The Experts below are selected from a list of 312 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Henry E. Brady - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Organizations and the Democratic Representation of Interests: What Does It Mean When Those Organizations Have No Members?
Perspectives on Politics, 2015Co-Authors: Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. BradyAbstract:This article documents the prevalence in organized interest politics in the United States of organizations—for example, corporations, think tanks, universities, or hospitals—that have no members in the ordinary sense and analyzes the consequences of that dominance for the democratic Representation of citizen Interests. We use data from the Washington Representatives Study, a longitudinal data base containing more than 33,000 organizations active in national politics in 1981, 1991, 2001, 2006, and 2011. The share of membership associations active in Washington has eroded over time until, in 2011, barely a quarter of the more than 14,000 organizations active in Washington in 2011 were membership associations, and less than half of those were membership association with individuals as members. In contrast, a majority of the politically involved organizations were memberless organizations, of which nearly two-thirds were corporations. The dominance of memberless organizations in pressure politics raises important questions about democratic Representation. Studies of political Representation by interest groups raise several concerns about democratic inequalities: the extent to which Representation of Interests by groups is unequal, the extent to which groups fail to represent their members equally, and the extent to which group members are unable to control their leaders. All of the dilemmas that arise when membership associations advocate in politics become even more intractable when organizations do not have members.
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Louder Chorus — Same Accent: The Representation of Interests in Pressure Politics, 1981–2011
The Organization Ecology of Interest Communities, 2015Co-Authors: Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. BradyAbstract:Citizens in American democracy have many channels for the expression of political voice, one among them being organized interest politics in Washington. But the Representation of citizen preferences and needs in organized interest politics is neither universal nor representative. That is, not all voices speak equally loudly in organized advocacy politics and systematic processes operate to influence which voices are amplified by a megaphone and which ones speak in a whisper. The result is pronounced inequalities of political voice. In this chapter, we draw upon the Washington Representatives Study, an extensive database covering the period from 1981 to 2011, to examine how the growth and changing composition of the pressure system have affected the extent to which it is representative of the American public.1 We find that, for all the diversity among the thousands of organizations active in Washington, the free-rider problem and the resource-constraint problem have a profound impact on political input from organizations. Policymakers hear much more from advocates for narrow Interests than from supporters of broad public Interests and much more from those with deep pockets than from the less affluent.
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louder chorus same accent the Representation of Interests in pressure politics 1981 2011
2015Co-Authors: Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. BradyAbstract:Citizens in American democracy have many channels for the expression of political voice, one among them being organized interest politics in Washington. But the Representation of citizen preferences and needs in organized interest politics is neither universal nor representative. That is, not all voices speak equally loudly in organized advocacy politics and systematic processes operate to influence which voices are amplified by a megaphone and which ones speak in a whisper. The result is pronounced inequalities of political voice. In this chapter, we draw upon the Washington Representatives Study, an extensive database covering the period from 1981 to 2011, to examine how the growth and changing composition of the pressure system have affected the extent to which it is representative of the American public.1 We find that, for all the diversity among the thousands of organizations active in Washington, the free-rider problem and the resource-constraint problem have a profound impact on political input from organizations. Policymakers hear much more from advocates for narrow Interests than from supporters of broad public Interests and much more from those with deep pockets than from the less affluent.
Kay Lehman Schlozman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Organizations and the Democratic Representation of Interests: What Does It Mean When Those Organizations Have No Members?
