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Alfred R Mele - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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approaching self Deception how robert audi and i part company
Consciousness and Cognition, 2010Co-Authors: Alfred R MeleAbstract:This article explores fundamental differences between Robert Audi's position on self-Deception and mine. Although we both depart from a model of self-Deception that is straightforwardly based on stereotypical interpersonal Deception, we differ in how we do that. An important difference between us might be partly explained by a difference in how we understand the kind of deceiving that is most relevant to self-Deception.
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Self-Deception Unmasked
2000Co-Authors: Alfred R MeleAbstract:Preface ix Chapter 1. Introduction: Approaches, Puzzles, Biases,and Agency 3 Chapter 2. Graden-Variety Straight Self-Deception: Some Psychological Process 25 Chapter 3. Self-Deception without Puzzles 50 Chapter 4. Attempted Empirical Demostrations of Strict Self-Deception 76 Chapter 5. Twisted Self-Deception 94 Chapter 6. Conclusion 119 Notes 125 References 137 Index 145
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Twisted self-Deception
Philosophical Psychology, 1999Co-Authors: Alfred R MeleAbstract:In instances of "twisted" self-Deception, people deceive themselves into believing things that they do not want to be true. In this, twisted self-Deception differs markedly from the "straight" variety that has dominated the philosophical and psychological literature on self-Deception. Drawing partly upon empirical literature, I develop a trio of approaches to explaining twisted self-Deception: a motivation-centered approach; an emotion-centered approach; and a hybrid approach featuring both motivation and emotion. My aim is to display our resources for exploring and explaining twisted self-Deception and to show that promising approaches are consistent with a plausible position on straight self-Deception.
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Understanding and explaining real self-Deception
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1997Co-Authors: Alfred R MeleAbstract:This response addresses seven main issues: (1) alleged evidence that in some instances of self-Deception an individual simultaneously possesses “contradictory beliefs”; (2) whether garden-variety self-Deception is intentional; (3) whether conditions that I claimed to be conceptually sufficient for self-Deception are so; (4) significant similarities and differences between self-Deception and interpersonal Deception; (5) how instances of self-Deception are to be explained, and the roles of motivation in explaining them; (6) differences among various kinds of self- Deception; (7) whether a proper conception of self-Deception implies that definitive ascriptions of self-Deception to individuals are impossible.
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Real self-Deception
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1997Co-Authors: Alfred R MeleAbstract:Self-Deception is made unnecessarily puzzling by the assumption that it is an intrapersonal analog of ordinary interpersonal Deception. In paradigmatic cases, interpersonal Deception is intentional and involves some time at which the deceiver disbelieves what the deceived believes. The assumption that self-Deception is intentional and that the self-deceiver believes that some proposition is true while also believing that it is false produces interesting conceptual puzzles, but it also produces a fundamentally mistaken view of the dynamics of self-Deception. This target article challenges the assumption and presents an alternative view of the nature and etiology of self-Deception. Drawing upon empirical studies of cognitive biases, it resolves familiar " paradoxes " about the dynamics of self-Deception and the condition of being self-deceived. Conceptually sufficient conditions for self-Deception are offered and putative empirical demonstra-tions of a kind of self-Deception in which a subject believes that a proposition is true while also believing that it is false are criticized. Self-Deception is neither irresolvably paradoxical nor mysterious, and it is explicable without the assistance of mental exotica. The key to understanding its dynamics is a proper appreciation of our capacity for acquiring and retaining motivationally biased beliefs.
J F Nunamaker - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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detection of Deception collaboration systems and technology
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2004Co-Authors: J F NunamakerAbstract:Deception is defined as messages and information knowingly transmitted to create a false impression or conclusion. Since 9/11 we are all aware of the threat of terrorism and need to be vigilant in our pursuit of the detection of Deception. A major risk to the success of our society in the 21st century is the failure to detect and counter Deception in the world. Success depends on our society achieving information superiority. This requires safeguarding information against manipulation, infiltration, and Deception by adversaries. Yet achieving high information assurance is complicated not only by the very speed, complexity, volume, and globality of communication and information exchange that society now expects and demands, but also by the fallibility of human Deception detection, vulnerability exacerbated by new information technologies. Although automating Deception detection is an appealing prospect, the complexity of detecting and countering Deceptions that involve humans as source, conduit, or target defies a completely automated solution. A more promising approach is to integrate improved human detection with automated tools. The objectives of this minitrack are to encourage research papers that offer approaches and theories to detecting Deception through one of the following: (1) synthesize applicable theories to create a model of Deception and detection processes; (2) identify through experimental and longitudinal research systematic uncertainty-reduction and information-processing biases that make humans susceptible to false positives and false negatives; (3) identify reliable indicators of deceit under varying task and communication conditions; (4) develop a multi-pronged, computer-assisted training program to improve detection abilities; (5) create prototypes for automated tools to augment human detection; and (6) test integrated training program and automated tools to improve accuracy in distinguishing truthful from deceptive information and communications. To accomplish these objectives, this minitrack will bring together scientists and practitioners from the relevant fields of information systems, communication, criminology, psychology, artificial intelligence and warfare.
