The Experts below are selected from a list of 4125 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Ben Lourie - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The Revolving-Door of Sell-Side Analysts
    The Accounting Review, 2018
    Co-Authors: Ben Lourie
    Abstract:

    ABSTRACT Equity analysts are often hired by firms they cover. I document the extent to which this Revolving Door phenomenon impairs analysts' independence. I do this by examining the presence of bi...

  • The Revolving-Door of Sell-Side Analysts: A Threat to Analysts’ Independence?
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014
    Co-Authors: Ben Lourie
    Abstract:

    The “Revolving-Door” phenomenon whereby analysts are hired by firms that they cover poses a threat to their independence. In this paper, I document this phenomenon and assess the extent to which it is associated with analysts’ issuance of biased research reports during the year prior to their employment with the covered firms. During this final year, I find that the Revolving-Door analysts alter their forecasts, target prices and recommendations in a direction which suggests that they are attempting to gain favor with their would-be employers. Specifically, relative to other analysts, they become more optimistic about the firms that end up hiring them while, at the same time, they become more pesimistic about other firms’ prospects. The findings raise concerns about their independence and indicate a potential benefit to tightening employment regulations in this industry.

Cheryl Long - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • What Do Revolving-Door Laws Do?
    The Journal of Law and Economics, 2012
    Co-Authors: Marc T. Law, Cheryl Long
    Abstract:

    AbstractOn the basis of evidence from state public utility commissions, we find that Revolving-Door laws—laws that restrict the post-government-employment opportunities of public sector workers, including public utility regulators—do not do much, at least with respect to electricity prices. In this paper, we take advantage of a quasi experiment afforded by the fact that Revolving-Door laws were introduced in different states at different times to investigate their effects on electricity prices. Our findings suggest that while Revolving-Door laws temporarily dampen industrial electricity prices, they have no effect on commercial or residential prices. There is also some evidence that these regulations affect the characteristics of state public utility commissioners; commissioners from states with Revolving-Door regulations serve shorter terms and are less likely to be subsequently employed in the private sector, compared with their counterparts from states without Revolving-Door laws.

  • Revolving Door laws and state public utility commissioners
    Regulation & Governance, 2011
    Co-Authors: Marc T. Law, Cheryl Long
    Abstract:

    This paper investigates the effects of Revolving Door regulations – laws that restrict the post-government employment opportunities of public sector workers – on the characteristics of state public utility commissioners. We find that commissioners from states with Revolving Door regulations have less expertise, serve shorter terms, and are less likely to be subsequently employed by the private sector, compared with their counterparts from states without Revolving Door laws. These findings suggest that Revolving Door regulations may have costly unintended consequences.

F. Russo De La Torre - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Retroauricular Revolving Door Island Flap
    Actas dermo-sifiliograficas, 2012
    Co-Authors: F. Russo De La Torre
    Abstract:

    The retroauricular Revolving Door island flap, first described by Masson in 1972, is very useful for the reconstruction of large defects of the concha of the auricle of the ear. It is harvested from the retroauricular area and is raised as an island (Fig. 1) so that it can rotate like a hinge on its pedicle and pass through the defect in the auricle (Fig. 2). The flap is then sutured to cover the defect of the concha (Fig. 3), and the retroauricular area is closed by simple suture (Fig. 4).

Joshua Mccrain - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Herschel F Thomas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Congressional Analytic Capacity, Party Polarization, and the Political Economy of Revolving Door Lobbying
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
    Co-Authors: Timothy M Lapira, Herschel F Thomas
    Abstract:

    We argue that the market for lobbying services is a function of two key features of modern American politics: (1) the decline in Congress’s analytic capacity and (2) the concentration of agenda setting powers to party leaders that has come with increased polarization in government. These trends have made the legislative process much more uncertain to external stakeholders. As a result, Revolving Door lobbyists’ strategic political process knowledge has increased their value relative to substantive, policy-oriented lobbyists. In a departure from previous work, our model does not rely on the assumption that Revolving Door lobbyists sell “access” to specific policymakers. Rather, Revolving Door lobbyists offer organized interests a form of political insurance against the perceived risk of chaotic, unpredictable government action (or inaction). We draw on our original data set of the career histories of more than 630 contract lobbyists. We find that Revolving Door lobbyists generate at least twice the revenue per year than those without government experience, especially with more senior positions Capitol Hill. These findings have important consequences for political reform: efforts to minimize the influence of lobbyists and special interests need to first look at how Congress itself has created a system that rewards those who spin through the Revolving Door.

  • Revolving Door lobbyists and interest representation
    Interest Groups & Advocacy, 2014
    Co-Authors: Timothy M Lapira, Herschel F Thomas
    Abstract:

    Although experience inside the halls of power afford lobbyists valuable political, policy and procedural skills that can improve the deliberative process, it also gives them privileged access to former employers that others do not have. Washington’s Revolving Door evokes legitimate ethical concerns, such as when former legislators resign their seats to take lucrative jobs representing the very industries they regulate. However, social scientists know surprisingly little about the Revolving Door beyond such sensational, albeit important, cases. To shed more light on the broader phenomenon, we systematically explore the Revolving Door on a large scale to answer a simple question: Do Revolving Door lobbyists represent different interests than conventional lobbyists? If, as Revolving Door proponents imply, these lobbyists work on behalf of organized interests solely for their specialized subject-matter expertise, then we would expect them to represent clienteles that are no different than conventional lobbyists. Alternatively, if they represent a wider variety of economic interests than conventional lobbyists then we assume they are hired more for their ability to get a foot in the Door than to serve as policy expert adjuncts to government. Using evidence from original data on the professional biographies of roughly 1600 registered lobbyists – which we link to data from almost 50 000 quarterly Lobbying Disclosure Act reports – we expose a significant transparency loophole in the law. Because lobbyists are not required to continuously disclose their ‘covered official’ status – the statutory definition of Revolving Door – periodic lobbying disclosure reports effectively hide the Revolving Door from public scrutiny. Instead, we rely on our more comprehensive information on lobbyists’ connections to previous employers to more accurately measure the size and scope of Washington’s Revolving Door, and to investigate how these connections affect which interests they represent. We find that Revolving Door lobbyists have worked mostly in Congress, tend to work as contract lobbyists rather than in-house government-relations staff and are more likely to specialize in lobbying for appropriations earmarks. Then, after controlling for a variety of lobbying specializations, we show that former members of Congress are no more likely than other lobbyists to attract a more economically diverse set of clients than their conventional-lobbyist counterparts. However, congressional staffers who had worked their way up the organizational ladder on Capitol Hill do. We infer that well-connected congressional staffers who spin through the Revolving Door sell access to key decision makers in Congress, not their industry- or issue-specific technical or substantive expertise. Simply, the Revolving Door problem is not limited to a handful of headline-catching former legislators, is much bigger than the existing lobbying disclosure regime reveals and – most importantly – significantly distorts the representation of interests before government. The practical implications are clear: lobbying transparency rules, cooling-off periods and other restrictions are insufficient disincentives. Interest group demand for access is simply too strong. We advocate enhancing lobbying transparency by expanding the statutory definitions of lobbying activities, requiring lobbyists to disclose more details about government employment and shifting some of the disclosure burden to democratically accountable government officials themselves.