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Shigeru Yamada - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT FOR SOFTWARE Safety Integrity Level WITH FUNCTIONAL Safety STANDARDS AND RISK COSTS
International Journal of Reliability Quality and Safety Engineering, 2014Co-Authors: Shigeru Yamada, Takahiro NishikawaAbstract:Reliability and Safety for hardware in computer systems have been sufficiently studied in recent years. On the other hand, a Safety-related system (SRS) for software has not been assured with the proper method of calculating the software Safety Integrity Level (SIL) in the functional Safety standards, which is currently determined only by the number of development methods applied to practical Safety-related system (SRSs). In this paper, we discuss quantitative assessment for it by applying quantitative measures based on software reliability growth models (SRGMs) that have been widely and successfully applied to practical software quality management activities. Based on a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP), the plausible methods of calculating software SIL in the functional Safety standard are proposed. Further, we discuss the quantitative method for assuring software SIL based on the optimal release policies with the test cost during testing-environment and the risk cost after the software products will be released.
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Quantitative assessment for software Safety Integrity Level with functional Safety standards and cost factors
Proceedings of 3rd International Conference on Reliability Infocom Technologies and Optimization, 2014Co-Authors: Shigeru YamadaAbstract:A Safety-related system has not been established with the usual method of calculating the software Safety Integrity Level (abbreviated as SIL) in the functional Safety standards, which is determined only by the number of development methods applied to practical Safety-related system (abbreviated as SRSs). In this paper, we discuss quantitative assessment for it by applying reliability measurement based on software reliability growth models (abbreviated as SRGM's) that have been widely and successfully applied to practical software quality management activities. Based on a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (abbreviated as NHPP), the plausible methods of calculating software SIL in the functional Safety standard are proposed. Further, we discuss the quantitative method for assuring software Safety Integrity Level with the optimal release policies.
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PRDC - A Method of Calculating Safety Integrity Level for IEC 61508 Conformity Software
2011 IEEE 17th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing, 2011Co-Authors: Takaji Fujiwara, Yoshinobu Satoh, Mitsuhiro Kimura, Shigeru YamadaAbstract:In the functional Safety standard (IEC 61508), development methods and quantitative analytical methods are defined for establishment of Safety-related systems. However, only development methods are recommended to establish the software of Safety-related systems. That is, the Safety Integrity Level for software is determined only by the number of the development methods applied to practical Safety-related system development. This is not reasonable to evaluate the Safety Integrity Level, because various risk factors should be taken up. In this paper, we propose how to calculate the Safety Integrity Level for software. Especially, we propose the calculation method based on software reliability growth models that have been utilized for many years in the large-scale system development.
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A Method of Calculating Safety Integrity Level for IEC 61508 Conformity Software
2011 IEEE 17th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing, 2011Co-Authors: Takaji Fujiwara, Yoshinobu Satoh, Mitsuhiro Kimura, Shigeru YamadaAbstract:In the functional Safety standard (IEC 61508), development methods and quantitative analytical methods are defined for establishment of Safety-related systems. However, only development methods are recommended to establish the software of Safety-related systems. That is, the Safety Integrity Level for software is determined only by the number of the development methods applied to practical Safety-related system development. This is not reasonable to evaluate the Safety Integrity Level, because various risk factors should be taken up. In this paper, we propose how to calculate the Safety Integrity Level for software. Especially, we propose the calculation method based on software reliability growth models that have been utilized for many years in the large-scale system development.
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a calculation method for software Safety Integrity Level
Computer Assisted Radiology and Surgery, 2010Co-Authors: Takaji Fujiwara, Yoshinobu Satoh, Juan Manuel Estevez, Shigeru YamadaAbstract:In the functional Safety standards (IEC 61508 and ISO/DIS 26262), development methods and quantitative analytical methods are defined for establishment of Safety-related systems. However, only development methods are recommended to establish the software of Safety-related systems. That is, the Safety Integrity Level for software is determined only by the number of the development methods applied to practical Safety-related system development. This is not reasonable to evaluate the Safety Integrity Level, because various risk factors should be taken up. In this paper, we propose how to calculate the Safety Integrity Level for software. Especially, we propose the calculation method based on the software reliability growth model that has long been used in the large-scale system development.
