The Experts below are selected from a list of 208995 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Richard Bean - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a coalition formation game framework for peer to peer energy trading
arXiv: Signal Processing, 2019Co-Authors: Wayes Tushar, Tk Saha, Chau Yuen, Imran M Azim, Thomas Morstyn, Vincent H Poor, Dustin Niyato, Richard BeanAbstract:This paper studies Social Cooperation backed peer-to-peer energy trading technique by which prosumers can decide how they can use their batteries opportunistically for participating in the peer-to-peer trading. The objective is to achieve a solution in which the ultimate beneficiaries are the prosumers, i.e., a prosumer-centric solution. To do so, a coalition formation game is designed, which enables a prosumer to compare its benefit of participating in the peer-to-peer trading with and without using its battery and thus, allows the prosumer to form suitable Social coalition groups with other similar prosumers in the network for conducting peer-to-peer trading. The properties of the formed coalitions are studied, and it is shown that 1) the coalition structure that stems from the Social Cooperation between participating prosumers at each time slot is both stable and optimal, and 2) the outcomes of the proposed peer- to-peer trading scheme is prosumer-centric. Case studies are conducted based on real household energy usage and solar generation data to highlight how the proposed scheme can benefit prosumers through exhibiting prosumer-centric properties.
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Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading with Sustainable User Participation: A Game Theoretic Approach
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory, 2018Co-Authors: Wayes Tushar, Tk Saha, Chau Yuen, Richard Bean, Paul Liddell, H. Vincent PoorAbstract:This paper explores the feasibility of Social Cooperation between prosumers within an energy network in establishing their sustainable participation in peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading. In particular, a canonical coalition game (CCG) is utilized to propose a P2P energy trading scheme, in which a set of participating prosumers form a coalition group to trade their energy, if there is any, with one another. By exploring the concept of the core of the designed CCG framework, the mid-market rate is utilized as a pricing mechanism of the proposed P2P trading to confirm the stability of the coalition as well as to guarantee the benefit to the prosumers for forming the Social coalition. The paper further introduces the motivational psychology models that are relevant to the proposed P2P scheme and it is shown that the outcomes of proposed P2P energy trading scheme satisfy the discussed models. Consequently, it is proven that the proposed scheme is consumer-centric that has the potential to corroborate sustainable prosumers participation in P2P energy trading. Finally, some numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the beneficial properties of the proposed scheme.
Long Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the increased risk of joint venture promotes Social Cooperation
PLOS ONE, 2013Co-Authors: Te Wu, Feng Fu, Yanling Zhang, Long WangAbstract:The joint venture of many members is common both in animal world and human society. In these public enterprizes, highly cooperative groups are more likely to while low cooperative groups are still possible but not probable to succeed. Existent literature mostly focuses on the traditional public goods game, in which cooperators create public wealth unconditionally and benefit all group members unbiasedly. We here institute a model addressing this public goods dilemma with incorporating the public resource foraging failure risk. Risk-averse individuals tend to lead a autarkic life, while risk-preferential ones tend to participate in the risky public goods game. For participants, group's success relies on its cooperativeness, with increasing contribution leading to increasing success likelihood. We introduce a function with one tunable parameter to describe the risk removal pattern and study in detail three representative classes. Analytical results show that the widely replicated population dynamics of cyclical dominance of loner, cooperator and defector disappear, while most of the time loners act as savors while eventually they also disappear. Depending on the way that group's success relies on its cooperativeness, either cooperators pervade the entire population or they coexist with defectors. Even in the later case, cooperators still hold salient superiority in number as some defectors also survive by parasitizing. The harder the joint venture succeeds, the higher level of Cooperation once cooperators can win the evolutionary race. Our work may enrich the literature concerning the risky public goods games.
