The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Bhaven N Sampat - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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can private money buy public science disease group Lobbying and federal funding for biomedical research
Management Science, 2015Co-Authors: Deepak Hegde, Bhaven N SampatAbstract:Private interest groups lobby politicians to influence public policy. However, little is known about how Lobbying influences the policy decisions made by federal agencies. We study this through examining Lobbying by advocacy groups associated with rare diseases for funding by the National Institutes of Health NIH, the world's largest funder of biomedical research. Disease group Lobbying for NIH funding has been controversial, with critics alleging that it distorts public funding toward research on diseases backed by powerful groups. Our data reveal that Lobbying is associated with higher political support, in the form of congressional "soft earmarks" for the diseases. Lobbying increases with disease burden and is more likely to be associated with changes in NIH funding for diseases with higher scientific opportunity, suggesting that it may have a useful informational role. Only special grant mechanisms that steer funding toward particular diseases, which comprise less than a third of the NIH's grants, are related to earmarks. Thus, our results suggest that Lobbying by private groups influences federal funding for biomedical research. However, the channels of political influence are subtle, affect a small portion of funding, and may not necessarily have a distortive effect on public science. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.
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can private money buy public science disease group Lobbying and federal funding for biomedical research
Social Science Research Network, 2014Co-Authors: Deepak Hegde, Bhaven N SampatAbstract:Lobbying is an important non-market strategy pursued by private interest groups to influence public policy. However, little is known about how Lobbying influences policy decisions made by federal agencies. We study this through examining Lobbying by advocacy groups associated with rare diseases for funding by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the world’s largest funder of biomedical research. Disease group Lobbying for NIH funding has been controversial, with critics alleging that it distorts public science funding towards diseases with powerful groups. Our data reveal that Lobbying is associated with higher political support, in the form of Congressional “soft earmarks” for the diseases. Lobbying increases with disease burden and is more likely to be associated with changes in NIH funding for diseases with higher scientific opportunity, suggesting it may have a useful informational role. Only special grant mechanisms that steer funding towards particular diseases, which comprise less than a third of NIH’s grants, are related to earmarks. Thus, our results suggest that Lobbying by private groups influences federal funding for biomedical research. However, the channels of political influence are subtle, affect a small portion of funding, and may not necessarily have a distortive effect on public science.
Deepak Hegde - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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can private money buy public science disease group Lobbying and federal funding for biomedical research
Management Science, 2015Co-Authors: Deepak Hegde, Bhaven N SampatAbstract:Private interest groups lobby politicians to influence public policy. However, little is known about how Lobbying influences the policy decisions made by federal agencies. We study this through examining Lobbying by advocacy groups associated with rare diseases for funding by the National Institutes of Health NIH, the world's largest funder of biomedical research. Disease group Lobbying for NIH funding has been controversial, with critics alleging that it distorts public funding toward research on diseases backed by powerful groups. Our data reveal that Lobbying is associated with higher political support, in the form of congressional "soft earmarks" for the diseases. Lobbying increases with disease burden and is more likely to be associated with changes in NIH funding for diseases with higher scientific opportunity, suggesting that it may have a useful informational role. Only special grant mechanisms that steer funding toward particular diseases, which comprise less than a third of the NIH's grants, are related to earmarks. Thus, our results suggest that Lobbying by private groups influences federal funding for biomedical research. However, the channels of political influence are subtle, affect a small portion of funding, and may not necessarily have a distortive effect on public science. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.
