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Vincent Vannetelbosch - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Unions' relative concerns and Strikes in wage bargaining
Bulletin of Economic Research, 2012Co-Authors: Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Cecilia VergariAbstract:We consider a model of wage determination with private information in a duopoly. We investigate the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the Strike Activity. We show that an increase of unions' relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the Strike Activity.
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Market integration and Strike Activity
Journal of International Economics, 2010Co-Authors: Ana Mauleon, Vincent VannetelboschAbstract:We consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized, imperfectly competitive, industries. We investigate the effects of opening up markets to trade as well as of further market integration on the negotiated wage and the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. From an initial situation of two-way intra-industry trade, an increase in product market integration decreases the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. However, opening up markets to trade has an ambiguous effect on both the wage outcome and the maximum real delay time
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market integration and Strike Activity
2005Co-Authors: Ana Mauleon, Vincent VannetelboschAbstract:We consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized imperfectly competitive industries. We investigate the effects of separated product markets opening up for competition as well as of further market integration on the negociated wage and the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. From an initial situation of reciprocal intra-industry trade, an increase in product market integration will decrease the maximal delay in reaching an agreement. However, markets opening up for competition have an ambiguous effect on both the wage outcome and the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement.
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Strategic union delegation and Strike Activity
2005Co-Authors: Ana Mauleon, Vincent VannetelboschAbstract:. We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus‐maximizing delegates or to wage‐maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that the wage outcome in case of surplus‐maximizing delegates is not necessarily smaller than the wage outcome in case of wage‐maximizing delegates, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then delegating to wage‐maximizing delegates definitely increases the wage at equilibrium. The maximum delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the union chooses wage‐maximizing delegates instead of surplus‐maximizing delegates and remains finite even when the period length shrinks to zero. JEL classification: C70, C71, C72, C78 Delegation syndicale strategique et activite de greve. Nous etudions comment l’option pour les syndicats de deleguer la negociation salariale va influencer le salaire negocie et les incitations a faire la greve. Nous developpons un modele de negociation salariale avec information incomplete dans lequel le syndicat a l’option de deleguer la negociation a un delegue qui maximise le surplus ou a un delegue qui maximise le salaire. Nous montrons que le salaire negocie par un delegue qui maximise le surplus n’est pas necessairement inferieur au salaire negocie par un delegue qui maximise le salaire. Cependant, si le syndicat est plus fort que la firme et la demande est elastique, alors le fait de deleguer la negociation a un delegue qui maximise le salaire va augmenter le salaire d’equilibre. Finalement, nous montrons que de plus longues greves sont observees lorsque le syndicat delegue la negociation a un delegue qui maximise uniquement le salaire. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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Strategic union delegation and Strike Activity
Canadian Journal of Economics Revue Canadienne d`Economique, 2005Co-Authors: Ana Mauleon, Vincent VannetelboschAbstract:We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus-maximizing delegates or to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that the wage outcome in case of surplus-maximizing delegates is not necessarily smaller than the wage outcome in case of wage-maximizing delegates, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then delegating to wage-maximizing delegates definitely increases the wage at equilibrium. The maximum delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates instead of surplus-maximizing delegates and remains finite even when the period length shrinks to zero.
Gregor Gall - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Labor Quiescence Continued? Recent Strike Activity in Western Europe
2018Co-Authors: Gregor GallAbstract:This paper begins by examining whether the downward trajectory in Strike Activity in seven of the main economies of western Europe has continued over the most recent period. It then moves on to consider the nature of the dominant forms of Strike Activity and how these relate to systems of bargaining and social pacts. The main finding of the paper is that while there has been a general decline in aggregate Strike Activity across the seven economies, the dominant nature of the Strike Activity has become increasingly concerned with mounting demonstrative collective mobilizations in the political, rather than industrial, arena. Consequently, much Strike Activity is increasingly being deployed as a tool of political leverage with governments rather than as a tool of industrial leverage with (private sector) employers.
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Quiescence continued? Recent Strike Activity in nine Western European economies
Economic and Industrial Democracy, 2012Co-Authors: Gregor GallAbstract:This article examines whether the downward trajectory in Strike Activity in nine Western European economies has continued over recent years. In doing so, it considers the nature of the dominant for...
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A review of Strike Activity in Western Europe at the end of the second millennium
Employee Relations, 1999Co-Authors: Gregor GallAbstract:Most analyses of Strike Activity in Western Europe suggest that it has declined quite dramatically since the early 1970s. The contention of this article is that this decline has been exaggerated, largely as a result of an inadequate recognition of the deficiencies of the statistical data on which these analyses are based. Recognising this, the article argues that Strike Activity in many countries in Western Europe may be considerably higher than previously thought.
Ana Mauleon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Unions' relative concerns and Strikes in wage bargaining
Bulletin of Economic Research, 2012Co-Authors: Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Cecilia VergariAbstract:We consider a model of wage determination with private information in a duopoly. We investigate the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the Strike Activity. We show that an increase of unions' relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the Strike Activity.