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emergence of Social Cooperation in threshold public goods games with collective risk
Physical Review E, 2009Co-Authors: Jing Wang, Long WangAbstract:In real situations, people are often faced with the option of voluntary contribution to achieve a collective goal, for example, building a dam or a fence, in order to avoid an unfavorable loss. Those who do not donate, however, can free ride on others' sacrifices. As a result, Cooperation is difficult to maintain, leading to an enduring collective-risk Social dilemma. To address this issue, here we propose a simple yet effective theoretical model of threshold public goods game with collective risk and focus on the effect of risk on the emergence of Social Cooperation. To do this, we consider the population dynamics represented by replicator equation for two simplifying scenarios, respectively: one with fair sharers, who contribute the minimum average amount versus defectors and the other with altruists contributing more than average versus defectors. For both cases, we find that the dilemma is relieved in high-risk situations where Cooperation is likely to persist and dominate defection in the population. Large initial endowment to individuals also encourages the risk-averse action, which means that, as compared to poor players (with small initial endowment), wealthy individuals (with large initial endowment) are more likely to cooperate in order to protect their private accounts. In addition, we show that small donation amount and small threshold (collective target) can encourage and sustain Cooperation. Furthermore, for other parameters fixed, the impacts of group size act differently on the two scenarios because of distinct mechanisms: in the former case where the cost of Cooperation depends on the group size, large size of group readily results in defection, while easily maintains Cooperation in the latter case where the cost of Cooperation is fixed irrespective of the group size. Our theoretical results of the replicator dynamics are in excellent agreement with the individual based simulation results.
Ivan Briz I Godino - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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effect of resource spatial correlation and hunter fisher gatherer mobility on Social Cooperation in tierra del fuego
PLOS ONE, 2015Co-Authors: José Ignacio Santos, José Manuel Galán, Jorge Caro, Myrian Álvarez, Débora Zurro, Maria Pereda, Ivan Briz I GodinoAbstract:This article presents an agent-based model designed to explore the development of Cooperation in hunter-fisher-gatherer societies that face a dilemma of sharing an unpredictable resource that is randomly distributed in space. The model is a stylised abstraction of the Yamana society, which inhabited the channels and islands of the southernmost part of Tierra del Fuego (Argentina-Chile). According to ethnographic sources, the Yamana developed cooperative behaviour supported by an indirect reciprocity mechanism: whenever someone found an extraordinary confluence of resources, such as a beached whale, they would use smoke signals to announce their find, bringing people together to share food and exchange different types of Social capital. The model provides insight on how the spatial concentration of beachings and agents’ movements in the space can influence Cooperation. We conclude that the emergence of informal and dynamic communities that operate as a vigilance network preserves Cooperation and makes defection very costly.
Wayes Tushar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a coalition formation game framework for peer to peer energy trading
arXiv: Signal Processing, 2019Co-Authors: Wayes Tushar, Tk Saha, Chau Yuen, Imran M Azim, Thomas Morstyn, Vincent H Poor, Dustin Niyato, Richard BeanAbstract:This paper studies Social Cooperation backed peer-to-peer energy trading technique by which prosumers can decide how they can use their batteries opportunistically for participating in the peer-to-peer trading. The objective is to achieve a solution in which the ultimate beneficiaries are the prosumers, i.e., a prosumer-centric solution. To do so, a coalition formation game is designed, which enables a prosumer to compare its benefit of participating in the peer-to-peer trading with and without using its battery and thus, allows the prosumer to form suitable Social coalition groups with other similar prosumers in the network for conducting peer-to-peer trading. The properties of the formed coalitions are studied, and it is shown that 1) the coalition structure that stems from the Social Cooperation between participating prosumers at each time slot is both stable and optimal, and 2) the outcomes of the proposed peer- to-peer trading scheme is prosumer-centric. Case studies are conducted based on real household energy usage and solar generation data to highlight how the proposed scheme can benefit prosumers through exhibiting prosumer-centric properties.
