The Experts below are selected from a list of 80343 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Seden Akcinaroglu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
rebel rivalry and the Strategic Nature of rebel group ideology and demands
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2020Co-Authors: Efe Tokdemir, Evgeny Sedashov, Carlos Enrique Moreno León, Sema Hande Ogutcufu, Jeremy Berkowitz, Seden AkcinarogluAbstract:How does the presence of multiple combatants affect rebel groups’ ideological positioning? Although violent forms of inter-group conflict have been widely studied in the civil war literature, rebel groups’ Strategic use of ideology has so far received scarce scholarly attention. We argue that the pressure of competition forces rebel groups to differentiate themselves ideologically from their rivals to maximize their chances of survival and success. Rebel groups strive to set themselves apart by offering unique ideological products to their supporters and recruits. Thus, we contend that rebel groups are more likely to modify their ideologies and demands from the government in the face of competition from rival groups. We test this theory using novel data collected from rebel group manifestos and public statements. Our findings suggest that groups are more likely to shift their ideology and modify their demands from the government as the number of rival groups increases.
-
Rebel Rivalry and The Strategic Nature of RebelGroup Ideology and Demands
2019Co-Authors: Sema Hande Ogutcu-fu, Seden Akcinaroglu, Efe Tokdemir, Evgeny Sedashov, Jeremy M. Berkowitz, Carlos Enrique Moreno LeónAbstract:How does the presence of multiple combatants affect rebel groups’ ideological positioning? Although violent forms of inter-group conflict have been widely studied in the civil war literature, rebel groups’ Strategic use of ideology has so far received scarce scholarly attention. We argue that the pressure of competition forces rebel groups to differentiate themselves ideologically from their rivals to maximize their chances of survival and success. Rebel groups strive to set themselves apart by offering unique ideological products to their supporters and recruits. Thus, we contend that rebel groups are more likely to modify their ideologies and demands from the government in the face of competition from rival groups. We test this theory using novel data collected from rebel group manifestos and public statements. Our findings suggest that groups are more likely to shift their ideology and modify their demands from the government as the number of rival groups increases.
Peter Winther Schrøder - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Strategic Risk Management Practice: How to Deal Effectively with Major Corporate Exposures
2010Co-Authors: Torben Juul Andersen, Peter Winther SchrøderAbstract:List of figures List of tables Preface 1. The Strategic Nature of corporate risk management 2. Economic exposures in corporate risk management 3. Managing market-related business exposures 4. Extending the risk management perspective 5. Integrative risk management perspectives 6. Current risk management practice and the rise of ERM 7. Strategic risk analyses 8. Strategic risk management - amendments to the ERM framework 9. Strategic risk management 10. Postscriptum Appendix Index.
-
Strategic Risk Management Practice: The Strategic Nature of corporate risk management
Strategic Risk Management Practice, 2004Co-Authors: Torben Juul Andersen, Peter Winther SchrøderAbstract:Contemporary institutions are exposed to a variety of risks ranging from natural catastrophes and uncontrolled human behaviours to different Strategic exposures that may hit the organization in unexpected ways. This chapter describes, partially by illustrative examples, the diverse Nature of the corporate risk landscape and how related exposures seem to increase. The chapter discusses how different approaches to risk management may enable corporate executives to deal more effectively with these important challenges. The relationship between positive risk management outcomes and performance is explored and the question about uncovering an effective risk management model is developed. 1.1 The Nature of risk management Risks are everywhere, as evidenced by many corporate events reported in the popular press, including major corporate scandals around once venerable companies like the Maxwell group, Baring Brothers, WorldCom, Enron, Parmalat and so on. We also witness a steady increase in man-made disasters around the world and even the emergence of mega-catastrophes caused by wilful human actions that have both direct and indirect economic effects. These developments have intensified our focus on corporate and public risks and the risk management processes that may be needed to circumvent the adverse economic impacts from such events. All the while, we have seen a public risk perception aimed at reducing system errors, operational malfunctions and uncontrolled human behaviours that affect the way in which we try to deal with corporate risks. 1 Hence, corporate risk management has become an essential topic and arguably constitutes a new lens through which we may conceive corporate strategy development – because poor risk management may lead to bankruptcy, whereas good risk management practices can excel corporate performance outcomes. Hence, risk management may be seen as a process that lets the organization achieve its full potential and gain optimal economic returns, or to use strategy jargon, effective risk management may be seen as a way in which to create sustainable competitive
Efe Tokdemir - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
rebel rivalry and the Strategic Nature of rebel group ideology and demands
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2020Co-Authors: Efe Tokdemir, Evgeny Sedashov, Carlos Enrique Moreno León, Sema Hande Ogutcufu, Jeremy Berkowitz, Seden AkcinarogluAbstract:How does the presence of multiple combatants affect rebel groups’ ideological positioning? Although violent forms of inter-group conflict have been widely studied in the civil war literature, rebel groups’ Strategic use of ideology has so far received scarce scholarly attention. We argue that the pressure of competition forces rebel groups to differentiate themselves ideologically from their rivals to maximize their chances of survival and success. Rebel groups strive to set themselves apart by offering unique ideological products to their supporters and recruits. Thus, we contend that rebel groups are more likely to modify their ideologies and demands from the government in the face of competition from rival groups. We test this theory using novel data collected from rebel group manifestos and public statements. Our findings suggest that groups are more likely to shift their ideology and modify their demands from the government as the number of rival groups increases.
