The Experts below are selected from a list of 258 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Tim Kelly - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Argument-based approach to computer System Safety Engineering
International Journal of Critical Computer-based Systems, 2012Co-Authors: Tim KellyAbstract:Safety case development is not a post-development activity, rather it should occur throughout the System development lifecycle. The key components in a Safety case are Safety arguments. Too often, Safety arguments are constructed without proper reasoning. Inappropriate reasoning in Safety arguments could undermine a System's Safety claims, which in turn contributes to Safety-related failures of the System. To address this, we argue that informal logic argument schemes have important roles to play in Safety arguments construction and review process. Ten commonly used reasoning schemes in computer System Safety domain are proposed against the Safety Engineering literature. The role of informal logic dialogue games in computer System Safety arguments reviewing is also discussed and a dialectical model for Safety argument review is proposed. It is anticipated that this work will contribute toward the development of computer System Safety arguments, and help to move forward the interplay between research in informal logic and research in computer System Safety Engineering.
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Argument Schemes in Computer System Safety Engineering
Informal Logic, 2011Co-Authors: Tim KellyAbstract:Safe Safety arguments are key components in a Safety case. Too often, Safety arguments are constructed without proper reasoning. To address this, we argue that informal logic argument schemes have important roles to play in Safety argument construction and reviewing process. Ten commonly used reasoning schemes in computer System Safety domain are proposed. The role of informal logic dialogue games in computer System Safety arguments reviewing is also discussed and the intended work in this area is proposed. It is anticipated that this work will contribute toward the development of computer System Safety arguments, and help to move forward the interplay between research in informal logic and research in computer System Safety Engineering.
Nancy G. Leveson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Engineering a safer world Systems thinking applied to Safety
2012Co-Authors: Nancy G. LevesonAbstract:A new approach to Safety, based on Systems thinking, that is more effective, less costly, and easier to use than current techniques.Engineering has experienced a technological revolution, but the basic Engineering techniques applied in Safety and reliability Engineering, created in a simpler, analog world, have changed very little over the years. In this groundbreaking book, Nancy Leveson proposes a new approach to Safety?more suited to today's complex, sociotechnical, software-intensive world?based on modern Systems thinking and Systems theory. Revisiting and updating ideas pioneered by 1950s aerospace engineers in their System Safety concept, and testing her new model extensively on real-world examples, Leveson has created a new approach to Safety that is more effective, less expensive, and easier to use than current techniques.Arguing that traditional models of causality are inadequate, Leveson presents a new, extended model of causation (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes, or STAMP), then shows how the new model can be used to create techniques for System Safety Engineering, including accident analysis, hazard analysis, System design, Safety in operations, and management of Safety-critical Systems. She applies the new techniques to real-world events including the friendly-fire loss of a U.S. Blackhawk helicopter in the first Gulf War; the Vioxx recall; the U.S. Navy SUBSAFE program; and the bacterial contamination of a public water supply in a Canadian town. Leveson's approach is relevant even beyond Safety Engineering, offering techniques for ?reEngineering? any large sociotechnical System to improve Safety and manage risk.
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Why Do We Need Something Different
2012Co-Authors: Nancy G. LevesonAbstract:Engineering has experienced a technological revolution, but the basic Engineering techniques applied in Safety and reliability Engineering, created in a simpler, analog world, have changed very little over the years. In this groundbreaking book, Nancy Leveson proposes a new approach to Safety--more suited to today's complex, sociotechnical, software-intensive world--based on modern Systems thinking and Systems theory. Revisiting and updating ideas pioneered by 1950s aerospace engineers in their System Safety concept, and testing her new model extensively on real-world examples, Leveson has created a new approach to Safety that is more effective, less expensive, and easier to use than current techniques. Arguing that traditional models of causality are inadequate, Leveson presents a new, extended model of causation (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes, or STAMP), then then shows how the new model can be used to create techniques for System Safety Engineering, including accident analysis, hazard analysis, System design, Safety in operations, and management of Safety-critical Systems. She applies the new techniques to real-world events including the friendly-fire loss of a U.S. Blackhawk helicopter in the first Gulf War; the Vioxx recall; the U.S. Navy SUBSAFE program; and the bacterial contamination of a public water supply in a Canadian town. Leveson's approach is relevant even beyond Safety Engineering, offering techniques for "reEngineering" any large sociotechnical System to improve Safety and manage risk.
