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Maiyoua Vang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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racial composition of school district on school leaders responses to state Takeover a field experiment on the application of michigan s emergency manager Law
Journal of Educational and Social Research, 2017Co-Authors: Maiyoua VangAbstract:Michigan’s Public Act 436, commonly referred to as the Emergency Manager Law, has provided for state installed emergency managers to oversee financially distressed municipalities as well as school districts. Given that a number of Michigan school districts, suburban, rural, and urban, have been operating at a deficit for several years and yet only the financial status of majority Black school districts (Detroit, Highland Park, Muskegon Heights) have triggered this Takeover Law, this field experiment investigated the effect of school district's racial composition on both the level of support for state-installed emergency managers in districts and the level of support for politically material resistance to the application of that remedy. Implications regarding policy and critical policy research are forwarded in light of the results. DOI: 10.5901/jesr.2017.v7n2p31
Lucian Arye Bebchuk - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002Co-Authors: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Allen FerrellAbstract:This article defends, and further develops, our earlier work on regulatory competition and Takeover Law. We have argued that competition for corporate charters provides incentives to states to protect incumbent managers from hostile Takeovers, and that the empirical evidence is consistent with this account. To improve the performance of regulatory competition, we have put forward the possibility of choice-enhancing federal intervention; such intervention would expand shareholder choice, and encourage states to become more attentive to shareholder interests, without imposing any mandatory arrangements. Replying to Jonathan Macey's response to our work in this issue of the Business Lawyer, we show that none of his claims weakens our analysis.The earlier work which we defend and develop in this paper is "A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition," 87 Virginia Law Review 111-164 (2001). In a related piece ("Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice," 87 Virginia Law Review 993-1006 (2001)), we reply to a critique of our work by Steve Choi and Andrew Guzman.
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a new approach to Takeover Law and regulatory competition
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001Co-Authors: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Allen FerrellAbstract:The development of U.S. state Takeover Law in the past three decades has produced considerable and quite possibly excessive protection for incumbent managers from hostile Takeovers. Although the shortcomings of state Takeover Law have been widely recognized, there has been little support for federal intervention because of the concern that such intervention might produce even worse Takeover arrangements. This paper puts forward a novel form of federal intervention in the regulation of Takeovers that would address these shortcomings without raising such a concern. Rather than mandating particular substantive Takeover arrangements, this form of federal intervention would focus on increasing shareholder choice. Choice-enhancing' federal intervention would consist of two elements: (i) an optional body of substantive federal Takeover Law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and (ii) a mandatory process rule that would provide shareholders the right to initiate and adopt, regardless of managers' wishes, proposals for opting into (or out of) the federal Takeover Law. We argue that such a federal role in Takeover Law cannot harm and would likely improve the regulation of Takeovers. Moreover, by showing how federal Law can be used to improve regulatory competition in the provision of Takeover Law rather than preempt it, our analysis lays the groundwork for a more general reconsideration of regulatory competition in the corporate Law area.
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A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001Co-Authors: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Allen FerrellAbstract:The paper puts forward a new approach to two corporate subjects that have been intensively debated in the last three decades, the regulation of Takeovers and state competition in the production of corporate Law. During this period, U.S. state Takeover Law has produced considerable and quite possibly excessive protection for incumbent managers from hostile Takeovers. Although the shortcomings of state Takeover Law have been widely recognized, there has been little support for federal intervention because of the concern that such intervention might produce even worse Takeover arrangements. This paper, however, identifies a form of federal intervention in the regulation of Takeovers "choice-enhancing" intervention that would address these shortcomings without raising such a concern. "Choice-enhancing" federal intervention would consist of two elements: (i) an optional body of substantive federal Takeover Law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and (ii) a mandatory process rule that would provide shareholders the right to initiate and adopt, regardless of managers' wishes, proposals for opting into (or out of) the federal Takeover Law. An alternative version of choice-enhancing intervention would provide a federal Law requiring states to allow shareholders to initiate and approve opting out of anti-Takeover arrangements provided by the state's Law. We argue that such a federal role in Takeover Law cannot harm and would likely improve the regulation of Takeovers. Moreover, by showing how federal Law can be used to improve regulatory competition in the provision of Takeover Law rather than preempt it, our analysis lays the groundwork for a more general reconsideration of regulatory competition in the corporate Law.
