticity of income. The model clarifies how the interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of social mobility. Two societies with similar economic and biological fundamentals may have vastly different degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on their political institutions. We offer empirical evidence in line with the predictions of the model. We conclude that international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are not particularly inFormative about fairness without taking into account differences in politico-economic institutions.

Loukas Karabarbounis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the political economy of intergenerational income mobility
    Economic Inquiry, 2011
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Loukas Karabarbounis, Enrico Moretti
    Abstract:

    The intergenerational elasticity of income is considered one of the best measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity to its members. While much research has been devoted to measuring this Reduced-Form Parameter, less is known about its underlying structural determinants. Using a model with exogenous talent endowments, endogenous parental investment in children, and endogenous redistributive institutions, we identify the structural Parameters that govern the intergenerational elasticity of income. The model clarifies how the interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of social mobility. Two societies with similar economic and biological fundamentals may have vastly different degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on their political institutions. We offer empirical evidence in line with the predictions of the model. We conclude that international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are not particularly inFormative about fairness without taking into account differences in politico-economic institutions. (JEL E24, J62, J68, P16)

  • the political economy of intergenerational income mobility
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010
    Co-Authors: Andrea Ichino, Loukas Karabarbounis, Enrico Moretti
    Abstract:

    The intergenerational elasticity of income is considered one of the best measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity to its members. While much research has been devoted to measuring this Reduced-Form Parameter, less is known about its underlying structural determinants. Using a model with exogenous talent endowments, endogenous parental investment in children and endogenous redistributive institutions, we identify the structural Parameters that govern the intergenerational elasticity of income. The model clarifies how the interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of social mobility. Two societies with similar economic and biological fundamentals may have vastly different degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on their political institutions. We offer empirical evidence in line with the predictions of the model. We conclude that international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are not particularly inFormative about fairness without taking into account differences in politico-economic institutions.

Frank Schorfheide - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • bayesian and frequentist inference in partially identified models
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009
    Co-Authors: Hyungsik Roger Moon, Frank Schorfheide
    Abstract:

    A large sample approximation of the posterior distribution of partially identified structural Parameters is derived for models that can be indexed by a finite-dimensional Reduced Form Parameter vector. It is used to analyze the differences between frequentist confidence sets and Bayesian credible sets in partially identified models. A key difference is that frequentist set estimates extend beyond the boundaries of the identified set (conditional on the estimated Reduced Form Parameter), whereas Bayesian credible sets can asymptotically be located in the interior of the identified set. Our asymptotic approximations are illustrated in the context of simple moment inequality models and a numerical illustration for a two-player entry game is provided.

Hyungsik Roger Moon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • bayesian and frequentist inference in partially identified models
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009
    Co-Authors: Hyungsik Roger Moon, Frank Schorfheide
    Abstract:

    A large sample approximation of the posterior distribution of partially identified structural Parameters is derived for models that can be indexed by a finite-dimensional Reduced Form Parameter vector. It is used to analyze the differences between frequentist confidence sets and Bayesian credible sets in partially identified models. A key difference is that frequentist set estimates extend beyond the boundaries of the identified set (conditional on the estimated Reduced Form Parameter), whereas Bayesian credible sets can asymptotically be located in the interior of the identified set. Our asymptotic approximations are illustrated in the context of simple moment inequality models and a numerical illustration for a two-player entry game is provided.