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Verhaegh Sander - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach and the Great Intellectual Migration. Part II: Hans Reichenbach
2020Co-Authors: Verhaegh SanderAbstract:In the years before the Second World War, Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach emigrated to the United States, escaping the quickly deteriorating political situation on the continent. Once in the U.S., the two significantly changed the American philosophical climate. In this two-part paper, I reconstruct Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s surprisingly numerous interactions with American academics in the decades before their move in order to explain the impact of their arrival in the late 1930s. Building on archival material of several key players and institutions in the development of scientific philosophy, I take some first steps toward answering the question why logical empiricism became so successful in the United States after the War. Part I reconstructs Carnap’s development between 1923, when he first visited New York, and 1936, when he was offered a position at the University of Chicago. Part II traces Reichenbach’s development and focuses on his frequent interactions with American academics throughout the 1930s. In both parts, special attention is paid to the zealous efforts of a number of American academics (most notably Edward Allen, Sidney Hook, C. I. Lewis, Charles Morris, Ernest Nagel, and W. V. Quine) to market the work of Carnap and Reichenbach in the United States
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Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach and the Great Intellectual Migration. Part II: Hans Reichenbach
2020Co-Authors: Verhaegh SanderAbstract:In the late 1930s, a few years before the start of the Second World War, a small number of European philosophers of science emigrated to the United States, escaping the increasingly perilous situation on the continent. Among the first expatriates were Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, arguably the most influential logical empiricists of their time. In this two-part paper, I reconstruct Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s surprisingly numerous interactions with American academics in the decades before their move in order to explain the impact of their arrival in the late 1930s. This second part traces Reichenbach’s development and focuses on his frequent interactions with American academics throughout the 1930s. I show that Reichenbach was quite ignorant about developments in Anglophone philosophy in the first stages of his career but became increasingly focused on the United States from the late 1920s onwards. I reconstruct Reichenbach’s efforts to find a job across the Atlantic and show that some of his English publications—most notably Experience and Prediction—were attempts to change the American narrative about logical empiricism. Whereas U. S. philosophers identified scientific philosophy with the views of the Vienna Circle, Reichenbach aimed to market his probabilistic philosophy of science as a subtler alternative
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Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach and the Great Intellectual Migration. Part I: Rudolf Carnap
2020Co-Authors: Verhaegh SanderAbstract:In the years before the Second World War, Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach emigrated to the United States, escaping the quickly deteriorating political situation on the continent. Once in the U.S., the two significantly changed the American philosophical climate. In this two-part paper, I reconstruct Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s surprisingly numerous interactions with American academics in the decades before their move in order to explain the impact of their arrival in the late 1930s. Building on archival material of several key players and institutions in the development of scientific philosophy, I take some first steps toward answering the question why logical empiricism became so successful in the United States after the War. Part I reconstructs Carnap’s development between 1923, when he first visited New York, and 1936, when he was offered a position at the University of Chicago. Part II traces Reichenbach’s development and focuses on his frequent interactions with American academics throughout the 1930s. In both parts, special attention is paid to the zealous efforts of a number of American academics (most notably Edward Allen, Sidney Hook, C. I. Lewis, Charles Morris, Ernest Nagel, and W. V. Quine) to market the work of Carnap and Reichenbach in the United States
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Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach and the Great Intellectual Migration. Part I: Rudolf Carnap