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Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001Co-Authors: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Allen FerrellAbstract:In a recent article, we have put forward a new approach to Takeover Law and regulatory competition. We proposed a 'choice-enhancing' federal intervention that would provide: (i) an optional body of substantive federal Takeover Law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and which would be more hospitable than existing state Takeover Law, and (ii) a mandatory process rule that would provide shareholders the right to initiate and adopt, regardless of managers' wishes, proposals for option into (or out of) the federal Takeover Law. In this Paper, we respond to critics of our proposal, and we further develop the case for it.
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Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice
Virginia Law Review, 2001Co-Authors: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Frank A. FerrellAbstract:In a recent article, we have put forward a new approach to Takeover Law and regulatory competition. We proposed a “choice-enhancing” federal intervention that would provide: (i) an optional body of substantive federal Takeover Law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and which would be more hospitable than existing state Takeover Law, and (ii) a mandatory process rule that would provide shareholders the right to initiate and adopt, regardless of managers’ wishes, proposals for option into (or out of) the federal Takeover Law. In this paper, we respond to a critique of our proposal by Professors Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman, and we further develop the case for choice-enhancing intervention. JEL Class: G30, H70, K22. 2001 Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell. All rights reserved. * William J. Friedman & Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics and Finance, Harvard Law School; Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic R esearch. ** Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. We would like to thank the Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business for its financial support. Future revisions of this paper will be available for downloading from http://www.Law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk.
Allen Ferrell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Why Continental European Takeover Law Matters
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004Co-Authors: Allen FerrellAbstract:This paper addresses the following question in the context of considering the recommendations of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Takeover Bids: Why does Continental European Takeover Law matter given the concentrated ownership structure of most Continental European firms? In answering this question, the paper discusses the interaction between Takeover rules and ownership structure and the possible lessons that can be drawn from the British and American experience with Takeover regulation. While a ban on the use of defensive tactics without shareholder approval (possibly in conjunction with a mandatory bid rule) can theoretically have the effect of either encouraging or discouraging the adoption of dispersed-ownership structures, the empirical evidence suggests that the former would be the more likely result. Moreover, the British and American experience highlights the importance of adopting a Takeover regime earlier rather than later in time.
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On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002Co-Authors: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Allen FerrellAbstract:This article defends, and further develops, our earlier work on regulatory competition and Takeover Law. We have argued that competition for corporate charters provides incentives to states to protect incumbent managers from hostile Takeovers, and that the empirical evidence is consistent with this account. To improve the performance of regulatory competition, we have put forward the possibility of choice-enhancing federal intervention; such intervention would expand shareholder choice, and encourage states to become more attentive to shareholder interests, without imposing any mandatory arrangements. Replying to Jonathan Macey's response to our work in this issue of the Business Lawyer, we show that none of his claims weakens our analysis.The earlier work which we defend and develop in this paper is "A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition," 87 Virginia Law Review 111-164 (2001). In a related piece ("Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice," 87 Virginia Law Review 993-1006 (2001)), we reply to a critique of our work by Steve Choi and Andrew Guzman.
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a new approach to Takeover Law and regulatory competition
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001Co-Authors: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Allen FerrellAbstract:The development of U.S. state Takeover Law in the past three decades has produced considerable and quite possibly excessive protection for incumbent managers from hostile Takeovers. Although the shortcomings of state Takeover Law have been widely recognized, there has been little support for federal intervention because of the concern that such intervention might produce even worse Takeover arrangements. This paper puts forward a novel form of federal intervention in the regulation of Takeovers that would address these shortcomings without raising such a concern. Rather than mandating particular substantive Takeover arrangements, this form of federal intervention would focus on increasing shareholder choice. Choice-enhancing' federal intervention would consist of two elements: (i) an optional body of substantive federal Takeover Law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and (ii) a mandatory process rule that would provide shareholders the right to initiate and adopt, regardless of managers' wishes, proposals for opting into (or out of) the federal Takeover Law. We argue that such a federal role in Takeover Law cannot harm and would likely improve the regulation of Takeovers. Moreover, by showing how federal Law can be used to improve regulatory competition in the provision of Takeover Law rather than preempt it, our analysis lays the groundwork for a more general reconsideration of regulatory competition in the corporate Law area.