Jaroslav Zajicek - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Safety Integrity Level sil versus full quantitative risk value nienaruszalnośc bezpieczenstwa a wartośc ryzyka
2013Co-Authors: Pavel Fuchs, Jaroslav ZajicekAbstract:Safety management of technical equipment is not possible without risk assessment. Therefore, many standards are available for risk assessment, e.g. ISO 13824:2009 General principles on risk assessment of systems involving structures or ISO/IEC 31010:2009 Risk management – Risk Assessment Techniques. In different industrial sectors risk assessment is fundamental step to determine required Safety Integrity Level (SIL), eventually performance Level (PL), which guarantees risk linked to some equipment on acceptable Level. Standards applied for risk management based on SIL in different industrial sectors differ in methods used for risk evaluation and SIL determination. IEC 61508-5 accepts the use of qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative approach for risk evaluation and SIL determination. The standard uses hazardous event severity matrix as an example of qualitative approach for SIL determination, the standard furthermore uses layer of protection analysis (LOPA) as an example of semi-quantitative approach. The standard also uses Risk graph method as an example of both qualitative and semi-quantitative approach. IEC 62061 only presents one semi-quantitative approach for risk evaluation and SIL determination based on combination of probability and severity of consequences. This approach is different from the approach presented in IEC 61508-5. Similarly ISO 13849-1 recommends the use of qualitative method combining probability and severity of consequences for risk evaluation and PL determination, however, distinctly from IEC 61508-5 as well as IEC 62061. All these standards evaluate risk in the first step and in the second step they set Safety systems reliability requirements, which should lower risk onto an acceptable Level. The elemental question is, how exactly these standards evaluate risk in their methods. Another question is what acceptable Level of risk is implicitly hidden in their requirements for choice of SIL and PL. This paper addresses these questions.
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Safety Integrity Level sil versus full quantitative risk value
2013Co-Authors: Pavel Fuchs, Jaroslav ZajicekAbstract:Zarządzanie bezpieczenstwem urządzen technicznych nie jest mozliwe bez oceny ryzyka. Dlatego tez istnieje wiele norm związanych z oceną ryzyka, np. ISO 13824:2009 Ogolne zasady dotyczące oceny ryzyka w systemach obejmujących konstrukcje lub ISO/ IEC 31010:2009 Zarządzanie ryzykiem - Techniki oceny ryzyka. W roznych galeziach przemyslu ocena ryzyka jest podstawowym krokiem na drodze do określenia wymaganego poziomu nienaruszalności bezpieczenstwa (SIL), oraz ewentualnie poziomu wydajności (PL), ktory gwarantuje, ze ryzyko w odniesieniu do niektorych urządzen pozostanie na akceptowalnym poziomie. Normy stosowane w zakresie zarządzania ryzykiem w oparciu o SIL w roznych galeziach przemyslu roznią sie jeśli chodzi o metody stosowane do oceny ryzyka i określenia SIL. IEC 61508-5 akceptuje zastosowanie jakościowego, pol-ilościowego lub ilościowego podejścia do oceny ryzyka oraz określenia SIL. Norma ta wykorzystuje macierz ciezkości zdarzen niebezpiecznych jako przyklad podejścia jakościowego do określenia SIL; ponadto, norma wykorzystuje analize warstw zabezpieczen (LOPA) jako przyklad podejścia polilościowego. Norma wykorzystuje rowniez metode wykresu ryzyka jako przyklad podejścia zarowno jakościowego jak i polilościowego. IEC 62061 prezentuje jedno pol-ilościowe podejście do oceny ryzyka i określenia SIL lącząc prawdopodobienstwo i ciezkośc nastepstw. To podejście rozni sie od metody stosowanej w IEC 61508-5. Podobnie ISO 13849-1 zaleca stosowanie metody jakościowej lączącej prawdopodobienstwo i ciezkośc nastepstw dla oceny ryzyka i określenia PL, jednak w sposob odmienny od IEC 61508-5 oraz IEC 62061. Wszystkie powyzsze normy dokonują oceny ryzyka w pierwszym etapie zaś w drugim etapie ustalają one wymagania odnośnie niezawodności systemow bezpieczenstwa, ktore powinny obnizyc ryzyko do akceptowalnego poziomu. Podstawowym pytaniem jest jak dokladnie powyzsze normy dokonują oceny ryzyka przy uzyciu swoich metod. Inną kwestią jest to, jaki dopuszczalny poziom ryzyka jest domyślnie ukryty w ramach ich wymagan dotyczących wyboru SIL i PL. Niniejszy artykul odnosi sie do powyzszych zagadnien.
Takaji Fujiwara - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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PRDC - A Method of Calculating Safety Integrity Level for IEC 61508 Conformity Software
2011 IEEE 17th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing, 2011Co-Authors: Takaji Fujiwara, Yoshinobu Satoh, Mitsuhiro Kimura, Shigeru YamadaAbstract:In the functional Safety standard (IEC 61508), development methods and quantitative analytical methods are defined for establishment of Safety-related systems. However, only development methods are recommended to establish the software of Safety-related systems. That is, the Safety Integrity Level for software is determined only by the number of the development methods applied to practical Safety-related system development. This is not reasonable to evaluate the Safety Integrity Level, because various risk factors should be taken up. In this paper, we propose how to calculate the Safety Integrity Level for software. Especially, we propose the calculation method based on software reliability growth models that have been utilized for many years in the large-scale system development.
