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Okko Olli - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland : Regulatory Control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty : Annual report 2019
'Helsinki Law Review', 2020Co-Authors: Okko OlliAbstract:Abstract The Regulatory Control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this Regulatory Control is implemented mainly by the Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). In addition, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE), have their roles in safeguards. During 2019, STUK together with the ministries continued and further strengthened national cooperation in the areas of non-proliferation, export Control and nuclear disarmament. Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants at Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the shut-down research reactor in Espoo with nuclear fuel still at the site, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. A new category of nuclear material holder was initiated in 2018 owing to the decision of the MEAE that all production source material grade uranium in the metal industry must be licensed according to Finnish nuclear energy legislation. STUK therefore granted operating licences to the Boliden Group’s Zinc and Copper production units at Kokkola and Harjavalta, owing to the uranium-rich intermediate copper product. These operations and materials are not considered by the European Commission and are excluded from the EU Safeguards Regulation owing to the non-nuclear use of the source material. In 2019, Dragon Mining Oy was licensed for its uranium-rich gold concentrates. STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union Safeguards Regulation and international agreements. These tasks are performed to verify that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction. The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2019 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities, and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the stakeholders' declarations. The number of international inspection days per year is approximately 25. According to the statements on inspection results and the conclusion of safeguards implementation provided by the IAEA and the Commission, neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks or required any actions in 2019. At the end of 2018, however, there was an unresolved request for clarification concerning findings in environmental sampling carried out by the IAEA in April 2018. The clarification was consequently prepared and provided to the IAEA in early 2019. In addition, there were a few other follow-ups pending owing to equipment maintenance needs that were resolved in the beginning of 2019. By means of their nuclear materials accountancy and Control systems, the stakeholders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. In safeguards, STUK is continuing with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days. A major goal of all current Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to carry out a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The Finnish National Data Centre for the CTBT (FiNDC) is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task. Human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2019 was focused on comprehensive competence development taking into account the risk assessment of certain areas of expertise and the ability of personnel to cope at work. The objective is to ensure the necessary human resources now and in the future, and to develop the work and work flows to fulfil STUK’s strategy for 2018–2022. As a continuation of technical development work, due to the need to regulate the construction of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site, safeguards instrumentation was under development, in particular passive gamma emission tomography and passive neutron albedo reactivity measurement for the verification of spent fuel. In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for authorities that represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK also contributed to EU-funded projects to promote safeguards and regulators in Tanzania and Vietnam
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Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland : Regulatory Control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty : Annual report 2018
'Helsinki Law Review', 2019Co-Authors: Okko OlliAbstract:Abstract The Regulatory Control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this Regulatory Control is implemented mainly by the Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). In addition, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE), have their roles in safeguards. During 2018, STUK together with the ministries strengthened national cooperation in the areas of non-proliferation, export Control and nuclear disarmament. Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants at Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the shut-down research reactor in Espoo with nuclear fuel at the site, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their visits to the construction site of the Olkiluoto 3 unit and installed safeguards instrumentation before the first fuel delivery that took place in 2017. The initial inventory verification of the new reactor unit was carried out in February 2018. A new category of nuclear material holder was initiated in 2018 owing to the decision of the MEAE that all production source material grade uranium in the metal industry must be licensed according to Finnish nuclear energy legislation. STUK therefore granted operating licences to the Boliden Group’s Zinc and Copper production units at Kokkola and Harjavalta, owing to the uranium-rich intermediate copper product. These operations and materials are not considered by the European Commission and are excluded from the EU Safeguards Regulation owing to the non-nuclear use of the source material. STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union Safeguards Regulation and international agreements. These tasks are performed to verify that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction. The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2018 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities, and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the stakeholders’ declarations. The number of routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been reduced significantly due to the state-level safeguards approach for Finland, which has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is approximately 25. According to the statements on inspection