Perspectives on Politics, 2015Co-Authors: Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. BradyAbstract:This article documents the prevalence in organized interest politics in the United States of organizations—for example, corporations, think tanks, universities, or hospitals—that have no members in the ordinary sense and analyzes the consequences of that dominance for the democratic Representation of citizen Interests. We use data from the Washington Representatives Study, a longitudinal data base containing more than 33,000 organizations active in national politics in 1981, 1991, 2001, 2006, and 2011. The share of membership associations active in Washington has eroded over time until, in 2011, barely a quarter of the more than 14,000 organizations active in Washington in 2011 were membership associations, and less than half of those were membership association with individuals as members. In contrast, a majority of the politically involved organizations were memberless organizations, of which nearly two-thirds were corporations. The dominance of memberless organizations in pressure politics raises important questions about democratic Representation. Studies of political Representation by interest groups raise several concerns about democratic inequalities: the extent to which Representation of Interests by groups is unequal, the extent to which groups fail to represent their members equally, and the extent to which group members are unable to control their leaders. All of the dilemmas that arise when membership associations advocate in politics become even more intractable when organizations do not have members.
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Louder Chorus — Same Accent: The Representation of Interests in Pressure Politics, 1981–2011
The Organization Ecology of Interest Communities, 2015Co-Authors: Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. BradyAbstract:Citizens in American democracy have many channels for the expression of political voice, one among them being organized interest politics in Washington. But the Representation of citizen preferences and needs in organized interest politics is neither universal nor representative. That is, not all voices speak equally loudly in organized advocacy politics and systematic processes operate to influence which voices are amplified by a megaphone and which ones speak in a whisper. The result is pronounced inequalities of political voice. In this chapter, we draw upon the Washington Representatives Study, an extensive database covering the period from 1981 to 2011, to examine how the growth and changing composition of the pressure system have affected the extent to which it is representative of the American public.1 We find that, for all the diversity among the thousands of organizations active in Washington, the free-rider problem and the resource-constraint problem have a profound impact on political input from organizations. Policymakers hear much more from advocates for narrow Interests than from supporters of broad public Interests and much more from those with deep pockets than from the less affluent.
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louder chorus same accent the Representation of Interests in pressure politics 1981 2011
2015Co-Authors: Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. BradyAbstract:Citizens in American democracy have many channels for the expression of political voice, one among them being organized interest politics in Washington. But the Representation of citizen preferences and needs in organized interest politics is neither universal nor representative. That is, not all voices speak equally loudly in organized advocacy politics and systematic processes operate to influence which voices are amplified by a megaphone and which ones speak in a whisper. The result is pronounced inequalities of political voice. In this chapter, we draw upon the Washington Representatives Study, an extensive database covering the period from 1981 to 2011, to examine how the growth and changing composition of the pressure system have affected the extent to which it is representative of the American public.1 We find that, for all the diversity among the thousands of organizations active in Washington, the free-rider problem and the resource-constraint problem have a profound impact on political input from organizations. Policymakers hear much more from advocates for narrow Interests than from supporters of broad public Interests and much more from those with deep pockets than from the less affluent.
Herschel F Thomas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Revolving door lobbyists and interest Representation
Interest Groups & Advocacy, 2014Co-Authors: Timothy M Lapira, Herschel F ThomasAbstract:Although experience inside the halls of power afford lobbyists valuable political, policy and procedural skills that can improve the deliberative process, it also gives them privileged access to former employers that others do not have. Washington’s revolving door evokes legitimate ethical concerns, such as when former legislators resign their seats to take lucrative jobs representing the very industries they regulate. However, social scientists know surprisingly little about the revolving door beyond such sensational, albeit important, cases. To shed more light on the broader phenomenon, we systematically explore the revolving door on a large scale to answer a simple question: Do revolving door lobbyists represent different Interests than conventional lobbyists? If, as revolving door proponents imply, these lobbyists work on behalf of organized Interests solely for their specialized subject-matter expertise, then we would expect them to represent clienteles that are no different than conventional lobbyists. Alternatively, if