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A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001Co-Authors: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Allen FerrellAbstract:The paper puts forward a new approach to two corporate subjects that have been intensively debated in the last three decades, the regulation of Takeovers and state competition in the production of corporate Law. During this period, U.S. state Takeover Law has produced considerable and quite possibly excessive protection for incumbent managers from hostile Takeovers. Although the shortcomings of state Takeover Law have been widely recognized, there has been little support for federal intervention because of the concern that such intervention might produce even worse Takeover arrangements. This paper, however, identifies a form of federal intervention in the regulation of Takeovers "choice-enhancing" intervention that would address these shortcomings without raising such a concern. "Choice-enhancing" federal intervention would consist of two elements: (i) an optional body of substantive federal Takeover Law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and (ii) a mandatory process rule that would provide shareholders the right to initiate and adopt, regardless of managers' wishes, proposals for opting into (or out of) the federal Takeover Law. An alternative version of choice-enhancing intervention would provide a federal Law requiring states to allow shareholders to initiate and approve opting out of anti-Takeover arrangements provided by the state's Law. We argue that such a federal role in Takeover Law cannot harm and would likely improve the regulation of Takeovers. Moreover, by showing how federal Law can be used to improve regulatory competition in the provision of Takeover Law rather than preempt it, our analysis lays the groundwork for a more general reconsideration of regulatory competition in the corporate Law.
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Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001Co-Authors: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Allen FerrellAbstract:In a recent article, we have put forward a new approach to Takeover Law and regulatory competition. We proposed a 'choice-enhancing' federal intervention that would provide: (i) an optional body of substantive federal Takeover Law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and which would be more hospitable than existing state Takeover Law, and (ii) a mandatory process rule that would provide shareholders the right to initiate and adopt, regardless of managers' wishes, proposals for option into (or out of) the federal Takeover Law. In this Paper, we respond to critics of our proposal, and we further develop the case for it.
Felecia Briscoe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Color of Neoliberal Reform: A Critical Race Policy Analysis of School District Takeovers in Michigan.
Urban Education, 2018Co-Authors: James S. Wright, Ronald W. Whitaker, Muhammad Khalifa, Felecia BriscoeAbstract:This critical case study analyzes Michigan’s implementation of Public Act 4 (PA4), also known as the emergency management (EM) Takeover Law. PA4 grants the state control of school districts with di...
Edward B Rock - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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how i learned to stop worrying and love the pill adaptive responses to Takeover Law
2002Co-Authors: Marcel Kahan, Edward B RockAbstract:This Article explores the relationship between Takeovers, legal doctrines, and private ordering. The authors first argue that the sanctioning of the poison pill and the "just say no" defense by DeLaware courts was far less consequential than feared by its critics and hoped for by its proponents. Rather, market participants adapted to these legal developments by embracing two adaptive devices - greater board independence and increased incentive compensation - which had the effect of transforming the pill, a potentially pernicious governance tool, into a device that is plausibly in shareholders' interest. Interestingly, however (and, for critics of the pill, disconcertingly), market participants neither tried to change the Law or to opt out of it. The authors then place these developments in a broader perspective. It draws a distinction between bilateral devices - which enjoy support from both stockholders and managers - and unilateral devices and argues that bilateral devices are more likely to be welfare enhancing, more stable, are privileged by DeLaware Law, and tend to further DeLaware's status as leading domicile for public corporations. Greater board independence and increased incentive compensation are examples of such bilateral devices. The authors conclude by examining why DeLaware courts embraced the poison pill (at the time, a largely unilateral device, albeit one with bilateral features) and how they should deal with the use of pills by companies with staggered boards.
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how i learned to stop worrying and love the pill adaptive responses to Takeover Law
University of Chicago Law Review, 2002Co-Authors: Marcel Kahan, Edward B RockAbstract:This Article explores the relationship between Takeovers, legal doctrines, and private ordering. The authors first argue that the sanctioning of the poison pill and the "just say no" defense by DeLaware courts was far less consequential than feared by its critics and hoped for by its proponents. Rather, market participants adapted to these legal developments by embracing two adaptive devices-greater board independence and increased incentive compensation-which had the effect of transforming the pill, a potentially pernicious governance tool, into a device that is plausibly in shareholders' interest. Interestingly, however (and for critics of the pill, disconcertingly), market participants neither tried to change the Law nor opt out of it. The authors place these developments in a broader perspective. They draw a distinction between bilateral devices-which enjoy support from both stockholders and managers-and unilateral devices, and argue that bilateral devices are more likely to be welfare-enhancing, are more stable, are privileged by DeLaware Law, and tend to further DeLaware's status as leading domicile for public corporations. Greater board independence and increased incentive compensation are examples of such bilateral devices. The authors conclude by examining why DeLaware courts embraced the poison pill (at the time, a largely unilateral device, albeit one with bilateral features) and how they should deal with the use of pills by companies with staggered boards.