results and the conclusion of safeguards implementation provided by the IAEA and the Commission, neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks or required any actions. However, at the end of 2018 there was an unresolved request for clarification concerning findings after the activities carried out by the IAEA in April 2018. This clarification was consequently prepared and provided to the IAEA in early 2019. In addition, there were a few other follow-ups pending owing to equipment maintenance needs. By means of their nuclear materials accountancy and Control systems, the stakeholders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. In safeguards, STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days. A major goal of all current Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task. Human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2018 was focused on a comprehensive competence development taking into account the risk assessment of certain areas of expertise and the ability of personnel to cope at work. The objective is to ensure the necessary human resources now and in the future and to develop the work and work flows to fulfil STUK’s strategy for 2018–2022 with emphasis on the strategic target of ‘having the happiest civil servants in the world’. As a continuation of technical development work, due to the need to regulate the construction of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site, safeguards instrumentation was under development, in particular passive gamma emission tomography and passive neutron albedo reactivity measurement for the verification of spent fuel. In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for authorities that represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK also contributed to EU-funded projects in Tanzania and Vietnam, respectively. In 2018, the partnerships programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE), the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK continued supporting the establishment of Saudi Arabia’s Regulatory authority in relation to its nuclear energy programme
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Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland : Regulatory Control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty : Annual report 2017
'Helsinki Law Review', 2018Co-Authors: Okko OlliAbstract:Abstract The Regulatory Control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this Regulatory Control is implemented by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the closed research reactor in Espoo with nuclear fuel at the site, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their visits to the construction site of the Olkiluoto 3 unit and installed safeguards instrumentation before the first fuel delivery that took place in 2017. STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union Safeguards Regulation and international agreements. These tasks are performed to verify that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction. The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2017 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the stakeholders' declarations. The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been reduced significantly due to the state-level safeguards approach for Finland, which has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2017. By means of their nuclear materials accountancy and Control systems, the stakeholders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. In safeguards, STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days. A major goal of all current Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task as demonstrated once during 2017. The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2017 was focused on nuclear material Control: in particular, standard operational procedures were addressed within the nuclear regulator departments. At the Nuclear Materials Section, the new nuclear materials database was developed in this context. Due to the need to regulate the construction of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site, safeguards instrumentation was under development, in particular the passive gamma emission tomography for the verification of spent fuel. In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK also contributed to EU-funded projects in Tanzania and Vietnam, respectively. In 2017, the partnerships programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK continued supporting the establishment of the Saudi Arabia’s Regulatory authority in relation to its nuclear energy programme
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Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory Control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty : Annual report 2015
Säteilyturvakeskus, 2016Co-Authors: Okko OlliAbstract:Executive summary The Regulatory Control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this Regulatory Control is implemented by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2015 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the stakeholders' declarations. Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, Control, security and the reporting of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities. The main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities that use nuclear materials, often referred to as “licence holders” or “operators”– and the state authority. A licence holder shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the state authority shall provide the Regulatory Control to ensure that the licence holder fulfils the requirements. The Control of nuclear expert organisations, technology holders and suppliers, to ensure the non-proliferation of sensitive technology, is also a growing global challenge for all stakeholders. In Finnish legislation, all these stakeholders are dealt with as users of nuclear energy. At the end of 2013, the revised STUK requirements were published as Regulatory guides on nuclear safety, security and safeguards, called YVL guides. According to the Guide YVL D.1 Regulatory Control of Nuclear Safeguards all the stakeholders were requested to prepare their safeguards manuals as a part of their quality managements systems. During 2015, in total 19 draft manuals were submitted to STUK, and 14 of those were approved. Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the research reactor in Espoo, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. Nuclear dual-use items and instrumentation for the Olkiluoto 3 reactor under construction are being imported and installed. The import licences are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their site visits to the construction site prior to the installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery. The planning and design of the Olkiluoto 4 reactor and a new nuclear power plant site, Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, were authorised in 2010. The safeguards systems for these new reactors shall be designed together with facility design and development. Similarly to the Olkiluoto 3 reactor that is under construction, the import licences for the new facilities are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology and sensitive information. The operators submitted the preliminary Basic Technical Characteristics to the European Commission and obtained Material Balance Area codes for the future reactors before the vendor companies were selected. During 2015, the construction licence application for the new Hanhikivi plant was submitted to the Government. The authorisation of the Olkiluoto 4 unit expired as the operator did not apply for the construction licence within the 5 year period of validity of the authorisation, i.e. the Decision-in-Principle by the Government, so the material balance area code was also withdrawn. The research reactor was shut down in 2015 and the preparations for decommissioning continue in Espoo. On the other hand, in order to continue research activities, the new VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety was under construction at the research campus in Espoo. Uranium production as one of the by-products of nickel at the Talvivaara mine was given approval by the Government in accordance with the nuclear energy legislation in March 2012. In 2013, the mining company constructed the uranium extraction plant, but the Supreme Administrative Court rescinded the approval, owing to claims of environmental and economic issues in December 2013 before the commissioning of the plant. The difficulties continued in 2014, and finally in November 2014 Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. filed for bankruptcy. During 2015 a new operator, Terrafame Mining Oy took over the mining and milling activities, but no uranium extraction nor safeguards activities took place at Talvivaara. Currently, uranium residuals are extracted from the nickel at Harjavalta Nickel Refinery and at Freeport Cobalt in Kokkola, and reported to STUK and to the European Commission. STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union Safeguards Regulation and international agreements. These tasks are performed to verify that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction. The application for the construction licence for the disposal facility, which consists of the encapsulation plant and the geological repository, was submitted to the Government in December 2012. During 2013 and 2014, the IAEA and the Commission defined the requirements for the safeguards equipment for the encapsulation plant in an interactive process with STUK and Posiva. These needs were included in the STUK statement and safety evaluation concerning the construction licence application finalised in February 2015. In November 2015 the Government granted the construction licence. In the meanwhile, the detailed design of the facility was updated resulting in the continuation of the planning of the safeguards system. The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been reduced significantly due to the state-level safeguards approach for Finland, which has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2015. By means of their nuclear materials accountancy and Control systems, the stakeholders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. In safeguards, STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days. In 2014, the number of inspection days was significantly higher owing to the extensive survey campaign to verify the design of the planned geological repository, called Onkalo. In 2015 a concise survey campaign was carried out at Onkalo resulting in an increased number of inspection days since 2013. The number of annual inspection days for nuclear material holders has remained at 20 days per international inspectorate. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide laboratories (RL07) in the CTBT International Monitoring Network (IMS). The main task of the FiNDC is to inspect data received from the International Monitoring System and to inform the national authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s organisation, together with the Regulatory Control of nuclear materials. A major goal of all current CTBT-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task. The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2015 was focused on nuclear material Control: in particular, information security issues were addressed. This was partly due to the need to regulate the construction of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site. In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK and Finnish Customs continued the joint multi-year border monitoring development project. The project covers customs officers training as well as the updating of technical equipment and of operational procedures. In 2014, the partnerships programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK began supporting the establishment of the Saudi Arabia’s Regulatory authority in relation to its nuclear energy programme. In the field of safeguards and nuclear security, STUK’s safeguards and security experts continued practical cooperation with their colleagues at K.A.CARE.1. paino
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Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory Control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Annual report 2014