2020Co-Authors: Verhaegh SanderAbstract:In the years before the Second World War, Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach emigrated to the United States, escaping the quickly deteriorating political situation on the continent. Once in the U. S., the two significantly changed the American philosophical climate. This two-part paper reconstructs Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s surprisingly numerous interactions with American academics in the decades before their move in order to explain the impact of their arrival in the late 1930s. Building on archival material of several key players and institutions, I take some first steps toward answering the question why logical empiricism became so successful in the United States after the War. This first part reconstructs Carnap’s development between 1923, when he first visited New York, and 1936, when he was offered a position at the University of Chicago. I describe Carnap’s first substantive contacts with American philosophers as well as the events leading up to his decision to emigrate. In addition, I argue that some of Carnap’s work from the mid-1930s—in particular “Testability and Meaning”—can be better understood if we take into account his attempts to correct the American narrative about logical positivism and his increasingly desperate efforts to find a position in the United States
Leon Malena - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Acerca de la naturaleza del “yo” narrativo en Dennett
'Griot Revista de Filosofia', 2020Co-Authors: Leon MalenaAbstract:Dennett's theory of personal identity argues that the “self” is no more than a center of narrative gravity. One of the main hurdles to assessing this proposal lies in the fact that it is difficult to understand what the nature of Dennett's concept of "self" is; specifically, what are the ontological and epistemological commitments that can be attributed to the phenomenon in question. In this article we claim that the best way to make an interpretative reconstruction of his notion of "self" is appealing to the distinction elaborated by Reichenbach between three classes of entities, Concreta, Abstracta, and Illata, and understanding the narrative centers of gravity as a case of Reichenbachian Abstracta. We defend that understanding the narrative centers of gravity as Abstracta in the sense of Reichenbach is pertinent and illuminating given that: i) although he does not apply it directly to the problem of the nature of the "self", Dennett does use Reichenbach's distinction in other parts of his work; ii) Dennett explicitly draws an analogy of the "self" with the centers of gravity that are, precisely, one of his examples of Abstracta; iii) this way of understanding the "self" allows us to give sense and better understand certain aspects of Dennett’s narrative theory. Besides allowing us to clarify the metaphors used by Dennett in the elaboration of his narrative theory, such conceptual elucidation allows us to better understand the distinction between the three classes of intentional psychology drawn by Dennett (1987) and is useful in suggesting to which of these three types the concept of "self" belongs.Dennett elabora una concepción del “yo” entendido como un centro de gravedad narrativo. Uno de los obstáculos principales para valorar esta propuesta radica en que resulta dificultoso entender cuál es la naturaleza del concepto dennettiano de “yo”: concretamente, cuáles son los compromisos ontológicos y epistemológicos que cabe atribuir al fenómeno en cuestión. En este artículo defendemos que el mejor modo de realizar una reconstrucción interpretativa de su noción de “yo” es apelando a la distinción elaborada por Reichenbach entre tres clases de entidades, Concreta, Abstracta e Illata, y entendiendo a los centros de gravedad narrativos como un caso de Abstracta Reichenbachiano. Sostenemos que resulta pertinente e iluminador entender los centros de gravedad narrativos como Abstracta en el sentido de Reichenbach, apoyándonos en que: i) aunque no la aplica directamente al problema de la naturaleza del “yo”, Dennett sí emplea la distinción de Reichenbach en otras partes de su obra; ii) Dennett traza explícitamente una analogía del “yo” con los centros de gravedad que son, justamente, uno de sus ejemplos de Abstracta; iii) este modo de entender al “yo” permite dar sentido y entender mejor ciertos aspectos de la teoría narrativista dennettiana. Además de permitirnos clarificar las metáforas empleadas por Dennett en la elaboración de su teoría narrativa, dicha elucidación conceptual permite comprender mejor la distinción entre las tres clases de psicología intencional trazada por Dennett (1987) y es útil para sugerir a cuál de estos tres tipos pertenece el concepto de “yo”
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On the nature Of Dennett’s narrative “self”
'Griot Revista de Filosofia', 2020Co-Authors: Leon MalenaAbstract:Dennett elabora una concepción del “yo” entendido como un centro de gravedad narrativo. Uno de los obstáculos principales para valorar esta propuesta radica en que resulta dificultoso entender cuál es la naturaleza del concepto dennettiano de “yo”: concretamente, cuáles son los compromisos ontológicos y epistemológicos que cabe atribuir al fenómeno en cuestión. En este artículo defendemos que el mejor modo de realizar una reconstrucción interpretativa de su noción de “yo” es apelando a la distinción elaborada por Reichenbach entre tres clases de entidades, Concreta, Abstracta e Illata, y entendiendo a los centros de gravedad narrativos como un caso de Abstracta Reichenbachiano. Sostenemos que resulta pertinente e iluminador entender los centros de gravedad narrativos como Abstracta en el sentido de Reichenbach, apoyándonos en que: i) aunque no la aplica directamente al problema de la naturaleza del “yo”, Dennett sí emplea la distinción de Reichenbach en otras partes de su obra; ii) Dennett traza explícitamente una analogía del “yo” con los centros de gravedad que son, justamente, uno de sus ejemplos de Abstracta; iii) este modo de entender al “yo” permite dar sentido y entender mejor ciertos aspectos de la teoría narrativista dennettiana. Además de permitirnos clarificar las metáforas empleadas por Dennett en la elaboración de su teoría narrativa, dicha elucidación conceptual permite comprender mejor la distinción entre las tres clases de psicología intencional trazada por Dennett (1987) y es útil para sugerir a cuál de estos tres tipos pertenece el concepto de “yo”.Fil: León, Malena. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentin
Reichenbach Roland - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Bildungsferne: Essays und Gespräche zur Kritik der Pädagogik
'DIAPHANES AG', 2020Co-Authors: Reichenbach Roland, Bossart RolfAbstract:Die hier ausgewählten Essays und Vorträge des international renommierten Bildungsforschers Roland Reichenbach kombinieren theoriegeleitete Kritik am pädagogischen Mainstream mit Beobachtungen aus dem schulischen Alltag. Sie führen überspannte Metaphern und sakralisierte Paradigmen der aktuellen Bildungsdiskurse wie »selbstorganisiertes Lernen« oder »Kompetenzorientierung« zurück auf ihre profane Basis. Reichenbachs an literarischen, philosophischen, aber auch autobiographischen Verweisen reiches Denken gibt mit Sprachwitz und intellektueller Schärfe auch verdrängten Vokabeln wie »Dilettantismus«, »Unsouveränität«, »Kitsch«, »Herzensbildung« ihren Raum und neue Bedeutung. Denn erst so eröffnen sich neue Denk- und Handlungsmöglichkeiten. In engagierter Skepsis plädieren die Texte für einen pädagogischen Realismus jenseits leergelaufenen Reformeifers. Die vorliegende Auswahl wird ergänzt durch Gespräche mit dem Herausgeber Rolf Bossart, die einige zentrale Themen dieses Buches vertiefen. Ein Buch, das die Erziehungswissenschaft an ihre Aufgabe erinnern will, ihre idealen Konzepte immer zuerst an den mannigfaltigen Phänomenen der realexistierenden pädagogischen Verhältnisse zu prüfen. (Verlag
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Bildungsferne: Essays und Gespräche zur Kritik der Pädagogik
'DIAPHANES AG', 2020Co-Authors: Reichenbach RolandAbstract:Die hier ausgewählten Essays und Vorträge des international renommierten Bildungsforschers Roland Reichenbach kombinieren theoriegeleitete Kritik am pädagogischen Mainstream mit Beobachtungen aus dem schulischen Alltag. Sie führen überspannte Metaphern und sakralisierte Paradigmen der aktuellen Bildungsdiskurse wie »selbstorganisiertes Lernen« oder »Kompetenzorientierung« zurück auf ihre profane Basis. Reichenbachs an literarischen, philosophischen, aber auch autobiographischen Verweisen reiches Denken gibt mit Sprachwitz und intellektueller Schärfe auch verdrängten Vokabeln wie »Dilettantismus«, »Unsouveränität«, »Kitsch«, »Herzensbildung« ihren Raum und neue Bedeutung. Denn erst so eröffnen sich neue Denk- und Handlungsmöglichkeiten. In engagierter Skepsis plädieren die Texte für einen pädagogischen Realismus jenseits leergelaufenen Reformeifers. Die vorliegende Auswahl wird ergänzt durch Gespräche mit dem Herausgeber Rolf Bossart, die einige zentrale Themen dieses Buches vertiefen. Ein Buch, das die Erziehungswissenschaft an ihre Aufgabe erinnern will, ihre idealen Konzepte immer zuerst an den mannigfaltigen Phänomenen der realexistierenden pädagogischen Verhältnisse zu prüfen
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Grenzen der interpersonalen Verständigung: eine Kommunikationskritik
'Psychosozial Verlag', 2020Co-Authors: Reichenbach RolandAbstract:Für demokratische Gesellschaften ist es entscheidend, dass Menschen in und mit Dissens leben können. Diese Fähigkeit ist weniger von kognitiver als vielmehr von affektiv-emotionaler Art. Ausgehend von der Unfreiwilligkeit der meisten Kommunikationsbeziehungen erläutert Roland Reichenbach in sieben essayistischen Kapiteln verschiedene Ursachen von Verständigungsproblemen – etwa soziale Asymmetrie, wechselseitige Hilflosigkeitserfahrungen oder unterschiedliche psychologische Voraussetzungen der KommunikationspartnerInnen –, Kulturen des Dissenses sowie die teilweise sehr ungünstigen Bedingungen, unter denen Einigungsprozeduren realisiert werden müssen. Abschließend fokussiert er auf produktive Mächte der Verständigung und des Verstehens
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Disziplin – ein pädagogisch ambivalentes Phänomen
Hans Balmer, 2019Co-Authors: Reichenbach RolandAbstract:Wie schaffen es Lehrerinnen und Lehrer, für Ruhe und Ordnung im Schulzimmer zu sorgen? Erziehungswissenschafter Roland Reichenbach erklärt in unserer Rubrik für frischgebackene Lehrpersonen, warum es Kollaborateure braucht und wie Befehl und Disziplin zusammenhängen
Bourdeau Michel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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La préparation du congrès de 1935 dans la correspondance d’Otto Neurath et de Louis Rougier