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A Brief Introduction to System Dynamics Modeling
2012Co-Authors: Nancy G. LevesonAbstract:Engineering has experienced a technological revolution, but the basic Engineering techniques applied in Safety and reliability Engineering, created in a simpler, analog world, have changed very little over the years. In this groundbreaking book, Nancy Leveson proposes a new approach to Safety--more suited to today's complex, sociotechnical, software-intensive world--based on modern Systems thinking and Systems theory. Revisiting and updating ideas pioneered by 1950s aerospace engineers in their System Safety concept, and testing her new model extensively on real-world examples, Leveson has created a new approach to Safety that is more effective, less expensive, and easier to use than current techniques. Arguing that traditional models of causality are inadequate, Leveson presents a new, extended model of causation (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes, or STAMP), then then shows how the new model can be used to create techniques for System Safety Engineering, including accident analysis, hazard analysis, System design, Safety in operations, and management of Safety-critical Systems. She applies the new techniques to real-world events including the friendly-fire loss of a U.S. Blackhawk helicopter in the first Gulf War; the Vioxx recall; the U.S. Navy SUBSAFE program; and the bacterial contamination of a public water supply in a Canadian town. Leveson's approach is relevant even beyond Safety Engineering, offering techniques for "reEngineering" any large sociotechnical System to improve Safety and manage risk.
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Stamp: An Accident Model Based on Systems Theory
2012Co-Authors: Nancy G. LevesonAbstract:Engineering has experienced a technological revolution, but the basic Engineering techniques applied in Safety and reliability Engineering, created in a simpler, analog world, have changed very little over the years. In this groundbreaking book, Nancy Leveson proposes a new approach to Safety--more suited to today's complex, sociotechnical, software-intensive world--based on modern Systems thinking and Systems theory. Revisiting and updating ideas pioneered by 1950s aerospace engineers in their System Safety concept, and testing her new model extensively on real-world examples, Leveson has created a new approach to Safety that is more effective, less expensive, and easier to use than current techniques. Arguing that traditional models of causality are inadequate, Leveson presents a new, extended model of causation (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes, or STAMP), then then shows how the new model can be used to create techniques for System Safety Engineering, including accident analysis, hazard analysis, System design, Safety in operations, and management of Safety-critical Systems. She applies the new techniques to real-world events including the friendly-fire loss of a U.S. Blackhawk helicopter in the first Gulf War; the Vioxx recall; the U.S. Navy SUBSAFE program; and the bacterial contamination of a public water supply in a Canadian town. Leveson's approach is relevant even beyond Safety Engineering, offering techniques for "reEngineering" any large sociotechnical System to improve Safety and manage risk.
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Role of Software in Spacecraft Accidents
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, 2004Co-Authors: Nancy G. LevesonAbstract:The first and most important step in solving any problem is understanding the problem well enough to create effective solutions. To this end, several software-related spacecraft accidents were studied to determine common Systemic factors. Although the details in each accident were different, very similar factors related to flaws in the Safety culture, the management and organization, and technical deficiencies were identified. These factors include complacency and discounting of software risk, diffusion of responsibility and authority, limited communication channels and poor information flow, inadequate System and software Engineering (poor or missing specifications, unnecessary complexity and software functionality, software reuse without appropriate Safety analysis, violation of basic Safety Engineering practices in the digital components), inadequate review activities, ineffective System Safety Engineering, flawed test and simulation environments, and inadequate human factors Engineering. Each of these factors is discussed along with some recommendations on how to eliminate them in future projects.
Nicholas J Bahr - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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System Safety Engineering and risk assessment
2013Co-Authors: Nicholas J BahrAbstract:System Safety Engineering and risk assessment , System Safety Engineering and risk assessment , کتابخانه دیجیتال جندی شاپور اهواز
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System Safety Engineering and risk assessment a practical approach