Säteilyturvakeskus, 2015Co-Authors: Okko OlliAbstract:The Regulatory Control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold the Finnish part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this Regulatory Control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK'’s nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2014 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders’ declarations. Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, Control, security and the reporting of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities. The main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities that use nuclear materials – often referred to as “licence holders” or “operators” – and the state authority. A licence holder shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the state authority shall provide the Regulatory Control to ensure that the licence holder fulfils the requirements. The Control of nuclear expert organisations, technology holders and suppliers, to ensure the nonproliferation of sensitive technology, is also a growing global challenge for all stakeholders. In Finnish legislation, all these stakeholders are dealt with as users of nuclear energy. At then end of 2013, the new STUK regulations – called YVL Guides – entered into force. All the stakeholders were requested to prepare their safeguards manuals as a part of their quality managements systems. The approval process will continue in 2015. Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the research reactor in Espoo, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. Nuclear dual-use items and instrumentation for the third reactor under construction at the Olkiluoto site are being imported and installed. The import licences are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their site visits to the construction site prior to the installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery. The planning and design of the fourth reactor at the Olkiluoto power plant and at a new nuclear power plant site Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki were authorised in 2010. The safeguards systems for these new reactors will be designed together with facility design and development. Similarly to the Olkiluoto 3 reactor that is under construction, the import licences for the new facilities are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology and sensitive information. The operators have submitted the preliminary Basic Technical Characteristics to the European Commission and obtained Material Balance Area codes for the future reactors before the vendor companies were selected. In December 2013, Fennovoima announced that the Hanhikivi reactor will be supplied by Rusatom Overseas. This was not included as an option in the application of 2009, and thus the re-evaluation of the conditions for the previous authorisation was carried out in 2014, resulting in new Decision-in-Principle endorsed by the Parliament in December 2014. In parallel with this, the TVO application to extend the time line for the fourth unit was denied by the Government. Owing to these decisions, the construction licence applications are expected in 2015. Uranium production as one of the by-products of nickel at the Talvivaara mine was given approval from the Government in accordance with the nuclear energy legislation in March 2012. In 2013, the company constructed the uranium extraction plant, but the Supreme Administrative Court rescinded the approval, owing to claims of environmental and economical issues in December 2013 before the commissioning of the plant. The difficulties continued in 2014; and, finally in November 2014 the Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. filed for bankruptcy. Currently, uranium residuals are extracted from the nickel at Harjavalta Nickel Refinery and at Freeport Cobalt in Kokkola, and reported to STUK. STUK maintains a central national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union legislation and international agreements. These tasks are performed to guarantee that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction. The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been reduced significantly due to the state-level integrated safeguards approach for Finland, which has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2014. By means of their nuclear materials accountancy and Control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days. In 2014, the number in inspection days was significantly higher owing to the extensive survey campaign carried out at Onkalo, the planned geological repository. In total, 65 working days were required for the one-week long scanning of the tunnels. The application for the construction licence for the disposal facility, which consists of the encapsulation plant and the geological repository, was submitted to the government in December 2012. The licensing of the facility was one of the main topics over the year as a whole at STUK. During 2013 and 2014, the IAEA and the Commission defined the requirements for the safeguards equipment for the encapsulation plant in an interactive process with STUK and Posiva. This document will be included in the STUK statement to be finalised in 2015. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide laboratories (RL07) in the CTBT International Monitoring Network (IMS). The main task of the FiNDC is to inspect data received from the International Monitoring System and to inform the national authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s organisation, together with the Regulatory Control of nuclear materials. A major goal of all current CTBT-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task. The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2014 was focused on nuclear material Control: in particular, information security issues were addressed. This was partly due to the need to regulate the construction of the final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site. In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK and Finnish Customs continued the joint multi-year border monitoring development project. The project covers customs officers training as well as the updating of technical equipment and of operational procedures. In 2014, the partnerships programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK began supporting Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy programme. In the field of safeguards and nuclear security, STUK’s safeguards and security experts initiated practical cooperation with their colleagues at K.A.CARE.1. paino
Bradley S Peterson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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an fmri study of self Regulatory Control and conflict resolution in adolescents with bulimia nervosa
American Journal of Psychiatry, 2011Co-Authors: Rachel Marsh, Zhishun Wang, Timothy B Walsh, Guillermo Horga, Pengwei Wang, Kristin Klahr, Laura A Berner, Bradley S PetersonAbstract:A self-Regulatory Control fMRI paradigm was employed to study adolescent girls with a short duration of bulimia nervosa compared with healthy comparison subjects. Adolescents with and without bulimia nervosa performed similarly on the behavioral study task. Those with bulimia nervosa showed less activation in the right frontostriatal regions and greater deactivation in left inferior and superior frontal gyri and right posterior cingulate cortex. The degree of neural deactivation among adolescents with bulimia nervosa was positively correlated with frequency of binge eating and vomiting and degree of preoccupation with body weight and shape.
