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Hal J. Singer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers
The American Economic Review, 2001Co-Authors: Jerry A. Hausman, J. Gregory Sidak, Hal J. SingerAbstract:To date, most residential customers to the Internet have used dial-up modems with a top speed of about 56.6 kbps [kilobits per second]. In the past two years broadband access has become available via cable modems offered by the local unregulated cable provider and via digital subscriber lines (DSL) offered by the local regulated Telephone Company (the incumbent local exchange carrier [ILEC]) and competitors who resell DSL using the ILEC facilities. Cable modems and DSL offer access speeds about 10-30 times higher than dial-up access and are termed broadband Internet access. Although Federal Communication Commission (FCC) regulation required ILEC's to sell the use of their facilities to competitors at below-cost prices, no regulation of cable companies has occurred. This outcome is curious given that cable companies have a significantly greater incentive to distort competition as a result of their unregulated monopoly profits from their cable operations. This asymmetric regulation by the FCC has led to the open-access debate. The open-access debate involves the question about whether the cable providers should be required to provide access to competing broadband Internet service providers (ISP's) or whether cable providers can use exclusive contract with their affiliated ISP's.Here, we consider the economic incentives and actions of the providers of broadband access with respect to limiting the usage of broadband access, including the potential competitive effects for cable television, a sector of the economy where, to date, system operators have been able to exercise significant market power. We answer the question of whether the price of narrowband Internet access constrains the price of broadband Internet access. We reject the hypothesis that the price of narrowband access does not affect the price of broadband access (transport) and ISP service is not rejected. Our finding is that lower narrowband access prices do not constrain the prices charged for broadband access.
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cable modems and dsl broadband internet access for residential customers
The American Economic Review, 2001Co-Authors: Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory J Sidak, Hal J. SingerAbstract:To date, most residential customers to the Internet have used dial-up modems with a top speed of about 56.6 kbps [kilobits per second]. In the past two years broadband access has become available via cable modems offered by the local unregulated cable provider and via digital subscriber lines (DSL) offered by the local regulated Telephone Company (the incumbent local exchange carrier [ILEC]) and competitors who resell DSL using the ILEC facilities. Cable modems and DSL offer access speeds about 10-30 times higher than dial-up access and are termed "broadband Internet access." Although Federal Communication Commission (FCC) regulation requires ILEC's to sell the use of their facilities to competitors at below-cost prices, no regulation of cable companies has occurred. This outcome is curious given that cable companies have a significantly greater incentive to distort competition as a result of their unregulated monopoly profits from their cable operations. This asymmetric regulation by the FCC has led to the "openaccess" debate. The open-access debate involves the question about whether the cable providers should be required to provide access to competing broadband Internet service providers (ISP's) or whether cable providers can use exclusive contracts with their affiliated ISP's. Here, we consider the economic incentives and actions of the providers of broadband access with respect to limiting the usage of broadband access, including the potential competitive effects for cable television, a sector of the economy where, to date, system operators have been able to exercise significant market power.' Currently, AT&T is the nation's largest cable multiple system operator (MSO). AT&T also controls Excite@Home Corp., the largest provider of residential broadband service, with over 2.3 million subscribers in November 2000. Excite@Home has exclusive contract rights to provide residential broadband service over the cable facilities of its three principal equity holders (AT&T, Comcast Corporation, and Cox Communications, Inc.), which collectively account for over 35 percent of the nation's cable subscribers. Similarly, Time-Warner is the second-largest cable provider and has an exclusive contract with Road Runner, the secondlargest provider of broadband Internet service, with 1.1 million subscribers. The competitive implication of the exclusive arrangements are straightforward: to access an alternative broadband ISP instead of the ISP affiliated with the cable provider, a user of broadband cable access has to "pay twice." Alternative sources of delivery for video programming provide a competitive threat to the significant market power of the cable industry. Previously, the cable industry has unsuccessfully attempted to control access through control of satellite delivery of video programming, the first alternative medium for multichannel video programming. This attempted strategy was blocked by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Control of broadband Internet delivery of video programming, the second alternative medium for multichannel video programming, arises from cable-provider control of cable broadband access. Internet "video streaming" competes and will compete even more in the future with video programming offered by cable systems, satellite companies, and television broadcasters.
Jerry A. Hausman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers
The American Economic Review, 2001Co-Authors: Jerry A. Hausman, J. Gregory Sidak, Hal J. SingerAbstract:To date, most residential customers to the Internet have used dial-up modems with a top speed of about 56.6 kbps [kilobits per second]. In the past two years broadband access has become available via cable modems offered by the local unregulated cable provider and via digital subscriber lines (DSL) offered by the local regulated Telephone Company (the incumbent local exchange carrier [ILEC]) and competitors who resell DSL using the ILEC facilities. Cable modems and DSL offer access speeds about 10-30 times higher than dial-up access and are termed broadband Internet access. Although Federal Communication Commission (FCC) regulation required ILEC's to sell the use of their facilities to competitors at below-cost prices, no regulation of cable companies has occurred. This outcome is curious given that cable companies have a significantly greater incentive to distort competition as a result of their unregulated monopoly profits from their cable operations. This asymmetric regulation by the FCC has led to the open-access debate. The open-access debate involves the question about whether the cable providers should be required to provide access to competing broadband Internet service providers (ISP's) or whether cable providers can use exclusive contract with their affiliated ISP's.Here, we consider the economic incentives and actions of the providers of broadband access with respect to limiting the usage of broadband access, including the potential competitive effects for cable television, a sector of the economy where, to date, system operators have been able to exercise significant market power. We answer the question of whether the price of narrowband Internet access constrains the price of broadband Internet access. We reject the hypothesis that the price of narrowband access does not affect the price of broadband access (transport) and ISP service is not rejected. Our finding is that lower narrowband access prices do not constrain the prices charged for broadband access.
