The Experts below are selected from a list of 7380 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Felix Mormann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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market segmentation vs Subsidization clean energy credits and the commerce clause s economic wisdom
Social Science Research Network, 2018Co-Authors: Felix MormannAbstract:The dormant Commerce Clause has long been a thorn in the side of state policymakers. The latest battleground for the clash between federal courts and state legislatures is energy policy. In the absence of a decisive federal policy response to climate change, nearly thirty states have created a new type of securities—clean energy credits—to promote low-carbon renewable and nuclear power. As more and more of these programs come under attack for alleged violations of the dormant Commerce Clause, this Article explores the constitutional constraints on clean energy credit policies. Many observers view the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as a major threat to state-led efforts to combat climate change. Pushing back against widespread scholarly skepticism and calls for reform, this Article makes the case that state policymakers can use clean energy credits to simultaneously promote global environmental and local economic causes without running afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. The latest wave of judicial decisions and scholarly criticism fail to recognize that not all energy credit programs are created equal. When states use energy credits as compliance instruments for their renewable portfolio standard—requirements that electric utilities source a percentage of their electricity sales from solar, wind, and other renewables—they partition power markets into renewable and non-renewable segments. Such segmentation policies cannot follow state or other geographically defined lines without violating the dormant Commerce Clause. A few pioneering states have begun to use energy credits as a vehicle for subsidies that operate independently of sourcing requirements. Unlike their market segmentation counterparts, these Subsidization policies raise no concerns under the dormant Commerce Clause even when subsidies are available only to in-state firms. The Commerce Clause’s “preference” for Subsidization over segmentation policies may seem counterintuitive. Both have, after all, the potential to disrupt interstate commerce and competition. Yet, two centuries of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence reflect a simple economic truth: segmentation prevents competition altogether, while Subsidization can have a pro-competitive effect, such as when used to correct for carbon externalities and other market failures.
Wolfram F Richter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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efficient education policy a second order elasticity rule
Finanzarchiv, 2011Co-Authors: Wolfram F RichterAbstract:Assuming a two-period model with endogenous choices of labour, education, and saving, efficient education policy is characterized for a Ramsey-like scenario in which the government is constrained to use linear instruments. It is shown that education should be effectively subsidized if, and only if, the elasticity of the earnings function is increasing in education. The strength of second-best Subsidization increases in the elasticity of the elasticity of the earnings function. This second-order elasticity rule extends the well-known RamseyBoiteux Inverse Elasticity Rule. JEL-Code: H21, I28, J24.
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efficient education policy a second order elasticity rule
Social Science Research Network, 2010Co-Authors: Wolfram F RichterAbstract:Assuming a two-period model with endogenous choices of labour, education, and saving, efficient education policy is characterized for a Ramsey-like scenario in which the government is constrained to use linear instruments. It is shown that education should be effectively subsidized if, and only if, the elasticity of the earnings function is increasing in education. The strength of second-best Subsidization increases in the elasticity of the elasticity of the earnings function. This second-order elasticity rule extends the well-known Ramsey-Boiteux Inverse Elasticity Rule.
Vasileios Zikos - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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mixed oligopoly privatization and r d Subsidization
Social Science Research Network, 2018Co-Authors: Maria Jose Gilmolto, Joanna Poyagotheotoky, Jose Rodrigues Neto, Vasileios ZikosAbstract:We develop a model of a mixed oligopoly to examine the role of R&D subsidies and evaluate the welfare effects of privatization. In solving the (n 1)-firms oligopoly model we make use of aggregative games techniques. Our analysis reveals that privatization reduces the optimal R&D subsidy, but increases aggregate R&D effort. Furthermore, privatization improves social welfare only when the number of firms is sufficiently large. In contrast to an output subsidy, implementing solely a subsidy to R&D does not lead to a ‘privatization neutrality theorem’ or, ‘irrelevance result’.
Junshan Zhang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Reward Optimization for Content Providers With Mobile Data Subsidization: A Hierarchical Game Approach
IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering, 2020Co-Authors: Zehui Xiong, Jun Zhao, Dusit Niyato, Ruilong Deng, Junshan ZhangAbstract:Mobile data Subsidization launched by mobile network operators is a promising business model to provide economic benefits for the mobile data market and beyond. It allows content providers to partly subsidize mobile data consumption of mobile users in exchange for displaying a certain amount of advertisements. From a content provider perspective, it is of great interest to determine the optimal strategy for offering appropriate data Subsidization (reward) in order to compete against others to earn more revenue and gain higher profit. In this paper, we take a hierarchical game approach to model the reward optimization process for the content providers. To analyze the relationship between the provider and the user, we first focus on the one-to-one interaction in a single-provider single-user system, and formulate a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). We apply the backward induction to solve the MPEC problem and prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium. We then formulate an Equilibrium Program with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) to characterize the many-to-many interactions among multiple providers and multiple users. Considering the inherent high complexity of the EPEC problem, we utilize the distributed Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) algorithm to obtain the optimum solutions with fast-convergence and decomposition properties of ADMM.
Zehui Xiong - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Reward Optimization for Content Providers With Mobile Data Subsidization: A Hierarchical Game Approach
IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering, 2020Co-Authors: Zehui Xiong, Jun Zhao, Dusit Niyato, Ruilong Deng, Junshan ZhangAbstract:Mobile data Subsidization launched by mobile network operators is a promising business model to provide economic benefits for the mobile data market and beyond. It allows content providers to partly subsidize mobile data consumption of mobile users in exchange for displaying a certain amount of advertisements. From a content provider perspective, it is of great interest to determine the optimal strategy for offering appropriate data Subsidization (reward) in order to compete against others to earn more revenue and gain higher profit. In this paper, we take a hierarchical game approach to model the reward optimization process for the content providers. To analyze the relationship between the provider and the user, we first focus on the one-to-one interaction in a single-provider single-user system, and formulate a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). We apply the backward induction to solve the MPEC problem and prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium. We then formulate an Equilibrium Program with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) to characterize the many-to-many interactions among multiple providers and multiple users. Considering the inherent high complexity of the EPEC problem, we utilize the distributed Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) algorithm to obtain the optimum solutions with fast-convergence and decomposition properties of ADMM.
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towards the future data market reward optimization in mobile data Subsidization
International Conference on 5G for Future Wireless Networks, 2020Co-Authors: Zehui Xiong, Jun Zhao, Jiawen Kang, Dusit Niyato, Ruilong Deng, Shengli XieAbstract:Mobile data Subsidization launched by network operators is a promising business model to provide some economic insights on the evolving direction of the 4G/5G and beyond mobile data market. The scheme allows content providers to partly subsidize mobile data consumption of mobile users in exchange for displaying a certain amount of advertisements. The users are motivated to access and consume more content without being concerned about overage charges, yielding higher revenue to the data Subsidization ecosystem. For each content provider, how to provide appropriate data Subsidization (reward) competing with others to earn more revenue and gain higher profit naturally becomes the key concern in such a ecosystem. In this paper, we adopt a hierarchical game approach to model the reward optimization process for the content providers. We formulate an Equilibrium Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) problem to characterize the many-to-many interactions among multiple providers and multiple users. Considering the inherent high complexities of the EPEC problem, we propose to utilize the distributed Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) algorithm to obtain the optimum solutions with fast-convergence and decomposition properties of ADMM.
