The Experts below are selected from a list of 911586 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Harris Schlesinger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Risk Aversion in Rent‐Seeking and Rent‐Augmenting Games
The Economic Journal, 1997Co-Authors: Kai A. Konrad, Harris SchlesingerAbstract:The effects of risk aversion are examined for two types of expenditures in Rent-Seeking contests: (1) Rent-Seeking expenditures, which improve the probability that the rent is obtained and (2) rent-augmenting expenditures, which increase the size of the rent to be awarded. Risk aversion is shown to reduce expenditures of type (2) unambiguously, while having an indeterminate effect on those of type (1). These two contrasting results are shown to derive from the very different effects Rent-Seeking and rent-augmenting expenditures have on the riskiness of a player's position. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.
Kai A. Konrad - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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orchestrating rent seeking contests
The Economic Journal, 1999Co-Authors: Mark Gradstein, Kai A. KonradAbstract:Contests have different, sometimes quite complex, organisational structures. In particular, while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests, multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered. This paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure, which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders.
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Risk Aversion in Rent‐Seeking and Rent‐Augmenting Games
The Economic Journal, 1997Co-Authors: Kai A. Konrad, Harris SchlesingerAbstract:The effects of risk aversion are examined for two types of expenditures in Rent-Seeking contests: (1) Rent-Seeking expenditures, which improve the probability that the rent is obtained and (2) rent-augmenting expenditures, which increase the size of the rent to be awarded. Risk aversion is shown to reduce expenditures of type (2) unambiguously, while having an indeterminate effect on those of type (1). These two contrasting results are shown to derive from the very different effects Rent-Seeking and rent-augmenting expenditures have on the riskiness of a player's position. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.
Roger D. Congleton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent Extraction
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice Volume 1, 2019Co-Authors: Roger D. CongletonAbstract:Rent Creation, Rent Extraction, and Rent Seeking are closely related concepts whose relationships are often misunderstood. For example, neither rent extraction nor rent seeking are possible until rents are created. Both rent extraction and rent seeking thus begin with the creation of rents. If one begins with the Hobbesian perspective on anarchy, all rents are ultimately the creation of government policies. Civil law determines what it means to own something, which includes an owner’s claims on the rents associated with his or her property and private activities. One in place, civil law also allows the possibility that rents can be created through private actions. Public policy may alter those claims through changes in use and rent-extraction rights associated with ownership. Such policies may create new rents or redistribute existing rents. In doing so, such policies induce Rent-Seeking efforts (or not) depending on the policies adopted and the manner in which rents are distributed. The welfare gains and losses associated with the various procedures for rent creation, rent seeking, and rent extraction imply that prohibitions against many, but not all, forms of rent extraction are warranted.
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Ideological conviction and persuasion in the Rent-Seeking society
Journal of Public Economics, 1991Co-Authors: Roger D. CongletonAbstract:Abstract The paper develops a model of Rent-Seeking in a democratic political context where voting, as well as Rent-Seeking, matters. In this context, the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the Rent-Seeking game as well as a possible avenue of Rent-Seeking. In a setting where there are both Rent-Seeking and ideological interest groups, rent-seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues, which tends to reduce Rent-Seeking effort. In a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts, both rent- seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase.
Randall G. Holcombe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Political incentives for rent creation
Constitutional Political Economy, 2016Co-Authors: Randall G. HolcombeAbstract:Rent-Seeking is often depicted as a contest in which rent-seekers compete for a prize—the rent. In the process of Rent-Seeking, much or perhaps all of the rent is dissipated through the costs the contestants incur to compete. Rent dissipation is inconsistent with the incentives of both the rent-seekers and those who create the rents. Policymakers have an incentive to create rents only if they gain from the process, and their gain comes from sharing any surplus that goes to those who obtain the rents. A surplus can be created through a barrier to entry into Rent-Seeking. When institutions that generate barriers to entry into Rent-Seeking break down, Rent-Seeking competitions can occur in which all rents are dissipated, but this should be a special case rather than the general rule in Rent-Seeking.
Samuel De Abreu Pessôa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Rent-Seeking AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
Economic Inquiry, 2010Co-Authors: Paulo Barelli, Samuel De Abreu PessôaAbstract:A general model incorporating rent‐seeking activities in the standard neoclassical model of capital accumulation is presented. The welfare of the representative agent is negatively affected by the efficiency of rent‐seeking activities. Although intuitive, this result is not obvious because long‐run income can be positively affected by more efficient rent‐seeking activities. The model is used to provide explanations for some recent experiences in developing countries, including the relative poor performance of economies that experience a move to a more decentralized system and the observed path of total factor productivity (TFP) in countries like Ireland and Venezuela.