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cable modems and dsl broadband internet access for residential customers
The American Economic Review, 2001Co-Authors: Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory J Sidak, Hal J. SingerAbstract:To date, most residential customers to the Internet have used dial-up modems with a top speed of about 56.6 kbps [kilobits per second]. In the past two years broadband access has become available via cable modems offered by the local unregulated cable provider and via digital subscriber lines (DSL) offered by the local regulated Telephone Company (the incumbent local exchange carrier [ILEC]) and competitors who resell DSL using the ILEC facilities. Cable modems and DSL offer access speeds about 10-30 times higher than dial-up access and are termed "broadband Internet access." Although Federal Communication Commission (FCC) regulation requires ILEC's to sell the use of their facilities to competitors at below-cost prices, no regulation of cable companies has occurred. This outcome is curious given that cable companies have a significantly greater incentive to distort competition as a result of their unregulated monopoly profits from their cable operations. This asymmetric regulation by the FCC has led to the "openaccess" debate. The open-access debate involves the question about whether the cable providers should be required to provide access to competing broadband Internet service providers (ISP's) or whether cable providers can use exclusive contracts with their affiliated ISP's. Here, we consider the economic incentives and actions of the providers of broadband access with respect to limiting the usage of broadband access, including the potential competitive effects for cable television, a sector of the economy where, to date, system operators have been able to exercise significant market power.' Currently, AT&T is the nation's largest cable multiple system operator (MSO). AT&T also controls Excite@Home Corp., the largest provider of residential broadband service, with over 2.3 million subscribers in November 2000. Excite@Home has exclusive contract rights to provide residential broadband service over the cable facilities of its three principal equity holders (AT&T, Comcast Corporation, and Cox Communications, Inc.), which collectively account for over 35 percent of the nation's cable subscribers. Similarly, Time-Warner is the second-largest cable provider and has an exclusive contract with Road Runner, the secondlargest provider of broadband Internet service, with 1.1 million subscribers. The competitive implication of the exclusive arrangements are straightforward: to access an alternative broadband ISP instead of the ISP affiliated with the cable provider, a user of broadband cable access has to "pay twice." Alternative sources of delivery for video programming provide a competitive threat to the significant market power of the cable industry. Previously, the cable industry has unsuccessfully attempted to control access through control of satellite delivery of video programming, the first alternative medium for multichannel video programming. This attempted strategy was blocked by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Control of broadband Internet delivery of video programming, the second alternative medium for multichannel video programming, arises from cable-provider control of cable broadband access. Internet "video streaming" competes and will compete even more in the future with video programming offered by cable systems, satellite companies, and television broadcasters.
Richard C Levin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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preying for monopoly the case of southern bell Telephone Company 1894 1912
Journal of Political Economy, 1994Co-Authors: David F Weiman, Richard C LevinAbstract:Focusing on the Southern Bell Telephone Company, we propose a modified version of the predation hypothesis to explain Bell's "natural" monopoly over local Telephone service. Southern Bell effectively eliminated competition through a strategy of pricing below cost in response to entry, which deprived competitors of the cash flow required for expansion even if it failed to induce exit; investing in toll lines ahead of demand, isolating independent companies in smaller towns and rural areas, and forcing them to consolidate on favorable terms; and influencing local regulatory policy in large cities to weaken rivals and ultimately to institutionalize the Bell monopoly.
John B Meisel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Telephone Company ownership of rural cable television companies
Review of Industrial Organization, 1993Co-Authors: Stanford L Levin, John B MeiselAbstract:In rural communities, cable companies owned by Telephone companies supply basic service at a lower price than comparable cable companies not owned by Telephone companies. The lower price (approximately $1.20 per month) appears to be due to lower costs and economies of scope rather than to any anti-competitive actions or cross subsidies. In addition, the monthly price of basic service is positively related to the total number of channels contained in basic service and, in particular, to the number of major channels contained in the basic package. The evidence also suggests that customers purchase basic service to gain access to pay channels.
Finol José-enrique - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Semiótica, publicidad y jóvenes: Discriminación de género en una marca de telefonía celular
The Venezuelan Civil Association for Social Research for Humanity (ACVENISPROH), 2018Co-Authors: Ortíz María-gabriela, Finol José-enriqueAbstract:En la investigación se elabora un análisis semiótico de la publicidad dirigida a jóvenes ecuatorianos por la marca de telefonía celular Tuenti realizada. Luego se realiza un estudio de percepción utilizando la técnica del focus group. El objetivo es conocer la percepción que tienen los jóvenes sobre los mensajes que trasmiten las piezas publicitarias de la mencionada marca, y si naturalizan la discriminación de género o el machismo. Los resultados evidencian que las imágenes analizadas utilizan la imagen de la mujer y reproducen estereotipos que son percibidos como discriminatorios y machistas.In this investigation we elaborate a semiotic analysis of advertisement addressed to young Ecuadorean people by the cellular Telephone Company Tuenti. Afterwards, we perform a perception study using the Focus Group technique. The objective is to find out the perception that young people have regarding the messages transmitted in the advertisements y the aforementioned brand, and whether thy normalize gender discrimination and machismo. The results evidence that the analyzed adverts use images of women and reproduce stereotypes which are perceived as discriminatory or machistas. © 2018, Universidad del Zulia. All rights reserved
