The Experts below are selected from a list of 24699 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Juan Carlos Barcenaruiz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
endogenous timing in a mixed Duopoly price competition
Journal of Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Juan Carlos BarcenaruizAbstract:The endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed Duopoly for differentiated goods, where firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. It is shown that, in contrast to the private Duopoly where firms set prices sequentially, in the mixed Duopoly firms choose prices simultaneously. Moreover, the result obtained in the mixed Duopoly under price competition differs from the one under quantity competition, since in the latter case decisions are taken sequentially.
C. F. Yeung - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Quantum Stackelberg–Bertrand Duopoly
Quantum Information Processing, 2020Co-Authors: C. F. YeungAbstract:We apply Li et al.’s “minimal” quantization rules (Phys. Lett. A 306, 73, 2002) to investigate the quantum version of the Stackelberg–Bertrand Duopoly, especially how the quantum entanglement affects the second-mover advantage in the Stackelberg–Bertrand Duopoly. It is found that positive quantum entanglement is more favourable to the profit of the leader and destroys the second-mover advantage.
David Robert Collie - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Export taxes under Bertrand Duopoly
2006Co-Authors: Roger Clarke, David Robert CollieAbstract:This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand Duopoly with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market. It is shown that the maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the optimum-welfare export tax. In a Nash equilibrium in export taxes, the country with the low cost firm imposes the largest export tax. The results under Bertrand Duopoly are compared with those under Cournot Duopoly. It is shown that the absolute value of the export subsidy or tax under Cournot Duopoly exceeds the export tax under Bertrand Duopoly.
-
OPTIMUM-WELFARE AND MAXIMUM-REVENUE TARIFFS UNDER BERTRAND Duopoly
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 2006Co-Authors: Roger Clarke, David Robert CollieAbstract:This article derives the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff under Bertrand Duopoly with differentiated products. It is shown that both tariffs are lower under Bertrand Duopoly than under Cournot Duopoly. Also, the optimum-welfare tariff may exceed the maximum-revenue tariff under both Bertrand Duopoly and Cournot Duopoly. This result is more likely the lower the costs of the home firm relative to the costs of the foreign firm, and the greater the degree of product substitutability. Also, it is shown that the optimum-welfare tariff is less likely to exceed the maximum-revenue tariff under Bertrand Duopoly than under Cournot Duopoly.
-
Collusion in Differentiated Duopolies with Quadratic Costs
Bulletin of Economic Research, 2006Co-Authors: David Robert CollieAbstract:The analysis of collusion in infinitely repeated Duopoly games has generally assumed that marginal cost is constant, but this note uses quadratic costs (linear marginal costs) to compare the sustainability of collusion under Bertrand and Cournot Duopoly with differentiated products. It is shown that when marginal costs are sufficiently increasing in output, then it is always easier to sustain collusion under Cournot Duopoly than under Bertrand Duopoly for any degree of product substitutability.
-
Product Differentiation and the Gains from Trade under Bertrand Duopoly
2003Co-Authors: David Robert Collie, Roger ClarkeAbstract:In the literature on the welfare effects of free trade under imperfect competition, one important case seems to have been overlooked and that is the Bertrand Duopoly model with differentiated products. Although many authors have analysed the welfare effects of free trade under Cournot Duopoly, and demonstrated the possibility of losses from trade, there has been no thorough analysis of the welfare effects of free trade under Bertrand Duopoly. This paper presents a thorough analysis of the welfare effects of free trade under Bertrand Duopoly with differentiated products, and it is shown that there are always gains from trade.
-
Product differentiation and the gains from trade under Bertrand Duopoly
Canadian Journal of Economics Revue Canadienne d`Economique, 2003Co-Authors: Roger Clarke, David Robert CollieAbstract:In the literature on the welfare effects of free trade under imperfect competition, one important case seems to have been overlooked, and that is the Bertrand Duopoly model with differentiated products. Although many authors have analysed the welfare effects of free trade under Cournot Duopoly and demonstrated the possibility of losses from trade, there has been no thorough analysis of the welfare effects of free trade under Bertrand Duopoly. In this article we present a thorough analysis of the welfare effects of free trade under Bertrand Duopoly with differentiated products, and it is shown that there are always gains from trade. JEL Classification: F12
Kazuhiro Ohnishi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization
Microeconomics and Macroeconomics, 2012Co-Authors: Kazuhiro OhnishiAbstract:This paper focuses on the role that production subsidies play in a Bertrand mixed Duopoly. The paper examines four regimes: mixed and private Duopoly, each with and without subsidies. The results of this study are compared with the findings of the existing Cournot mixed market literature. As a result, the paper shows that that the introduction of production subsidies into the analyses of Bertrand and Cournot mixed markets can improve social welfare.
-
A UNILATERAL PRICING POLICY AND THE STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
International Game Theory Review, 2010Co-Authors: Kazuhiro OhnishiAbstract:Cooper (1986) examines the equilibrium of the retroactive most-favored-customer pricing policy by using a two-period Duopoly model. He shows that the most-favored-customer policy enables both firms to offer higher prices and to enjoy higher profits. Neilson and Winter (1992) show that even if one firm in a price-setting Duopoly adopts the most-favored-customer policy, the equilibrium does not coincide with the Stackelberg solution. This paper introduces a pricing policy by using a one-period two-stage model and shows that if one firm in a price-setting Duopoly adopts this policy, then the equilibrium coincides with the Stackelberg solution.
Pu-yan Nie - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Commitment for storable good Duopoly
Nonlinear Analysis: Real World Applications, 2009Co-Authors: Pu-yan NieAbstract:Commitment plays exceedingly important roles in industrial organization theory and there exists extensive research on the commitment. In this paper, we extend commitment for storable goods to Duopoly structure. Based on the discrete-time dynamic models, commitment is compared with non-commitment under Duopoly and the corresponding results are obtained. Namely, the prices under commitment are lower than that without commitment under Duopoly and the social welfare is improved under commitment.