Philosophia Scientiæ, 2021Co-Authors: Bourdeau MichelAbstract:Dans les Archives Neurath conservées à Haarlem, une des correspondances les plus volumineuses est celle qu’il a échangée avec Louis Rougier. Les deux hommes ayant été chargés de co-organiser le premier congrès du mouvement pour l’unité de la science, qui s’est tenu à Paris en septembre 1935, cette correspondance permet de retracer l’histoire, pleine de péripéties, des préparatifs de cet événement, dont l’idée première surgit à Berlin en 1932, lors d’une conversation entre Rougier et Reichenbach. Outre l’éclairage qu’elle apporte sur le congrès, cette étude permet, de façon plus générale, de combler une lacune dans l’histoire du mouvement pour l’unité de la science, où le nom de Rougier n’apparaît que rarement, alors pourtant que, de 1933 à 1940, il en a été un des membres les plus actifs. Aussi, il s’agira également, de façon subsidiaire, de mettre en valeur l’action de Rougier dans l’histoire de la philosophie scientifique et de s’interroger en particulier sur le rôle qui lui revient dans la non-réception en France des idées du Cercle de Vienne.One of the main correspondences to be found in Neurath’s Nachlass in Haarlem is the one he had with Louis Rougier. The two men had been in charge of the preparation of the first Congress for the unity of science that took place in Paris in September 1935 and their correspondence allows us to describe the preparation of this event, starting from a conversation between Rougier and Reichenbach in Berlin in 1932. Besides what it taught us about the congress, this correspondence helps also to fill a gap in the history of the movement, where the name of Rougier is seldom mentioned, while he was, from 1933 until 1940, one of its most active members. This paper aims to show the role of Rougier in the history of scientific philosophy, and, more specifically, to try to understand the role he could have had in the non-reception in France of the ideas of the Vienna Circle
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La préparation du congrès de 1935 dans la correspondance d’Otto Neurath et de Louis Rougier
Editions Kime, 2018Co-Authors: Bourdeau MichelAbstract:International audienceOne of the main correspondences to be found in Neurath’s Nachlass in Haarlem is the one he had with Louis Rougier. The two men had been in charge of the preparation of the first Congress for the unity of science that took place in Paris in September 1935 and their correspondence allows us to describe the preparation of this event, starting from a conversation between Rougier and Reichenbach in Berlin in 1932. Besides what it taught us about the congress, this correspondence helps also to fill a gap in the history of the movement, where the name of Rougier is seldom mentioned, while he was, from 1933 until 1940, one of its most active members. This paper aims to show the role of Rougier in the history of scientific philosophy, and, more specifically, to try to understand the role he could have had in the non-reception in France of the ideas of the Vienna Circle.Dans les Archives Neurath conservées à Haarlem, une des corres- pondances les plus volumineuses est celle qu’il a échangée avec Louis Rougier. Les deux hommes ayant été chargés de co-organiser le premier congrès du mouvement pour l’unité de la science, qui s’est tenu à Paris en septembre 1935, cette correspondance permet de retracer l’histoire, pleine de péripéties, des préparatifs de cet événement, dont l’idée première surgit à Berlin en 1932, lors d’une conversation entre Rougier et Reichenbach. Outre l’éclairage qu’elle apporte sur le congrès, cette étude permet, de façon plus générale, de combler une lacune dans l’histoire du mouvement pour l’unité de la science, où le nom de Rougier n’apparaît que rarement, alors pourtant que, de 1933 à 1940, il en a été un des membres les plus actifs. Aussi, il s’agira également, de façon subsidiaire, de mettre en valeur l’action de Rougier dans l’histoire de la philosophie scientifique et de s’interroger en particulier sur le rôle qui lui revient dans la non-réception en France des idées du Cercle de Vienn
Malena Leon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Acerca de la naturaleza del "yo" narrativo en Dennett
'Griot Revista de Filosofia', 2020Co-Authors: Malena LeonAbstract:Dennett's theory of personal identity argues that the "self" is no more than a center of narrative gravity. One of the main hurdles to assessing this proposal lies in the fact that it is difficult to understand what the nature of Dennett's concept of "self" is; specifically, what are the ontological and epistemological commitments that can be attributed to the phenomenon in question. In this article we claim that the best way to make an interpretative reconstruction of his notion of "self" is appealing to the distinction elaborated by Reichenbach between three classes of entities, Concreta, Abstracta, and Illata, and understanding the narrative centers of gravity as a case of Reichenbachian Abstracta. We defend that understanding the narrative centers of gravity as Abstracta in the sense of Reichenbach is pertinent and illuminating given that: i) although he does not apply it directly to the problem of the nature of the "self", Dennett does use Reichenbach's distinction in other parts of his work; ii) Dennett explicitly draws an analogy of the "self" with the centers of gravity that are, precisely, one of his examples of Abstracta; iii) this way of understanding the "self" allows us to give sense and better understand certain aspects of Dennett’s narrative theory. Besides allowing us to clarify the metaphors used by Dennett in the elaboration of his narrative theory, such conceptual elucidation allows us to better understand the distinction between the three classes of intentional psychology drawn by Dennett (1987) and is useful in suggesting to which of these three types the concept of "self" belongs