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can private money buy public science disease group Lobbying and federal funding for biomedical research
Social Science Research Network, 2014Co-Authors: Deepak Hegde, Bhaven N SampatAbstract:Lobbying is an important non-market strategy pursued by private interest groups to influence public policy. However, little is known about how Lobbying influences policy decisions made by federal agencies. We study this through examining Lobbying by advocacy groups associated with rare diseases for funding by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the world’s largest funder of biomedical research. Disease group Lobbying for NIH funding has been controversial, with critics alleging that it distorts public science funding towards diseases with powerful groups. Our data reveal that Lobbying is associated with higher political support, in the form of Congressional “soft earmarks” for the diseases. Lobbying increases with disease burden and is more likely to be associated with changes in NIH funding for diseases with higher scientific opportunity, suggesting it may have a useful informational role. Only special grant mechanisms that steer funding towards particular diseases, which comprise less than a third of NIH’s grants, are related to earmarks. Thus, our results suggest that Lobbying by private groups influences federal funding for biomedical research. However, the channels of political influence are subtle, affect a small portion of funding, and may not necessarily have a distortive effect on public science.
Hye Young You - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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foreign agents registration act a user s guide
Interest groups & Advocacy, 2020Co-Authors: Hye Young YouAbstract:Foreign entities are among the most active interest groups that lobby policymakers in the US government. There is a long history of concern about foreign powers’ influence on public opinion and government policies in the USA, but little is known about the scope and magnitude of their influence. I introduce a new dataset that facilitates the measurement of Lobbying activities by foreign entities: information extracted from Lobbying reports submitted under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). The FARA requires that lobbyists representing foreign entities submit semi-annual reports detailing all their Lobbying contacts. I highlight the difference in the disclosure requirements between the Lobbying Disclosure Act and the FARA and provide detailed guidance on how to extract information from reports submitted under the FARA. FARA data provide a unique opportunity to address unresolved questions in studies of interest groups as well as foreign entities’ Lobbying activities in the USA.
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presence and influence in Lobbying evidence from dodd frank
Business and Politics, 2019Co-Authors: Pamela Ban, Hye Young YouAbstract:Interest groups face many choices when Lobbying: when, who, and how to lobby. We study interest group Lobbying across two stages of regulatory policymaking: the congressional and agency rulemaking stages. We investigate how the Securities and Exchange Commission responds to interest groups at the end of these stages using a new, comprehensive Lobbying dataset on the Dodd-Frank Act. Our approach examines citations in the SEC's final rules which reference and acknowledge the Lobbying activities of specific interest groups. We find that more than 2,900 organizations engaged in different types of Lobbying activities either during the congressional bill stage, the agency rulemaking stage, or both. Meetings with the SEC and hiring former SEC employees are strongly associated with the citation of an organization in a final rule. Comments submitted by trade associations and members of Congress are cited more in a final rule compared to other organizations. While there is more variety in the types of organizations who lobby the bureaucracy than those who lobby Congress, presence does not necessarily lead to recognition or influence.
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ex post Lobbying
The Journal of Politics, 2017Co-Authors: Hye Young YouAbstract:Nearly half of all Lobbying activity targeting specific bills between 1998 and 2012 happened after the Congress passed legislation, yet existing theories of Lobbying generally fail to account for Lobbying that occurs after a bill is passed. I argue that ex post Lobbying aims to influence the distribution of particularistic benefits that will arise from legislation by targeting regulatory rule-making processes. I develop a model that describes Lobbying as a collective action problem among interest groups, who must trade off between spending money to lobby for a bill’s passage and spending money to lobby over the details of its implementation. The implications of the model suggest that bills with high proportions of particularistic provisions draw more ex post Lobbying and that trade associations and larger firms bear a disproportionately large share of the ex ante Lobbying burden. Empirical analysis of Lobbying reports is consistent with these predictions.
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ex post Lobbying
Social Science Research Network, 2014Co-Authors: Hye Young YouAbstract:Existing theories of Lobbying do not fully explain Lobbying that occurs after a final floor vote on a bill is taken. I show that nearly half of all Lobbying activity targeting specific bills between 1998 and 2012 happened after the final vote. Ex post Lobbying aims to influence the distribution of private benefits that will arise from legislation by targeting regulatory rulemaking processes that clarify non-specific parts of the bills. I develop a model that describes Lobbying as a collective action problem among firms, who must trade off between spending money to lobby for a bill's passage and spending money to lobby over the details of its implementation. The model predicts that bills that have high proportions of nonspecific provisions draw more ex post Lobbying and that trade associations and larger firms bear a disproportionately large share of the ex ante Lobbying burden. Empirical analysis is consistent with these predictions.
