The Experts below are selected from a list of 933 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Erwann Michelkerjan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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policy watch challenges for terrorism Risk insurance in the united states
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004Co-Authors: Howard Kunreuther, Erwann MichelkerjanAbstract:This paper examines the role that insurance has played in dealing with terrorism before and after September 11, 2001, by focusing on the distinctive challenges associated with terrorism as a catastrophic Risk. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) was passed by the U.S. Congress in November 2002, establishing a national terrorism insurance program that provides up to $100 billion commercial coverage with a specific but temporary Risk-Sharing Arrangement between the federal government and insurers. TRIA's three-year term ends December 31, 2005, so Congress soon has to determine whether it should be renewed, whether an alternative terrorism insurance program should be substituted for it, or whether insurance coverage is left solely in the hands of the private sector. As input into this process, the paper examines several alternatives and scenarios, and discusses their potential to create a sustainable terrorism insurance program in the Unites States.
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policy watch challenges for terrorism Risk insurance in the united states
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2004Co-Authors: Howard Kunreuther, Erwann MichelkerjanAbstract:This paper examines the role that insurance has played in dealing with terrorism before and after September 11, 2001, by focusing on the distinctive challenges associated with terrorism as a catastrophic Risk. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) was passed by the U.S. Congress in November 2002, establishing a national terrorism insurance program that provides up to $100 billion commercial coverage with a specific but temporary Risk-Sharing Arrangement between the federal government and insurers. TRIA's three-year term ends December 31, 2005, so Congress soon has to determine whether it should be renewed, whether an alternative terrorism insurance program should be substituted for it, or whether insurance coverage is left solely in the hands of the private sector. As input into this process, the paper examines several alternatives and scenarios, and discusses their potential to create a sustainable terrorism insurance program in the Unites States.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Howard Kunreuther - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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policy watch challenges for terrorism Risk insurance in the united states
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004Co-Authors: Howard Kunreuther, Erwann MichelkerjanAbstract:This paper examines the role that insurance has played in dealing with terrorism before and after September 11, 2001, by focusing on the distinctive challenges associated with terrorism as a catastrophic Risk. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) was passed by the U.S. Congress in November 2002, establishing a national terrorism insurance program that provides up to $100 billion commercial coverage with a specific but temporary Risk-Sharing Arrangement between the federal government and insurers. TRIA's three-year term ends December 31, 2005, so Congress soon has to determine whether it should be renewed, whether an alternative terrorism insurance program should be substituted for it, or whether insurance coverage is left solely in the hands of the private sector. As input into this process, the paper examines several alternatives and scenarios, and discusses their potential to create a sustainable terrorism insurance program in the Unites States.
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policy watch challenges for terrorism Risk insurance in the united states
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2004Co-Authors: Howard Kunreuther, Erwann MichelkerjanAbstract:This paper examines the role that insurance has played in dealing with terrorism before and after September 11, 2001, by focusing on the distinctive challenges associated with terrorism as a catastrophic Risk. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) was passed by the U.S. Congress in November 2002, establishing a national terrorism insurance program that provides up to $100 billion commercial coverage with a specific but temporary Risk-Sharing Arrangement between the federal government and insurers. TRIA's three-year term ends December 31, 2005, so Congress soon has to determine whether it should be renewed, whether an alternative terrorism insurance program should be substituted for it, or whether insurance coverage is left solely in the hands of the private sector. As input into this process, the paper examines several alternatives and scenarios, and discusses their potential to create a sustainable terrorism insurance program in the Unites States.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Shoji Masahiro - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Incentive for Risk Sharing and trust formation: Experimental and survey evidence from Bangladesh
2016Co-Authors: Shoji MasahiroAbstract:Using data from a unique household survey and an artefactual field experiment conducted in rural Bangladesh, this study evaluates the impact on trust in community members of incentive for Risk-Sharing Arrangement between villagers. Risk Sharing provides a major opportunity for cooperation in rural economies, and the experience of cooperation could facilitate trust. In order to test this hypothesis, this study characterizes the incentive for Risk Sharing by the patterns of exogenous income shocks in the real world and Risk preference, and trust in community members is elicited experimentally. The empirical results from dyadic regression demonstrate that villagers connected by a stronger incentive form a higher level of trust
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Incentive of Risk Sharing and trust formation: Experimental and survey evidence from Bangladesh
2016Co-Authors: Shoji MasahiroAbstract:Using data from a unique household survey and an artefactual field experiment conducted in rural Bangladesh, this study evaluates the impact on trust in community members of an incentive to maintain a Risk-Sharing Arrangement between villagers. Risk Sharing is a major opportunity for cooperation in rural economies, and the experience of cooperation could facilitate trust. In order to test this hypothesis, this study characterizes the incentive for Risk Sharing by the patterns of exogenous income shocks in the real world and Risk preference, and trust in community members is elicited experimentally. The empirical results from dyadic regression demonstrate that villagers connected by a stronger incentive form higher level of trust. It is also found that villagers are more likely to share Risks in villages that have stronger incentives. These findings suggest that the introduction of formal insurance, which reduces the incentive of Risk Sharing, could break down trust