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Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading with Sustainable User Participation: A Game Theoretic Approach
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory, 2018Co-Authors: Wayes Tushar, Tk Saha, Chau Yuen, Richard Bean, Paul Liddell, H. Vincent PoorAbstract:This paper explores the feasibility of Social Cooperation between prosumers within an energy network in establishing their sustainable participation in peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading. In particular, a canonical coalition game (CCG) is utilized to propose a P2P energy trading scheme, in which a set of participating prosumers form a coalition group to trade their energy, if there is any, with one another. By exploring the concept of the core of the designed CCG framework, the mid-market rate is utilized as a pricing mechanism of the proposed P2P trading to confirm the stability of the coalition as well as to guarantee the benefit to the prosumers for forming the Social coalition. The paper further introduces the motivational psychology models that are relevant to the proposed P2P scheme and it is shown that the outcomes of proposed P2P energy trading scheme satisfy the discussed models. Consequently, it is proven that the proposed scheme is consumer-centric that has the potential to corroborate sustainable prosumers participation in P2P energy trading. Finally, some numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the beneficial properties of the proposed scheme.
Tk Saha - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A coalition formation game framework for peer-to-peer energy trading
'Elsevier BV', 2020Co-Authors: Tushar W, Tk Saha, Yuen C, Mi Azim, Morstyn T, Hv Poor, Niyato D, Bean RAbstract:This paper studies a Social Cooperation backed peer-to-peer energy trading technique by which prosumers can decide how they can use their batteries opportunistically for participating in the peer-to-peer trading. The objective is to achieve a solution in which the ultimate beneficiaries are the prosumers, i.e., a prosumer-centric solution. To do so, a coalition formation game is designed, which enables a prosumer to compare its benefit of participating in the peer-to-peer trading with and without using its battery and thus, allows the prosumer to form suitable Social coalition groups with other similar prosumers in the network for conducting peer-to-peer trading. The properties of the formed coalitions are studied, and it is shown that (1) the coalition structure that stems from the Social Cooperation between participating prosumers at each time slot is both stable and optimal, and (2) the outcomes of the proposed peer-to-peer trading scheme are prosumer-centric. Case studies are conducted based on real household energy usage and solar generation data to highlight how the proposed scheme can benefit prosumers through exhibiting prosumer-centric properties
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a coalition formation game framework for peer to peer energy trading
arXiv: Signal Processing, 2019Co-Authors: Wayes Tushar, Tk Saha, Chau Yuen, Imran M Azim, Thomas Morstyn, Vincent H Poor, Dustin Niyato, Richard BeanAbstract:This paper studies Social Cooperation backed peer-to-peer energy trading technique by which prosumers can decide how they can use their batteries opportunistically for participating in the peer-to-peer trading. The objective is to achieve a solution in which the ultimate beneficiaries are the prosumers, i.e., a prosumer-centric solution. To do so, a coalition formation game is designed, which enables a prosumer to compare its benefit of participating in the peer-to-peer trading with and without using its battery and thus, allows the prosumer to form suitable Social coalition groups with other similar prosumers in the network for conducting peer-to-peer trading. The properties of the formed coalitions are studied, and it is shown that 1) the coalition structure that stems from the Social Cooperation between participating prosumers at each time slot is both stable and optimal, and 2) the outcomes of the proposed peer- to-peer trading scheme is prosumer-centric. Case studies are conducted based on real household energy usage and solar generation data to highlight how the proposed scheme can benefit prosumers through exhibiting prosumer-centric properties.
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Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading with Sustainable User Participation: A Game Theoretic Approach
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory, 2018Co-Authors: Wayes Tushar, Tk Saha, Chau Yuen, Richard Bean, Paul Liddell, H. Vincent PoorAbstract:This paper explores the feasibility of Social Cooperation between prosumers within an energy network in establishing their sustainable participation in peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading. In particular, a canonical coalition game (CCG) is utilized to propose a P2P energy trading scheme, in which a set of participating prosumers form a coalition group to trade their energy, if there is any, with one another. By exploring the concept of the core of the designed CCG framework, the mid-market rate is utilized as a pricing mechanism of the proposed P2P trading to confirm the stability of the coalition as well as to guarantee the benefit to the prosumers for forming the Social coalition. The paper further introduces the motivational psychology models that are relevant to the proposed P2P scheme and it is shown that the outcomes of proposed P2P energy trading scheme satisfy the discussed models. Consequently, it is proven that the proposed scheme is consumer-centric that has the potential to corroborate sustainable prosumers participation in P2P energy trading. Finally, some numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the beneficial properties of the proposed scheme.