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A Method of Calculating Safety Integrity Level for IEC 61508 Conformity Software
2011 IEEE 17th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing, 2011Co-Authors: Takaji Fujiwara, Yoshinobu Satoh, Mitsuhiro Kimura, Shigeru YamadaAbstract:In the functional Safety standard (IEC 61508), development methods and quantitative analytical methods are defined for establishment of Safety-related systems. However, only development methods are recommended to establish the software of Safety-related systems. That is, the Safety Integrity Level for software is determined only by the number of the development methods applied to practical Safety-related system development. This is not reasonable to evaluate the Safety Integrity Level, because various risk factors should be taken up. In this paper, we propose how to calculate the Safety Integrity Level for software. Especially, we propose the calculation method based on software reliability growth models that have been utilized for many years in the large-scale system development.
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a calculation method for software Safety Integrity Level
Computer Assisted Radiology and Surgery, 2010Co-Authors: Takaji Fujiwara, Yoshinobu Satoh, Juan Manuel Estevez, Shigeru YamadaAbstract:In the functional Safety standards (IEC 61508 and ISO/DIS 26262), development methods and quantitative analytical methods are defined for establishment of Safety-related systems. However, only development methods are recommended to establish the software of Safety-related systems. That is, the Safety Integrity Level for software is determined only by the number of the development methods applied to practical Safety-related system development. This is not reasonable to evaluate the Safety Integrity Level, because various risk factors should be taken up. In this paper, we propose how to calculate the Safety Integrity Level for software. Especially, we propose the calculation method based on the software reliability growth model that has long been used in the large-scale system development.
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EDCC-CARS - A calculation method for software Safety Integrity Level
Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Critical Automotive applications Robustness & Safety - CARS '10, 2010Co-Authors: Takaji Fujiwara, Yoshinobu Satoh, Juan Manuel Estevez, Shigeru YamadaAbstract:In the functional Safety standards (IEC 61508 and ISO/DIS 26262), development methods and quantitative analytical methods are defined for establishment of Safety-related systems. However, only development methods are recommended to establish the software of Safety-related systems. That is, the Safety Integrity Level for software is determined only by the number of the development methods applied to practical Safety-related system development. This is not reasonable to evaluate the Safety Integrity Level, because various risk factors should be taken up. In this paper, we propose how to calculate the Safety Integrity Level for software. Especially, we propose the calculation method based on the software reliability growth model that has long been used in the large-scale system development.
Dennis P. Nolan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Specialized Reviews—CHAZOP, EHAZOP, Bow-Tie Analysis, Layers of Protection Analysis, Safety Integrity Level, Fishbone Diagram, and Cyber Security Vulnerability Analysis
Safety and Security Review for the Process Industries, 2015Co-Authors: Dennis P. NolanAbstract:The specialized reviews of Bow-Tie Analysis (BTA), Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA), and Safety Integrity Level (SIL), which are being increasingly utilized in the industry for Safety reviews, are defined and discussed in this chapter. The origin of BTAs is highlighted along with how such a review is undertaken, with a simplified diagram of its process. LOPA features are defined in order to ensure they qualify as true risk-reduction applications. The description explains how probabilities are determined for the risk-reduction features. For SIL reviews, the applicable standards are highlighted along with the SIL Levels utilized in industry. How SIL probabilities are determined are also explained. An example of an SIL worksheet arrangement is presented. Additionally, CHAZOP (Computer Hazard and Operability Study), EHAZOP (Electrical Hazard and Operability Study), Fishbone Diagram, and Cyber Security Vulnerability Analysis are described.
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specialized reviews chazop ehazop bow tie analysis layers of protection analysis Safety Integrity Level fishbone diagram and cyber security vulnerability analysis
Safety and Security Review for the Process Industries (Fourth Edition)#R##N#Application of HAZOP PHA What-If and SVA Reviews, 2015Co-Authors: Dennis P. NolanAbstract:The specialized reviews of Bow-Tie Analysis (BTA), Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA), and Safety Integrity Level (SIL), which are being increasingly utilized in the industry for Safety reviews, are defined and discussed in this chapter. The origin of BTAs is highlighted along with how such a review is undertaken, with a simplified diagram of its process. LOPA features are defined in order to ensure they qualify as true risk-reduction applications. The description explains how probabilities are determined for the risk-reduction features. For SIL reviews, the applicable standards are highlighted along with the SIL Levels utilized in industry. How SIL probabilities are determined are also explained. An example of an SIL worksheet arrangement is presented. Additionally, CHAZOP (Computer Hazard and Operability Study), EHAZOP (Electrical Hazard and Operability Study), Fishbone Diagram, and Cyber Security Vulnerability Analysis are described.