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deficient activity in the neural systems that mediate self Regulatory Control in bulimia nervosa
Archives of General Psychiatry, 2009Co-Authors: Rachel Marsh, Joanna E Steinglass, Andrew J Gerber, Kara Graziano Oleary, Zhishun Wang, David Murphy, Timothy B Walsh, Bradley S PetersonAbstract:Context Disturbances in neural systems that mediate voluntary self-Regulatory processes may contribute to bulimia nervosa (BN) by releasing feeding behaviors from Regulatory Control. Objective To study the functional activity in neural circuits that subserve self-Regulatory Control in women with BN. Design We compared functional magnetic resonance imaging blood oxygenation level–dependent responses in patients with BN with healthy Controls during performance of the Simon Spatial Incompatibility task. Setting University research institute. Participants Forty women: 20 patients with BN and 20 healthy Control participants. Main Outcome Measure We used general linear modeling of Simon Spatial Incompatibility task–related activations to compare groups on their patterns of brain activation associated with the successful or unsuccessful engagement of self-Regulatory Control. Results Patients with BN responded more impulsively and made more errors on the task than did healthy Controls; patients with the most severe symptoms made the most errors. During correct responding on incongruent trials, patients failed to activate frontostriatal circuits to the same degree as healthy Controls in the left inferolateral prefrontal cortex (Brodmann area [BA] 45), bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44), lenticular and caudate nuclei, and anterior cingulate cortex (BA 24/32). Patients activated the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32) more when making errors than when responding correctly. In contrast, healthy participants activated the anterior cingulate cortex more during correct than incorrect responses, and they activated the striatum more when responding incorrectly, likely reflecting an automatic response tendency that, in the absence of concomitant anterior cingulate cortex activity, produced incorrect responses. Conclusions Self-Regulatory processes are impaired in women with BN, likely because of their failure to engage frontostriatal circuits appropriately. These findings enhance our understanding of the pathogenesis of BN by pointing to functional abnormalities within a neural system that subserves self-Regulatory Control, which may contribute to binge eating and other impulsive behaviors in women with BN.
Rachel Marsh - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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implicit learning on a probabilistic classification task in adults and adolescents with bulimia nervosa
Journal of Psychiatric Research, 2016Co-Authors: Christa D Labouliere, Kate Terranova, Joanna E Steinglass, Rachel MarshAbstract:Abstract Background Dysfunction in frontostriatal circuits likely contributes to impaired Regulatory Control in Bulimia Nervosa (BN), resulting in binge-eating and purging behaviors that resemble maladaptive habits. Less is known about the implicit learning processes of these circuits, which may contribute to habit formation. Methods We compared 52 adolescent and adult females with BN to 55 healthy matched-Controls during performance of a probabilistic classification learning task, one form of implicit learning. Groups were compared in accuracy and response times, using mixed-models with block, age, and diagnosis as predictors, corrected for multiple comparisons with confounds covaried. Results BN participants showed differences in performance on a probabilistic classification learning task that varied by age. Adolescents with BN initially performed as accurately as healthy adolescents, but showed poorer perseverance over time. Adults with BN initially performed less accurately than healthy adults, but improved to perform equivalently. Symptom severity was associated with poorer accuracy in both adults and adolescents with BN. Conclusions Frontostriatal dysfunction may underlie abnormalities in Regulatory Control and probabilistic classification learning in BN, likely contributing to the dysregulation of implicitly learned, maladaptive binge-eating and purging behaviors. Such dysfunction in BN may progress with increasing age, first manifesting in poor Regulatory Control over behaviors and then expanding to implicit learning processes that may underlie habitual behaviors.
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an fmri study of self Regulatory Control and conflict resolution in adolescents with bulimia nervosa
American Journal of Psychiatry, 2011Co-Authors: Rachel Marsh, Zhishun Wang, Timothy B Walsh, Guillermo Horga, Pengwei Wang, Kristin Klahr, Laura A Berner, Bradley S PetersonAbstract:A self-Regulatory Control fMRI paradigm was employed to study adolescent girls with a short duration of bulimia nervosa compared with healthy comparison subjects. Adolescents with and without bulimia nervosa performed similarly on the behavioral study task. Those with bulimia nervosa showed less activation in the right frontostriatal regions and greater deactivation in left inferior and superior frontal gyri and right posterior cingulate cortex. The degree of neural deactivation among adolescents with bulimia nervosa was positively correlated with frequency of binge eating and vomiting and degree of preoccupation with body weight and shape.
