The Experts below are selected from a list of 51 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
E Juppeaux - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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using simulink design verifier for proving behavioral properties on a complex Safety Critical system in the ground transportation domain
CSDM, 2010Co-Authors: Jeanfrederic Etienne, S Fechter, E JuppeauxAbstract:We present our return of experience in using Simulink Design Verifier for the verification and validation of a Safety-Critical Function. The case study concerns the train tracking Function for an automatic train protection system (ATP). We basically show how this Function is formalized in Simulink and present the various proof strategies devised to prove the correctness of the model w.r.t. high-level Safety properties. These strategies have for purpose to provide a certain harness over time/memory consumption during proof construction, thus avoiding the state space explosion problem.
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CSDM - Using Simulink Design Verifier for Proving Behavioral Properties on a Complex Safety Critical System in the Ground Transportation Domain
Complex Systems Design & Management, 2010Co-Authors: Jeanfrederic Etienne, S Fechter, E JuppeauxAbstract:We present our return of experience in using Simulink Design Verifier for the verification and validation of a Safety-Critical Function. The case study concerns the train tracking Function for an automatic train protection system (ATP). We basically show how this Function is formalized in Simulink and present the various proof strategies devised to prove the correctness of the model w.r.t. high-level Safety properties. These strategies have for purpose to provide a certain harness over time/memory consumption during proof construction, thus avoiding the state space explosion problem.
Jeanfrederic Etienne - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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using simulink design verifier for proving behavioral properties on a complex Safety Critical system in the ground transportation domain
CSDM, 2010Co-Authors: Jeanfrederic Etienne, S Fechter, E JuppeauxAbstract:We present our return of experience in using Simulink Design Verifier for the verification and validation of a Safety-Critical Function. The case study concerns the train tracking Function for an automatic train protection system (ATP). We basically show how this Function is formalized in Simulink and present the various proof strategies devised to prove the correctness of the model w.r.t. high-level Safety properties. These strategies have for purpose to provide a certain harness over time/memory consumption during proof construction, thus avoiding the state space explosion problem.
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CSDM - Using Simulink Design Verifier for Proving Behavioral Properties on a Complex Safety Critical System in the Ground Transportation Domain
Complex Systems Design & Management, 2010Co-Authors: Jeanfrederic Etienne, S Fechter, E JuppeauxAbstract:We present our return of experience in using Simulink Design Verifier for the verification and validation of a Safety-Critical Function. The case study concerns the train tracking Function for an automatic train protection system (ATP). We basically show how this Function is formalized in Simulink and present the various proof strategies devised to prove the correctness of the model w.r.t. high-level Safety properties. These strategies have for purpose to provide a certain harness over time/memory consumption during proof construction, thus avoiding the state space explosion problem.
S Fechter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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using simulink design verifier for proving behavioral properties on a complex Safety Critical system in the ground transportation domain
CSDM, 2010Co-Authors: Jeanfrederic Etienne, S Fechter, E JuppeauxAbstract:We present our return of experience in using Simulink Design Verifier for the verification and validation of a Safety-Critical Function. The case study concerns the train tracking Function for an automatic train protection system (ATP). We basically show how this Function is formalized in Simulink and present the various proof strategies devised to prove the correctness of the model w.r.t. high-level Safety properties. These strategies have for purpose to provide a certain harness over time/memory consumption during proof construction, thus avoiding the state space explosion problem.
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CSDM - Using Simulink Design Verifier for Proving Behavioral Properties on a Complex Safety Critical System in the Ground Transportation Domain
Complex Systems Design & Management, 2010Co-Authors: Jeanfrederic Etienne, S Fechter, E JuppeauxAbstract:We present our return of experience in using Simulink Design Verifier for the verification and validation of a Safety-Critical Function. The case study concerns the train tracking Function for an automatic train protection system (ATP). We basically show how this Function is formalized in Simulink and present the various proof strategies devised to prove the correctness of the model w.r.t. high-level Safety properties. These strategies have for purpose to provide a certain harness over time/memory consumption during proof construction, thus avoiding the state space explosion problem.
Jinpyo Hong - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a study of software hazard analysis for Safety Critical Function in military aircraft
Journal of IKEEE, 2012Co-Authors: Jinpyo HongAbstract:This paper is the Software Hazard Analysis (SWHA) which will study the managerial process and the technical methode and techniques inherent in the performance of software Safety task within the Military Aircraft System Safety program. This SWHA identifies potential hazardous effects on the software intensive systems and provides a comprehensive and qualitative assessment of the software Safety. The purpose of this paper is to identify Safety Critical Functions of software in Military A/C. The identified software hazards associated with the design or Function will be evaluated for risks and operational constraint to further improve the software design requirement, analysis and testing efforts for Safety Critical software. This common SWHA, the first time analysis in KOREA, was review all avionics OFP(Operational Flight Program), and focus only on software segments which are Safety Critical. This paper provides a important understanding between the customer and developer as to how the software Safety for the Military A/C will be accomplished. It will also provide the current best solution which may as one consider the necessary step in establishing a credible and cost-effective software Safety program.
Lakshman Maalolan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Formal Verification Tool Evaluation For Unmanned Aircraft Containing Complex Functions
2020 AIAA IEEE 39th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC), 2020Co-Authors: Heber Herencia-zapana, James Lopez, Glen Gallagher, Baoluo Meng, Cameron Patterson, Lakshman MaalolanAbstract:The expected proliferation of UAS in the NAS requires technologies that ensure safe operation. There is significant interest from industry and civil aviation authorities to have a standard practice to enable flight operations for UAS containing flight Safety Critical Functions which are too costly to certify. Developing a certification path for these UAS technologies could advance Safety of UAS operating in the NAS. In response to this need ASTM released standard F3269-17 in 2018. This standard proposes a run-time assurance architecture whereby an untrusted or non-pedigreed and therefore non-certified flight Safety Critical Function (complex Function) can be included in a UAS avionics system that can be certified. GE Aviation is developing an avionics solution intended for safe operation of UAS. As part of ensuring safe operation of UAS GE Aviation's avionics implements a runtime Safety assurance (RTA) system that follows the guidelines laid out in the ASTM F3269-17 standard. Formal methods-based verification and validation (V&V) tools hold great promise for addressing the exploding cost of performing V&V on flight Safety Critical systems that include software. However, there are very few examples demonstrating a side-by-side comparison of the traditional V&V approach and a V&V approach where formal methods-based tools are used at appropriate steps in the process. This paper presents a side-by-side comparison of a complete V&V process for the RTA using both traditional and formal methods-based V&V and shows the benefits of formal tools applied at various early stages of the V&V process. More specifically this paper shows a comparison for the generation of the following evidence for the RTA: Requirements analysis, test case generation, and prof that requirements are fully implemented by the select sub-systems and/or components architecture.