Michael I Norton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The what and why of self-Deception
Current Opinion in Psychology, 2015Co-Authors: Zoe Chance, Michael I NortonAbstract:Scholars from many disciplines have investigated self-Deception, but defining self-Deception and establishing its possible benefits have been a matter of heated debate. -. a debate impoverished by a relative lack of empirical research. Drawing on recent research, we first classify three distinct definitions of self-Deception, ranging from a view that self-Deception is synonymous with positive illusions to a more stringent view that self-Deception requires the presence of simultaneous conflicting beliefs. We then review recent research on the possible benefits of self-Deception, identifying three adaptive functions: deceiving others, social status, and psychological benefits. We suggest potential directions for future research.
Robert Trivers - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Reflections on self-Deception
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2011Co-Authors: William Von Hippel, Robert TriversAbstract:Commentators raised 10 major questions with regard to self-Deception: Are dual representations necessary? Does self-Deception serve intrapersonal goals? What forces shape self-Deception? Are there cultural differences in self-Deception? What is the self? Does self-Deception have costs? How well do people detect Deception? Are self-deceivers lying? Do cognitive processes account for seemingly motivational ones? And how is mental illness tied up with self-Deception? We address these questions and conclude that none of them compel major modifications to our theory of self-Deception, although many commentators provided helpful suggestions and observations.
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The evolution and psychology of self-Deception
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2011Co-Authors: William Von Hippel, Robert TriversAbstract:In this article we argue that self-Deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal Deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious Deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-Deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the Deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of Deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-Deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-Deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-Deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-Deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-Deception.
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Deceit and self-Deception
Mind the Gap: Tracing the Origins of Human Universals, 2010Co-Authors: Robert TriversAbstract:Deception is a universal feature of life, at all levels and in all relationships both within species and between species, inside individuals and outside, with strong effects on both deceiver and deceived. Being detected often results in a sharp reversal of fortune for the deceiver thereby intensifying selection to deceive successfully. In encounters between human strangers, nervousness, signs of control and of cognitive load can all serve as cues of Deception but cognitive load appears to be the most important. Self-Deception is defined as hiding true information from the conscious mind in the unconscious, and is illustrated by classical experimental work. Selection to deceive can favor self-Deception, the better to hide the Deception and separately to reduce its cognitive costs. Four examples are described. There is a general tendency toward self-inflation in humans, the better to give off a positive image. Conscious thought suppression, studied via fMRI, shows that one area of the brain has been coopted to Suppress memory formation elsewhere in the brain. When people reach age 60, they fail to attend to negative social reality, and this old-age positivity may give immune benefits. Across primates there is a strong positive association between relative size of the neocortex and frequency of deceptive acts in nature. If the relationship holds within species, we may expect relatively intelligent humans to be prone to self-Deception. There is such a thing as imposed self-Deception, in which we act out the system of self-Deception of another. Likewise, there is parasitized self-Deception in which our system of self-Deception makes us more vulnerable to Deception by others. Con artists are given as an example. One could model the evolution of deceit and self-Deception as a multiplayer game, which can then be analyzed mathematically, modeled via computer simulations or tested experimentally. One promising possibility is a variant of the Ultimatum Game, in which Deception and detection of Deception are permitted and given quantitative values.
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The Elements of a Scientific Theory of Self-Deception
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 2006Co-Authors: Robert TriversAbstract:An evolutionary theory of self-Deception--the active misrepresentation of reality to the conscious mind--suggests that there may be multiple sources of self-Deception in our own species, with important interactions between them. Self-Deception (along with internal conflict and fragmentation) may serve to improve Deception of others; this may include denial of ongoing Deception, self-inflation, ego-biased social theory, false narratives of intention, and a conscious mind that operates via denial and projection to create a self-serving world. Self-Deception may also result from internal representations of the voices of significant others, including parents, and may come from internal genetic conflict, the most important for our species arising from differentially imprinted maternal and paternal genes. Selection also favors suppressing negative phenotypic traits. Finally, a positive form of self-Deception may serve to orient the organism favorably toward the future. Self-Deception can be analyzed in groups and is done so here with special attention to its costs.
Geert Crombez - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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lying takes time a meta analysis on reaction time measures of Deception
Psychological Bulletin, 2017Co-Authors: Kristina Suchotzki, Bruno Verschuere, Bram Van Bockstaele, Gershon Benshakhar, Geert CrombezAbstract:Lie detection techniques are frequently used, but most of them have been criticized for the lack of empirical support for their predictive validity and presumed underlying mechanisms. This situation has led to increased efforts to unravel the cognitive mechanisms underlying Deception and to develop a comprehensive theory of Deception. A cognitive approach to Deception has reinvigorated interest in reaction time (RT) measures to differentiate lies from truths and to investigate whether lying is more cognitively demanding than truth telling. Here, we provide the results of a meta-analysis of 114 studies (n = 3307) using computerized RT paradigms to assess the cognitive cost of lying. Results revealed a large standardized RT difference, even after correction for publication bias (d = 1.049; 95% CI [0.930; 1.169]), with a large heterogeneity amongst effect sizes. Moderator analyses revealed that the RT Deception effect was smaller, yet still large, in studies in which participants received instructions to avoid detection. The autobiographical Implicit Association Test produced smaller effects than the Concealed Information Test, the Sheffield Lie Test, and the Differentiation of Deception paradigm. An additional meta-analysis (17 studies, n = 348) showed that, like other Deception measures, RT Deception measures are susceptible to countermeasures. Whereas our meta-analysis corroborates current cognitive approaches to Deception, the observed heterogeneity calls for further research on the boundary conditions of the cognitive cost of Deception. RT-based measures of Deception may have potential in applied settings, but countermeasures remain an important challenge. (PsycINFO Database Record
