The Experts below are selected from a list of 16602 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Bruce Wydick - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Does Social capital matter? Evidence from a five-country group lending experiment
Oxford Economic Papers, 2010Co-Authors: Alessandra Cassar, Bruce WydickAbstract:Does Social capital matter to economic decision-making? We address this broad question through an artefactual group lending experiment carried out in five countries: India, Kenya, Guatemala, Armenia, and the Philippines, obtaining data on 10,673 contribution decisions from 1,554 subjects in 259 experimental borrowing groups. We carry out treatments for Social Homogeneity, group monitoring, and borrowing group self-selection. Results show that societal trust positively and significantly influences group loan contribution rates, that group lending appears to create as well as harness Social capital, and that peer monitoring can have perverse as well as beneficial effects. Copyright 2010 Oxford University Press 2010 All rights reserved, Oxford University Press.
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the effect of Social capital on group loan repayment evidence from field experiments
The Economic Journal, 2007Co-Authors: Alessandra Cassar, Luke Crowley, Bruce WydickAbstract:An important question to microfinance is the relevance of existing Social capital in target communities to the performance of group lending. This research presents evidence from field experiments in South Africa and Armenia, in which subjects participate in trust and microfinance games. We present evidence that personal trust between group members and Social Homogeneity are more important to group loan repayment than general societal trust or acquaintanceship between members. We also find some evidence of reciprocity: those who have been helped by other group members in the past are more likely to contribute in the future.
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The Effect of Social Capital on Group Loan Repayment: Evidence from Field Experiments
The Economic Journal, 2007Co-Authors: Alessandra Cassar, Luke Crowley, Bruce WydickAbstract:An important question to microfinance is the relevance of existing Social capital in target communities to the performance of group lending. This research presents evidence from field experiments in South Africa and Armenia, in which subjects participate in trust and microfinance games. We present evidence that personal trust between group members and Social Homogeneity are more important to group loan repayment than general societal trust or acquaintanceship between members. We also find some evidence of reciprocity: those who have been helped by other group members in the past are more likely to contribute in the future. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.
Alessandra Cassar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Does Social capital matter? Evidence from a five-country group lending experiment
Oxford Economic Papers, 2010Co-Authors: Alessandra Cassar, Bruce WydickAbstract:Does Social capital matter to economic decision-making? We address this broad question through an artefactual group lending experiment carried out in five countries: India, Kenya, Guatemala, Armenia, and the Philippines, obtaining data on 10,673 contribution decisions from 1,554 subjects in 259 experimental borrowing groups. We carry out treatments for Social Homogeneity, group monitoring, and borrowing group self-selection. Results show that societal trust positively and significantly influences group loan contribution rates, that group lending appears to create as well as harness Social capital, and that peer monitoring can have perverse as well as beneficial effects. Copyright 2010 Oxford University Press 2010 All rights reserved, Oxford University Press.
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the effect of Social capital on group loan repayment evidence from field experiments
The Economic Journal, 2007Co-Authors: Alessandra Cassar, Luke Crowley, Bruce WydickAbstract:An important question to microfinance is the relevance of existing Social capital in target communities to the performance of group lending. This research presents evidence from field experiments in South Africa and Armenia, in which subjects participate in trust and microfinance games. We present evidence that personal trust between group members and Social Homogeneity are more important to group loan repayment than general societal trust or acquaintanceship between members. We also find some evidence of reciprocity: those who have been helped by other group members in the past are more likely to contribute in the future.
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The Effect of Social Capital on Group Loan Repayment: Evidence from Field Experiments
The Economic Journal, 2007Co-Authors: Alessandra Cassar, Luke Crowley, Bruce WydickAbstract:An important question to microfinance is the relevance of existing Social capital in target communities to the performance of group lending. This research presents evidence from field experiments in South Africa and Armenia, in which subjects participate in trust and microfinance games. We present evidence that personal trust between group members and Social Homogeneity are more important to group loan repayment than general societal trust or acquaintanceship between members. We also find some evidence of reciprocity: those who have been helped by other group members in the past are more likely to contribute in the future. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.
Rebecca Saxe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Preferences for redistribution are sensitive to perceived luck, Social Homogeneity, war and scarcity.
Cognition, 2020Co-Authors: Daniel Nettle, Rebecca SaxeAbstract:Abstract Many human societies feature institutions for redistributing resources from some individuals to others, but preferred levels of redistribution vary greatly within and between populations. We postulate that support for redistribution is the output of a structured cognitive system that is sensitive to features of the Social situation. We developed an experimental approach in which participants prescribe appropriate redistribution for hypothetical villages whose features vary. Over seven experiments involving 2400 adults from the UK, we show that participants shift their redistribution preferences systematically as situational features change. Higher levels of redistribution are favoured when luck is more important in the initial distribution of resources; when Social groups are more homogeneous; when the group is at war; and when resources are abundant rather than scarce. Judgements about the right level of redistribution carry moderate or high levels of moral conviction. Participants have systematic intuitions about when the implementation of redistribution will prove problematic, distinct from their intuitions about when it is desirable. Individuals are only weakly consistent in the level of redistribution they prefer, and political orientation explains rather little variation in preferred redistribution for a given situation. We argue that people have divergent views on redistribution at least in part because they have different appraisals of the features of their societies. Understanding the operating principles of the psychology of redistribution may help explain variation and change in support for, and hence existence of, redistributive institutions across societies and over time.