-
Rebel Rivalry and The Strategic Nature of RebelGroup Ideology and Demands
2019Co-Authors: Sema Hande Ogutcu-fu, Seden Akcinaroglu, Efe Tokdemir, Evgeny Sedashov, Jeremy M. Berkowitz, Carlos Enrique Moreno LeónAbstract:How does the presence of multiple combatants affect rebel groups’ ideological positioning? Although violent forms of inter-group conflict have been widely studied in the civil war literature, rebel groups’ Strategic use of ideology has so far received scarce scholarly attention. We argue that the pressure of competition forces rebel groups to differentiate themselves ideologically from their rivals to maximize their chances of survival and success. Rebel groups strive to set themselves apart by offering unique ideological products to their supporters and recruits. Thus, we contend that rebel groups are more likely to modify their ideologies and demands from the government in the face of competition from rival groups. We test this theory using novel data collected from rebel group manifestos and public statements. Our findings suggest that groups are more likely to shift their ideology and modify their demands from the government as the number of rival groups increases.
Carlos Enrique Moreno León - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
rebel rivalry and the Strategic Nature of rebel group ideology and demands
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2020Co-Authors: Efe Tokdemir, Evgeny Sedashov, Carlos Enrique Moreno León, Sema Hande Ogutcufu, Jeremy Berkowitz, Seden AkcinarogluAbstract:How does the presence of multiple combatants affect rebel groups’ ideological positioning? Although violent forms of inter-group conflict have been widely studied in the civil war literature, rebel groups’ Strategic use of ideology has so far received scarce scholarly attention. We argue that the pressure of competition forces rebel groups to differentiate themselves ideologically from their rivals to maximize their chances of survival and success. Rebel groups strive to set themselves apart by offering unique ideological products to their supporters and recruits. Thus, we contend that rebel groups are more likely to modify their ideologies and demands from the government in the face of competition from rival groups. We test this theory using novel data collected from rebel group manifestos and public statements. Our findings suggest that groups are more likely to shift their ideology and modify their demands from the government as the number of rival groups increases.
-
Rebel Rivalry and The Strategic Nature of RebelGroup Ideology and Demands
2019Co-Authors: Sema Hande Ogutcu-fu, Seden Akcinaroglu, Efe Tokdemir, Evgeny Sedashov, Jeremy M. Berkowitz, Carlos Enrique Moreno LeónAbstract:How does the presence of multiple combatants affect rebel groups’ ideological positioning? Although violent forms of inter-group conflict have been widely studied in the civil war literature, rebel groups’ Strategic use of ideology has so far received scarce scholarly attention. We argue that the pressure of competition forces rebel groups to differentiate themselves ideologically from their rivals to maximize their chances of survival and success. Rebel groups strive to set themselves apart by offering unique ideological products to their supporters and recruits. Thus, we contend that rebel groups are more likely to modify their ideologies and demands from the government in the face of competition from rival groups. We test this theory using novel data collected from rebel group manifestos and public statements. Our findings suggest that groups are more likely to shift their ideology and modify their demands from the government as the number of rival groups increases.
Edward B. Tomme - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
The Strategic Nature of the Tactical Satellite. Part 1
2006Co-Authors: Edward B. TommeAbstract:Abstract : Using General Jumper's metric of "effects on the ground," the difficulties in tactical satellites actually being tactical become apparent. Continued funding of the tactical satellite program under the misguided notion that they can provide tactical effects on the ground only serves to drain scarce budgetary resources from other programs that could provide these desired effects. The myth of the tactical satellite is that they are tactical. Accordingly, this paper will present the tactical satellite program in the best light possible to show that even if all systems work better than advertised, the projected tactical satellite program still fails to provide required tactical effects on the ground. These generous programmatic assumptions will demonstrate that the failure to provide effects is not due to engineering shortfalls, where more money might solve the problem, but instead is due to physical limitations that cannot be overcome until the satellites become inexpensive enough to field constellations of hundreds simultaneously. The purpose of this paper is as much to educate the tactical satellite proponent on what the warfighter needs as it is to educate the warrior on what tactical satellites can offer. The tactical satellite program needs a change of name and a change of focus as the effects it can provide lie much closer to the Strategic end of the spectrum of conflict. Such a change of focus would allow operationally responsive launch to compete in the Strategic arena where it actually has a great deal of utility. As it stands, the money the program receives comes from money intended to support tactical warfighters on the ground, support it cannot provide.
-
The Strategic Nature of the Tactical Satellite. Part 2
2006Co-Authors: Edward B. TommeAbstract:Abstract : Using General Jumper's metric of "effects on the ground," the difficulties in tactical satellites actually being tactical become apparent. Continued funding of the tactical satellite program under the misguided notion that they can provide tactical effects on the ground only serves to drain scarce budgetary resources from other programs that could provide these desired effects. The myth of the tactical satellite is that they are tactical. Accordingly, this paper will present the tactical satellite program in the best light possible to show that even if all systems work better than advertised, the projected tactical satellite program still fails to provide required tactical effects on the ground. These generous programmatic assumptions will demonstrate that the failure to provide effects is not due to engineering shortfalls, where more money might solve the problem, but instead is due to physical limitations that cannot be overcome until the satellites become inexpensive enough to field constellations of hundreds simultaneously. The purpose of this paper is as much to educate the tactical satellite proponent on what the warfighter needs as it is to educate the warrior on what tactical satellites can offer. The tactical satellite program needs a change of name and a change of focus as the effects it can provide lie much closer to the Strategic end of the spectrum of conflict. Such a change of focus would allow operationally responsive launch to compete in the Strategic arena where it actually has a great deal of utility. As it stands, the money the program receives comes from money intended to support tactical warfighters on the ground, support it cannot provide.