1997Co-Authors: Nicholas J BahrAbstract:INTRODUCTION Why Do We Need Safety Engineering? What Is Safety Analysis? System Safety and Risk Assessment. A Brief History of Safety DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS The Make-up of an Accident. How Safe Is Safe Enough? What Is a Hazard and Other Important Concepts. The System Safety Process. Hazard Identification. Hazard Control. Risk Acceptance. Hazard Reduction Precedence. "Design out" the Hazard. Safety Devices. Warning Devices. Special Procedures and Training. The Use of Standards in Safety. U.S. Government Standards. U.S. Industry Standards. International Standards. Safety ANALYSIS IN Engineering--HOW IS IT USED? The Manufacturing Industry. The Chemical Process Industry. Aerospace and Military Industries. The Nuclear Power Industry. The Mass Transit Industry Safety MANAGEMENT Safety in the System Life Cycle. System Life Cycle. Safety and the System Life Cycle. Examples of Poor Application of Safety in the System Life Cycle. Organizational Management and Safety. Management Commitment. Suggested Ideas to Enhance Management Involvement. The System Safety Organization. Developing a System Safety Program. Elements of a System Safety Program. Setting up a System Safety Program. Evaluating Contractors and Subcontractors. Emergency Preparedness Programs. Common Mistakes in Implementing Safety Programs. A Closed-Loop Process. Hazard Tracking and Resolution. System Safety Reviews and Audits. Voluntary Protection Programs. HAZARD ANALYSIS Hazard Analysis Methodology. Preliminary Hazard List. Passenger-Carrying Submersible Example. Hazard Analysis--Preliminary, SubSystem, and System. Facility Hazard Analysis. Operations and Support Hazard Analysis. Examples of Hazard Analyses. Example Hazard Analysis of NASA Laser. Brief Example of a Hazardous Waste Storage Facility Hazard Analysis. PROCESS Safety ANALYSIS Process Hazard Analysis. HAZOP. "What If?" Analysis and Safety Checklists. Brief HAZOP Example of an Ammonia Fill Station. Example "What If?" Safety Checklist for Pressure Test Equipment. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS Fault Tree Symbols and Logic. Finding Cut Sets. Fault Tree Quantification. Example of a Fault Tree Construction of a Motor-Pump Pressure System. Common Mistakes in Fault Trees. FMECA, HUMAN FACTORS, AND SOFTWARE Safety Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis. Conducting a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis. Human Factors Safety Analysis. Performance and Human Error. Human Factors Safety Analysis. Brief Example of Human Factors Safety Analysis--Manual Switchover to Auxiliary Feedwater System. Software Safety. Software Safety Analysis. Software Testing and IV & V. OTHER TECHNIQUES MORT. Energy Trace Barrier Analysis. Sneak Circuit Analysis. Cause-Consequence Analysis. Dispersion Modeling. Test Safety. Comparing the Various Techniques. Advantages and Disadvantages DATA SOURCES AND TRAINING Government Data Banks. Industry Data Banks. Creating Your Own Data Bank--Some Suggestions. Safety Training. Employee Training. Emergency Preparedness and Response Training. Personnel Certification for Hazardous Operations. Sample Safety Training Course Outline for a Microprocessor Production Plant. Safety Awareness. ACCIDENT REPORTING, INVESTIGATION, AND DOCUMENTATION Reporting the Accident. Setting up a Closed-Loop Reporting System. Example of an Automated System. Forming an Investigation Board. Selecting the Investigation Board. Conducting the Investigation. Investigation Report. Documenting the Accident. Retention of Records. Public Release of Information RISK ASSESSMENT What Is Risk? Risk Perception. Risk Assessment Methodology. Identifying Risk in a System. Risk Communication. RISK EVALUATION . A Probabilistic Approach. A Risk Analysis Model. Developing Accident Scenarios and Initiating Events. Event Trees. Consequences Determination. Uncertainty. Risk Evaluation--The Use of Risk Profiles. Calculating Safety Costs. Brief Example: Risk Assessment of Launching a Space Shuttle Payload APPENDICES Typical Energy Sources Generic Hazard Checklist Generic Facility Safety Checklist Internet Sources References and suggested reading recommendations follow most chapter.
Ren Ping-fa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Analyzing the risk of road tunnel fire based on fuzzy fault tree method
Journal of Hunan University of Science & Technology, 2013Co-Authors: Ren Ping-faAbstract:On the basis of System Safety Engineering theory and fire theory,combining the characteristic of the uncertainty and subjectivity of tunnel fire and its traditional fire risk analysis method,a model of tunnel fire named Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis(FFTA) was built.Using triangle fuzzy theory,the fuzzy probability of basis accidents and roof accidents based on experts scognition degree was achieved,then the fuzzy grade of each factors' relevance giving rise to gas explosion was obtained also.The result show that fire and fuel is the main elements leading to tunnel fire,following by fire-fighting measures ineffective.In order to reducing the risk of tunnel fire,ensuring the safe operation and sustainable development of road transport,we analysis the various factors and its logical relationship of road tunnel fire comprehensive,monitor the possibility of tunnel fire dynamically,and work out the strategy of active and passive fire protection.
Guang-hui Li - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Analysis of road tunnel fire risk based on Fuzzy Fault Tree method
2011 International Conference on Electric Information and Control Engineering, 2011Co-Authors: Zhi-sheng Xu, Ai-you Wu, Shi-liang Shi, Xiao-kang Li, Guang-hui LiAbstract:On the basis of System Safety Engineering theory and fire science, a model of tunnel fire named Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA) Model has been built according to the uncertainty of tunnel fire and the subjectivity of traditional fire risk analysis method. Using triangular fuzzy theory, the fuzzy probabilities of basic events and top events based on experts cognition level. Then the relationship degrees of influence factors was compared by their fuzzy classifications. The result shows that fire sources and fuels are the main causes of tunnel fires, and the failure of fire extinguishing equipments is in the second place. In order to reduce the risk of tunnel fire, the factors of tunnel fire and their logical relationships should be analyzed comprehensively, the possibility of tunnel fire should be monitored dynamically, and fire protection strategies should be established, which is significant to the safe operation and sustainable development of transportation.