Michael J Robbins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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foreign lobbies and us trade policy
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2006Co-Authors: Kishore Gawande, Pravin Krishna, Michael J RobbinsAbstract:Abstract In popular discussion, much has been made of the susceptibility of government policies to Lobbying by foreigners—the general presumption being that this is harmful to the home economy. However, in a trade policy context this may not be the case. If the policy outcome absent any foreign Lobbying is characterized by welfare-reducing trade barriers, foreign Lobbying may reduce such barriers and possibly raise welfare. Using a new data set on foreign political activity in the United States, this paper investigates this question empirically. Tariffs and nontariff barriers are both found to be negatively related with foreign Lobbying activity.
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foreign lobbies and us trade policy
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004Co-Authors: Kishore Gawande, Pravin Krishna, Michael J RobbinsAbstract:In popular discussion much has been made recently of the susceptibility of government policies to Lobbying by foreigners. The general presumption has also been that such interactions have a deleterious effect on the home economy. However, it can be argued that, in a trade policy context, bending policy in a direction that would suit foreigners may not in fact be harmful: If the policy outcome absent any Lobbying by foreigners is characterized by welfare-reducing trade barriers, Lobbying by foreigners may result in reductions in such barriers and raise consumer surplus (and possibly improve welfare). Using a new data set on foreign political activity in the US, this paper investigates the relationship between trade protection and Lobbying activity empirically. The approach taken in this paper is primarily a structural one. To model the role of foreign and domestic lobbies in determining trade policy, we develop first a theoretical framework building on the well-known work of Grossman and Helpman (1994); the econometric work that follows is very closely linked to the theory. Our analysis of the data suggests that foreign Lobbying activity has significant impact on trade policy - and in the predicted direction: Tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are both found to be negatively related with foreign Lobbying activity. We consider also extended specifications in which we include a large number of additional explanatory variables that have been suggested in the literature as determinants of trade policy (but that emerge from outside of the theoretical structure described above) and confirm the robustness of our findings in this setting.
Brian Kelleher Richter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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advancing the empirical research on Lobbying
Annual Review of Political Science, 2014Co-Authors: John M. De Figueiredo, Brian Kelleher RichterAbstract:This review identifies empirical facts about Lobbying that are generally agreed upon in the literature. It then discusses challenges to empirical research in Lobbying and provides examples of empirical methods that can be employed to overcome these challenges—with an emphasis on statistical measurement, identification, and casual inference. The article then discusses the advantages, disadvantages, and effective use of the main types of data available for research in Lobbying. It closes with a number of open questions for researchers in the field and avenues for future work to advance empirical research on Lobbying.
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Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013Co-Authors: John M. De Figueiredo, Brian Kelleher RichterAbstract:This essay identifies the empirical facts about Lobbying which are generally agreed upon in the literature. It then discusses challenges to empirical research in Lobbying and provides examples of empirical methods that can be employed to overcome these challenges — with an emphasis on statistical measurement, identification, and casual inference. The essay then discusses the advantages, disadvantages, and effective use of the main types of data available for research in Lobbying. It closes by discussing a number of open questions for researchers in the field and avenues for future work to advance the empirical research in Lobbying.
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Lobbying and taxes
American Journal of Political Science, 2009Co-Authors: Brian Kelleher Richter, Krislert Samphantharak, Jeffrey F TimmonsAbstract:Lobbying dominates corporate political spending, but comprehensive studies of the benefits accrued are scarce. Using a dataset of all U.S. firms with publicly available financial statements, we delve into the tax benefits obtained from Lobbying. Firms that spend more on Lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year. Increasing registered Lobbying expenditures by 1% appears to lower effective tax rates by somewhere in the range of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points for the average firm that lobbies. While individual firms amass considerable benefits, the costs of Lobbying-induced tax breaks appear modest for the government.