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Preferences for redistribution are sensitive to perceived luck, Social Homogeneity, war and scarcity
2019Co-Authors: Daniel Nettle, Rebecca SaxeAbstract:Many human societies feature institutions for redistributing resources from some individuals to others, but preferred levels of redistribution vary greatly within and between populations. We postulate that support for redistribution is the output of a structured cognitive system that is sensitive to features of the Social situation. We developed an experimental approach in which participants prescribe appropriate redistribution for hypothetical villages whose features vary. Over seven experiments involving 2400 adults from the UK, we show that participants shift their redistribution preferences systematically as situational features change. Higher levels of redistribution are favoured when luck is more important in the initial distribution of resources; when Social groups are more homogeneous; when the group is at war; and when resources are abundant rather than scarce. Judgements about the right level of redistribution carry moderate or high levels of moral conviction. Participants have systematic intuitions about when the implementation of redistribution will prove problematic, distinct from their intuitions about when it is desirable. Individuals are only weakly consistent in the level of redistribution they prefer, and political orientation explains rather little variation in preferred redistribution for a given situation. We argue that people have divergent views on redistribution not so much because they have different psychologies of redistribution, but because they have different appraisals of the features of their societies. Understanding the operating principles of the psychology of redistribution may help explain variation and change in support for, and hence existence of, redistributive institutions across societies and over time.
William V. Gehrlein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Structure of Voters’ Preferences Induced by the Dual Culture Condition
Studies in Choice and Welfare, 2014Co-Authors: William V. Gehrlein, Souvik RoyAbstract:We consider the case of three-candidate elections with large electorates under the assumption of the Dual Culture Condition. It is well known that a perfect relationship does not exist between the probability that Condorcet’s Paradox will be observed and a simple measure of the Social Homogeneity of voters’ preferences under these conditions. However, we show that this intuitively appealing relationship actually is found to hold on an expected value basis, except for an aberration in one very small region of possible voter situations, and this aberration is completely explainable. It is also found that the expected value of the Condorcet Efficiency of Borda Rule consistently increases as the simple measure of Social Homogeneity increases, except in the same small region of aberration for voting situations that is noted above.
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Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence: The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules
2010Co-Authors: William V. Gehrlein, Dominique LepelleyAbstract:Voting Paradoxes and Their Probabilities.- Condorcet's Paradox and Group Coherence.- Other Incompability Paradoxes.- Other Voting Paradoxes.- Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity.- Coherence and the Efficiency Hypothesis.- Other Characteristics of Voting Rules.- The Significance of Voting Rule Selection.- Complete PMR Ranking Efficiencies.
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Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity
Studies in Choice and Welfare, 2010Co-Authors: William V. Gehrlein, Dominique LepelleyAbstract:There are many different aspects of election procedures that might be studied. In general we might be concerned with the procedure by which an election will be held, the fairness of the procedure toward candidates, and the consideration of how well the procedure does at selecting the candidate who best reflects the preferences of the voters. Fishburn (1983) presents a survey of research that deals with these issues in some detail. The aspects of elections that are considered are: the nomination process, agenda formation, candidate strategy, voter psychology and strategy, ballot forms and method of aggregation, evaluative aspects of aggregation, incentive compatibility, costs and financing, and institutional effects. Richelson (1975, 1978a, b, 1979, 1980, 1981), Nurmi (1983) and Tideman (2006) all present analyses that evaluate voting rules according to a number of different criteria, including the Condorcet Criterion. Bordley (1983, 1985) presents simulation studies to evaluate voting rules on a number of criteria other than the Condorcet Criterion. There are clearly many different criteria by which voting rules can be evaluated.
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Condorcet’s Paradox and Group Coherence
Studies in Choice and Welfare, 2010Co-Authors: William V. Gehrlein, Dominique LepelleyAbstract:The possibility that various election paradoxes might exist has been seen to be a potentially significant threat to the stability of election processes, and we have developed a number of different mathematical models that can be used to assess the likelihood that these paradoxes might actually be observed. These basic models have been used to yield some support to the intuitively appealing hypothesis that the likelihood that these voting paradoxes will be observed should tend to decrease with increasing levels of Social Homogeneity among the preferences of voters in the population, or as the degree of dependence among voters’ preferences in the population tends to increase. There is a direct linkage between increases in the measure of dependence among voters’ preferences and the degree of Social Homogeneity that is expected to exist in a voting situation.