Ronny Dwi Noriyati - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Hazard & Operability Study and Determining Safety Integrity Level on Sulfur Furnace Unit: A Case Study in Fertilizer Industry
Procedia Manufacturing, 2015Co-Authors: Ronny Dwi Noriyati, Wisnu Rozaaq, Ali Musyafa, Adi SoepriyantoAbstract:Abstract In the process production, it is possible that some risks may be happen and potentially causing hazard. Therefore, it will lead to a failure to achieve the production target. Hazard & Operating Study (HAZOPS) of sulphur furnace are done in this research. Here, the nodes used are sulphur furnace, waste heat boiler, and steam superheater. From the analysis, it obtained 11 instruments attached on those three nodes with the highest hazard potential reaches extreme Level based on AS/NZS 4360:2004 standard, while in standard of the factory it reaches a high Level. Both of them are in low temperature sulphur furnace and high temperature sulphur furnace deviation. At the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) determination, it obtained 1st Level of SIL on installed SIS in node sulphur furnace with a total of PFD 0,021 and RRF 48,3. Meanwhile, SIL 1 in waste heat boiler has a total value of Probability Failure of Demand (PFD) 0.0184 and Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) of 54.32. While in the last node, steam superheater, the SIS is not installed.
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hazard operability study and determining Safety Integrity Level on sulfur furnace unit a case study in fertilizer industry
Procedia Manufacturing, 2015Co-Authors: Ronny Dwi Noriyati, Wisnu Rozaaq, Ali Musyafa, Adi SoepriyantoAbstract:Abstract In the process production, it is possible that some risks may be happen and potentially causing hazard. Therefore, it will lead to a failure to achieve the production target. Hazard & Operating Study (HAZOPS) of sulphur furnace are done in this research. Here, the nodes used are sulphur furnace, waste heat boiler, and steam superheater. From the analysis, it obtained 11 instruments attached on those three nodes with the highest hazard potential reaches extreme Level based on AS/NZS 4360:2004 standard, while in standard of the factory it reaches a high Level. Both of them are in low temperature sulphur furnace and high temperature sulphur furnace deviation. At the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) determination, it obtained 1st Level of SIL on installed SIS in node sulphur furnace with a total of PFD 0,021 and RRF 48,3. Meanwhile, SIL 1 in waste heat boiler has a total value of Probability Failure of Demand (PFD) 0.0184 and Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) of 54.32. While in the last node, steam superheater, the SIS is not installed.
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hazad and operability study and analysis of Safety Integrity Level case study ammonia refrigerant compressor at petrocemical plant
2015Co-Authors: Ali Musyafa, Resti Nabila, Ronny Dwi NoriyatiAbstract:Keyword 1 (Compressor); Keyword 2 (Hazop); Keyword 3 (SIS ); Keyword 4 (SIL ) ; Keyword 5 (PFD); Background: On the refrigeration system at the Petrocemical Plant there ammonia refrigerant compressor 105 J that operating to raise the vapor pressure of ammonia that comes from the refrigerant drum 120 CF flush and keep the pressure on the refrigerant flush drum 120 CF in order to maintain their liquid ammonia product temperature at -33 ° C. To avoid the risks that occur in ammonia refrigerant compressor 105 J we perform the identification of potential Hazard that can occur in the process in ammonia refrigerant compressor 105 J by using Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) and SIL analysis. In this study determined four nodes consisting of ammonia refrigerant compressor stage 1 to 105 J ammonia refrigerant compressor 105 J stage 4. Based on the identification of 20 instruments are installed on all four nodes, the valve components, namely the Level of 1024 which has a high risk based standards PT.Petrokimia Gresik. For Safety Integrity Level (SIL) value obtained from the calculation of Safety Instrumented System (SIS) in ammonia refrigerant compressor 105 J is NO SIL. With SIS Probability Failure Demand (PFD) worth 0.3 and RRF at 3:33. The recommendations on the Level of risk reduction valve 1024 Level by adding redundant generate failure rate is much lower at 4:45 x 10-10 and PFD total of 1.28 x 10-4 worth SIS SIL 2. The recommendations of the panel in the form of local turnover based relay into Programable Logic Control (PLC) generates total PFD total =0.038 worth SIL 1.