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Market integration and Strike Activity
Journal of International Economics, 2010Co-Authors: Ana Mauleon, Vincent VannetelboschAbstract:We consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized, imperfectly competitive, industries. We investigate the effects of opening up markets to trade as well as of further market integration on the negotiated wage and the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. From an initial situation of two-way intra-industry trade, an increase in product market integration decreases the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. However, opening up markets to trade has an ambiguous effect on both the wage outcome and the maximum real delay time
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market integration and Strike Activity
2005Co-Authors: Ana Mauleon, Vincent VannetelboschAbstract:We consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized imperfectly competitive industries. We investigate the effects of separated product markets opening up for competition as well as of further market integration on the negociated wage and the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. From an initial situation of reciprocal intra-industry trade, an increase in product market integration will decrease the maximal delay in reaching an agreement. However, markets opening up for competition have an ambiguous effect on both the wage outcome and the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement.
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Strategic union delegation and Strike Activity
2005Co-Authors: Ana Mauleon, Vincent VannetelboschAbstract:. We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus‐maximizing delegates or to wage‐maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that the wage outcome in case of surplus‐maximizing delegates is not necessarily smaller than the wage outcome in case of wage‐maximizing delegates, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then delegating to wage‐maximizing delegates definitely increases the wage at equilibrium. The maximum delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the union chooses wage‐maximizing delegates instead of surplus‐maximizing delegates and remains finite even when the period length shrinks to zero. JEL classification: C70, C71, C72, C78 Delegation syndicale strategique et activite de greve. Nous etudions comment l’option pour les syndicats de deleguer la negociation salariale va influencer le salaire negocie et les incitations a faire la greve. Nous developpons un modele de negociation salariale avec information incomplete dans lequel le syndicat a l’option de deleguer la negociation a un delegue qui maximise le surplus ou a un delegue qui maximise le salaire. Nous montrons que le salaire negocie par un delegue qui maximise le surplus n’est pas necessairement inferieur au salaire negocie par un delegue qui maximise le salaire. Cependant, si le syndicat est plus fort que la firme et la demande est elastique, alors le fait de deleguer la negociation a un delegue qui maximise le salaire va augmenter le salaire d’equilibre. Finalement, nous montrons que de plus longues greves sont observees lorsque le syndicat delegue la negociation a un delegue qui maximise uniquement le salaire. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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Strategic union delegation and Strike Activity
Canadian Journal of Economics Revue Canadienne d`Economique, 2005Co-Authors: Ana Mauleon, Vincent VannetelboschAbstract:We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus-maximizing delegates or to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that the wage outcome in case of surplus-maximizing delegates is not necessarily smaller than the wage outcome in case of wage-maximizing delegates, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then delegating to wage-maximizing delegates definitely increases the wage at equilibrium. The maximum delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates instead of surplus-maximizing delegates and remains finite even when the period length shrinks to zero.
John Godard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Strikes as collective voice a behavioral analysis of Strike Activity
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 1992Co-Authors: John GodardAbstract:This paper outlines a “collective voice” approach for examining the behavioral determinants of variation in Strike Activity at the organizational level. The author argues that Strikes should be vie...
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Strikes as collective voice: A behavioral analysis of Strike Activity
ILR Review, 1992Co-Authors: John GodardAbstract:This paper outlines a “collective voice†approach for examining the behavioral determinants of variation in Strike Activity at the organizational level. The author argues that Strikes should be viewed primarily as expressions of worker discontent rather than a result of imperfect or asymmetrical information. An analysis of survey data collected from 112 Canadian firms in 1980–81 indicates that managerial practices, operations size and technology, product market structure and conditions, union politics, and various other factors that influence the behavioral context of negotiations are significantly related to days lost due to Strike Activity. These findings are generally consistent with predictions from the collective voice approach.
Peter Jacobebbinghaus - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Strike Activity and centralisation in wage setting
22 2005, 2010Co-Authors: Johannes Ludsteck, Peter JacobebbinghausAbstract:"We test the theoretical claim that coordination and centralisation in wage setting reduce Strike Activity by estimating nonlinear regression models using a dataset of 17 OECD countries for the period 1972-2000. We find moderating effects of coordination on Strike Activity but the effects are not stable over time. Several means are employed to check for the robustness of our results. We compute bootstrapped standard errors, conduct nonlinear median regressions. A remaining problem of the study is that we cannot control completely for country-specific heterogeneity in the estimates of coordination and centralisation effects." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Strike Activity and centralisation in wage setting
22 2005, 2010Co-Authors: Johannes Ludsteck, Peter JacobebbinghausAbstract:The moderating effects of centralisation in wage bargaining on Strike Activity are considered as a stylised fact by many economists (Hoel, Moene, & Wallerstein, 1993, p. 103. Berthold & Fehn, 1996, p. 82). The theoretical rationale is based on Hicks' (1962) observation that Strikes cannot occur in bargaining models based on perfect symmetric information, since rational agents can agree ex ante on the outcome resulting after a Strike and thus avoid a harmful/costly Strike. If Strikes are caused by uncertainty and asymmetric information, centralisation of wage setting should have a moderating effect since wage setting at higher levels is based on aggregate and consequently more ‘objective’ data (e. g. productivity growth data provided by statistical offices) and these data are (symmetrically) available to all bargaining parties. Modern theoretical models of Strikes (see e. g. Kennan & Wilson, 1989, 1990, 1993) are in line with this reasoning: Strikes serve as screening devices to extract private information (regarding profits, Strike funds, willingness to Strike of the work force etc.) of the opponent.