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deficient activity in the neural systems that mediate self Regulatory Control in bulimia nervosa
Archives of General Psychiatry, 2009Co-Authors: Rachel Marsh, Joanna E Steinglass, Andrew J Gerber, Kara Graziano Oleary, Zhishun Wang, David Murphy, Timothy B Walsh, Bradley S PetersonAbstract:Context Disturbances in neural systems that mediate voluntary self-Regulatory processes may contribute to bulimia nervosa (BN) by releasing feeding behaviors from Regulatory Control. Objective To study the functional activity in neural circuits that subserve self-Regulatory Control in women with BN. Design We compared functional magnetic resonance imaging blood oxygenation level–dependent responses in patients with BN with healthy Controls during performance of the Simon Spatial Incompatibility task. Setting University research institute. Participants Forty women: 20 patients with BN and 20 healthy Control participants. Main Outcome Measure We used general linear modeling of Simon Spatial Incompatibility task–related activations to compare groups on their patterns of brain activation associated with the successful or unsuccessful engagement of self-Regulatory Control. Results Patients with BN responded more impulsively and made more errors on the task than did healthy Controls; patients with the most severe symptoms made the most errors. During correct responding on incongruent trials, patients failed to activate frontostriatal circuits to the same degree as healthy Controls in the left inferolateral prefrontal cortex (Brodmann area [BA] 45), bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44), lenticular and caudate nuclei, and anterior cingulate cortex (BA 24/32). Patients activated the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32) more when making errors than when responding correctly. In contrast, healthy participants activated the anterior cingulate cortex more during correct than incorrect responses, and they activated the striatum more when responding incorrectly, likely reflecting an automatic response tendency that, in the absence of concomitant anterior cingulate cortex activity, produced incorrect responses. Conclusions Self-Regulatory processes are impaired in women with BN, likely because of their failure to engage frontostriatal circuits appropriately. These findings enhance our understanding of the pathogenesis of BN by pointing to functional abnormalities within a neural system that subserves self-Regulatory Control, which may contribute to binge eating and other impulsive behaviors in women with BN.
Michael J Kristo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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nuclear forensic science analysis of nuclear material out of Regulatory Control
Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences, 2016Co-Authors: Michael J Kristo, Amy M Gaffney, N E Marks, K B Knight, William S Cassata, I D HutcheonAbstract:Nuclear forensic science seeks to identify the origin of nuclear materials found outside Regulatory Control. It is increasingly recognized as an integral part of a robust nuclear security program. This review highlights areas of active, evolving research in nuclear forensics, with a focus on analytical techniques commonly employed in Earth and planetary sciences. Applications of nuclear forensics to uranium ore concentrates (UOCs) are discussed first. UOCs have become an attractive target for nuclear forensic researchers because of the richness in impurities compared to materials produced later in the fuel cycle. The development of chronometric methods for age dating nuclear materials is then discussed, with an emphasis on improvements in accuracy that have been gained from measurements of multiple radioisotopic systems. Finally, papers that report on casework are reviewed, to provide a window into current scientific practice.
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nuclear forensics scientific analysis supporting law enforcement and nuclear security investigations
Analytical Chemistry, 2016Co-Authors: Elizabeth Keegan, Michael J Kristo, Kaitlyn Toole, Ruth Kips, Emma YoungAbstract:Nuclear forensic science, or "nuclear forensic", aims to answer questions about nuclear material found outside of Regulatory Control. In this Feature, we provide a general overview of nuclear forensics, selecting examples of key "nuclear forensic signatures" which have allowed investigators to determine the identity of unknown nuclear material in real investigations.
Emma Young - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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nuclear forensics scientific analysis supporting law enforcement and nuclear security investigations
Analytical Chemistry, 2016Co-Authors: Elizabeth Keegan, Michael J Kristo, Kaitlyn Toole, Ruth Kips, Emma YoungAbstract:Nuclear forensic science, or "nuclear forensic", aims to answer questions about nuclear material found outside of Regulatory Control. In this Feature, we provide a general overview of nuclear forensics, selecting examples of key "nuclear forensic signatures" which have allowed investigators to determine the identity of unknown nuclear material in real investigations.