they represent a wider variety of economic Interests than conventional lobbyists then we assume they are hired more for their ability to get a foot in the door than to serve as policy expert adjuncts to government. Using evidence from original data on the professional biographies of roughly 1600 registered lobbyists – which we link to data from almost 50 000 quarterly Lobbying Disclosure Act reports – we expose a significant transparency loophole in the law. Because lobbyists are not required to continuously disclose their ‘covered official’ status – the statutory definition of revolving door – periodic lobbying disclosure reports effectively hide the revolving door from public scrutiny. Instead, we rely on our more comprehensive information on lobbyists’ connections to previous employers to more accurately measure the size and scope of Washington’s revolving door, and to investigate how these connections affect which Interests they represent. We find that revolving door lobbyists have worked mostly in Congress, tend to work as contract lobbyists rather than in-house government-relations staff and are more likely to specialize in lobbying for appropriations earmarks. Then, after controlling for a variety of lobbying specializations, we show that former members of Congress are no more likely than other lobbyists to attract a more economically diverse set of clients than their conventional-lobbyist counterparts. However, congressional staffers who had worked their way up the organizational ladder on Capitol Hill do. We infer that well-connected congressional staffers who spin through the revolving door sell access to key decision makers in Congress, not their industry- or issue-specific technical or substantive expertise. Simply, the revolving door problem is not limited to a handful of headline-catching former legislators, is much bigger than the existing lobbying disclosure regime reveals and – most importantly – significantly distorts the Representation of Interests before government. The practical implications are clear: lobbying transparency rules, cooling-off periods and other restrictions are insufficient disincentives. Interest group demand for access is simply too strong. We advocate enhancing lobbying transparency by expanding the statutory definitions of lobbying activities, requiring lobbyists to disclose more details about government employment and shifting some of the disclosure burden to democratically accountable government officials themselves.
Philip Edward Jones - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Organizations and the Democratic Representation of Interests: What Does It Mean When Those Organizations Have No Members?
Perspectives on Politics, 2015Co-Authors: Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. BradyAbstract:This article documents the prevalence in organized interest politics in the United States of organizations—for example, corporations, think tanks, universities, or hospitals—that have no members in the ordinary sense and analyzes the consequences of that dominance for the democratic Representation of citizen Interests. We use data from the Washington Representatives Study, a longitudinal data base containing more than 33,000 organizations active in national politics in 1981, 1991, 2001, 2006, and 2011. The share of membership associations active in Washington has eroded over time until, in 2011, barely a quarter of the more than 14,000 organizations active in Washington in 2011 were membership associations, and less than half of those were membership association with individuals as members. In contrast, a majority of the politically involved organizations were memberless organizations, of which nearly two-thirds were corporations. The dominance of memberless organizations in pressure politics raises important questions about democratic Representation. Studies of political Representation by interest groups raise several concerns about democratic inequalities: the extent to which Representation of Interests by groups is unequal, the extent to which groups fail to represent their members equally, and the extent to which group members are unable to control their leaders. All of the dilemmas that arise when membership associations advocate in politics become even more intractable when organizations do not have members.
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Louder Chorus — Same Accent: The Representation of Interests in Pressure Politics, 1981–2011
The Organization Ecology of Interest Communities, 2015Co-Authors: Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. BradyAbstract:Citizens in American democracy have many channels for the expression of political voice, one among them being organized interest politics in Washington. But the Representation of citizen preferences and needs in organized interest politics is neither universal nor representative. That is, not all voices speak equally loudly in organized advocacy politics and systematic processes operate to influence which voices are amplified by a megaphone and which ones speak in a whisper. The result is pronounced inequalities of political voice. In this chapter, we draw upon the Washington Representatives Study, an extensive database covering the period from 1981 to 2011, to examine how the growth and changing composition of the pressure system have affected the extent to which it is representative of the American public.1 We find that, for all the diversity among the thousands of organizations active in Washington, the free-rider problem and the resource-constraint problem have a profound impact on political input from organizations. Policymakers hear much more from advocates for narrow Interests than from supporters of broad public Interests and much more from those with deep pockets than from the less affluent.