J Saaadu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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optimal mortgage contract choice decision in the presence of pay option adjustable rate mortgage and the balloon mortgage
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Yaomin Chiang, J SaaaduAbstract:The unprecedented run-up in global house prices of the 2000s was preceded by a revolution in U.S. mortgage markets in which borrowers faced a plethora of mortgages to choose from collectively known as nontraditional mortgages (NTMs), whose poor performance helped ignite the global financial crisis in 2007. This paper studies the choice of mortgage contracts in an expanded framework where the menu of contracts includes the pay option adjustable rate mortgage (PO-ARM), and the balloon mortgage (BM), alongside the traditional long horizon fixed rate mortgage (FRM) and the short horizon regular ARM. The inclusion of the PO-ARM is based on the fact it is the most controversial and perhaps the Riskiest of the NTMs, whereas the BM has not been analyzed in the literature despite its different Risk-Sharing Arrangement and long vintage. Our inclusive model relates the structural differences of these contracts to the horizon Risk management problems and affordability constraints faced by the households that differ in terms of expected mobility. The numerical solutions of the model generates a number of interesting results suggesting that households select mortgage contracts to match their horizon, manage horizon Risk and mitigate liquidity or affordability constraints they face. From a Risk management and welfare perspectives, we find that the optimal contract for households with shorter horizons, specifically households who expect to move house once every 1 to 2 years, is the PO-ARM. Beyond 2 years the welfare advantage of the PO-ARM diminishes and BM becomes the more optimal contract up to 5-year horizon. Overall, the results suggest that households are neither as Risk averse as the selection of the FRM would suggest, nor are they as Risk-seeking as the selection of PO-ARM or regular ARM would suggest. The results also suggest that the exuberance demonstrated for NTMs by borrowers, especially PO-ARMs, may be both rational and irrational.
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optimal contract choice decision in the presence of pay option adjustable rate mortgage and the balloon mortgage
2014Co-Authors: Yaomin Chiang, J SaaaduAbstract:The unprecedented run-up in global house prices of the 2000s was preceded by a revolution in U.S. mortgage markets in which borrowers faced a plethora of mortgages to choose from collectively known as nontraditional mortgages (NTMs), whose poor performance helped ignite the global financial crisis in 2007. This paper studies the choice of mortgage contracts in an expanded framework where the menu of contracts includes the pay option adjustable rate mortgage (PO-ARM), and the balloon mortgage (BM), alongside the traditional long horizon fixed rate mortgage (FRM) and the short horizon regular ARM. The inclusion of the PO-ARM is based on the fact it is the most controversial and perhaps the Riskiest of the NTMs, whereas the BM has not been analyzed in the literature despite its different Risk-Sharing Arrangement and long vintage. Our inclusive model relates the structural differences of these contracts to the horizon Risk management problems and affordability constraints faced by the households that differ in terms of expected mobility. The numerical solutions of the model generates a number of interesting results suggesting that households select mortgage contracts to match their horizon, manage horizon Risk and mitigate liquidity or affordability constraints they face. From a Risk management and welfare perspectives, we find that e optimal contract for households with shorter horizons, specifically households who expect to move house once every one to two years, is the PO-ARM. Beyond 2 years the welfare advantage of the PO-ARM diminishes and BM becomes the more optimal contract up to 5-year horizon. Overall, the results suggest that households are neither as Risk averse as the selection of the FRM would suggest, nor are they was Risk-seeking as the selection of PO-ARM or regular ARM would suggest. The results also suggest that the exuberance demonstrated for NTMs by borrowers, especially PO-ARMs, may be both rational and irrational.
Budi M. Prasetyo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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BANK RUN AND STABILITY OF ISLAMIC BANKING IN INDONESIA
Bank Indonesia, 2017Co-Authors: Rahmatina A. Kasri, Tika Arundina, Kenny D. Indraswari, Budi M. PrasetyoAbstract:Bank run is an important economic phenomenon which increasingly occurred in in modern banking system and potentially threatened banking stability as it could trigger a banking crisis. However, most studies related to bank run focus on the occurrence of bank run in conventional banking system. Very few of them discuss the bank run phenomenon under Islamic banking system or dual banking system where Islamic banks jointly operating with conventional banks. Therefore, this study attempts to analyze the determinants of bank run in the Indonesian Islamic banking industry by employing primary data from 256 customers of Indonesia Islamic banks in 2015 and by utilizing factor analysis and descriptive statistics. In theory, Islamic banks tend to be more resilient towards any macroeconomic or financial shocks as compared to conventional banks due to the nature of its asset-based and Risk-Sharing Arrangement. However, the result exhibits that both psychological and fundamental factors (i.e. macroeconomics and bank fundamentals) strongly influence the behaviors of Islamic banking depositors to withdraw their funds, which might trigger the occurrence of bank runs in the country. Insider information, macroeconomic condition and bank fundamental factors are also shown to have the highest impacts among all variables. Hence, in the context of banking stability, the finding implies that Islamic banks are not completely immune to the impacts of macroeconomic shocks or financial crisis. As a country with a dual banking system, Indonesia had experienced several bank runs since 1990s. Therefore, the findings of the study should provide the policy makers important insight into research based-policy in order to attain financial stability as one of the main economic goals of the country. Keywords: Bank run, Islamic bank, Factor analysis, Indonesia JEL Classification: C83, G21, G2