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Consistency in Measures of Social Homogeneity: A Connection with Proximity to Single Peaked Preferences
Quality and Quantity, 2004Co-Authors: William V. GehrleinAbstract:A survey of work is presented that is related to the relationship between measures of Social Homogeneity and probability that a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (PMRW), or Condorcet Winner, exists. Little evidence has been reported to support the notion of a strong relationship between these two factors. Exact probability representations are derived to show that it is possible to find a parameter that is directly observable from voter profiles that can be systematically changed, so that an expected decrease in Social Homogeneity will lead to a counterintuitive increase in the expected probability that a PMRW exists. Using a different observable profile parameter that reflects a rough measure of the proximity of profiles to completely single-peaked preferences adds a sufficient degree of consistency among voters' preferences to produce the expected outcome.
Dominique Lepelley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence: The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules
2010Co-Authors: William V. Gehrlein, Dominique LepelleyAbstract:Voting Paradoxes and Their Probabilities.- Condorcet's Paradox and Group Coherence.- Other Incompability Paradoxes.- Other Voting Paradoxes.- Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity.- Coherence and the Efficiency Hypothesis.- Other Characteristics of Voting Rules.- The Significance of Voting Rule Selection.- Complete PMR Ranking Efficiencies.
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Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity
Studies in Choice and Welfare, 2010Co-Authors: William V. Gehrlein, Dominique LepelleyAbstract:There are many different aspects of election procedures that might be studied. In general we might be concerned with the procedure by which an election will be held, the fairness of the procedure toward candidates, and the consideration of how well the procedure does at selecting the candidate who best reflects the preferences of the voters. Fishburn (1983) presents a survey of research that deals with these issues in some detail. The aspects of elections that are considered are: the nomination process, agenda formation, candidate strategy, voter psychology and strategy, ballot forms and method of aggregation, evaluative aspects of aggregation, incentive compatibility, costs and financing, and institutional effects. Richelson (1975, 1978a, b, 1979, 1980, 1981), Nurmi (1983) and Tideman (2006) all present analyses that evaluate voting rules according to a number of different criteria, including the Condorcet Criterion. Bordley (1983, 1985) presents simulation studies to evaluate voting rules on a number of criteria other than the Condorcet Criterion. There are clearly many different criteria by which voting rules can be evaluated.
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Condorcet’s Paradox and Group Coherence
Studies in Choice and Welfare, 2010Co-Authors: William V. Gehrlein, Dominique LepelleyAbstract:The possibility that various election paradoxes might exist has been seen to be a potentially significant threat to the stability of election processes, and we have developed a number of different mathematical models that can be used to assess the likelihood that these paradoxes might actually be observed. These basic models have been used to yield some support to the intuitively appealing hypothesis that the likelihood that these voting paradoxes will be observed should tend to decrease with increasing levels of Social Homogeneity among the preferences of voters in the population, or as the degree of dependence among voters’ preferences in the population tends to increase. There is a direct linkage between increases in the measure of dependence among voters’ preferences and the degree of Social Homogeneity that is expected to exist in a voting situation.
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Voting rules, manipulability and Social Homogeneity ∗
Public Choice, 2003Co-Authors: Dominique Lepelley, Fabrice ValognesAbstract:To what extent are some voting rules more vulnerable tostrategic manipulation than others? In order to answer thisquestion, representations are developed for the coalitionalmanipulability of eight voting rules under various assumptionsconcerning the likelihood that given voters' preferenceprofiles are observed on three alternatives. Of particularinterest is the impact that Social Homogeneity (defined as thetendency of voters' preference to be similar) has on themanipulability of voting rules. The results we obtain showthat the hierarchy of the voting rules that results from ourcomputations can crucially depend on the degree of SocialHomogeneity. However, it turns out that, whatever the degreeof Homogeneity, the Hare method (or two-stage plurality)minimizes susceptibility to strategic manipulation bycoalitions of voters in three-candidate elections.
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voting rules manipulability and Social Homogeneity
Public Choice, 2003Co-Authors: Dominique Lepelley, Fabrice ValognesAbstract:To what extent are some voting rules more vulnerable tostrategic manipulation than others? In order to answer thisquestion, representations are developed for the coalitionalmanipulability of eight voting rules under various assumptionsconcerning the likelihood that given voters' preferenceprofiles are observed on three alternatives. Of particularinterest is the impact that Social Homogeneity (defined as thetendency of voters' preference to be similar) has on themanipulability of voting rules. The results we obtain showthat the hierarchy of the voting rules that results from ourcomputations can crucially depend on the degree of SocialHomogeneity. However, it turns out that, whatever the degreeof Homogeneity, the Hare method (or two-stage plurality)minimizes susceptibility to strategic manipulation bycoalitions of voters in three-candidate elections.