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louder chorus same accent the Representation of Interests in pressure politics 1981 2011
2015Co-Authors: Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. BradyAbstract:Citizens in American democracy have many channels for the expression of political voice, one among them being organized interest politics in Washington. But the Representation of citizen preferences and needs in organized interest politics is neither universal nor representative. That is, not all voices speak equally loudly in organized advocacy politics and systematic processes operate to influence which voices are amplified by a megaphone and which ones speak in a whisper. The result is pronounced inequalities of political voice. In this chapter, we draw upon the Washington Representatives Study, an extensive database covering the period from 1981 to 2011, to examine how the growth and changing composition of the pressure system have affected the extent to which it is representative of the American public.1 We find that, for all the diversity among the thousands of organizations active in Washington, the free-rider problem and the resource-constraint problem have a profound impact on political input from organizations. Policymakers hear much more from advocates for narrow Interests than from supporters of broad public Interests and much more from those with deep pockets than from the less affluent.
Hye Young You - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Organizations and the Democratic Representation of Interests: What Does It Mean When Those Organizations Have No Members?
Perspectives on Politics, 2015Co-Authors: Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. BradyAbstract:This article documents the prevalence in organized interest politics in the United States of organizations—for example, corporations, think tanks, universities, or hospitals—that have no members in the ordinary sense and analyzes the consequences of that dominance for the democratic Representation of citizen Interests. We use data from the Washington Representatives Study, a longitudinal data base containing more than 33,000 organizations active in national politics in 1981, 1991, 2001, 2006, and 2011. The share of membership associations active in Washington has eroded over time until, in 2011, barely a quarter of the more than 14,000 organizations active in Washington in 2011 were membership associations, and less than half of those were membership association with individuals as members. In contrast, a majority of the politically involved organizations were memberless organizations, of which nearly two-thirds were corporations. The dominance of memberless organizations in pressure politics raises important questions about democratic Representation. Studies of political Representation by interest groups raise several concerns about democratic inequalities: the extent to which Representation of Interests by groups is unequal, the extent to which groups fail to represent their members equally, and the extent to which group members are unable to control their leaders. All of the dilemmas that arise when membership associations advocate in politics become even more intractable when organizations do not have members.
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Louder Chorus — Same Accent: The Representation of Interests in Pressure Politics, 1981–2011
The Organization Ecology of Interest Communities, 2015Co-Authors: Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. BradyAbstract:Citizens in American democracy have many channels for the expression of political voice, one among them being organized interest politics in Washington. But the Representation of citizen preferences and needs in organized interest politics is neither universal nor representative. That is, not all voices speak equally loudly in organized advocacy politics and systematic processes operate to influence which voices are amplified by a megaphone and which ones speak in a whisper. The result is pronounced inequalities of political voice. In this chapter, we draw upon the Washington Representatives Study, an extensive database covering the period from 1981 to 2011, to examine how the growth and changing composition of the pressure system have affected the extent to which it is representative of the American public.1 We find that, for all the diversity among the thousands of organizations active in Washington, the free-rider problem and the resource-constraint problem have a profound impact on political input from organizations. Policymakers hear much more from advocates for narrow Interests than from supporters of broad public Interests and much more from those with deep pockets than from the less affluent.
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louder chorus same accent the Representation of Interests in pressure politics 1981 2011
2015Co-Authors: Kay Lehman Schlozman, Philip Edward Jones, Hye Young You, Traci Burch, Sidney Verba, Henry E. BradyAbstract:Citizens in American democracy have many channels for the expression of political voice, one among them being organized interest politics in Washington. But the Representation of citizen preferences and needs in organized interest politics is neither universal nor representative. That is, not all voices speak equally loudly in organized advocacy politics and systematic processes operate to influence which voices are amplified by a megaphone and which ones speak in a whisper. The result is pronounced inequalities of political voice. In this chapter, we draw upon the Washington Representatives Study, an extensive database covering the period from 1981 to 2011, to examine how the growth and changing composition of the pressure system have affected the extent to which it is representative of the American public.1 We find that, for all the diversity among the thousands of organizations active in Washington, the free-rider problem and the resource-constraint problem have a profound impact on political input from organizations. Policymakers hear much more from advocates for narrow Interests than from supporters of broad public Interests and much more from those with deep pockets than from the less affluent.