The Experts below are selected from a list of 84 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Umut Riza Ozkan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The origins of severance Pay in unemployment compensation: a comparative analysis
Labor History, 2018Co-Authors: Umut Riza OzkanAbstract:ABSTRACTThis article contributes to an under-developed field in the social policy literature through an analysis of the origins of severance Pay (SP)/Redundancy Pay schemes and, more specifically, ...
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Comparing Formal Unemployment Compensation Systems in 15 OECD Countries
Social Policy & Administration, 2013Co-Authors: Umut Riza OzkanAbstract:This study contributes to the welfare regime literature by analyzing unemployment compensation programmes – unemployment insurance (UI)/assistance (UA) programmes and Redundancy Pay schemes – of welfare state/occupational welfare regimes. It covers 15 countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) selected from Southern European, Liberal, Continental-corporatist and Social Democratic country clusters. In contrast to the common argument that Southern European countries have underdeveloped formal unemployment compensation systems, this study argues that they (especially in Spain, Portugal, and to some extent Italy) are comparable in strength to those in Continental-corporatist countries if occupational welfare programmes – notably Redundancy Pay – are considered alongside welfare state programmes for unemployment protection. The study also outlines the characteristics of Redundancy Pay schemes in the four country clusters and shows how different Redundancy Pay schemes are linked to UI/UA schemes in these clusters.
Laszlo Goerke - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Redundancy Pay and Collective Dismissals
FinanzArchiv, 2003Co-Authors: Laszlo GoerkeAbstract:Redundancy Payments for collective dismissals are incorporated into a Shapiro-Stiglitz model of efficiency wages. It is shown that a lump-sum Payment will lower wages, leaving employment and welfare unaffected if there are neither wage-dependent taxes nor additional firing costs. If Payroll taxes exceed firing costs, employment and welfare will rise with Redundancy Payments. If these Payments are also a function of previous wages or reduce unemployment benefits, positive employment effects will be mitigated or reversed. A substitution of wage-dependent for lump-sum Redundancy Payments can lower employment, allowing for a continuous variation of effort.
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Redundancy Pay and Collective Dismissals
2001Co-Authors: Laszlo GoerkeAbstract:Redundancy Payments for collective dismissals are incorporated into a Shapiro-Stiglitz model of efficiency wages. It is shown that a fixed Payment will lower wages, leave employment and welfare unaffected if there are no wage-dependent taxes, no additional firing costs and if unemployment benefits are not altered by Redundancy Payments. If Payroll taxes exceed firing costs and unemployment benefits are independent of Redundancy Pay, employment and welfare will rise with Redundancy Payments. If these Payments are also a function of previous wages, positive employment effects will be mitigated. A substitution of wage-dependent for lump-sum Redundancy Payments can lower employment, allowing for a continuous variation of effort.
Alison L. Booth - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Redundancy Pay, Unions and Employment
The Manchester School, 1999Co-Authors: Alison L. Booth, Andrew MccullochAbstract:In this paper, the authors estimate the determinants of bargaining over Redundancy Pay, and its impact on employment variation and financial performance, using the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. The estimates indicate that bargaining over Redundancy Pay is more prevalent in plants with a strong union presence. However, voluntary negotiation of Redundancy Pay does not appear to reduce employment variability in the face of small demand shocks. Bargaining over manual Redundancy Pay has an insignificant impact on plants' financial performance, while bargaining over nonmanual Redundancy Pay has a large significant positive effect. The authors' findings may explain the positive attitudes to Redundancy Pay reported by some employers, and reinforce the general conclusion of cross-country studies that firing constraints in Britain may be relatively unimportant in preventing labor market flexibility.
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Firing Costs, Unions and Employment
1996Co-Authors: Alison L. BoothAbstract:This paper develops a simple model of employment, non-statutory Redundancy Pay and wage determination. An interesting feature of this model is that the contract curve is vertical. Some of the predictions of the model are confronted with the available British data on non-statutory firing costs, from the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. The estimates indicate: first, that bargaining over Redundancy Pay is more prevalent in plants with a strong union presence; second, that bargaining over Redundancy Pay has no impact on recent employment variation for plants in the sample; and third, that financial performance is unaffected by manual bargaining, but is positively associated with non-manual bargaining.
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Layoffs with Payoffs: A Bargaining Model of Union Wage and Severance Pay Determination
Economica, 1995Co-Authors: Alison L. BoothAbstract:Popular characterizations of union preferences assume that the income of laid-off union members is exogenous. There is evidence, however, of intra-union distribution schemes such as severance Payments, unemployment insurance, retraining arrangements and early retirement schemes. This paper develops a model of wage and severance Pay determination by a trade union and a firm bargaining in a right-to-manage framework. The important point differentiating the model in this paper from the orthodox union model is that it is efficiency-improving in the sense that it makes full-insurance possible and marginal productivity is equal to the opportunity cost of labour. Moreover, with Redundancy Pay on the bargaining agenda, both the right-to-manage and the efficient bargaining union models are characterized by the same efficiency conditions. This has implications for empirical research which attempts to distinguish between these two models, since the outcome of both models is the same. Finally, the union-firm bargaining model can also be compared with the outcome of the implicit contract model with Redundancy Pay. There is an important difference between the two approaches, however. While the result in this paper derives from an imperfectly competitive labour market where unions and firms bargain over wages and Redundancy Pay, the implicit contract result derives from a perfectly competitive labour market in which competitive forces lead to an efficient outcome.
Elizabeth Shi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Redundancy Pay in Australia - before and after work choices
Labor Law Journal, 2008Co-Authors: Elizabeth ShiAbstract:The article presents a discussion on Redundancy Pay in Australia. Redundancy is a situation wherein an employer does not want the job of an employee to be continued. Under Redundancy, the fault is not from the employee. Factors that trigger Redundancy include technological changes, outsourcing and corporate restructure. Before reforms to the Workplace Relations Act 1996, workers in the country are given Redundancy Pay. However, the Work Choices reforms eliminated Redundancy Pay guarantees and ousted laws related to it.
Paul Bridgen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The State, Redundancy Pay, and economic policy-making in the early 1960s
Twentieth Century British History, 2000Co-Authors: Paul BridgenAbstract:The setting up of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) and other reforms to the institutions of economic policy-making in the early 1960s are regarded by commentators as the first concerted attempt by government of confront the issue of Britain's relative economic decline. The general assessment of these reforms is that they failed, largely due to the 'possessive individualist' culture of British peak organizations. This article investigate these issues from the perspective of negotiations on financial provision for the unemployed - one of the first issues to be considered by the NEDC. It shows that in this area the main problem was the nature of the Whitehall policy-making process and the failure of government to co-ordinate its policy position. This caused both sides of industry to question government commitment to the tripartite process and seriously undermined the entire NEDC project at an early stage. These findings are consistent with recent theoretical analyses of British government which emphasize the complexity of the policy process and co-ordination problems within Whitehall.